

**Alfred Schutz and Citizenship:
Rethinking Citizenship
in a Multinational State**

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If a mixed population in a given territory tends to segregate rather than to merge (as whites and colored in the United states it will become two peoples which should not necessarily prevent them from living side by side under the same government). In a democracy the people, however defined, is not only the object of government but also its agent. The operations of the government are necessarily a part of the people's life and history.

- Alfred Schutz, *Collected Papers, Vol.II:221*

Federalism is about the protection of spatially demarcated values and interests.

- D. V. Smiley and R. L. Watts (1985), cited in I. D. Duchacek, 1986:91.

Canada is divisible because it is not a real country.

- Lucien Bouchard, *The Premier of Quebec, 1996.*

If Canada is divisible, Quebec is divisible.

- Jean Chretien, *The Prime Minister of Canada, 1996.*

Introduction

The notion of citizenship has been much problematized and contested in political science and international relations literature in recent years. This can be attributed to the re-emergence of ethnonationalism and separatist, secessionist movements where peoples are seeking their self-government and sovereign status in a multinational state. Another reason is that, with the advent of "a new Europe" and "the global society", many democracies increasingly face growing cultural diversity as a challenge to democratic governance. So what we see as political reality is the rather contradictory yet simultaneous phenomena of the integration and

disintegration of states. The question of a people's cultural identity poses a basic challenge to our understanding of citizenship, the nation-state, and the relationship between them. In examining the challenge posed above, Schutz's analysis of "the well-informed citizen" will be used as a point of departure. Looking through politically relevant materials in Schutz's work that the theme of citizenship is readily identified.¹ Related to the theme of citizenship, one can also identify the liberal conception of citizenship as found in Schutz's analyses of equality and the issue of minority rights. The liberal conception of citizenship has been stretched by demands for the accommodation of "minority rights" and "self-government rights" in federal states like the United States and Canada.

This issue will be explored with reference to the notion of "multicultural citizenship" recently advanced by Will Kymlicka. Kymlicka explains why such rights should be accorded to "national minorities" consistent with the liberal conception of citizenship with which Schutz was primarily concerned. What is at stake is not only the subjective interpretations which Schutz's social phenomenology elucidated. The issue also concerns the conflict that is generated by the dichotomous interpretation of citizenship centered around the issue of group-differentiated rights, or 'the distinct society' as Quebecers in Canada call it. Secessionist movements therefore pose a theoretical challenge to the liberal conception of citizenship. In addition, the Quebec case raises an interesting political question of how *demos* (political community) and *ethnos* (social community) can live together in a multinational state or a federal form of government, which was intended to accommodate the minority rights of

ethnic groups (*ethnos*) in the first place. Thus the secession of Quebec from the Canadian federation, or the demand of national minorities for self-government, challenges the long cherished liberal conception of citizenship in our time. As a corollary, the question of whether or not federalism is a viable alternative to secession is negatively assessed.² Quebec may be seen as autonomous 'region' building, which is not in the mode of modern nation building, but which is indicative of the emergence of a postnationalist/postmodern Quebec.

Schutz's discourse on citizenship

Schutz's distinctive and unique arguments regarding citizenship can be found in his ideal-typical constructs of persons (e.g., the man on the street, the expert, and the well-informed). These ideal constructs correspond to knowledge which arises in the course of social life as a person deals with the problems of social existence. The man on the street, the first type, deals with his own survival, which normally depends on 'recipe knowledge' so that its potential inconsistencies and contradictions are generally taken for granted until further notice. The second type is called the expert whose knowledge is 'rigidly limited' with its "single system of relevances," but is clear and distinct, a kind of technical, or 'repair' knowledge as it is applied to the recipe, or "taken for granted" knowledge. The well-informed citizen is, the third type of Schutz's construct who can reflect and deal laterally with expert knowledge. This type of citizen will gain a comprehensive and coherent knowledge about the problems as they arise in the very existence of social life. What is distinctive and unique in Schutz's construct is that

these types of persons are not separate beings, but are inherent in us. Each type corresponds to a different province of knowledge.

