

## SPACE AND PLACE

### A Schema for Analyzing the Possibilities and Limits of the Contemporary Legal/Democratic State

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“As to the question whether the virtue of the good man is the same as that of the good citizen the considerations already adduced prove that in some states the man and the good citizen are the same, and in others different.”

Aristotle, *Politics*, Book III, Chapter 5, 1278<sup>b</sup>.

“Should it really matter so little for the ethical demands on politics that politics operates with very special means, namely, power backed up by violence?”

Max Weber, “Politics as a Vocation.”

“The instrumentalization of action and the degradation of politics into a means for something else has of course never really succeeded in eliminating action, in preventing its being one of the decisive human experiences, or in destroying the realm of human affairs altogether.”

Hannah Arendt, *The Human Condition*, p. 230.

In *Political Management: Redefining the Public Sphere*, I attempted to provide an alternative to prevailing approaches to analyzing and critiquing the type of democratic state found in Western industrial societies, and to a lesser extent, in Japan as well.<sup>1)</sup> In this text I was concerned to locate what I considered then, and still consider now, to be a central problematic of all such systems, based as they are on the unavoidable tension between the ethical and the public or political life. In this endeavour, I believe Aristotle's rendition of the problem not only to have evidenced the most profound grasp of this tension of any of his predecessors, contemporaries or successors in the antique world. I also believe that this rendition continues to capture the essence of the problem and, in so doing, to provide us with the basis for a very useful and insightful schema in the process.<sup>2)</sup>

Aristotle's problem was how the good citizen might be *produced*, given the imminent collapse of the polis that he was personally witnessing, and its displacement by territorial imperium — the predecessor of the nation-state. This particular problem of "production" arose for him because presumptions which had once been valid (and operative) about citizenship in Athens no longer held true. The eclipse of the city state as a result of successive victories by Philip, solidified and extended Philip's son (and his pupil) Alexander, in effect created a problem which had not been present before. In the polis, citizenship as such was restricted in all cases to men of leisure. All other men, and all women, children and slaves were excluded from this opportunity. As Cleisthenes had already pointed out, this exclusion was based on the fact that only men could be heads of families and only heads of families had a political voice.<sup>3)</sup> Nevertheless it was only to those heads of

families who were also men of leisure that the opportunity for real, active citizenship as a politics of display presented itself. Others were effectively (not formally) confined to reflection and voting — essential activities for the process of politics but nevertheless incomplete by comparison to the kind of fullfledged citizenship which included an active politics of display.

This internal distinction between heads of families who were and were not sufficiently independent to be men of leisure continues, to a surprising extent, to define the nature of political participation engaged in by members today. Indeed, few matters are clearer in this regard than the fact that in most cases a person — usually a man — must be sufficiently independent in economic and financial terms if he is to translate his membership into agency in a representative democratic system. We all too often receive evidence of the extent to which such independence is a lesser evil when compared to the temptations to corruption found in circumstances in which an individual lacks it. Particularly in the United States, but in Europe as well, there has grown up a modern tradition of reposing trust in “patricians,” whose independence from economic and financial corruptibility is alleged to make them a better bet when it comes to looking after the elusive “public interest.” These men are all too often to be found at the head of parties to the left of centre, at least with regard to the issues with which they are most concerned, if not others as well (Roosevelt, Kennedy, Trudeau, Wedgwood-Benn *etc.*).

Translating membership into agency in a representative system may or may not entail effectiveness in carrying out the electoral and party political mandate. At the very least, we must never make the

mistake of confusing such agency, even when it is functioning at its relative best, with citizenship. As the American “founding fathers” well understood, no representative system was ever intended to operate effectively in the absence of consistent and continuous public interest, activity and participation.<sup>4)</sup> These “inputs” are what make such a system work at all. Without them, a country or culture has little more than the formal, institutional mechanisms and processes of a representative democracy. While these constitute the scaffolding for an effective system, on their own they can guarantee little more than predictable stability and continuity (in the absence of external threats and disruptions) to a quiescent population.<sup>5)</sup> Where the main function of states and their organizations is the pursuit of international and regional economic and financial comparative advantage, this sort of system seems to work well, but only in conditions of stability and incremental change and only for a while. In conditions of turbulence, when one might think that such a system would be a godsend, it turns out to be at best a mixed blessing, if not worse.

