

ISLAM AND MUSLIMS IN DIASPORA

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The question of a Muslim minority in the Western context has become an important one in view of some “fear and hysteria literature” that continue to depict them as a threat to Western liberal values and socio-political system. Immigrant Muslims have been preoccupied with ensuring their survival in the West, and, hence, have not responded to this “hate literature” adequately, especially in view of the fact that in the Western context, in general, and the North American setting, in particular, Islam and Muslims remain widely misunderstood and tend to be perceived quite monolithically. In fact, however, diversity in the Muslim community is evident in a variety of ways, from different national and cultural groupings—even among Arabs—to the various schools of thought to which Muslims belong. Nationality, culture and sectarian affiliation in turn influence their religious practices, whether they are classified as either Sunnites or Shi’ites.¹⁾ Moreover, the complexity of theological and practical religious differences among the immigrant Muslim community has been virtually incomprehensible not only to outside observers but also to many

Muslims who in their native countries have belonged to one particular school of thought to the exclusion of others. Only in fairly unusual cases — such, for example, as in Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan and India — have Muslims acknowledged the existence of other minority Muslim groups within the majority. In some cases, such as that of Saudi Arabia, for instance, it has been the Wahhabi government policy to particularly deny the existence of the Shi'ite minority within its borders to give an impression of a factionless Muslim society.

The governments of the Middle East countries in general have exercised much influence over the immigrant Sunni community by providing them with badly needed financial assistance to set up Islamic centers and other such organizations, with the two-fold aim of fostering a sense of loyalty to those governments and preserving the Islamic characteristics of the minority in the West. These very efforts, however, have many times been obstacles in the way of adequate recognition of the vibrant Shi'ite Muslim minority that is equally engaged in providing religious centers and facilitating systems of organization to protect the Islamic identity of its members. Until recently little acknowledgement was made of Shi'ite realities or information provided about Shi'ite communities in Europe and North America in conferences and studies on Islam in the Western context. The obvious reason for this belated interest in Shi'ites, of course, is the Islamic revolution of Iran, followed by Shi'ite activism in Lebanon in the aftermath of the Israeli invasion of 1983. These events in Iran and Lebanon, in addition to the Iran-Iraq war which was reduced by both the Western press and the Arab nationalists to a Sunni-Shi'i and Arab-Persian struggle, have produced a negative image of the Shi'ites and Shi'ism.

In this paper I will be concerned with general observations regarding Islam and the entire Muslim community, the Sunnites and the Shi'ites, in the West, including North America. My long term involvement with Islamic studies as a Muslim academician and with the community as an active participant-believer permits me to undertake the following presentation with necessary objectivity and empathy connected with the cultural and religious adjustment of a Muslim minority in the Western environment.

Long before the Muslim jurists undertook to provide religious rationale for the historical practice of *jihad* by developing the political-legal terminology like *dar al-islam* (the sphere of "submission [to God]) and *dar al-harb* (the sphere of war), the Qur'an had implicitly divided the world into *dar al-iman* (the sphere of belief) and *dar al-kufr* (the sphere of disbelief). There is, however, a difference in the way Islamic religious law defined the two spheres and the way the Qur'an projected the realm of "belief" and "disbelief." For Islamic law the division of the world into the spheres of "submission to God" and "war" was in terms of spatial-temporal as well as religious hegemony of Islam; whereas for the Qur'an the spatial division was simply in terms of spiritual and moral distinction between the spheres of "belief" and "disbelief."

The Qur'an, according to Muslim belief, is not only the record of the divine revelation received by the Prophet. Existentially, it also reflects the history of individual and collective Muslim religious endeavor in creating the sphere of "belief," the sphere of "sound, integral existence." This endeavor of creating the sphere of "belief,"

the *dar al-iman*, is related to infusion of the necessary religious attitude prior to its concretization in any part of the earth.

There is no concept of eschatological "promised land" or "holy land" in the Qur'an to suggest "diaspora" — the dispersion of its adherents from it — even in the remotest sense of the word. The entire earth, according to the Qur'an, belongs to God, and it has been created for humanity to seek its own advancement towards the moral and spiritual goals in any region of the world as long as no injustices are committed against fellow humans. The Qur'an in this sense is proposing a universally recognizable ethical order on earth founded upon moral and spiritual consciousness in which exclusivist historical claim to any territory has to be subjected to the universal litmus test of faith in God. Moreover, any exclusivist claim of monopoly over religious truth has to be rectified by the moral conduct based on justice and equity. This interdependency between religious claim and personal morality was supposed to humble human self-righteousness and serve as the foundation for the principle of religious tolerance and religious pluralism.²⁾

The evidence for my assertion that we cannot speak about "diaspora" of Islam, and hence of contemporary Muslims, is provided by the historical status of the city of Mecca and those who inhabited it before its conversion to Islam. Mecca was regarded as *dar al-kufr* (the sphere of "disbelief") as long as the people of Mecca had not accepted Islam. The "submission" of the people to the Islamic order brought about the conversion of Mecca to *dar al-iman* (the sphere of "belief"). The religious distinction is thus attached to the spiritual-moral condition of the people, and not necessarily to the land where

everyone should aspire to return as part of the divine promise. There are no such prophetic promises in Islam at all that would make Muslims endeavor to return from the “diaspora” to their “holy land” located somewhere in Arabia. Moreover, and perhaps pertinently, there are no divine guarantees that once the sphere of “belief” is established it will not revert to the sphere of “disbelief.” The maintenance of the sphere of “belief” from turning into a corrupt and tyrannical sphere of “disbelief” is human responsibility. Furthermore, there is no covenant between God and Muslims that certain parts of the earth will be immune from becoming the “city of wrong” (*qaryat zalima*). Ultimately, human response to the divine challenge of becoming morally and spiritually attentive would decide the “sacredness” or “otherwise” of any part of the earth.

However, can a human being become spiritually homeless?, morally homeless?, culturally homeless? Can a human being find himself/herself metaphorically in “exile” with a hope of ultimate return to his/her home? This brings me to consider the concept of *dar al-hijra* in Islam. *Hijra* which literally means “cutting oneself off from friendly or loving communion,” technically signifies “an emigration from the territory of the unbelievers to the territory of the believers or to any place of safety or refuge on account of religious persecution, and so on”.³⁾ In a distinct sense, it is a journey undertaken to overcome spiritual or moral “homelessness” to the sphere which holds promise to alleviate this unfavorable condition. To this early signification of emigration of a person or persons from a particular place or set of surroundings to seek protection is added emigration for the sake of seeking economic advantage temporarily or permanently somewhere else.