All three types thus roughly outlined are, of course, mere constructs devised for the purpose of the present investigation. As a matter of fact, each of us in daily life is at any moment simultaneously expert, well-informed citizen, and man on the street, but in each case with respect to different provinces of knowledge.³

Further, it is important to note that the three types of knowledge differ with respect to "their readiness to take things for granted," and yet, Schutz assigns a theoretical task to the well-informed citizen. As Schutz asserts, "it is the well-informed citizen who considers himself perfectly qualified to decide who is a competent expert and even to make up his mind after having listened to opposing expert opinions."⁴

The distinctive manner in which Schutz relates society and the politically active citizen was illuminated in Schutz's social phenomenology, Schutz thought that citizenship was "free and active deliberation on the part of a society's members about that society's disparate activities," which is "conducive to that society's internal integration."⁵ In the same vein, Schutz characterizes a society as:

an agglomeration of different levels and spheres of knowledge, that two of them at least, recipe knowledge and expertise, prevail as the means by which we manage the problems of living. But, by implication, the well-informed citizen when a society seems in disarray, takes to task the integrative function

in the interests of clarity and coherence.⁶

The point of it all is that, as Horowitz explains:

it is at the 'well-informed citizen' level that a society's life becomes coherent and integrated...Taking the time to play the citizen role in a society's life makes it possible to cope with such events...And without a great deal of analytical difficulty such activity may be construed as 'political'.⁷

Therefore, by implication, it can be said that the well-informed citizen corresponds to the politically ideal citizen whose integrative capacity and function are anticipated for the democratic governance of society. Conversely, in the same article, Schutz warns of the danger of the lapse into a 'mass' democracy which was noticeable in the 1950s in the United States. This would entail a concomitant retrogression in the role of the well-informed citizen and the man on the street. His defense of liberal democracy thus ultimately depends on the integrative role of the well-informed citizen, and his 'private' opinions should prevail over the 'public' opinions of polls, interviews and questionnaires. As he concludes the article:

A certain tendency to misinterpret democracy as a political institution in which the opinion of the uninformed man on the street must predominate increase the danger. It is the duty and the privilege, therefore, of the well-informed citizen in a democratic society to make his private opinion prevail over the public opinion of the man on the street.⁸

'Multicultural' Citizenship

For the purpose of contrasting the notion of 'multicultural' citizenship with the liberal notion of citizenship, Schutz's analysis of the issue of minority rights will be referred to by elucidating the notion of formal and real equality.⁹ Schutz states that:

the problem of minorities is a problem of subjective interpretation of group membership and of the subjective aspects of the system of typifications and relevances valid within it. Both the problem of formal equality in terms of abolishing discrimination, and the problem of material equality in terms of minority rights, originate in the discrepancy between the objective and subjective definition of a concrete groups situation.¹⁰

What is more to the point in our discussion is Schutz's elucidation of the issue in terms of equality aimed-at and equality to-be-granted. In this connection Schutz introduces the two types of minorities formulated by the United Nations in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which, as he says, corroborates his findings as previously analyzed: Minorities in category (a) "prefer to be assimilated by the dominant group; minorities in category (b) feel that even full realization of the principle of non-discrimination would not place their group in a position of real equality – but only of formal equality – with respect to the dominant group."¹¹ While category (a) is called the "immigrant model," the minorities in category (b), however, seek real equality. For the minorities, rule is imposed by the predominant group, which prevents the preservation of distinctive characteristics, or inhibits further the development of their aspirations so

that their relationship becomes strained.¹² Schutz further elaborates that for category(a) assimilation is the kind of equality aimed-at, and for category(b) real equality is the kind aimed-at, that is, "obtaining special rights such as the use of their national languages in schools, before the courts, etc."¹³ Then he recalls the cultural struggle of national minorities in terms of formal and real equality mentioned above:

The history of the cultural struggle of national minorities in the old Austro-Hungarian monarchy is an excellent instance of the point in question. The predominant group may interpret equality-to-be granted as formal equality, and may even be willing to concede full equality before the law and full political equality, and yet resist bitterly any claim to special rights.¹⁴

The tensions built up from dichotomous interpretations of assimilation and real equality can be solved. Schutz refers to Simmel's observation that distinguishes between "shifts within the prevailing common system of relevance, or whether this system itself must be abolished." The former attitude is characteristic of the conservative and the latter of revolutionary thinking on the question of "equality-to-be granted" to minorities. Between the conservative and radical attitudes on this issue, and Schutz relates those to the positions held by Albert Salomon, R. H. Tawney and Crane Brinton, Schutz ultimately adheres to the liberal conception of citizenship. He upholds the "ideal of equality of opportunity," insofar as this situation in social reality permits "the right to the pursuit of happiness" in terms of his own definition for "the maximum of self-realization."¹⁵

It will be shown that the notion of "multicultural" citizenship elaborated by Will Kymlicka is the affirmation and defense of national minorities, which is consistent with the liberal conception of citizenship. Kymlicka correctly applies the distinction to national minorities as cultural groups,¹⁶ where Schutz's idea is a non-cultural definition of "the people" with an integrationist impulse. This distinction is very crucial in designating the United States as a "territorial" federalism rather than the "multinational," or "multicultural" federalism of Canada.¹⁷

