

On the Theory of the Unification of the Cognizant and the Cognizable

by Akiro MATSUMOTO

I.

This treatise aims at an analysis of the logical structure of the theory of the unification of the cognizant and the cognizable in Islamic philosophy, focusing on Allâmah Qazwîni's¹⁾ Persian treatise on the unification of the cognizant and the cognizable²⁾, and moreover tries to make clear the significance which this theory may have in the present situation of philosophy.

The theory of the unification of the cognizant and the cognizable is a translation of the Arabic "ittihâd al-'âqim wa al-ma'qûm" or "ittihâd al-'âlim wa al-ma'lûm". Just as Allâmah Qazwîni mentioned in this treatise, argumenet on the problem of the unification of the cognizant and the cognizable has a long history. Porphyry is believed to be the initiator of this theory in the Islamic world, as we see it in this treatise.³⁾ But the problem on the cognizant — cognizable relationship has a longer history than is believed in the islamic world. It is known in the history of Western philosophy that Parmenides is the initiator of this philosophic argument.⁴⁾ The real meaning of the philosophic poem by Parmenides is disputable today, but, we can say that, in the history of human thinking, he may be the first person who took into philosophic consideration the problem of the subject-object relationship in cognition.

Apart from the question of the true initiator of this epistemological subject, the problem of the subject-object relationship in cognition must always be carefully analyzed in order to make clear and firm the basis for the validity of cognition. If the subject of cognition were to have no connection or relation with the object of cognition, the cognition itself cannot be valid anymore. But, the theory of simple conformity of the subject with the object, or simple unity of thinking and reality, which is held in the position of natural realism (naive realism), is very easy to confute, although such a position is the starting point for philosophic reflections on the problem of cognition. From the reflections on the position of natural realism began the conflict between realism and idealism in modern Western philosophy. Those who take the position of realism believe in general that the essence of a cognitional object in reality should build up in a certain manner its cognition in a cognitional subject, and then should have a real relation with the cognitional subject, although the cognitional object is held to be existent in the form of complete independence from the cognitional subject. Therefore, in the position of realism, a certain transcendental, necessary relationship is held to exist between the cognizant and the cognizable in order for cognition to have validity.

On the other hand, in the position of idealism, only the consciousness is regarded as real existence. And the consciousness is generalized as universal thing, like "bewusstsein Uberhaupt" in Kantian philosophy, in order to avoid solipsism. In the position of idealism, consciousness is regarded as the only primarily self-evident, in contrast with Islamic philosophy, in which the primarily self-evident is considered to be existence. Anyhow, in this idealistic position, the cognitional object cannot exist independently from the cognitional subject. Therefore, in a sense, a formal conformity of

the subject with the object in cognition is being preserved in idealism. But, the cognitional object in idealism cannot be free from an epistemological question that there might be an unknowable something behind the cognizable object, even if idealists insist that cognition is not only conditioned by consciousness but also conditioned by something essential in reality such as “Ding an sich” which may lie behind the cognitional object.

In modern Western philosophy, we meet the third approach to the problem of the subject-object relationship other than idealism and realism. So-called “Identitätsphilosophie” which was held by Schelling, Hegel and others might be regarded as this third way in epistemology. In Identitätsphilosophie it is held that the absolute identity should exist in the transcendental form behind the consciousness and phenomena, and is guaranteeing the validity of cognition as well as the conformity of the subject with the object in cognition. But, we may be able to say that such an absolute, transcendental concept is the result of logical postulation and has no ontological evidence.

Among the above mentioned philosophic positions, realism (excluding natural realism) seems to be a better way towards being free from logical criticism. But, the realistic position on cognition cannot assure the conformity of knowledge and the knowable decisively, because cognition in the cognitional subject is dependent on the cognitional object, while this cognitional object is standing ontologically outside the consciousness of the cognitional subject. Therefore, the ontological relation between the subject and object is not established in a conclusive manner in the position of realism. By granting the fact that the origin of cognition exists outside the consciousness, realistic ground of cognition is assured in realism, but the subject in cognition itself is ontologically discontinuous with the object. This

ontological discontinuity seems to originate in the dichotomy between consciousness and existence. And this dichotomy is a deep-rooted tradition in modern Western philosophy. Anyhow, this ontological discontinuity that steals into the realistic theory of knowledge weakens the validity of knowledge or cognition in realism because the grounds of the conformity of the subject and object in cognition is eroded by this discontinuity.