Hijra in both these technical meanings has been a prominent feature of Muslim experience from the early days of Islam. The Qur'an orders Muslims to depart from the places where they are persecuted and seek to settle anywhere in the earth (8;72,74,75). To live under disbelief is more tolerable than to live under persecution and tyranny. "Whoso emigrates in the way of God will find in the earth many refuges and plenty" (4:97). Moreover, it encourages them to "disperse in the land and seek God's bounty," (62:10). *Hijra*, then, is not an act that leads to permanent state of homelessness; nor is *dar al-hijra* the sphere of "homelessness." On the contrary, the illustration provided by the city of Yathrib, which became permanently the *madinat al-nabi* (the city of the Prophet), that is, Medina, shows that with the construction of the space that related the believers to their religious and moral practice, that is, the first mosque in Medina, the sphere of "emigration" was converted to the sphere of "belief." Consequently, the sphere of "emigration," became the abode of "security and sound, integral existence," as the lexical sense of the term *iman* signifies.

In other words, the concept of *dar al-hijra* (the sphere of emigration) not only suggests that every corner of the earth is open to such emigration to seek God's universal bounty; it also considers any part of the earth unrestrictedly and potentially capable of providing humanity with all the necessary conditions to direct it towards obedience to God. However, the Qur'an warns about the challenges that the process of *hijra* and the conversion of *dar al-hijra* to a Muslim "home" involve. It regards the process of *hijra* as requiring perseverance, steadfastness, and tolerance in the face of the inevitable hardships that any human

encounters upon leaving the security of one's familial and social surroundings. "And those who emigrated, and were expelled from their habitations, and those who suffered hurt in My way, and struggled, and were slain, them I shall surely acquit of their evil deeds, and I shall admit them to gardens underneath which flow rivers" (3:195). In this sense the act of "emigration" becomes equated with a *jihad* — a "struggle and striving" — undertaken to make God's purpose of creating an ethical order on earth successful.

This understanding of the relationship between faith and space in Islam is central to our comprehension of the situation created by the increasing numbers of Muslim immigrants seeking to share the capitalistic prosperity of the West. Whereas the inability of the Muslim to integrate themselves fully in their new "home" in *dar al-hijra* seems to be related more to their cultural roots than their religious orientation, the inability of the Western societies to integrate these immigrants appears to be linked to the lack of adequate and candid acknowledgment of the adverse conditions created by the inseparable accompaniments of a universal consumerist culture in their social universe.⁴⁾ A factual evaluation of the existing fear, hatred, and even hysteria among the Western population about the Muslim immigrants living among them will lead to inevitable conclusions about the effects of a materialistic consumerist culture, which has in large measure generated spiritual "homelessness" and the breakdown of familial and communal relationships necessary to sustain healthy human nature among the peoples in the West. The argument for the universalization of the Western political and economic experience through liberal democracy can become persuasive only when the West could concretely demon-

strate within the context of its secular liberalism ways in which it could satisfy the search for absolutes and for community within the soul of individuals. In the contemporary world, in view of the collapse of communism, Islam, despite its inherent exclusivism as a religious ideology, has offered the only political alternative to both liberalism and communism.⁵⁾

Having said this I would like to remind you that both the Western scholarship and media describe and interpret Islam and the Muslims in the West as "alien" against the idealized, ahistorical Judeo-Christian mirror. The Muslims are "others," because of their relationship to their religious beliefs which continue to dominate their interactive relationship in the family and in the host society. What is overlooked in this distorted image of the "other" is the common ethical presuppositions generated by shared monotheism on which the Judeo-Christian and Islamic attitudes towards life and its purpose are constructed. Overall, this method of looking at Muslims as "others" has resulted in erroneous conclusions about their strongly community and family-oriented belief system and their particularistic cultural-ethnic identity in the new "sphere of emigration."

There is no doubt that under the impact of secular humanism and liberal democracy in the West a culture war has been waging all over to determine the direction of the future generation.⁶⁾ The culture war is taking place on a variety of issues relating to abortion, a marriage that ends in divorce, a youth who has become homeless because of drug addiction, a local school teaches values people deeply disagree with, and so on. In other words, the culture war is being waged over the moral and religious content of public education and its impact upon the

character of the nation, as it would be inherited by posterity. In some ways this process has been the experience of the German *kulturkampf* of the last decades of the nineteenth century, when efforts were made to unify disparate Prussian empires into a unified nation-state.

It is indeed a common feature of human life to reflect upon the cultural and religious similarities and dissimilarities between themselves and others and to nurture oppositional attitudes to some features of historical cultural configuration and to adhere to others which afford absolute responses to the problems of relative existence. Antagonism towards certain views of life and ambiguity concerning numerous unresolved conflicts and inner stresses that have become a common destiny of modern humanity, is shared by many peoples, including Muslims, in their interactive relationship with the society in the West. When these unresolved conflicts and stresses are voiced in the context of the nation-state they function as an important medium of intercultural communication about real lives of individuals as they unfold in real communities all across the world.

In the Fall of 1991 the annual convention of the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA) was held in Dayton, Ohio. More than 6,000 Muslims from across North America attended to listen to and participate on the theme of: "Developing an Islamic Environment in North America." The President of ISNA, Dr. Imtiyaz Ahmad, in his opening address, remarked that the theme of the convention would be rendered an empty slogan if Muslims did not involve themselves in solving the problems that plague North American Society, in general, and the Muslims who live in it, in particular. He reminded his audience the religious obligation that demanded from each Muslim to reflect on the

condition of the place where he/she chose to make his/her home and to decide what role he or she would play to help create a healthy, peaceful environment here.

The theme and the organization of the convention reflected the three primary domains through which the Muslims interact in a social-cultural environment in the West. These three domains pertain to inherited normative Islamic tradition, specific ethno-cultural identity, and the larger Western secular society.⁷⁾ These three domains are the primary sources for developing interactive direction for the evolution of a new integrated identity of American-, Canadian-, or European-Muslim. The interactive strategy accentuates the commonalties and contradictions in the Muslim and host cultures. Moreover, the cultural discourse becomes the source for furthering the ways that are necessary to relate to each other as individuals, as members of a family and a community, and as citizens living in *dar al-sulh* (the sphere of peace).