Another important consideration is that both countries are peopled by "immigrants," thus forming polyethnic states, but none of the immigrant groups demands to establish a separate and self-governing society side by side with the mainstream society. Rather, they aim to reform mainstream institutions which enable immigrant groups to feel more at home with them. Such "polyethnic rights" are not only consistent with, but also often promote, the integration of immigrants into the public institutions of the mainstream society. The situation of national minorities is, however, very different in that the component nations or peoples in most multinational states are inclined "to demand some form of political autonomy or territorial jurisdiction, so as to ensure the full and free development of their cultures and to promote the interests of their people."¹⁸ The history of Quebec secessionism must be seen in the context of francophone Canada where a national minority demanded self-government and sovereign status for its "cultural survival"¹⁹ This was particularly so after the debacle of the constitutional negotiations and the national referendum on the Meech Lake and the Charlottetown Accords. As an illustration, only the symbolic aspect,

though more decisive for the turn toward secessionism, is presented below.²⁰

The Cultural Dynamic of Secession

One of the consequences of Quebec's expansionist regionalism has been an increased awareness, as a people and a nation, of a Quebec identity. One public opinion poll in Quebec indicated a shift from people identifying themselves as Canadiens (French Canadians) to Quebecois from 21% (1970) to 59% (1990). It means, over a twenty year interval Quebec's national identity became firmly established.²¹ During the Meech and the Charlottetown negotiations, the vision of a Quebec nation arose and then clashed with a new Canadian national identity. This had been promoted and fostered by Prime Minister Trudeau since the 1982 adoption of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.²²

When the new Constitution was promulgated with the approval of nine provinces (17 April 1982), Quebec's opposition to the Constitution was widely shared by the Quebec federalists.²³ Nonetheless, after its promulgation, Quebec's separatist movement subsided with the comeback of R. Bourassa (the Liberal Party) as premier of Quebec and thus, "Quebec appeared to be safely back in the federalist fold."²⁴ Or so it seemed. What we saw subsequently was the resurgence of the nationalist movement in a new mould as explained below:

As it happened, a resurgence in nationalist fortunes did come about, but it was generated by a division among the forces for Canadian federalism rather than by a new mobilization of the forces for Quebec sovereignty. Quebec federalists found

themselves isolated from their ostensible allies in the rest of the country, once again over the question of Quebec's distinctiveness. The division in federalist ranks, already manifest at the time of the constitutional repatriation, became much more pronounced, and was ultimately to push support for Quebec sovereignty to heights never seen before.²⁵

Realizing that Quebec was still not a signatory to the Constitution, the newly arrived Bourassa Liberals began addressing the problem. They worked out the conditions which would enable Quebec to join the Canadian constitutional family. These conditions, five in all, appeared to be rather modest and fell well short of ones proposed by Quebec governments over the years. These conditions were: (1) an expanded veto over constitutional change; (2) the limitation of the federal government's use of the spending power in provincial jurisdictions; (3) participation in nominations to the Supreme Court; (4) recognition of Quebec's existing role in immigration; and (5) formal recognition of Quebec's status as a distinct society.²⁶

The nine provincial premiers under the leadership of Prime Minister B. Mulroney agreed to Quebec's demands contingent on an additional provision, that is, provincial participation in nominations to the federal Senate whose seats will be allocated and elected in the provinces. These agreements reached between P.M. Mulroney and nine provincial premiers came to be known as the "Meech Lake Accord." Since the additional provision was acceptable to Quebec it seemed that at long last it would formally embrace the new constitutional order, which until then, had limited legitimacy in Quebec. Then the accord faced a backlash from federalists outside Quebec who expressed a number of grievances; some

complained of the lack of popular legitimacy in the negotiation of the accord, some feared that certain provisions (i.e., the restriction on the federal spending power and the linking of provincial lists to Supreme Court and Senate nominations) would weaken the power of federal government. The most important objection was related to the distinct society clause. McRoberts recounts the clash of the two "mutually exclusive identities" and that "the most important basis of English-Canadian (and aboriginal) opposition was the clause declaring Quebec to be a distinct society. The notion that Quebec was not simply a province like the others was at odds with the vision of Canada that was shared by a great many English Canadians."²⁷