II

In the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas, the epistemological relationship of the subject to the object is understood in a manner similar to that of Islamic philosophy. However, we can recognize a rather great difference between the two. The epistemological position of Thomas Aquinas is that all the intelligibles are contained in the sensibles, including abstract, non-material representations.⁵⁾ Therefore, the origin of human cognition consists only of sensuous percepts in the position of Thomas Aquinas.⁶⁾ In these sensuous percepts are contained the sensuous imageries (*phantasmata*) which are results of the sensuous experience of man, and also the origins of the intellectual cognition of man.⁷⁾ These sensuous imageries are grasped as shapes similar to the objects of sense perception. Sensuous imageries are called the “sens-perceptibles in actuality” (*sensibilia in actu*),⁸⁾ yet, they cannot be directly the objects of intellectual cognition by themselves. Therefore, they are called the intelligibles in potentiality (*intelligibilia in potentia*). Sensuous imageries can become the objects of intellectual cognition only through the act of illumination of active intellect (*intellectus agens*).⁹⁾ The epistemological position of Thomas Aquinas asserts

that active intellect has two aspects to its actions. One of them is act of illumination and the other is act of abstraction. Act of illumination of active intellect is believed to exert his influence on sensuous imagines and extract intelligible representations (species intelligibilia) from them.¹⁰⁾ Sensuous images are believed to be unable to exist in the human intellect by themselves because of their materialities. Only the non-material intelligible representations which were extracted from the material and sensuous images can exist in the human intellect as the object of intellectual cognition.¹¹⁾

On the other hand, the act of abstraction which active intellect has can extract universal conception from the intelligible representations. This universal conception extracted from the intelligible representations is the universal essence which is included in the individual, intelligible representations. Therefore, we can say that in the position of Thomas Aquinas, the intelligible representations, which are extracted from sensuous images through the illumination of active intellect, are emancipated from material individualities by the act of abstraction of active intellect and can exist in the human mind as a universal conception which is the object of intellectual cognition. In other words, that is knowledge itself. Thomas Aquinas understands the epistemological relationship between the subject and the object on the above explained way. He also believes that cognition would be valid only on the condition of the unification of the cognitional subject with the cognitional object.¹²⁾ But, since man has his own essential form, it is clear that he cannot be unified with the essential form of the other, and moreover he cannot become the possessor of the essential form of the other in himself. Therefore, the cognitional subject will not be able to be unified with the cognitional object on the level of actual existence. But, it is

grasped in the position of Thomas Aquinas that the essential form of the sensible, which is the real object of cognition and exists outside the intellect, transforms its mode of existence in the aforesaid process of cognition and comes to exist in the intellect in the non-material mode of intelligence. Therefore, the object of cognition is regarded as existing spiritually and intentionally (*spiritualiter sive intentionaliter*).¹³⁾ As long as the cognitional object exists inside the cognitional subject in such a way, the epistemological unity of the subject with the object is considered preserved for the validity of cognition in the position of Thomas Aquinas. Therefore, in his theory, the epistemological unity in the subject-object relationship is the similarity of the essential form in the sensible to the universal conception in the intellect.¹⁴⁾

III

Here, I attempt to analyze the logical structure of the theory of the unification of the cognizant and the cognizable, based mainly on 'Allamah Qazwîni's treatise on this subject.

According to Allamah Qazwîni, the word "cognizable" (*ma'qûl*) has two meanings. One of them is the "accidental cognizable" (*ma'qûl bi-l-'arad*). The other is the "essential cognizable" (*ma'qûl bi-l-dhât*). The "accidental cognizable" is considered able to become the object of rational understanding (*idrâk-'âqli*), but the "essential cognizable" is considered unable to become the object of rational understanding. In the position of 'Allâmah Qazwîni, it is believed that the unification of the cognizant and the cognizable (*ittihâd al-'âqil bi-i-ma'qûl*) can happen only between the

cognizant and the “essential cognizable”, not the “accidental cognizable.”¹⁵⁾

As for the true nature of the “essential cognizable,” it is understood as the form identical with the external reality on the level of quiddity, but completely different from it on the level of existence.¹⁶⁾ This form is believed to have only “rational existence” (*wujûd ‘aqlî*), and it is also believed to appear directly in the soul without any intermedium.¹⁷⁾ This form is called the “essential cognizable” which is sometimes called the “intellectual form” (*sûrah ‘ilmîyah*), or called knowledge (*‘ilm*). And the rational existence, which this intellectual form has, is believed to be identical with the existence of the soul (*nafs*).¹⁸⁾