Agents should not, in short, be assumed to be better, more competent, citizens than members who are not agents. Indeed, there is much evidence on the other side which suggests that agency corrupts where independence is not considerable and temptations resistible. On the other hand, the possession of independence from worldly concerns itself constitutes the basis for a radical indictment of collective forms — including Society — where such independence is alleged to be the only real guarantee of incorruptibility. After all, how did such independence come about, and might it not constitute a basis for an agent feeling that he could pursue a policy path independent of his constituents? Hence a

major motivator might be commitment to an ideology or vision which the independent agent believes it necessary to pursue even where its economic, political and social implications, or public support for it apart from these concerns, argues for a change of course or greater moderation. Looked at from this perspective, the golden mean might very well turn out to be the career politician who lacks independence and who, partly for this reason, feels it necessary to continually take the pulse of public opinion lest his career projections and aspirations be jeopardized.

Max Weber is perhaps the best known scholar of modern Western institutions to address the significance of the contrast between living for and living off politics, with all that this distinction has come to mean. He believed that implicit in the world-historical process of rationalization and de-enchantment lay not only incipient bureaucratization, but the gradual extension of this mode to politics itself. The result was the development of the same sort of career notion for politicians that had historically transformed the limited number of vocations available under Catholic hegemony into “callings.” These latter had in turn been extended to other occupations essential to the emergence of a modern secular national state based on the rule of law, including modern “rational” bureaucracy.<sup>6)</sup> The result, as Mannheim would later point out, was the emergence of a notion of “success” tied to the pursuit of (adult) lifelong careers modelled on bureaucratic office holding which were independent and distinct from either economic or political success.<sup>7)</sup> The later extension of the concept of career to politics presupposed the establishment and thoroughgoing acceptance of the idea *and practice* of success inspired by — and to

some extent traceable to — the procedures by which a bureaucratic system staffs and maintains itself and provides for its perpetuation through a combination of succession and a renewal of the ranks.<sup>8)</sup>

The agent who views his occupational and work life in politics as a career is precisely the individual whom Weber had in mind when he spoke of the practice of politics as a vocation. In virtually every instance he cited (or recounted) it was in stable, republican systems based on the rule of law and a constitutional system that the likelihood of the career politician was greatest. While a certain level of formal (and societal) rationalization, and corollary de-enchantment, were clearly necessary to the systemic stability on which all commitments to a career orientation then (and today) depended, it was to constitutionalism and the rule of law that Weber turned in "Politics as a Vocation" in order to make his case for an ethics of responsibility rather than one of ultimate ends.<sup>9)</sup> Implicit in Weber's analysis of this particular tension was the view that even though charisma may be essential to societal change, thus a way of periodically halting the process of routinization that grips all those who follow in the leader's wake, it was as an interruption to the process of incipient rationalization and corollary de-enchantment that charisma was considered to be such a significant historical and social event by Weber. To the extent that this was the case, it could only be construed as a threat to both representative democracy (republicanism) and the rule of law (constitutionalism).<sup>10)</sup>

Looked at from Weber's perspective as a property (or problem) of the macro system, charisma was at best a mixed blessing. For the price it extracted for halting rationalization and de-enchantment might be thoroughly disorganizing to societies and polities. Indeed, the essence

of charisma defined as the “gift of grace” was an irrational devotion to the leader which effectively set aside formally rational considerations bearing on decision making, policy making and justice, or at the very least shunted them into a faraway second place position. Weber, to the end ambiguous as to whether rationalization or charisma was the greater evil, in the final analysis seemed to opt for an ethics of responsibility and for living off politics (like Machiavelli before him) because the long term benefits and the number who would benefit would be greater. Weber’s is a modern day dilemma which is not dissimilar to the one which Aristotle in particular faced when he had to address the impact on the *polis* of territorial imperium. Whether it became the capital of the captured, dominated space around it or not, such city states became mere urban aggregations — social places rather than political spaces in their own right. Out of this change emerged the question of how to make persons who could never become citizens in the former sense good societal members. The answer, one anticipated by Plato, was ethics and the ethical as an alternative to politics and a public life.<sup>11)</sup>