Dar al-sulh as a spatial-religious conception conveys the essence of Muslim cognition of their emigration in the West. As a minority, in spite of some difficulties in making cultural adjustments in a society where their Islamic values are in conflict with the secular liberal ones, they are relatively able to continue to live in peace and to practice their religion freely. I have been often asked, both by my American colleagues and students, if I am able to follow practically all the requirements of Islam. And, I have always responded with an emphatic affirmation that having lived in the various parts of the world, personally I find that I am able to follow my faith in America even more freely than in other parts of the world. It does not mean that I do not encounter any difficulties and conflicts in making some decisions

regarding my children's moral and social life. But in that respect I am part of all those American parents who are struggling to define their spiritual and moral goals in education and society and I share with them all my common human concerns for creating a sound, integral existence.

The first area of the interactive relationship with the cultural-social environment in the "sphere of emigration" is the one in which the inherited form of the Islamic tradition plays a dominant role in defining the parameters of the necessary social and political adjustments in the West. Depending upon the different schools of law and theology which they follow, Muslim immigrants have demonstrated the ability of Islamic tradition to allow required flexibility within the context of modern living. Moreover, level of education and exposure to Western secularism, lay humanism, nationalism, and other such ideologies have caused a significant variation in the ways in which Muslims in the West interact with their religious heritage.

For the majority of Muslims who have immigrated in the last decade or so, Islam is essentially an all-embracing ethical and social code: a way of life embodied in the Sacred Law of Islam, the Shari'a. For others who have been in the West much longer Islam is a form of culture that does not depend on anything specifically Islamic except a spiritual path in a particular Sufi Tariqa, and a kind of humanistic ethics which is a personalized religious experience. Still others, in the wake of the political upheavals in the Islamic world, regard Islam as an ideology and political force capable of serving as an alternative to the godless secularization of the West.

What emerges from my own personal observation of the Muslim

community, whether in North America or Europe, is that there is no monolithic Islam to which different groups and even different individuals within a given community adhere to suggest a unified Islam among the Western Muslims. In interacting with Islam as a belief system Muslims in the West tend to freely exercise their preference of the religious orientation they seek from their Islamic heritage. In addition, in the absence of a unified religious leadership which can actually bring about religious uniformity in the community at large, Islamic allegiance has become a matter of cultural identity first and then a religious commitment.

Nevertheless, there is much influence exercised by the representatives of these various trends in Islamic identities who are imported from the centers of traditional Islamic learning in the Middle East or South Asia. In many cases Muslim encounters in the West are determined by these preachers and teachers of Islamic knowledge, who, in the last decade, due to their prolonged sojourn in the West, seem to be better informed about Western society and social-political thought. Still, there is much dissatisfaction among the younger generation of Muslims, both male and female, in their interaction with the Islam of the preachers coming from "outside."

In response to the critical situation stemming from religious disinterest among this latter group, in the last year or two, centers for training the new generation of Muslim preachers and teachers who can interact with the youth in the secular context effectively have been established both in Europe and America. Religious and cultural pluralism of the West has been one of the major driving forces that has prompted some Muslim leaders to emphasize the Qur'anic teachings

about the divine purpose in allowing diversity of spiritual and moral responses in the world religions. I must point out that the very fact that Muslims have had to come to terms with the realities of modern life has ushered a creative era in their interaction with their Islamic heritage. It has made possible for them, courageously and honestly, to make a necessary distinction between the original teachings of Islam and the diverse cultural norms, both Arab and non-Arab, that had attained through a long process of assimilation the status of a normative tradition, and to adhere to the former, and call for reexamination of the latter.

The second area of the interactive relationship with the cultural-social environment in the "sphere of emigration" is the specific ethno-cultural identity. The major issue in this interaction is related to the preservation of certain traits in one's identity while adopting others as a necessary consequence of cultural symbiosis. However, the cultural as well as linguistic diversity of the immigrant Muslim community has not permitted a unified interactive direction to satisfy specific ethno-cultural predilections among different nationalities in the matter of fostering a new integrated identity of the Western Muslim. The problem is even greater when for many being a Muslim is a cultural identity, which overlooks or even ignores the universal aspect of the faith, relegating it to an ethnic identity. Thus, the problematic of interaction with the host socio-cultural environment, however selectively, becomes incoherent, causing many a Muslim to impose an aloofness in the name of Islamic identity, whereas the actual source of impediment is the ethno-cultural distinctiveness and not the trans-cultural Islam.

Consequently, it is not surprising that many times when Muslim parents complain that "ninety-nine percent of the Muslim youth in North America [, for instance,] are losing their Islamic identities,"⁸⁾ what they really have in mind is the specific ethno-cultural identity which has Islam as one of its basic components. In her reaction to the situation of Muslim youth losing their Islamic identities Aminah Jundali, a first generation American Muslim mother of four children, says: "I find this very common that parents don't remember Islam until their children are teenagers, and suddenly they want to cure the ills their children have been acquiring all these years. Well, obviously Islam is from the birth of the child, and if you haven't been educating your child on what Islam is all these years, it's going to be difficult."⁹⁾

This question regarding religious identity as raised by Muslim parents is an important issue running across North America and Europe among the religiously oriented peoples (call them "fundamentalists," if you like) of all traditions who are engaged in identifying the proper moral and spiritual direction for their future generation in the secular culture. But, for Muslim families, who interact with the outside world within their particular ethno-cultural matrices, the question is critical in developing strategies to assist them in their adaptation in the new environment.

An important sociological characteristic of different ethnic groups in the immigrant community in general is highly integrated endogamous, kinship-based units. This characteristic is one of the major factors in preserving the ethnic identity of the immigrant community. Yet, the preservation of this ethno-cultural peculiarity shared by Muslims with other immigrant communities has raised questions about

the extent and feasibility of assimilative interaction with the host environment and its implications for the ethno-cultural future of the group. In fact, my observation in the cultural dynamics of the Muslim community in North America indicates that the assimilative interaction even within the diverse cultural and linguistic groupings in the Muslim community until recently had not advanced beyond the realm of common theology. The difficulty of cross-cultural communication can be discerned even now within the cultural and linguistic groups of the Muslim community.

However, within certain groups of Muslim immigrants, more particularly among the South Asian and Arab Muslims, one can detect two common sensible strategies adopted to nurture the ethno-cultural peculiarity: first is to create analogous social units in the new environment; and second is to rely extensively on the homeland for social and cultural reinforcements through regular visits and importation of required paraphernalia for maintaining such ethnicity. Islamic centers in the West have been used by different groups to further this ethno-cultural interaction. In addition to the traditional function of the mosques as places of religious services and education, Islamic centers have assumed a much wider role as community centers in the dissemination of cultural paraphernalia.