Now, as for the concept of unification (*ittihâd*), three types of unification are admitted in Islamic philosophy. One of them is the unification of two concepts, like the unification of the “generic concept” and “differential” in a specific concept. This type of unification is acceptable from the point of new logical judgement. The other is the unification of two real existents, like the unification of Zayd and ‘Amr. But, this type of unification is completely absurd and is unacceptable to any kind of rational understanding. The third is the unification of two things which are in the continual state. For example, the identity which can be admitted between a thing in potentiality and a thing in actuality is regarded as this type of unification. Therefore, when identity is admitted between two things in a generative state, it is regarded as a kind of unification.¹⁹⁾ ‘Allâmah Qazwînî believes that the meaning of the word “unification” in the unification of the cognizant and the cognizable is the same as this third type of unification, in the sense that the cognizant in potentiality becomes the cognizant in actuality by occurring of the essential cognizable in the soul of the cog-

nizant.²⁰⁾ The essential cognizable, or in other words, the intellectual form is believed not to be accidental for the soul of the cognizant, because the accidental cannot be a cause of actualization of substance.²¹⁾

The soul is a substance in potentiality as long as it is standing by itself. The intellectual form is the entelechy of soul. It is believed that the soul in potentiality is brought into actuality by the occurrence of the intellectual form in it. But, we should notice that the intellectual form is not an accident to the soul, but is the cause of the actual existence of soul. Then, the soul can obtain actual existence only by the occurrence of the intellectual form in it. And what is more, the existence of the soul is identical with the existence of the intellectual form, as 'Allamah Qazwīnī points out.²²⁾ Therefore, as far as the intellectual form is the cause of the actualization of the soul, and its existence is identical with existence of soul, we can say not only that the epistemological bridge is preserved between the intellectual form of the cognitional object and the cognitional subject, but the ontological bridge is also preserved between them. In this sense, the cognitional subject is unified with the intellectual form of the cognitional subject. This is the meaning of the "unification of the cognizant and the cognizable", which 'Allamah Qazwini is expounding in his treatise.

Apart from the above mentioned argument, here, we attempt to discuss the theory of the unification of the cognizant and the cognizable from another viewpoint in order to spotlight another aspect of this theory.

In the tradition of Hikmah philosophy, knowledge is usually classified into two sorts. One of them is empirical knowledge ('ilm husūfī) and the other is intuitive knowledge ('ilm huḍūrī).²³⁾ It is believed that empirical knowledge originates in the quiddity of the cognitional object. On the other hand, intuitive knowledge is believed to originate in the existence of the

cognitional object. But, according to the view of 'Allâmah Tabâtabâ'i, empirical knowledge is included finally into the category of intuitive knowledge, because empirical knowledge really originates in the intellectual form which is free from materialities and occurs immediately in the soul.²⁴⁾ The intellectual form originates in the actual existence of the object, as mentioned before. It occurs immediately in the soul as intuitive knowledge. And what is more, the intellectual form is the cause of the actualization of the object. In other words, we can say that it is the cause of individualization of existence. Or, the individualized existence is called the intellectual form or the essential cognizable here. From such intellectual form is extracted by human reason the empirical knowledge or quiddity. Therefore, 'Allâmah Tabâtabâ'i says, "the empirical knowledge is a rational abstract (i'tibâr 'aqlî) to which human reason is compelled to have recourse and which is taken out of the intuitive knowledge. And, the intuitive knowledge is an ideal or rational pure existent which occurs intuitively to the perciever by its external existence."²⁵⁾

On the other hand, the soul is believed to have its own intellectual form by means of the self-cognition of soul itself in the tradition of Hikmah philosophy.²⁶⁾ Therefore, it follows that the intellectual form of the cognitional object is incorporated in the intellectual form of soul and unified with it at the time when the cognizant takes cognizance of the cognitional object. Therefore, the unification of the cognizant and the cognizable can happen only on the level of the intuitive knowledge. It never happens on the level of empirical knowledge. Since the intellectual form is the entelechy of substance which is called the soul and the intellectual form cannot be more than one in every substance, the two intellectual forms cannot exist separately in the single soul. Therefore, it follows that the intellectual

form of the object must be unified with the intellectual form of the subject. In this way, the subject-object relationship in cognition is grasped as continual and unifiable in the Hikmah philosophy from the viewpoint of the formative process of knowledge.