In the new equation, the idea would be to bring into being agencies of socialization whose task would be to mold the large majority of persons into right thinking, right acting social beings. Though the family was to continue to play a central role in this endeavour, it was now to be assisted on a continuous basis by education and by the state directly. In either case, it was clear that the state’s major function in pursuit of properly socialized (i.e. ethical) societal members was the maintenance of law and order internally alongside protection from external invasion. This constitutes a very significant alteration in the

nature of political activity, inasmuch as the *polis* was now to be replaced by a state structure whose legitimacy rested on its ability not only to protect and secure, but also to provide what amounted to *its own* legitimation through the aegis of the socialization processes cited. These were, in their turn, to be complemented by propaganda and agendas of strategic and tactical inclusion and exclusion of persons and groups whenever this was thought necessary. The result was a thoroughgoing displacement of the operative understanding of politics and public life in the *polis* — with all its problems and limitations — in favour of a view of politics as state power legitimated through tradition, charisma and occasionally law and grounded in terror, force and the fear of meeting violent death.<sup>12)</sup>

The project of producing and reproducing societal members as ethical beings confining any political views they might have to what was required for stability, public safety and law and order was absolutely necessary to the success of the state as an organized territory where cities were no more than urban social places within the dead space of territorial imperium. The established Athenian view that it was *space* which was to be the defining characteristic of public life in the *polis*, with place the essential complement or counterpoint to it in private life and matters of necessity, was effectively inverted in the transmogrification of the *polis* into the urban city within a state. What emerged was a view of space as inchoate, unorganized and unfocussed, and, most important of all ungoverned or ungovernable. Place came forward as the answer to the problem, for it offered specificity, definiteness, the promise and distinct likelihood of organization, focus, control and governance.<sup>13)</sup> Aristotle, in an attempt to offer some sort of alternative

to the collapse of the *polis* in circumstances which even he could but scarcely envision, was compelled to address this inversion as a necessary evil given territorial imperium and the inability of the Hellenes to deny to Philip and Alexander what had been denied to Cyrus and Darius of Persia in an earlier time.

The tension which Weber notes over 2000 years later in conditions in which the modern nation-state possesses sovereignty as well as one or another form of the rule of law, and even representative democracy, continues to derive its clearest sense from an understanding of Aristotle's problem. For it is by no means obvious that the present type (and level) of political organization has done anything more than formalize the tensions between the ethical and the political life in circumstances that reflect a world historical shift in the nature of legitimation itself. In effect, today regimes are required to legitimize themselves *from below* as well as from above, that is, by dint of their capacity to deliver prosperity, economic growth, improved living standards and increasing purchasing power rather than by appeals to tradition, charisma or even terror.<sup>14)</sup> As a matter of fact, it is a defining characteristic of regimes that do not fit the description of a modern nation-state that they rely on any combination of the latter three appeals in the absence of legitimation from below in the ways indicated. *Political* progress, such as it is, continues to take shape in the shadow of Aristotle's problem — the inversion of space and place and the eclipse of the city state by territorial imperium, with a resulting displacement of politics and public life (space) by ethics and social life (place).<sup>15)</sup>

As Arendt noted, the result was a reformulation of the public and

private whose effect was to annihilate the *relationship* between them as it had existed in the *polis*, in favour of the ubiquitous social (now societal).<sup>16)</sup> After all, given in the state agenda for producing and reproducing its members in and through various modes of direct socialization outside (and often in contradistinction to) the family — its ethical task — was a displacement of the distinction between public and private in favour of mass membership in the collective (social) form itself. The idea, so central to the *polis*, that there should be a strict distinction between public matters (politics) and those of one's private existence (necessity) rested on a hierarchical model of humanness in which man's highest attributes and capabilities were those which belonged uniquely to him alone. As one went down the line one encountered, successively, activities, functions and needs which he shared with higher animal forms below him, then all forms of animate life together. Since politics, with its concern about virtue and the good life, marked human beings off from all other animate forms, while more mundane activities, functions and needs constituted necessities and requirements which men had in common with many or all such animate forms, the distinction between the public and private seemed incontrovertible, sensible and well worth enforcing.<sup>17)</sup>