It is therefore important to recognize how the 1982 adoption of the Charter has become "a statement charged with symbolism and one to which Canadians look for an expression of their identity as a people." On the other hand, with the distinct society clause, "a statement that was both highly symbolic and ambiguous, the Meech lake Accord enlarged the symbolic component of the Constitution and multiplied the attendant risks."²⁸

Constitutional documents, historical facts or almost any object can become a symbol for a group or society. Symbolic statements such as the distinct society or a charter of rights are not necessarily controversial, but they assume meanings beyond their manifest content evoking different, often contradictory interpretations. A word is a symbol and by its very nature is polysemic, having more than one meaning. Thus, Breton asserts that:

The use of symbols, like the use of other kinds of resources, entails risk. The nature of the risk varies according to the resource used. But whatever the resource involved – financial, technological, natural, human, or symbolic – the way it is invested and managed can yield either positive or negative results.²⁹

Symbols are then conveyors of meanings and vehicles for collective identities in a society which can become sources of conflict. In other words, “at the heart of the conflict is not the object or document itself but the concepts of ideals that it represents” where “symbolic conflicts are struggles over different theories of society.”³⁰

Three factors affect the degree to which the use of symbols provokes social conflict. They are the ambiguity of symbolic statements, the role of collective memories, and “climate creating events.”³¹ When ambiguous terms such as “distinct society” were included in the Meech Lake proposal for constitutional change, neither was a coherent explanation of this concept provided, nor a systematic framework presented to explain the changes. Questions and criticisms against the policy makers became inevitable. The Quebec government apparently refused to define this term intimating that the accord was simply an official recognition of Quebec’s cultural distinctiveness or a mechanism for redistributing power.³² While in English Canada, the central issue raised by the accord was one of power and the opposition to it was largely related to power. In Quebec the central notions were recognition and status. The question of power and the issue of recognition came to dominate, what Breton calls, “the interpretive schemes

on each side of the linguistic divide.”³³

The opposing side assumed that Quebec’s socio-economic conditions had improved in the past, and that the province had been given enough power. Some argued that the federal balance of power had shifted in favour of Quebec, which now had more influence on national issues and which needed to be redressed. Even those who did not see the imbalance found it hard to justify further changes. They believed that francophone grievances had been met satisfactorily by now, though many English Canadians supported them as legitimate. In a word, Quebec now was better off. Breton contended that, “change must be justified with reference to valued objectives” and opined that “it will improve an already acceptable situation, [as] a move toward some social or moral ideal, or confirms elements that are already part of people’s identity.”³⁴ A crucial pole of identity for the Quebecois is language.

In 1979, Charles Taylor already perceived that the majority of the Quebec people saw their language/culture as valued objectives, and hence their linguistic community as a viable pole of identification. “That is, even opponents of independence and of the Parti Quebecois accept some moderate variant...that language and the linguistic community form a crucial part of the horizon that defines their identity.”³⁵ Without having a more comprehensive view of the accord, however, proponents only stressed the urgency of ratification and the negative justification that it would be detrimental if the public failed to bring Quebec back in the Canadian family. As the prime minister put it, “Quebec’s isolation would become a fact of constitutional life...slowly creating two Canadas in respect to the country’s

basic law.”³⁶

The English Canadian reaction to Quebec’s demands for increased autonomy was ambivalent – while they generally recognized and accepted Quebec’s distinctiveness, they wondered if the locus of the accord should be the Quebec government rather than Quebec society. What would be the underlying intention for more power? Was it protection of language and culture, or “a disguised pursuit of sovereignty-association” to get more advantages through “asymmetric” federalism while bearing little cost? Was the “distinct society” clause “a symbolic instrument” to be used without an end? Unfortunately, proponents and government authorities were unable to answer these questions and convince “the suspicious.” Even some Quebec government officials suggested that the accord was a means for “a substantial transfer of powers and that the distinct society clause was to be used for this purpose in subsequent negotiations” – as in the terms of reference of the Allaire Committee that was set up months before the Meech deadline.³⁷

The central issues of the accord for French-speaking Quebec were recognition and status. As Breton explained:

The questions and oppositions expressed by English Canada were perceived as a refusal to recognize Quebec’s distinctiveness, both cultural and historical. They were also considered a withdrawal of historically acquired status in federation. Losing something is probably always more painful than failing to acquire it. ³⁸

Perhaps more important to note is that this status anxiety is also at

the root of Quebec's resistance to the notion of the equality of the provinces," which, since the Constitution Act, became one of the defining political principles of English Canada. Nonetheless, Quebec's denunciation of the opposition was expressed in terms of humiliation, rejection and isolation and its perceptions were "cast in the context of the history of English-French relations in Canada."³⁹ The resistance and opposition to the view that the francophone province should rely on itself for cultural survival and vitality was interpreted as an impediment to their "cultural aspirations."