Now, from the considerations stated above, we can recognize a great difference between Thomas Aquinas's theory of the unification of the cognizant and the cognizable and that of the Hikmah philosophy. In the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas, the basis of cognition is grasped as the sensuous percepts in contrast with the Islamic philosophy in which the ground for cognition is believed to be the intellectual form which occurs immediately and intuitively in the soul. And, what is more, in the position of Thomas Aquinas, the unification of the cognizant and the cognizable is understood in the sense of similarity of the essential form in the sensible to the universal concept in the intellect, in contrast with that of Hikmah philosophy in which the meaning of unification is exactly the unification of the intellectual form of the cognitional object with the intellectual form of the cognitional subject. Therefore, in the theory of Thomas Aquinas, the epistemological bridge between the subject and the object in cognition is that similarity. I believe that as far as the epistemological bridge is concerned, "similarity" is not as strong as the "unification" in Hikmah philosophy.

I think that the theory of the unification of the cognizant and the cognizable in the Hikmah philosophy can be considered to be a kind of realism because real existence is posited as the major premise for this theory. But, as far as realism is concerned, we can recognize a great difference from realism of Western philosophy in which ontological discontinuity is stealing into the subject-object relationship. In contrast with this, ontological

continuity is preserved between the subject and the object in the theory of the unification of the cognizant and the cognizable in Islamic philosophy, based upon the intuitive knowledge about actual existence. Therefore, I believe that the theory of the unification of the cognizant and the cognizable in the Islamic philosophy should have a strong validity for the establishment of cognition and should be helpful for the unity and integration of consciousness and reality which are apt to separate from each other in the ordinary life. Since the separation of consciousness from reality is one of the main causes of "alienation" prevailing in the present world, this theory which is insisted on by Islamic philosophers should be considered to be a strong weapon to conquer it.

Appendix

A Treatise on the Unification of the Cognizant and the Cognizable by Sayyed Abu-l-Hasan Rafi'i Qazwini

By the name of God, the Merciful and the Compassionate. The theory named the unification of the cognizant and the cognizable (ittihad al-'aql wa -al-ma'qul) is one of the most important subjects in the highest science, i.e., divine philosophy or metaphysics. However, many philosophers, including even the venerable master of philosophy, Ibn Sina (Avicenna in latin),²⁷⁾ fell short of understanding the real content of this theory. This is

the reason why such philosophers are strongly opposed to the philosophers who maintained his theory.

Even Hakīm Sabzawārī,²⁸⁾ one of the modern philosophers, shows logical confusion in understanding this theory and completion of its argumentation in spite of his incomparable expertness in this study. This philosophic topic was first proposed and argued theoretically by a person called Porphiry before the Islamic era. He is known as one of the greatest pupils of Aristotle, author of the book of Theology. In the Islamic era, Sadr al-Muta'allihīn (the foremost amongst the theosophs) Shīrāzī (Mullā Sadrā) was convinced that the emanation of divine grace and the inspiration concerning this philosophic subject descended on to him and no one before him had been able to reach the bottom of this subject.²⁹⁾

Nevertheless, the truth is that the problem of the unification of the cognizant and the cognizable has been considered in books of theosophy, such as *Misbāh al-unṣ*³⁰⁾ (the lamp for the divine acquaintance) and other books like this. Moreover, in some poems by Jalāl al-Dīn Balkhī (Rūmī) reference to that subject can be found, or even explicit, direct expression about it. But, at any rate, it goes without saying that Mullā Sadrā gains distinctions in the argumentation on the unification of the cognizant and the cognizable by his eloquent explanation, sufficient studies and successful demonstration. Therefore, before going into the argument on the aimed subject, it is necessary for us to sketch the logical structure of the theory of the unification of cognizant and the cognizable and to try to give explanations about this theory. All of these subjects will be dealt in the following three chapters.