While today one might claim that with minor exceptions this distinction is still enforced, he would be deluding himself if he did not acknowledge the precise way (as well as the fact) the societal has upended both the distinction between the public and the private and the relationship between them. Society's essence, in line with the socializational agenda whose origins reach back to territorial imperium, is to wipe out public spaces while making the private (as well as the remaining

public) social. The social (now societal), after all, promises a better levelling out and linearizing of space as the territorial surround within which urban (and capital) places can govern.<sup>18)</sup> Society, and its creature socialization, effectively “one-dimensionalize” the relationship between space (public) and place (private) by reconstituting space as the dead space of territorial imperium and place as the urban (and capital) positions from which the space surrounding it is organized, managed and governed.<sup>19)</sup> The state is society’s vehicle for invading, upending and transmogrifying politics and public life (and things) in the *polis*, while socialization and resulting imitation is the way that it takes effective control of the private. In effect, what is left of what is called the private (“privacy”) today is either what no one cares about or what everyone really knows, after all.

In these circumstances, space is reformulated as “dead” because, it is territory, and territory can only be governed by being filled up with places which are in turn aggregations of people. This “urbanization” may seem to make governance less possible and secure, but this ignores both the state’s role and socialization processes favouring imitation imposed from the centre (capital urban places). The purpose of such efforts is to make space subordinate to place by reformulating it as the “space-in-between-places,” thus not only inchoate and undefined by comparison, but the conceptual *and social* residual as well. Persons become socialized members of territorial imperiums who are viewed (and treated) as mass populations best organized in urban places where the full panoply of fear, anxiety, conformity and imitation, alongside the reality of state power and force and the fear of meeting violent death, can have their maximum impact. What better way of organizing

the disparate elements of an ethnically, racially, culturally or religiously heterogeneous population in particular than by collecting them together in enclosed places, and subjecting them to power and socialization, while forcing them to learn to coexist in the new conditions of “moral” or “dynamic density.”<sup>20)</sup>

One approach in the contemporary context to the problem posed by this consequential inversion of space and place would require me to employ charisma in a way quite at variance with Weber’s understanding of it. In what follows, I shall reformulate charisma as a necessary feature of any dynamic microcosm in which public things are being discussed and debated. Seen in this light, charisma need not exact the price alluded to above, where it would appear to constitute a perennial liability in the absence of very strong and secure legal and representative institutions at the macro (societal) level.<sup>21)</sup> My sense of charisma, which treats it as a politically necessary combination of passion, convictions, facts and deep knowledge, would comprehend it microcosmically not because it lacks relational properties between persons, but rather because it is now potentially (when not actually) “available” to virtually everyone rather than being a remote possibility for all but a few. In saying this I am identifying its relational properties as being immediate and direct in nature, rather than constituting a one dimensional (and one way) oral tradition whose “speechfulness” has been destroyed by being filtered through the written (bureaucratic/sociological) tradition which is, quite literally, Society’s hidden agenda.<sup>22)</sup>

Such a view of charisma offers the last best hope for dynamizing the public sphere in ways which preserve the necessary legal and representative institutions possessed by advanced industrial societies,

while providing us with the prospect of simultaneously complementing these processes and mechanisms and eventually transcending them in favour of better institutions. The point I am making is that we cannot overcome existing political institutions unless we use them up, and we cannot use them up until we complement them with possibilities for display which will generate an oscillating, dynamic tension between them. Neither regression to older forms nor annihilation of existing institutions is either possible or desirable in the circumstances. Rather, a way must be found which will provide a basis for reestablishing the proper and sensible relationship between space and place which obtained in the *polis*, but adapted to what is worth preserving in the present collective form. To be sure, the real objective of the ideas proposed here is to overcome this very collective form itself—Society, with its view of public and private alike as the prerogative of state action through either socialization or the threat (or reality) of violence.<sup>23)</sup>