The third factor or the "climate-creating events" which pushed the accord to the point of rejection (52% support in June 1988 fell to 31% by January 1989) should be noted as well. Several events during those six months influenced the way people interpreted the accord, and two of them are dealt with below; (1) a bill was passed in July 1988 amending the Official Languages Act to expand bilingual services in the federal government, (2) Quebec's Bill 178 on the language of commercial signs was also passed. Both Bills colored people's view of the accord. The former met considerable opposition from the Western provinces and accentuated the feeling that Central Canada and the francophone province already had disproportionate power in Ottawa. The latter legislation was also intensely debated and clashed with the Charter provisions relating to individual rights over and against the collective right of French language. The Quebec National Assembly, using the "notwithstanding" clause of the Charter (which allows provinces to override some of its provisions) challenged the Supreme Court's declaration of the unconstitutionality of Bill 101, and passed a new version of Bill 178 restricting languages other than French.

This event seemed particularly crucial in creating a faultline between two already visibly divided communities adding also a particular meaning to the notion of a "distinct society." "It was generally perceived as unfair: bilingualism was imposed in the rest of Canada while unilingualism was imposed in Quebec."⁴⁰ It was a critical event, in retrospect, which was confirmed by Manitoba's decision not to ratify the accord. Breton's analysis above suggests among other things that those differing interpretations of the accord were also reflected in their competing conceptions of political community. The Charter's individual rights conflicted with the collective rights of Quebec as a people and a nation, which became irreconcilable in the last ditch effort to save the situation in August 1982 at Charlottetown.

The collapse of the Meech Lake Accord triggered a smashing reaction in Quebec. It confirmed to the Quebec francophones that the English-Canadian opposition stemmed from a rejection of their claims for recognition of their distinct status. It no less meant the rejection of Quebec itself. More importantly, it also triggered a surge of nationalist sentiment, which was reflected in the two reports commissioned by the Quebec Liberal Party (one was the 1991 Allaire Report). The Belanger-Campeau Commission of the National Assembly proposed a radical reduction in federal powers and responsibilities as well as calling for a referendum. It saw only two available options for Quebec which are either renewed federalism or Quebec sovereignty.⁴¹

The Charlottetown Accord, a new scheme for constitutional revision, was an agreement reached among the eleven first ministers, two territories, and four national aboriginal organizations, which in the main reflected "a

two-pronged strategy” to satisfy English-Canadian concerns. The purpose was to tone down the objectionable parts of the Meech Lake Accord, and to incorporate new provisions for constitutional change that English Canadians had been expressing. “Thus the infamous ‘distinct society’ clause was now only one of eight ‘fundamental characteristics’ of Canada enumerated in a ‘Canada clause’.”⁴²

The revision now was also to include Senate reform, strengthening the social and economic union, recognition of the aboriginal people’s inherent right to self-government, etc. The accord was to fail primarily over the issue of recognizing Quebec’s distinctiveness. It appeared that the recasting of the “distinct society” clause might lessen English-Canadian concern. Senate reform was an attempt to mollify Quebecois discontent as it would increase Quebec’s representation (along with Ontario) in the House of Commons and would even guarantee Quebec 25% of seats in perpetuity, more seats than its share of the Canadian population. It was observed that “[f]or many English Canadians, this new attempt to accommodate Quebec’s distinctiveness was no less objectionable than the Meech Lake Accord’s distinct society clause.”⁴³

Thus, the accord which tried to straddle the faultline between the English and French Canadian divide ended in “the resounding defeat” in a national referendum on October 26, 1992. The vote in Quebec was split 45.7% for, and 56.7% against; outside Quebec the result was 45.7% for, and 54.3% against. Thus “the second attempt to secure Quebec’s signature to the 1982 constitutional regime ended in abject failure.”⁴⁴ And the “abject failure” was the critical turning point for Quebec regionalism to further

expand beyond asymmetrical federalism, and to move towards the ultimate demand which is secession. In the words of another political scientist:

The result of the No vote on 26 October is that the counterweight that has existed in the past against the sovereignty option in Quebec (the 'renewed federalism' of Claude Ryan and Pierre Trudeau in 1980 and Bourassa in 1992) is now unequivocally dead. The choice in the future will be between sovereignty and the status quo. The death of asymmetrical federalism may then become a clue to the mystery of the dog that suddenly began barking again – very loudly.⁴⁵

In the aftermath of the failure of executive federalism, the English and French Canadian divide was even more pronounced and visible and it was obvious that there were two “mutually exclusive conceptions of national community.” As McRoberts explained, in English Canada “the new Canadian identity had taken root, thanks in particular to the constitutional revision of 1982. By the same token, it was the commitment of most English Canadians to the new principles of Canadian nationality that explained their resistance to such ideas as asymmetry. Within these principles, there was no room for recognition of Quebec’s specificity.⁴⁶ The conflicting visions then seemed to ensure deadlock for any constitutional negotiations for Quebec and for any attempt to opt out of Canada, which indeed had already been noticeable in the Quebec legislature.