Chapter one: that which is meant by the word "cognizable" must be understood as a thing which is the object of rational understanding; the

example of rational understanding is intellection as well as understanding of the essence of man or an animal. But, the essence with which rational understanding has a relation is the accidental cognizable, not the essential cognizable, because the meaning of the essential cognizable is that which exists by rational existence and does not possess the other existence except this rational existence as will explain in the next chapter. Here, one should only know that the meaning of the unification of the cognizant and the cognizable is not the unification of the cognizant and the accidental cognizable because the external things are existing outside the mental world and the range of the rational ability. For this reason, any rational person does not say that the essence of the rational person is one with a man or a heavenly body or an angel or an animal which are existing outside the mental world. This is an indisputable and evident fact. And moreover, the meaning of the unification of the cognizant and the cognizable is the unification of the cognizant with a thing which exists in the existential domain of the human soul and has no existential value outside the world of the human soul. Such a thing is the essential cognizable.

Chapter two: the explanation about the reality of the essential cognizable. Know that the rational soul needs the form as well as the archetype of reality in order to know and understand reality existing outside the essence of the rational soul; while this form is identical with external reality on the level of quiddity, it is completely different from them on the level of existence. This kind of form is called "knowledge" or "the intellectual form" or "the essential cognizable". By means of this form, the external things become the cognizable for the soul and also become the existent in the world of the soul. But for this form, external things could never have any relation to the soul. This cognizable, intellectual form is, however, estab-

lished and represented in the soul by itself without the help of any other things, and that is pure and unperceptible to the senses. It does not depend on the material and the body. It has no existence except the existence connecting with the substance of the soul. For this reason, it is said that the actual existence of the intellectual form, that is the essential cognizable, is exactly the same existence that the soul has. In other words, the relation and the connection of the intellectual form with the soul will never be excluded from the existence of the intellectual form, but if the intellectual and cognizable form should lose and cut the relation with the soul, its actual existence will also disappear and become extinct. It is not in such a way that the intellectual form remains a form by itself and loses the relation with the soul. In a word, the form which is reflected to the substance of the soul from the external things and is the cause of the manifestation and the intelligibility is the essential cognizable which we pointed out already in the first chapter.

The third chapter is on the types of unification actualizing between two things and its representation. Know that the unification of a thing with another has three types. Among them, two types are possible, but the other is completely impossible.

Part one: the unification of the various ideas or the various concepts is found in the being-existent and the existence, as far as two things or several things being different one from another from the viewpoint of ideas and representation are existing by means of one existence or actualization on the level of being and actualization. The difference is only due to the representation because it can represent them separately one from another. This type of unification is possible and even of frequent occurrence like the unification of genus and differential in the existence of species which exists

by one existence but are different from each other on the level of conceptual ideas. For example, in the ontological level, the concept of animal and the concept of rational have one existence which is the same existence that man has, but those are different each other in the level of concept. And moreover, it is the same with one of the perfect attributes of God, may his name be exalted, which can be identified with the essence itself of the lofty Creator. Therefore, for example, in spite of the fact that from the viewpoint of the concept, divine knowledge, divine power and divine life are different each other, all of them exist by a unique divine existence in such a way that we can say that the lofty Creator is knowledge itself, or he is power itself or he is life itself.

Part two: unification of two existing things which are standing horizontally like the unification of Zaid and Amr or the unification of fire and water, etc.,. It is clear that this type of unification is absurd, and we need no explanation for it, just as Shaykh al-Ra'is (Avicenna) gave a long passage repudiating this type of unification with a clear demonstration in his *Kitâb al-Ishârât wa al-Tanbîhât* (Book of directions and cautions).³¹⁾

Part three: unification of two things which are standing vertically, in such a sense that one is the imperfect in existence and the other is a perfectible form of that imperfect in such a manner that the imperfect obtains its perfection by means of it, and the imperfectness is eliminated from the imperfect and potentiality changes into actuality, just as in the case that an infant becomes a youth, or an ignorant becomes intelligent, or an incapable person becomes a powerful and capable. In a word, that which is called the perfection and the progress belongs to this third type. This type of unification is possible and has external existence. Know that the unification of the cognizant and the cognizable belongs to this type, as will become

clear later.