Marx had attacked the state of his day (and by implication ours) as an “executive committee of the ruling class,” while at the same time viewing the post-revolutionary period communism as a system in which politics, in clear contrast, would be progressively *more* available to all members-as-citizens.<sup>24)</sup> One does not need to involve himself with any other aspects of his arguments and observations to notice how prescient such a vision was. For it is now increasingly clear that human beings are too dynamic in their mental and emotional make up (not to speak of their biological and organic natures), and too much different from one another, for progress and the future to be conceived of in ways which would negate or minimize these realities. But the question which

keeps pressing for an answer is how this new microcosm, based on a revised estimate of the meaning of charisma, will serve to sufficiently dynamize the public sphere so as to address Aristotle's problem. While it may just be possible to reaffirm a new relationship between space and place, such that space (politics as display) can at least acquire parity, even while we acknowledge our continuing need for place (politics as institutional practices), we still need to address what impact this might have on the tension between the ethical and the political.

On the first matter, the very presence of a sustained politics of display now available to a far wider range of members than was the case for the *polis* would serve as a constant challenge to the tendency to treat space as little (or nothing) more than the (dead) space-in-between-places. Here the very dynamism of this space newly (re)defined would lie in its lack of permanence, its evanescence. In opposition to our tendency to view something as more valuable (or real) to the degree that it is more permanent — for example political structures over discussions about the good and the virtuous — the very dynamism of a politics of display would be manifested precisely by its lack of permanence.<sup>25)</sup> After all, to the extent that such activities of a direct and immediate nature in (or following from) the microcosm became permanent or stable features of collective life, they too would (and do) become place. Indeed, this process was to a considerable extent what Max Weber meant by both rationalization and de-enchantment as discernible processes. Where Weber erred was in his view that they were only reversible temporarily, and only then by the irrational intervention — planned or unplanned — of the charismatic leader or his equivalent.<sup>26)</sup>

It is *this* very dynamic by which space turns into place through the formalization of “informal” discussion and debate that necessitates the constant production of new public spaces to compensate for this unavoidable development. Only in concert with place, by which I specifically mean the legal and representative institutions of advanced industrial societies, can space provide for the possibility, indeed likelihood, that existing institutions, now scarcely utilized, will be used up and thereby transcended in favour of superior institutions. This is precisely what the American founding fathers had in mind when they *assumed* that the political/legal system which they were bringing into being could not hope to be a success in the absence of consistent and continuing citizen inputs. While the relative absence of space may seem a picayune consideration in the light of U.S. pre-eminence, its failure to *publicly* revitalize and transcend its political and legal institutions (in contrast to judicial review and primaries) has proven (and will prove) to be at least as serious a failure as its position in any future international market system. It is little wonder that scholars continue to prefer waxing euphemistic about America’s political past to optimistic forecasts about its political future.<sup>27)</sup>

The issue of a continuing tension between the ethical and the political is directly tied to the discussion about space and place, if only because the need for a charismatic politics of display based on speech and discussion in the microcosm challenges the socializing agenda of the state, an agenda which is best understood as an effort, and even a determination, to produce *and/or reproduce* the “good” person that is always the subject of ethics. What politics and a dynamic-because-evanescent space of appearance would secure, apart from any

transmogrification of such space into stable and permanent institutional places, would be a continuous counterpoint to this process understood as the other side of legitimation from below. Habermas, while correct to note the increasingly central role of legitimation from below in capitalist and advanced industrial societies, goes too far when he implies that an *independent* process of legitimation from above has ceased to be necessary in these societies. While it may be true that socialization may include features and aspects of this process, it is most certainly not exhausted by it. Indeed, one of the pre-eminent features of socialization is a kind of symbolic horde-based identification with cultures and national traditions that no amount of “symbolically mediated interaction” can do any more than confirm.<sup>28)</sup>

It is for this reason that I find Habermas’ reformulation of *both* Weber’s distinction between rationalization (rational purposive action) and de-enchantment (symbolically mediated interaction), *and* Marx’s distinction between substructure and superstructure, unsatisfying. For there is no place in it for the possibility of a real, dynamic (and charismatic) politics of display alongside the continued functioning of the institutional process and mechanisms of the legal and political systems so central to our collective form. Weber’s distinction between living for and living off politics is not, after all, a mutually exclusive one from the standpoint of process, only (perhaps) from the standpoint of the individual. The transmogrification of the informal into the formal — what Weber pessimistically viewed as the necessary evil of rationalization — has its ethical counterpoint in the non-exclusive distinction between an ethics of ultimate ends (for politics) and an ethics of responsibility (off politics). No politics which fails to provide

a complement and counterpoint, rather than a zero sum option, to prevailing mechanisms and processes is either possible or desirable. The increased independence from systems of rational purposive action which Habermas would like to see for members as citizens is inconceivable in the absence of the very “lay” persons that he claims presently lack the necessary “communicative competence” to achieve it.<sup>29)</sup>