Nevertheless, overemphasis on ethno-cultural identity among Muslims runs in the teeth of Islamic universalism. However strong, ethno-cultural peculiarity, from the point of view of transnational and transcultural Islamic ideology, suffers from inherent disability. Can one emphasize one's cultural identity over an Islamic one? Am I a Muslim-Indian or an Indian-Muslim? And now, am I an Indian-

Canadian-Muslim or simply a Canadian-Muslim or Muslim-Canadian? This question of identity in the "sphere of emigration," on the one hand, touches upon the quality of intra-community interaction through the requirements of universal Islamic heritage and the Muslim ethno-cultural identities; and on the other, they deal with the central issue of inter-community interactive relationships of individual Muslims and their families within the Western social universe.

"Can Muslims avoid assimilation?" was the theme of the 1991 annual convention of the Islamic Society of North America. The topic has assumed urgency in the wake of the realization that more than the youths it is the parents who are in need of internal adjustments to foster better relationship with their children. Communicating with the second generation of Muslims in the West has required parents to develop special skills in dealing with the social and moral problems faced by young Muslim men and women. Muslim youth who have grown up in the secular society with an educational curriculum geared towards nurturing secular humanism and liberal democracy, and popular culture based on TVs, videos, and so on, are on the verge of losing their Islamic, ethnic personality that held the family together all this time. Dictatorial traditional methods of bringing up children that had worked adequately in the homeland are met with much resistance and resentment by the Muslim youth in the West.

In this domain of ethno-cultural interactive relationships leading to partial or complete assimilation of the Muslims in the Western environment, Muslim women are under enormous pressure. The firmly rooted Islamic belief among those who promote kinship-based social units dictate that Muslim women, in their role as the nurturers of the familial

relations, should undertake the responsibility of molding the future of Islam in the West. Advising the Muslim women who participated in the annual convention of ISNA, Aminah Jundali gives expression to this belief. She says: "If Muslim youth don't survive, it's all over for the Muslim community in North America. So Muslim women should be serious about their responsibility to raise and nurture the future of Islam. I would like to say to the second generation [Muslim women], beware of following the American way ... especially the women ... of putting one's profession, one's career above that all-important goal of being a mother, the goal which God gave and blessed, and gave the honor to women, which unfortunately in this society is given the lowest priority."¹⁰⁾

The nature of issues contested in the domain of familial interactive relationship, especially over the status and role of women, are central to the contemporary culture war in the West and are perhaps fateful for other battles being waged to preserve the relative strength of the institution of family under the concrete social and economic circumstances. In the context of the Muslim family what appears to be at stake is a male-dominated nuclear family that both sentimentalized childhood and motherhood and, at the same time, celebrated domestic life as a utopian retreat from the harsh realities of materialistic consumerist society. Conservative Catholics, Mormons, and Evangelical Protestants generally share this Muslim view of family not just because it was believed to be established in nature and ordained by God, but because it is believed to foster social harmony.¹¹⁾

Sharifa al-Khateeb, president of the Muslim Education Council, based in Herndon, Virginia, believes that if fathers and mothers do not

actively work to develop their children Islamically, they will find, as others in the West have, that their children will not turn out as they would have liked. Moreover, sometimes Muslim youth grow up with weak Islamic identities because parents uncsciously emphasize weakness, developing a philosophy of "Just fit in. Don't rock the boat." Those children, according to al-Khateeb, "grow up with absolutely no cultural consciousness, no Islamic consciousness. They are not proud of themselves. They lack a self-identity, and they very often become very confused adults."¹²⁾

The solution to this growing problem of alienation among the youths has been found in community development. Community support in fulfilling one's moral and spiritual obligations has been an important part of Islamic social identity. Muslims living in the larger cities are aware that the secular non-Islamic society's way of life poses a threat to Islamic social and familial values because it practically drags individual Muslims away from their religion. Consequently, according to Al-Amin Abdul Latif, Imam of Masjid al-Mu'minin in New York, who is trying to create such a physical community in Long Island, New York, a consensus has emerged in certain quarters of Islamic leadership that the only way to start saving Muslims in the Western environment is to establish physical Muslim communities, as the early Muslims did in Arabia. Abdul Latif gives further justification for building a physical community when he says: "Once we begin to live together, like we are supposed to, as Muslims in this environment, we will have an impact on this (i.e., American) society. *You* will have an impact on this society. Your numbers, your presence, your culture. Your children, you will not lose your children. Islam

will no longer be abstract to them. It will be real. It will become relevant now ... because they will see the Islamic society within this society.” Citing the examples of thriving non-Muslim Italian, Chinese and German communities in New York, Abdul Latif believes it to be a solution to many problems encountered by Muslims in the “sphere of emigration.” However, there are others in the community who think that forming physical Muslim communities separate from others would hamper their recognition as full citizens in host countries.

This brings us to consider the third area of interactive relationship developed by the Muslims in the West to identify themselves as members of the society among whom they have created the “sphere of peace” as a minority. It is also this domain of Muslim interaction with the Western society that has been criticized by some social analysts as “isolationist” or “exclusivist,” and so on. Undoubtedly, there is a fundamental difference in the way Muslims have conceptualized their orientation and authoritative perspective of the world and the way the Western secular ideology has defined its world view. This difference has, in large measure, to do with the way tradition and morality are perceived by a Muslim and a Westerner. Muslims generally seem to cherish ancestral tradition in community life and maintain that Islamic cultural tradition provides one with a sense of continuity with the authoritative custom. As a consequence of secular pluralistic culture in the West such an attachment to one’s tradition is almost absent. In the realm of morality and moral values Muslims believe in the absolutes which are believed to have been prescribed by the timeless divine revelation and the normative tradition. With the emphasis on secular humanism as the main source of moral values in the West, morality has

been relativized. In order to protect individual freedom of conscience no particular value system is accorded the status of the absolute and hence binding on all. Religiously fostered values are generally privatized, with the result that there is a discernible decline in individual and social morality.

This difference in the understanding of the centrality of tradition and morality in the society also points to the existing contradictions in developing effective interactive strategies that would make social integration by the immigrant Muslims in the areas of commonalities more successful. The situation of integration is far more complex than what I have been able to show in the context of this paper. Nevertheless, it reflects the dilemma of Muslim families, who, on the one hand, are desirous of full social integration in the Western society; and, on the other, they are afraid of what they consider to be the West's inferior moral standards, especially the sexual laxity, criminality, and drug abuse among juveniles. Western liberalism that had been found to be almost infatuating by the first generation of Muslim immigrants has lost its prestige as a source of hope and conviction to foster a new identity of a "Westernized Muslim." The second generation that grew up in the West and is more integrated both culturally and through education than the previous generation is painfully aware of the serious moral problems facing their age group in the high schools and the colleges.