After the above explanation, we insist that as far as this subject is concerned, those who maintain the unification of the cognizant and the cognizable in the intellection of the realities of things are right. This can be demonstrated in the following way, that is, the cognizant and the cognizable are two interrelating things. In other words, they are correlative, i.e., both the concept of the cognizant and that of the cognizable always exist together in external existence and in mental existence. In the external world, the existence of the cognizant should be considered together with the existence of the cognizable at the same time. Neither of them will ever be separated from each other. In the consciousness, the representation of the concept of the cognizant and the representation of the concept of the cognizable will be achieved at the same time and to the same one degree. Whenever the cognizant is the cognizant in actuality, the cognizable will be the cognizable in actuality also. And, whenever the cognizable is in potentiality, the cognizable will be in potentiality also, because the parallel correlation necessitates the mutual relation. That is a very clear fact.

Therefore, whenever the intellectual form, that is, the essential cognizable is brought forth in the soul in such a manner that we mentioned it in the second chapter on the intellection of reality, without doubt knowledge as well as the object of its cognition become the cognizable in actuality, and the effulgence and radiance of knowledge come into actuality parting from potentiality. And, as you already know, the cognizant must be the cognizant in actuality also. In this case, if knowledge, intellection and the cognizable should be accidental in actuality and separated from the substance of the cognizant for the reason that every accident is separated from the substance to which it attaches, it follows inevitably that reason should

have hierarchical posteriority to the existence of the cognizant because the real nature of the accident is exactly as mentioned above, and the substance of the cognizant has hierarchical priority to the cognizable. But, in this case, let's pose following questions: what is the cause by which the potential cognizant comes out of potentiality into actuality, and what kind of cause gives actuality to the intellectual ability of the cognizant, and by what kind of internal eye does he see the cognizable?

However, if the intellectual form which is regarded as an accident should be considered to be a cause by which the soul becomes actually intelligent, and should be regarded as a cause of substantial completion of the soul, we must say that the accident the place of which is situated posterior to the substance shall never become the completing cause of the substance as well as the cause of actualization of its substantiality, because when an accident happens to fall on a substance, the essence of substance must be perfect in every respect from the viewpoint of its substantiality and it will never begin the process of its perfection from an accident and never make use of an accident for that sake. In this case, it follows that the cognizant should remain in the state of potentiality of being cognizant while the cognizable of this cognizant is in the state of being actually cognizable. But, it is impossible that one side of correlation changes from potentiality into actuality which the other side of it remains in the former state, which is pure potentiality as we explained before. Therefore, inevitably we find it impossible to regard the intellectual form as an accident attaching to the substance of the soul, we should rather regard the intellectual form which is actually cognizable as the state of perfection for the rational substantiality of the soul, by which the cognizant in the state of potentiality changes into the cognizant in the state of actuality, and the

eyes of rational perspicacity and wisdom of the soul are exactly at one with the intellectual form. For this reason, it is said that the cognizant is the same as the cognizable, and is the same as both the reason and the intellect. In other words, knowledge, which is the rational and essentially cognizable form, is both the object of cognition and the rational eyes of the soul, and moreover is the illuminous mode of cognition. Therefore, the cognizant, the cognizable and the cognition are one. This assertion has a decisive greatness and firmness.

Through the above mentioned explanations, it is verified that man is united with the objects of his perception. The light in the essence of humanity which is not separated from his substance and makes a distinction between the beast and him is exactly these cognizables which are mingled with the essence of man's substance, and make him separated from the beast in the level of substance and essence.

To our surprise, Shaykh al-Ra'is (Avicenna) confines the concept of unification only in the first type of unification and does not take into consideration the third type of unification on which this truthful theory is built.³²⁾

Moreover, it is strange too that Hakîm Sabzawârî had regarded the demonstration of correlation as an insufficient to the theory of unification of the cognizant and the cognizable, and had not illustrated this theme in the adequate way, in spite of the fact that the demonstration of correlation has an extreme strength and rightness and firmness, and leaves no room for anxiety and dispute, just as we explained it.³³⁾

Sermon: the Soul is a light being purified from materials and is living by the incorporeal life, so that Suhrawardî, the head of illuminationists, called the soul the light of Esfahbad³⁴⁾ and called reason the victorious

light. Rational knowledge is too a purified light because it combines the abstraction of soul as well as the abstraction of intellectual form and the rational cognition with demonstration in its own place.