Let me conclude by addressing a third element of Aristotle’s problem — the nature of the contemporary city in advanced industrial societies.<sup>30)</sup> All of the great thinkers with whom I am concerned here have quite understandably viewed the city as the origin and fount of virtually all sound ideas, inventions and discoveries. Marx carried the point to considerable extremes with his reference to the “idiocy of rural life” because he saw this form of life as a drag to progress and development.<sup>31)</sup> Durkheim framed his hope for organic solidarity mainly on the rediscovery of the very dynamic or moral density which had been worked out in the late medieval city some 500 years before industrialization brought about the collapse of mechanical solidarity and the onset of anomie after 1750.<sup>32)</sup> Weber, on the other hand, knew that the city was a form of collective organization which had emerged *prior to* (rather than following) the development of settled agriculture, and that it arose out of the need for trading centres by mainly nomadic peoples. With this in particular in mind, it is important to realize that the *polis* as such was always a city state which had an economic and social, as well as a political life and existence. Today we consider it to be something of an epitome precisely because it combined — with all its limitations taken into account — political/legal institutions and political display, albeit neither the representative institutions nor those

of the formal rule of law that we take largely for granted today.<sup>33)</sup>

My point in saying this is to argue for a persuasive (and necessary) contrast between the civic and the civil, the first correlated with both institutional politics and a (possible and actual) politics of display and the second mainly with the social, the socializational and the ethical. It is particularly necessary in large urban aggregations, and particularly in states where a large percentage of members as citizens reside in such aggregations, that the suggested reformulation of charisma and resulting dynamization occur there. At the same time, this is neither to restrict a politics of display to such places, nor to accord them any greater recognition than is granted to smaller cities, towns and rural areas. What remains paramount is that space be constantly created and recreated anew, as a counterpoint to existing places (structures) and as the major vehicle of institutional improvement through progressive formalization, and through challenges to formalizations already in existence or proposed.<sup>34)</sup>

Members-as-citizens are absolutely necessary to the real progress of politics, and agents can only claim higher status on the matter of citizenship if they count themselves among those determined to use power, socialization and legitimation mechanisms to thwart or reverse this most necessary human activity in the name of social order.

#### NOTES

- 1) Berlin and New York, Walter de Gruyter, 1985.
- 2) See especially Chapters 2-4.
- 3) See generally Alvin Gouldner, *Enter Plato* (New York: Basic Books, 1965).

- 4) Wilson, *Political Management*, Chapter 12; Gary Wills, *Explaining America* (Garden City: Doubleday, 1981).
- 5) On quiescence, Murray Edelman, *The Symbolic Uses of Politics* (Urbana: University of Illinois, 1964).
- 6) Max Weber, "Politics as a Vocation," in *From Max Weber*, edited by H. Gerth and C.W. Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), pp. 77-128; Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (New York: Scribners, 1958), especially Chapter 3; Weber, *Theory of Social and Economic Organization* (Glencoe: Free Press, 1947), pp. 329-341; and *From Max Weber*, pp. 196-244.
- 7) Karl Mannheim, *Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge* (London: Routledge, 1952), pp. 235-249.
- 8) See H.T. Wilson, *The American Ideology* (London: Routledge, 1977), Chapter 7.
- 9) Weber, *From Max Weber*, pp. 118-128.
- 10) Weber, *Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, pp. 358-92; H.T. Wilson, *Tradition and Innovation* (London: Routledge, 1984), especially Chapters 5, 4.
- 11) Aristotle, "Nicomachean Ethics," in *The Basic Works of Aristotle*, edited by R. McKeon (New York: Random House, 1941), pp. 1109-1112; Aristotle, "Politics," in *Ibid.*, Book III, pp. 1176-1205.
- 12) Weber, "Politics as a Vocation," *op. cit.*
- 13) Hannah Arendt, *The Human Condition* (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1958), pp. 175-247.
- 14) Jurgen Habermas, "Technology and Science as Ideology," in *Toward a Rational Society* (London: Heinemann, 1971), pp. 81-122.
- 15) See Weber, *Methodology of the Social Sciences* (Glencoe: Free Press, 1949), pp. 28-39 on "progress" as a concept central to modern Western civilization; and Wilson, *Tradition and Innovation*, discussing both Weber's and Wittgenstein's understanding of the concept.
- 16) Arendt, *op. cit.*, pp. 22-78.
- 17) *Ibid.*, pp. 79-135, based to a considerable extent on Aristotle's "Nicomachean Ethics" and "Politics," *op. cit.*
- 18) Wilson, *Political Management*, Chapter 10; Wilson, *The American Ideology*, Chapters 8, 9.