In view of this pessimism regarding Western liberalism, all undertakings of the community administrators and religious leaders are directed in defining their moral-spiritual space and the entailments of this definition in guiding the corporate life of the community in the

“sphere of emigration.” Of course, much effort would be required to provide practical solutions to the growing problem of communication between the almost fully integrated, college attending second generation and the conservative, half assimilated first generation of the Muslim immigrants. The problem of communication, as discussed earlier, is actually related to the first domain of interactive relationship between the immigrants and their Islamic heritage as preserved in the normative tradition. Hence, community leaders have lately acknowledged that by merely establishing social-religious institutions like the Islamic centers without qualified religious leadership to guide the Muslim communities intellectually in the new social environment would be difficult if not impossible to provide the urgently needed moral-spiritual support for the survival of a Western Muslim identity. Through their various educational and religious services the centers, however, continue to generate a resourceful fount to draw from in the situation of insecurity experienced by almost all the Muslim immigrants from different ethno-cultural backgrounds in the West.

So far the paper has dealt with Islam and Muslims in the West in general without any reference to the status of the Muslim community as a minority. Of course, that was implied when I introduced the concept of *dar al-sulh* — the sphere of peace, where Muslims live as a minority but with freedom of religion and in peace with fellow citizens. We should consider one more spatial-temporal concept which is peculiar to a Muslim minority within the larger Muslim community. Here I speak about the experience of the Shi'ites as a minority within a minority that continues to formulate their religious identity in the West through their distinctive interactive relationship to

a theological-legal concept of *dar al-taqiyya*, the sphere of "prudential concealment."

As discussed earlier, Islamic religious law defined space in terms of Islamic political hegemony. Accordingly, the world was divided into two spheres: those of "submission to God," that is, Islam, and "war." The Shi'ites, while accepting this general division of space under the Sunni ruler, in the absence of the political rule of their Imam, who alone, according to their doctrine, could and would create the sphere of "belief" (*dar al-iman*), have defined their space as the sphere of "prudential concealment."

The sphere of "prudential concealment," then, is the place where the Shi'ites as a minority continue to exist and to await for the final restoration of the just public order. Furthermore, this willingness to exist in the midst of perceived imperfections and even unbearable social-moral conditions has allowed the Shi'ite minority living under different conditions to adjust. Functionally, then, the sphere of "prudential concealment" is close to the sphere of "emigration" (*dar al-hijra*) which allows Muslim to migrate to other places when they find situations in their homeland oppressive. This understanding of space in relation to a theological concept allows one to explore the process of adjustment for a "minority within a minority," that is, the Shi'ites, in their newly adopted places of residence in the West.

What I propose to do in the rest of my presentation is to deal with the question of a Muslim minority within a minority in the Western context and underscore the importance of such an investigation in the study of Muslim communities in the West.

The Shi'ite minority with which this paper will be concerned

constitutes the major group of the Shi'ite sub-division who believe in the line of the Twelve Imams after the death of the Prophet (A.D. 632). They are known as the *Imamiyya* or *Ithna 'Ashariyya*, or simply the *Shi'ites*. Other Shi'ite sub-divisions, such as the Isma'iliyya, both the Nizari (followers of the Aga Khan)¹³⁾ and the Must'ali (Bohra) branches, and the Zaydiyya are not part of this study. Moreover, I shall limit my discussion of this group in the context of North America because so far my investigation has been carried out only in the U.S. and Canada. Nevertheless, having established contacts through personal visits among the Shi'ites in England and France, my observations about the problems faced by the community in making necessary social and cultural adjustments in North America more or less holds true in the context of Europe.

It is uncertain exactly when the early Shi'ite immigrants began to settle in North America. Immigration records are not of help in this matter, because no sectarian affiliations are registered there; nor do we have any sources compiled or maintained by the Shi'ite families in North America to give us a definite word on the background of the community. Their history on this continent still needs to be written.

The speculation is that some Shi'ite families from India and Lebanon settled in Canada well before the middle of this century, a reasonable guess considering the numbers of Muslims who emigrated in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. The appearance of the well-educated middle class professionals in considerable numbers on the American scene is a comparatively recent phenomenon.¹⁴⁾ The existence of the distinctly Shi'ite Muslim community was known through their distinctive religious participation in the annual commemoration of

the martyrdom of the grandson of the Prophet Muhammad, the third Iman of the Shi'ites, Husayn b. 'Ali.¹⁵⁾ Some of these annual gatherings of the Shi'ites, according to the oral history transmitted by some families from Hyderabad, India are dated to this period.¹⁶⁾ It is certain that if individual Shi'ites existed anywhere they would have made every effort to come together for these annual devotional meetings.

It is important to qualify this statement on the basis of the research done by Abdolmaboud Ansari about Iranian Shi'ite immigrants in the United States who had by and large paid little attention to preserve their religious identity prior to the victory of the Islamic revolution in 1978-79. Following the revolution, according to Ansari, only the religiously oriented Iranians have asserted their religious identity. Accordingly, the sense of religious cohesiveness among a segment of Iranian immigrants is a recent phenomenon.¹⁷⁾ At approximately the same time or a little earlier the nationwide Persian Speaking Group of Muslim Students Association, (MSA/PSG, made up of Shi'ites, of course) separated from the larger group in which the Wahhabis and pro-Wahhabi elements of the Sunni community supported by the Arab governments in the Middle East dominated the organization. Besides the Iranians, one should also mention the Shi'ite Arab students from Iraq, Lebanon and the Persian Gulf region, including Saudi Arabia. Their organizations like the MSA/PSG are centered within the university student administration and they mainly cater to the religious interests of the Shi'ite students and their immediate families with only peripheral concern for migrant Shi'ite families. Among these Shi'ite students, especially among the PSG, a number of them are married to American women, and, after the Islamic revolution in Iran have for

some personal as well as political reasons chosen to make the U.S. their permanent home. Whereas some of these American Muslim women have conformed to the revived norms of Islamic social ethic in Iran, a large number, it seems, have found it difficult to follow the strict code introduced under the “Islamization” program regarding the role of a Muslim woman in a modern society. Moreover, the deterioration of the economic situation in the aftermath of the Iran-Iraq war has discouraged a number of highly qualified and conscientious Iranian students to return to Iran.