In short, since both the cognizant and the cognizable originate essentially in the incorporeal light, the distinction as well as the dichotomy between these two will cease to exist and become one when they come together into a place, just as this becomes clear in the example of two sense-perceptible, external lights because when two lamps are put in one place, these two things are separated one from the other as long as the body and the material of these lamps should retain the slightest vestige of material, but once we neglect the lamp as well as their bodies and we only see the flames of these two, we are not able to represent the duality as well as the difference between these two. However, this allegory has an another complexity, but space is not left to us for explanation of it. You should know that you will not find a study on this interesting subject in any other books which has an explanation in this compact style. God be praised for his grace and favour.

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Notes

- 1) 'Allāmah Qazwīnī (1897-1976), whose full name is Āyatullāh Hājī Mīrzā Sayyed Abu-l-Hasan Rafī'ī Qazwīnī, was one of the eminent scholars of traditional

Islamic philosophy in modern Iran.

- 2) This treatise was edited and annotated by Âyatullâh Hasan Hasanzâde Âmolî and published in the title *Ettehâd-e Âqel be ma'qûl* in the Iranian year 1361 from Markaz-e Enteshârât-e 'Elmî o Farhangî.
- 3) cf. English translation of *Ettehâd-e Âqel be Ma'qûl* appended to this paper, P.48
- 4) cf. DK.B8. 34-36.
- 5) cf. Super De Trinitate 6,2.
- 6) cf. Summa Theologica, I, 12, 12.
- 7) cf. Super De Trinitate 6, 2-5.
- 8) cf. Summa Contra Gentiles, 11, 76.
- 9) cf. Summa Theologica, I, 54, 4.
- 10) cf. Summa Theologica, I, 79, 4-2.
- 11) cf. Summa Theologica, I, 79, 2.
- 12) cf. Summa Theologica, 12, 2; 87, 1-3.
- 13) cf. Summa Theologica, I. 12, 4; 85,2.
- 14) cf. summa Theologica, I, 85, 2.
- 15) cf. *Ettehâd-e 'Âqel be Ma'qûl* by 'Allâmah Qazwînî, ed., Âyatullâh Hasan Hasanzâde Âmolî, 1361, Tehran, pp. 6-7.
- 16) cf. *ibid.* p. 7.
- 17) cf. *ibid.* p. 7.
- 18) cf. *ibid.* p. 7.
- 19) cf. *ibid.* p. 8.
- 20) cf. *ibid.* p. 9.
- 21) cf. *ibid.* p. 10.
- 22) cf. *ibid.* p. 7
- 23) e.g. cf. *Nihâyah al-Hikmah* by Allâmah Tabâtabâ'î, Qum, undated, pp. 210-211.
- 24) cf. *ibid.* p. 211.
- 25) cf. *ibid.* p. 211.
- 26) cf. *ibid.* p. 211.
- 27) Ibn Sinâ refutes and rejects this theory in the fifth article in the sixth chapter of *Physics of Kitâb al-Shifâ*, and also in his other works.
- 28) cf. *Sharh-i Manzûmah*, ed. by M. Mohaghegh & T. Izutsu, Tehran 1969, p. 66.
- 29) e.g. cf. *Mafâtih al-Ghayb* by Mollâ Sadrâ, ed. by Muhammad Khâjavî, Tehran

1984, pp. 580-5.

- 30) Misbâh al-Uns is a commentary by Ibn Fannârî (?-1430) on Sadr al-Dîn Qûnawî's *Miftâh Ghayb al-Jam' wa al-wujûd*.
- 31) From chapter 7 to chapter 11 in the seventh way of this book.
- 32) *ibid*.
- 33) cf. note 28
- 34) This word means literally the lordly light which is used by Shaykh al-Ischrâq al-Suhrawardî in order to express symbolically the rational soul (al-nafs al-Nâtîqah) which reins over five senses.