- 19) See especially Herbert Marcuse, *One Dimensional Man* (Boston: Beacon, 1964). On "socialization," particularly outside the family, John Findlay Scott, *Internalization of Norms* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1971) and Orville Brim and Stanton Wheeler, *Socialization after Childhood* (New York: John Wiley, 1966). On the role of the city in this process in specific cultural and historical settings, compare Jane Jacobs, *The Economy of Cities* (New York: Knopf, 1969) to Ira Lapidus, *Muslim Cities in the Later Middle Ages* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard, 1967) and (ed.) *Middle Eastern Cities* (Berkeley: California, 1969). The classic study, of course, remains Max Weber, "The City" in *Economy and Society*, Volume 2, edited by G. Roth and C. Wittich (Berkeley: University of California, 1978), pp. 1212-1372. On an important view of the influence of capitalism on socialization, Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia* (New York: Viking, 1977).
- 20) Emile Durkheim, *The Division of Labour in Society* (New York: Macmillan, 1952), pp. 256-82. Compare to Lapidus (ed.), *op. cit.*, contributions by Oppenheim, Issawi, Gulick and Abu-Lughod.
- 21) An all too apt recent Canadian example is the serious institutional damage — totally unintended — done by former Prime Minister Trudeau's charismatic leadership. That the Canadian system was believed better capable of subordinating charisma to tradition and legality than virtually any other in existence only underscores my point.
- 22) See particularly Harold Innis, *Empire and Communications* (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1950) and *The Bias of Communication* (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1951) for discussion of the tension between the oral and written traditions, and the social and political consequences of the triumph of the written tradition.
- 23) See DeLeuze and Guattari, *op. cit.*, Part 3 "Savages, Barbarians, Civilized Man" and Part 4 "Introduction to Schizoanalysis," for a psychosocial critique of Society and its socialization processes, and their consequences for the family, the body and territoriality.
- 24) Karl Marx, *The Communist Manifesto* (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1947).

- 25) Arendt, *op. cit.*, pp. 167-174, 188-207.
- 26) Wilson, *The American Ideology*, Chapter 10; Wilson, *Political Management*, Chapter 12.
- 27) For example, Gary Wills, *Inventing America* (Garden City: Doubleday, 1978); Wills, *Explaining America* (Garden City: Doubleday, 1981).
- 28) Habermas, *op. cit.*
- 29) Habermas, "Towards a Theory of Communicative Competence," in *Recent Sociology*, No. 2, edited by H.P. Dreitzel (New York: Macmillan, 1970), pp. 115-148. Also see Wilson, *Political Management*, Chapter 8 for another approach to the problem.
- 30) Aristotle, "Politics," in *op. cit.*, Book I, Book IV, Chapters 11-13, Book VII, Chapters 4-12. I am most indebted to the work of Jane Jacobs on the modern and contemporary city in Western societies since 1750, in particular her *The Economy of Cities*.
- 31) Marx, *op. cit.*, "The bourgeoisie . . . has . . . rescued a considerable part of the population from the idiocy of rural life."
- 32) Durkheim, *op. cit.*
- 33) Weber, "The City" in *op. cit.*
- 34) This point is addressed to the pessimism of both Weber and Arendt. See Wilson, *Political Management*, Chapter 12 and "Reprise."

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