Concluding Remarks

Reading Schutz's politically relevant writings he clearly delineates the liberal conception of citizenship, and the theoretical and critical role of the "well-informed citizen," he who seeks clarity, coherence and integration of society. One could also see his intellectual affinity to Plato and Aristotle so that his version of liberal democracy goes back to the idea of citizenship in ancient Greece. Therefore, in reading Schutz, we should be careful to make a distinction between atomistic, abstract individuals and contractarians which are presupposed in modern democracies. The most basic commitment of liberal democracy is to the freedom and equality of its individual citizens, which is entrenched in the constitutional bills of rights guaranteeing basic civil and political rights to all individuals, regardless of their group membership. A basic question raised is how can liberals accept the demand for group-differentiated rights, which relates to self-government rights by francophone national minorities?

This issue is raised nowadays in the context of "individual" vs. "collective" rights which ultimately creates a false dichotomy. Too many people, according to Kymlicka, tend to view group-differentiated rights or collective rights as reflecting a philosophy or world-view opposite to that of liberalism. They are concerned more with the status of groups than with that of individuals, and treat individuals as "the mere carriers of group identities and objectives, rather than as autonomous personalities capable of defining their own identity and goals in life."⁴⁷ But, this is a misperception resting on a number of confusions, says Kymlicka. And he tries to show that many forms of group-differentiated citizenship (i.e., self-government

rights, polyethnic rights, and special representation rights) are “consistent with liberal principles of freedom and equality.”⁴⁸

Without a detailed analysis, it is sufficient to illustrate Kymlicka’s main arguments with regard to the false dichotomy. Collective rights often refer to the rights exercised by collectivities, which are seen as distinct and perhaps conflicting with the rights accorded to the individuals who compose the collectivity. Thus, by definition, many agree that collective rights are not individual rights. But, as Kymlicka illustrates, “many forms of group-differentiated citizenship are in fact exercised by individuals. Group-differentiated rights can be accorded to the individual members of a group, or to the group as whole or to a federal state/province within which the group forms the majority.”⁴⁹ Consider for example minority language rights or the right of the Quebecois to preserve and promote their culture as affirmed in the existing system of federalism:

[I]t is exercised by the province of Quebec, whose citizens are predominantly Quebecois, but also include many non-francophones. These are all group-differentiated rights, since they are accorded on the basis of cultural membership. But some are accorded to individuals, some to the group, some to a province or territory, and some where members warrant. The fact that certain minority language rights are exercised by individuals had led to a large (and largely sterile) debate about whether they are really ‘collective rights’ or not. The debate is sterile because the question of whether the right is (or is not) collective is morally unimportant. The real issue in evaluating language rights is why they are group-specific – that is why francophones should be able to demand court proceedings or education in their mother-tongue at public expense when

Greek- or Swahili-speakers cannot. The answer...is that language rights are one component of the national rights of the French Canadians. Since immigrant groups are not national minorities, they are not accorded similar language rights.⁵⁰

One last theoretical task is to clear away a common misunderstanding often expressed in a non-cultural conception of national membership where “a truly liberal conception of national membership should be based solely on accepting political principles of democracy and rights, rather than integration into a particular culture.” This is raised to distinguish the “civic” or “constitutional” nationalism of the United States from illiberal “ethnic” nationalism.⁵¹ “What distinguishes “civic” nations from “ethnic” nations,” Kymlicka contends, “is not the absence of any cultural component to national identity, but rather the fact that anyone can integrate into the common culture, regardless of race or colour.”⁵²

With the advent of “global society” many liberal democracies will increasingly encounter, if they have not already, a growing cultural diversity. This in part at least raises the issue of democratic governance and calls for rethinking citizenship, not just in a multinational state, but perhaps in all states. The Quebec case in Canada gives us some food for rethinking on that score. Kymlicka elsewhere argues rather persuasively that:

A well-designed federal system may defer secession – perhaps into the indefinite future. But secession will remain a live option in the hearts and minds of national minorities. Indeed, it is likely to form the benchmark against which federal systems are measured.⁵³

One may be permitted to speculate that Quebec will shape itself as an autonomous “region” outside the mode of the modern nation-state of the 19th century. One other lesson of “multicultural” citizenship in Canada might be that nations, peoples, citizens have a janus-faced quality of *demos* and *ethnos*, after all. On the European debate on citizenship, Schnapper makes a similar point:

No society can exist as a purely civic entity... Can we conceive of a form of politics that would not spring from the specific values, traditions, and institutions that define a political nation? Every organized, democratic society indissolubly carries ethnic elements – cultural, historical, and nationalist – as well as civic principles.⁵⁴

Endnotes

- ¹ Ruth Horowitz, "Phenomenology and Citizenship: A Contribution by Alfred Schutz," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, XXXVII, No.3, March 1977, pp.293-311.
- ² Will Kymlicka, "Is federalism a viable alternative to secession?" in Percy B. Lehning, (eds.), *Theories of Secession*, Routledge, 1998, Chapter 7.
- ³ Alfred Schutz, *Collected Papers, Vol.II: Studies in Social Theory*, Arvid Brodersen (ed.), Martinus Nijhoff, 1964, 1971, p.123.
- ⁴ Schutz, *Ibid.* Compare also the following by Schutz: "The well-informed citizen finds himself placed in a domain which belongs to an infinite number of possible frames of reference. There are no pre-given ready-made ends to fixed border lines within which he can look for shelter. He has to choose the frame of reference by choosing his interest; he has to investigate the zones of relevance adhering to it; and he has to gather as much knowledge as possible of the origin and sources of relevances actually or potentially imposed upon him... Thus, his is an attitude as different from that of the expert whose knowledge is delimited by a single system of relevances as from that of the man on the street which is indifferent to the structure of relevance itself." *Ibid.*, pp. 130-131.
- ⁵ Horowitz, p.295.
- ⁶ *Ibid.*, p.300.
- ⁷ *Ibid.*, p.302.
- ⁸ Schutz, p.134.
- ⁹ *Ibid.*, pp.265-273. For the sake of brevity, I skip otherwise interesting analyses and arguments on the notion of equality stimulated by the dichotomy of subjective and objective meanings on various levels and on various problems contained therein.
- ¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p.266.
- ¹¹ *Ibid.*, p.265.
- ¹² *Ibid.*, pp.265-6.
- ¹³ *Ibid.*, pp.267-8.
- ¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p.268.
- ¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p.273, pp.268-273.
- ¹⁶ Will Kymlicka, *Multicultural Citizenship*. Oxford, 1995, p.23.
- ¹⁷ Kymlicka explains why American federalism is called "territorial," as follows: "In the United States... a deliberate decision was made not to use federalism to accommodate the self-government rights of national minorities. It would have been quite possible in the nineteenth century to create states dominated by the Navaho, for example, or by Chicanos, Puerto Ricans, and native Hawaiians. At the time these groups were incorporated into the United States they formed majorities in their homelands. However, a deliberate decision was made not to accept any territory as a state unless these national groups were outnumbered. In some cases, this was achieved by drawing boundaries so that Indian tribes or Hispanic groups were outnumbered (Florida). In other cases, it was achieved by delaying statehood until anglophone settlers swamped the older inhabitants (e.g. Hawaii; or the south-west). In cases where the national minority was not likely to be outnumbered, a new type of non-federal political unit was created, such as the 'commonwealth' of Puerto Rico, or the 'Protectorate' of Guam," Kymlicka, *Ibid.*, pp.28-29. The existence of national minorities in Canada was discussed as follows: "Canada's historical development has involved the federation of three distinct national groups (English, French, and Aboriginals). The original incorporation of the Quebecois and Aboriginal communities into the Canadian political community was involuntary. Indian homelands were overrun by French settlers, who were then conquered by the English."

While the possibility of secession is very real for the Quebecois, the historical preference of these groups – as with the national minorities in the United States – has not been to leave the federation, but to renegotiate the terms of federation, so as to increase their autonomy within it.” Ibid., p.12.

¹⁸ Ibid., pp.120-2.

¹⁹ The often ambiguous concept of culture is here redefined as a “societal culture” which seems to capture the full meaning, i.e., “a culture which provides its members with meaningful ways of life across the full range of human activities including social, educational, religious, recreational, and economic life, encompassing both public and private spheres. These cultures tend to be territorially concentrated, and based on a shared language.” Ibid., p.76.