In any case it is certain that by the 1950s there were small clusters of Shi'ite families in some major cities of Canada and the United States. The main venue of their ethno-cultural expression was their religious gatherings during the month of Muharram. It is probably correct to say that those Shi'ites who did not participate in these annual rituals were not known to the leaders of the community who organized their members around these annual commemorations. If one takes into account newly arriving Iranians and, in small numbers, Iraqi and Lebanese Shi'ites, it is reasonable to estimate that Shi'ites make up at least 30 percent of the total Muslim population in North America.

Since the 19th century the Shi'ite community around the world has acknowledged the centralized leadership of its religious scholar/jurists, the Ayatullah, who have been centered mainly in the Shi'ite holy cities of Iraq and Iran. Recognition of a centralized leadership (whether that be of the Imam or his deputy) among the Shi'ites has a long tradition and a doctrinal foundation in their belief system according to which the Imams from among the descendants of the Prophet are regarded as the sole leaders of the Muslim community. In the absence

of the last of these, the twelfth Imam al-Mahdi, who went into concealment in the 10th century is to return as the final restorer of the Islamic faith in the Last Days. The Shi'ites have regarded their religious scholars as the deputies and spokesmen of the Hidden Imam on whose behalf they direct the spiritual as well as social activities of their followers.¹⁸⁾

This institution of religious leadership developed into a powerful, highly centralized authority of the *marja' al-taqlid* among the Shi'ites. The *marja' al-taqlid* which means "the most learned juridical authority in the Shi'ite community whose rulings on the Shari'a are followed by those who acknowledge him as such and commit themselves to base their religious practice in accordance with his judicial opinions" has provided a sense of unity as much as direction in all matters pertaining to living a religio-moral life for the Shi'ites since the concealment of the twelfth Imam. Moreover, the institution of religious leadership has remained independent of any political control by the governments. The reason is that it has been able to preserve its independence by depending solely on donations derived from the religious taxes paid by the Shi'ites for the maintenance of the religious institutions administered by the Ayatullah. Besides the *zakat* (alms-levy) that all the Muslims, including the Shi'ites, pay voluntarily as part of their social obligation to the underprivileged in the community, the Shi'ites contribute 20 percent (one-fifth) of their gross savings as the *Khums*. The Ayatullah authorizes the manner in which these religiously ordained contributions are to be allocated to various religious projects in the Shi'ite community. One of the major projects funded by these donations is the construction of the Islamic centers and the salary of the

religious preachers and teachers who are not usually supported by any other community generated revenues, such as annual dues, and so on. Accordingly, pious donations in the Shi'ite community have been an important source of religious independence from outside interference for the Shi'ite centers in North America and Europe. Moreover, the preachers supported by this fund have found themselves in a better position to serve the community freely in their capacity as religious guides and teachers.

Most importantly, the independent nature of the highest religious authority (especially independence from any political control in a modern nation state) acknowledged by the Shi'ites of their own accord and the self-generated and self-managed financial structure of the Shi'ite religious organization has made it possible for the Shi'ite community in North America to organize its affairs substantially and independent of any control from the Muslim governments in the Middle East or elsewhere. Accordingly, the problems of direction faced by some of the Sunni Islamic centers funded by Saudi Arabia or Libya, whether religious or political, do not exist for the Shi'ite community at all. Much of this independence in developing responsive interactive strategies among the membership in the community and with the host environment is a direct result of the pioneer immigrants' vision and their attachment to their religious heritage. In recognition of their leadership the supreme Shi'ite religious authority also appoints them as its representatives in the community to manage their religious and other social affairs.

However, as among other immigrant groups in general, the Shi'ite minority faces the problems of creating a unified community out of

diverse ethno-cultural interests and goals. Additionally it has to define the matrices of ethno-cultural particularistic relationship to the universalistic Islamic identity. It is this latter identity that effects the necessary pluralism in interactive relationships among individuals and national groups. As yet it has not been possible for the various Shi'ite groups from around the world to come together as a unified Shi'ite Muslim community. Although efforts to create some sort of national and international federation of these communities in North America and Europe have succeeded, the unity of minds has remained marginal because that which actually unites each group seems to be the common language and common national ties, rather than religious affiliation as such. In the recent years, some South Asian Shi'ite communities from East Africa, Pakistan and India, who share the common ethno-cultural heritage, have formed regional and world wide organizations to benefit from its common pool of religious as well as financial resources.

Evidently, ethno-cultural differences have made it difficult for the leadership committed to the new vision of a North American Islamic community and new integrated identification of its individual members in North America to create a degree of social cohesion. More and more, the domain of ethno-cultural identities has encroached upon the universal ideology of Islam, making the complex interactional relationship in the Western socio-cultural environment difficult. It is, I believe, the cultural rather than monotheistic religious heritage that tends to augment problems of adjustment within and create a sense of opposition to the social universe of North America. Consequently, "regionalism" and "exclusivism" among the Muslim immigrants in general can be attributed to the religious emphasis on the community

building that gives an uncommon character to the interface of ethnicity and religion. Moreover, this interface gives rise to tensions in the interrelationship between the domains of inherited religious and ethno-cultural heritage.

Ironically, one of the main obstacles in creating a kind of primary allegiance to Islam has been the religious leadership provided by the imported preachers who use their local languages in teaching Islam to the believers. While the community leaders have adopted languages of the region in their administration of the community affairs, the use of other languages by the Muslim preachers has given rise to dual leadership in the communities with clear conflicts of interest. The conflict of interest in the two types of leadership can be seen in their attitude to the question of social integration in the West. The community leaders who have either lived for a lengthy period of time in this country or were brought up in the North American environment have a thorough grasp of the problems of adjustment for the Muslim immigrants in the new environment. Hence, their solutions are pragmatically formulated. On the other hand, religious leadership imported from mother countries have a thorough grounding in the tradition but often very little understanding of the problems of adjustments encountered by the believers in their day-to-day survival. Moreover, the narrow mindedness and indiscriminate negative attitude towards the Western society has made the religious leadership even handed authoritative in their religious idealism. The situation has created immense difficulties for the community in keeping their younger generation interested in the Islamic faith. Solutions worked out by the community leaders so far have produced temporary results. Long term resolution would require

training of religious leadership that would combine the traditional and modern Western education necessary to provide practical religious guidance to the second generation Muslims who are more and more finding themselves in a traditionally imposed "homelessness" in the West.