²⁰ Kazuhiko Okuda, *Futures of Canada's Federal State*. Seizan-sha, 1997, Chapter 7.

²¹ The table below illustrates the transition of identity formation from Canadien (French Canadian) to Quebecois (Quebec as a nation) in the public polls taken in respective years:

Year	Canadien	Quebecois	Canadian	Others
1970	44%	21%	34%	1%
1977	51%	31%	18%	0%
1984	48%	37%	13%	1%
1988	39%	49%	11%	1%
1990	28%	59%	9%	2%

See Kenneth McRoberts, “Quebec: Province Nation, or ‘Distinct Society’,” in M.S. Whittington and G. Williams (eds.), *Canadian Politics in the 1990s*, Nelson Canada, 1995, Chapter 5, pp.95-6; Okuda, 1997, p.180.

²² Kenneth McRoberts, “Disagreeing on Fundamentals,” in Kenneth McRoberts and P. Monahan (eds.), *The Charlottetown Accord, the Referendum, and the Future of Canada*, University of Toronto Press, 1993.

²³ McRoberts, 1995, p.95.

²⁴ Ibid., p.96.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Ibid. p.97, 1993, pp.249-63.;also Reg Whitaker, *A Sovereign Idea*. McGill-Queen's University Press. 1992, Chapter 10.

²⁸ Raymond Breton, *Why Meech Failed*. C.D. Howe Institute, 1992, p.5, *passim*.

²⁹ Ibid., p.5.

³⁰ Ibid., p.1.

³¹ Ibid., pp.7-11.

³² Ibid., pp.10-11.

³³ Ibid., p.17.

³⁴ Ibid., p.13.

³⁵ McRoberts, 1993, p.56.

³⁶ Breton, p.14.

³⁷ Ibid., p.15.

³⁸ Ibid., p.16.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Ibid., pp.8-9.

⁴¹ McRoberts, 1995, pp.97-8.

⁴² Ibid., p. 98.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Ibid., p.99; 1993, p.248.

- ⁴⁵ Reg Whitaker, "The Dog that Never Barked," in Kenneth McRoberts and P. Monahan (eds.), *The Charlottetown Accord*, University of Toronto Press, 1993, p.114.
- ⁴⁶ McRoberts 1993, p.260 *passim*.
- ⁴⁷ Kymlicka, 1995, Chapter 3, *passim*.
- ⁴⁸ *Ibid.*
- ⁴⁹ *Ibid.*
- ⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, pp.45-6.
- ⁵¹ Jurgen Habermas, "Struggles for Recognition in the Democratic Constitutional State," in C. Cronin and P. De Greff (eds.), *The Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory*, Polity Press, 1998, Chapter 8.
- ⁵² Kymlicka, *Multicultural Citizenship*, p.24. The American situation is explained by Kymlicka as follows: "The Americans, as much as the English, conceived of national membership in terms of participation in a common culture. The emphasis on political principles affected the nature of that common culture, of course, and gave the American national identity a distinctively ideological character not found in England or other English-settler societies. Ideology shaped, but did not replace, the cultural component of national identity. The idea of a purely non-cultural definition of civic nationalism is implausible, and often leads to self-contradiction." See *Ibid.*, p.200, fn.15. Perhaps this is one of the reasons why Habermas diagnosed the Quebec situation as different from the case of the Kurds, or Bosnia-Herzegovina. Thus: "The situation is different in Canada, where reasonable efforts are being made to find a federalist solution that will leave the nation as a whole intact but will try to safeguard the cultural autonomy of a part of it by decentralizing state powers. If these efforts succeed, the portion of the citizenry that participates in the democratic process in specific areas of policy will change, but the principles of that process will not. For the theory of rights in no way forbids the citizens of a democratic constitutional state to assert a conception of the good in their general legal order, a conception they either already share or have come to agree on through political discussion. It does, however, forbid them to privilege one form of life at the expense of others within the nation. In federal versions of the nation-state this is true at both the federal and the state levels. If I am not mistaken, in Canada the debate is not about this principle of equal rights but about the nature and extent of the state powers that are to be transferred to the Province of Quebec." Habermas, *op.cit.*, p.220.
- ⁵³ Kymlicka in Lehning, p.142.
- ⁵⁴ Dominique Schnapper, "The European Debate on Citizenship," *Daedalus*, 126, 3, Summer 1997, pp.199-221., Okuda, Chapter 7, p.219, also John Gray, "The Politics of Cultural Diversity," in his *Post-Liberalism: Studies in Political Thought*. Routledge, 1993, 1996, Chapter 18.