In the domain of political interaction with the society at large, events in Iran, Iraq and Lebanon since the late 1970s have played a particularly important role in developing particular interactional encounters between the Shi'ites and the North American society. In the first place, the events in Iran have served to awaken religious sentiment and pride in the Shi'ite community in general. Moreover, in some Sunni communities where the Iranian revolution is interpreted in non-sectarian terms it is viewed as an Islamic response to the Western-American cultural imperialism.¹⁹⁾ In some concrete sense the Islamic revolution of Iran has been of immeasurable and unprecedented influence in the Shi'ite community in North America because it has been used by the leadership in neutralizing the psychologically damaging effects of the "cultural colonization"²⁰⁾ of the Muslim peoples. A number of young men and women in Shi'ite organizations have adopted Islamic codes of behavior and have forced the Sunni leaders to view them as authentic Muslims who follow the Ayatullah's teachings. For these young men and women Ayatullah Khomeini was a truly Muslim leader in comparison with the other Muslim leaders around the world. In the last decade events in Iran have given Muslims a renewed confidence in preserving their identity in a secular cultural setting. In addition, dissatisfaction with the Sunni Arab interpretation of Islam, which tends to legitimize and afford support to the Arab Muslim

governments, and attraction towards the activist leadership of the Ayatullah Khomeini has given Shi'ism not only a visibility but also a sort of alternative to a number of Afro-American Muslims in North America who have changed their affiliation from Sunnism to Shi'ism in the last twelve years. It is difficult to give any definite figures on Afro-American Shi'ites, but the growing number of Afro-American Shi'ite centers indicates that their number is steadily increasing.

It is important to note, however briefly, that the Shi'ite communities have created some important institutions for the well being of their members. Besides the Islamic Centers built in the major cities of the U.S. and Canada, including New York, Washington, Los Angeles, Chicago, Vancouver, Edmonton and Toronto, the Shi'ites have concentrated on creating highly efficient educational institutes of "Sunday Religious School System" in these cities. This school system is rightly regarded as the second most important institute to ensure the continuation of the Islamic moral-religious education, the first being the weekly and annual gatherings to commemorate Imam Husayn b. 'Ali's martyrdom. The latter gatherings have provided the best platform for the spread of religious education to the adults. However, a traditional outlook and conservative spirit have dominated these gatherings. The role of Muslim women in the West or the concerns of the Shi'ite youths, who have grown up in the American environment, receives minimal attention. Shi'ite women are pressing for reform of some of the traditional institutions that are discriminational to women and which, as the argument goes, are the product of Muslim culture rather than the essential teachings of Islam. The guidance of the supreme religious authority in these reform measures has been sought from time to time,

and surprisingly, the religious leaders in Iraq and Iran, being fully informed about the essential teachings of the Qur'an and the spirit of Islamic religious-moral law, the Shari'a, have been found to be far progressive than their Shi'ite followers in the West on many issues. Thus, for instance, some Shi'ites were opposed to the idea of introducing closed circuit televisions to allow women, who usually sit separately, behind a partition in these gatherings, to watch the male speaker during the religious lectures. However, the religious authority issued a ruling granting the permission to introduce such technological devices as a religiously commendable act because it furthered the religious well-being of the women.

The reform to accommodate the religious needs of the second generation Shi'ites depends upon the local English-speaking preachers for whose training a seminary type of institution has been recently established in Medina, New York. The seminary has two components: The Jami'a Wali al-'Asr for male students; and the Madrasa al-Khadija al-kubra, for the female students. The first batch of Shi'ite youth, nine males and three females, has begun its four year training after the completion of a high school diploma under some prominent teachers of Islamic sciences in this seminary. These teachers have been trained in the Shi'ite centers of Islamic learning in Qumm, Iran, and Najaf, Iraq, by prominent scholars. As such, they impart thorough training to these students in the traditional sources, which include Arabic and Islamic theological-juridical studies as taught in the Shi'ite Islamic seminaries in Iran and Iraq. Perhaps, the most remarkable feature of this seminary in Medina is the inclusion of female students who receive the training that was traditionally reserved for males. After the

completion of their studies in this seminary these graduates will be qualified to become the imams and teachers in the community school system. Some of them would continue their education by going for further studies in Iran or Iraq or become graduate students in the secular universities to return as the teachers of the seminary and preachers in the community. The program is bound to have positive implications for the future integration of Muslim youths because the students at this seminary are recruited among the second generation Muslims in the West, who, in all probability will emerge as the full-fledged American Shi'ite leaders of the community in the West.

The Shi'ite adjustment in Western society underscores the significance of an interactive relationship between socio-cultural background and Islamic tradition to generate both organizational strength and the identification of the Shi'ite community with its new social universe. Two reasons can be cited for the relatively successful social integration without completely succumbing to secularism: independence of all the Shi'ite communities from any control of foreign Muslim governments or their agencies in North America; and a strong tradition of dynamic Shi'ite religious practices that nurture shared social identity and provide the necessary moral support in times of psychologically stressful periods of settling in the new environment. These extra religious practices have functioned as successful, regular media for bringing together members of the community to engage in a religious discourse. They have, additionally, provided an intellectual platform for the ever growing number of professionals and highly educated second generation to come together to form a pressure group for introducing changes that are imperative for making North America part of the sphere of a

“sound and integral existence.”

In conclusion it can be pointed out that perhaps it is the will of a minority to achieve it to its goal that has enabled Muslims and Islam to survive and even flourish in the secular West, where the word “Muslim” and “Shi’ite” is too often used as an adjective to describe Middle Eastern terrorists. Many Westerners view Islam, one of fastest growing religions of the world in this age of technicalization and mass education, as something alien, mysterious, and threatening to the Judeo-Christian heritage of the West. This is in spite of the fact that Islam shares common roots with Christianity and Judaism and has interacted with the West not only militarily but also intellectually and culturally for hundreds of years. Undoubtedly, that which often puts Muslims in conflict with the dominant Western culture is a set of values derived from their religious faith that, for instance, puts emphasis on public modesty which prompts many Muslims to cover themselves up, and strictly prohibits premarital and extramarital sex.

As I have shown in this paper, for immigrant Muslims the greatest challenge remains in developing adequate interactional strategies that would strike a balance between full integration in the society of their adopted land and their Islamic and ethno-cultural values that seems often at odds with modern Western society. My own estimation is that efforts are directed towards selective assimilation by absorbing useful elements of the dominant culture, accompanied by critical evaluation of the inherited ethno-cultural norms and their adequacy and applicability in the social universe. Moreover, as the historical spread of Islam in different parts of the world and its dynamically interactive relationship

with the diverse local cultures has demonstrated, I believe Islam in the West also is bound to foster a characteristically Western Islamic identity for its adherents. There are all indications to suggest that in the war of cultures the confrontation is not entirely one-sided. Like other concerned citizens of the secular societies who are engaged in defining the moral and spiritual boundaries for the future of their children in the age of moral decadence, Muslims are also getting involved in local governments, school boards, parent-teacher associations, and their influence is beginning to be felt. An illustration of this integration and influence is provided by Lila Amen, a Muslim mother in Dearborn, Michigan. She wears a full-length modest dress and head covering and was concerned to discover open shower stalls in the girl's locker room at the public elementary school her 11-year old daughter attends. She went to the principal and explained that it violated Muslim standards of modesty. Shower curtains were quickly installed.²¹⁾

The process of cultural contact between the Muslims and their new sphere of "belief" and "peace" — *dar al-iman wa al-sulh* is irreversible. To borrow Bassam Tibi's conceptualization of "acculturation,"²²⁾ which looks at the inter-cultural process of communication as an inevitable outcome of the technicalization of the contemporary World Society, neither Islam nor the Muslims anywhere in the world can choose to remain indifferent and non-contributive to the process that is determined by the World Society as a whole.

NOTES

- 1) Thus within the Sunnites one can speak about the Wahhabi generated "conservative" beliefs and strict adherence to the letter of the Shari'a, or mystically oriented Sufi beliefs and practices. Whereas, among the Shi'ites one can speak of non-Shar'i, esoterically oriented Nizari Isma'ilism, Shari'a oriented Must'ali Isma'ilism and so on.
- 2) I have treated the Qur'anic view of religious pluralism and freedom of conscience by examining the traditional exegeses of the Qur'anic passages dealing with the divine mystery in not coercing a uniform belief on humanity in my chapter on: "Freedom of Conscience and Religion in the Qur'an," in *Human Rights and the Conflict of Cultures*, coauthored with David Little and John Kelsay, Columbia, University of South Carolina Press, 1988.
- 3) Lane, *Lexicon*, VIII/2880, column three.
- 4) The phrase is adopted from Francis Fukuyama's article entitled: "The End of History?" in *The National Interest*, Number 16/Summer 1989, pp. 3-18.
- 5) *Ibid.*, p. 14, Fukuyama concedes to Islamic ideology that role, but goes on to dismiss it by saying "the doctrine has little appeal for non-Muslims, and it is hard to believe that the movement [that is, Islamic Fundamentalism] will take on any universal significance." He offers no more explanation to support his latter assertion, except that because of its religious nature it is bound to have limited appeal. On the contrary, empirical evidence in the Third World suggests that an Islamic alternative by its commitment to the ethical order under the aegis of divine guidance has much universal application to redress social and political injustices.
- 6) In his recent work, American sociologist James Davison Hunter has treated in great detail the struggle to come to grips with American identity in the last decade of this century. See: *Culture Wars: The Struggle to Define America*, Basic Books, 1991.
- 7) These three domains are identified as sources for commonalties and contradictions for Muslim immigrants who are trying to make sense of their new socio-cultural identity in the West. See: *Muslim Families in North America*, edited by Earle H. Waugh, et. al., Edmonton, University of Alberta Press, 1991.

- 8) The Dayton, Ohio, convention of ISNA in 1991 has been covered in *Islamic Horizons*, Winter 1991 issue in which Aminah Jundali discusses this problem in her article entitled: "Muslim Parents: First Line of Defense," pp. 10-13.
- 9) *Ibid.*
- 10) *Ibid.*, p. 12.
- 11) Hunter, *Culture Wars*, p. 181.
- 12) *Islamic Horizons*, p. 13.
- 13) For the followers of the Aga Khan in North America see: Azim Nanji, "The Nizari Ismaili Muslim Community in North America: Background and Development," in *The Muslim Community in North America*, ed. by Earle H. Waugh, Baha Abu-Laban, and Ragula B. Qureshi, Edmonton, University of Alberta Press, 1983, pp. 149-164.
- 14) Abdolmaboud Ansari, *Iranian Immigrants in the United States: A Case Study of Dual Marginality*, Millwood, N.Y., Associated Faculty Press, Inc., 1988, discusses Iranian Emigration and Patterns of Emigration which, more or less, holds true for other educated middle-class emigrants from third world countries to Canada and the U.S.
- 15) For the significance of the martyrdom of Imam Husayn and the religious practices that grew out of this commemoration, see: Mahmoud Ayoub, "Redemptive Suffering in Islam. A Study of the Devotional Aspects of 'Ashura'," in *Twelver Shi'ism*, The Hague, Mouton Publishers, 1978.
- 16) Oral communication by some old families now residing in Toronto, Canada.
- 17) See Ansari, *Iranian Immigrants*, pp. 116-121.
- 18) For the doctrinal basis of the deputyship of the Shi'ite religious scholars, see my: *Islamic Messianism: The Idea of the Mahdi in Twelver Shi'ism*, Albany, State University of New York, 1981. For the leadership of the deputies and their powers see my: *The Just Ruler in Shi'ite Islam: The Comprehensive Authority of the Jurist in Imamite Jurisprudence*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1988.
- 19) See an informative article on the impact of Iranian revolution on the Syrian Sunni Muslims by Yvonne Haddad, "The Impact of the Islamic Revolution in Iran on the Syrian Muslims of Montreal," in *The Muslim Community in North*

America, pp. 165-181.

- 20) The phrase has been employed by Nikki R. Keddie, "Islamic Revival as Third Worldism," in *Le Cuisier et le Philosophe: Hommage a Maxime Rodinson, Etudes d'Ethnographie Historique du Proche-Orient*, reunies par J.P. Digard, pp. 275-281, in her discussion about the social classes to whom "third worldism" appeals. Islamic revivalism is also, in her opinion, a form of "third worldism" that appeals to the militantly oriented classes who have a poorer place on the socio-economic ladder.
- 21) "Islam in America," *U.S. News and World Report*, October 8, 1990, p. 71.
- 22) Bassam Tibi, *The Crisis of Modern Islam: A Pre-Industrial Culture in the Scientific-Technological Age*, trans. by Judith von Sivers, Salt Lake City, University of Utah Press, 1988, pp. 12-13.

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