

**RELIGION, COMMUNITY  
AND POLITICAL CULTURE  
IN THE ISLAMIC WORLD:**

**Reflections on *Millah***

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**Introduction**

This article aims to raise some hypotheses, which this author believes to be essentially important, in order to understand the Middle East, especially against the recent backgrounds of the Islamic revival, or religious resurgence in general, since we can observe a revival of religious sentiments not only among Muslims but also among members of other denominations in the region. I have been working for a decade and a half to understand and analyze the fundamental characteristics of the Middle East, especially those related to politics, with special emphasis on political thought in its interaction with the society. In the Middle East, the prominent role of religion, especially that of Islam, in the formation of political thought is very important. I have dealt with that aspect of political thought fully, while giving secular ideas their due weight. The hypotheses I am putting forward here are partly an outcome of my reflections in this field during my endeavors as well as of my observations

in some countries in the region where I had the opportunity to stay and conduct research of various durations. I will not, however, try to prove the hypotheses immediately in this article as much as I will try to illustrate them. I might be simplistic in my expressions in order to illustrate clearly my points of view. Though they could not be exhaustive for analyses on our topics, I believe that they would provide a more convenient way to see some of the contemporary phenomena related to religious revival than the conventional secularist approach.

It is also hoped that this argument leads finally to comparison with other areas of the Islamic world. Since many parts of the Islamic world share Islamic characteristics at various levels as well as the recent "Islamic revival," it will be highly interesting to assess the similarities and differences among them.

Apparently, most of the observers and researchers on the region were caught by surprise when we saw the first spectacular scene of religious revival in the region in the form of the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979. This occurred after some decades of secularization and de-Islamization as well as a rise of secular nationalisms in most of the Middle Eastern and Islamic countries.

In order to understand the meaning of religions in the Middle East today, and its implications to society, in general, and to politics, in particular, we should start by examining what "religion" may mean in the cultural context of the region, then proceed to discover why religions remain strong, or are able to become strong again as we see them today. In the course of this discussion, we must critically examine the wisdom of our conventional premises on the issues of religion.

In this article, when we refer to the Middle East, we mean that

region which was delineated in the process of establishing modern “nations-states” out of the central region of the Islamic world. One may describe it as the “Afro-Asian territories of the former Ottoman Empire,”<sup>1)</sup> in addition to the land traditionally under Iranian dynasties. This area can be sub-divided by language/culture into three regions, that is, Turkish, Iranian, and Arabic areas/countries, while they also share an Islamic history. It is presumed, therefore, that the heritage of the region is that of the Islamic civilization with its particular institutional manifestations.<sup>2)</sup> My examples, however, come mostly from Egypt, Lebanon and Iran for my limitation of survey areas, while I hope to expand the application, or examination of the applicability, of my hypotheses to other countries in the region, as well as to make comparisons with other regions of the Islamic world.<sup>3)</sup>

## I. *Millah* as Socio-religious Community

Religions, or more appropriately religious communities, in Japan and elsewhere in most of the developed countries are considered voluntary associations, in which members participate only part time, through their own choice. While political parties are voluntary associations based on common political ideologies and objectives, religious communities are based on common creeds and beliefs. Members belonging to these associations only do so part time, since they are not their permanent attribute. This is unlike cases of associations based on blood relations or locality which are common attributes that everyone is born with. Needless to say, since everyone is born into a certain family and into a

certain locality, these elements cannot be changed after birth by the human will. The question of will is essential to distinguish what voluntary associations are and what they are not.

The primacy of religion in the Middle East is well recognized. It is there that religions are often described as a part of the attributes with which everyone is born. It is true that traditionally all members of a society in the region had a religious affiliation with one of the religions, and however weak the real contents of "religions" have become today, the reality of religious affiliations persists. A child born into a Muslim family is considered a Muslim, and a child of a Christian family, a Christian. Secularization has certainly weakened the binding power of religion to the extent that being a Muslim or a Christian no longer implies *a priori* actual belief. This process, however, did not create "religionless" persons, as we observe in Japan, or in Western countries. The term "religionless" does not necessarily indicate atheists. They might be people living in highly "secularized" manners, with or without consciousness of the secular nature of their lives. In these countries, having "religionless" parents, children might be raised without a religion in the first place, though this may not exclude the possibilities of their acquiring a religion at a later stage in their lives.

We don't observe the same phenomenon of "religionless" persons in the Middle East, so we tend to agree with the primacy of religions in the region. Yet, seeing religions as something as fundamental as blood relations is problematic for two reasons. First, we have to wonder about the applicability of our understanding of religion as voluntary associations as just described above. Secondly, although all Middle Easterners are born into a religion, their affiliations can still be changed, while blood

relations or locality of birth cannot.

Since the term “religion” may have a connotation as we use it in the context of a secularized society where religion is a personal matter related to one’s own belief in heart and private behaviors related to it rather than concrete social implications, let us use an Arabic term, *millah*, to indicate “religion” in Middle Eastern forms.

We avoid using *dīn*, because it means religion as such, that is, a system of beliefs and creeds, while we concern ourselves with religions in social terms, in other words, religious communities with their members. We also avoid the term *ummah* which means religious community in traditional literatures but is used more often as nation in contemporary literature. *Millah*’s case is contrary to this. “In the Kur’an, it always means ‘religion,’” and in modern Arabic it “still means ‘religion, confession, religious community’.”<sup>4)</sup>

*Millah* can be used with an adjective indicating a particular denomination, so *millah Islāmīyah* means Islamic community, *millah masīḥīyah*, Christian community, and so forth. The usage of the term *millah* here reminds us of “*milal* literatures” (*milal* is the plural of *millah*) in the mediaeval periods, which can be translated roughly as “comparative religion,” though this may not be understood in the modern scientific sense.<sup>5)</sup> When we say everyone in the region is born with a religion, that means he/she is born into one of the *millahs*.

The Islamic world was a world of *millahs*. Apparently, when Islam emerged from a *void* between the two universal empires of those days, that is, the Arabian peninsula located between the Roman Empire and the Persian Empire under the Sasanid dynasty, and conquered a vast territory, it projected its own world view in the process of recognizing and

organizing groups of people under its rule. So it treated its new subjects in terms of religious communities, while Islam was seen by itself and others as a conquering religious community, or sovereign *millah*.

In terms of political organizations of these religious communities, Islam institutionalized a system of *dhimmah*, or protection. Religious communities which, after conquest, recognized the sovereignty of the Islamic state became *ahl al-dhimmah*, or protected communities, under certain conditions, such as payment of poll tax and exemption of military service. A protected community may not necessarily be a minority, since early Islamic empires had protected communities which were far greater numerically than the ruling Islamic community. The subject population maintained their original religious affiliations for a substantial period. It should be noted that an Islamic state, in theory, does not have to have a Muslim majority, if Islamic hegemony is attained. One may define an Islamic state, if one wishes, as a state where the Islamic community as a sovereign *millah* concluded contracts of governance with other member communities, while these communities become members of the state with "protected" status upon conclusion of the contracts.<sup>6</sup>

Distinction must be made between *millah* (religious community) and *ahl al-dhimmah* ("protected" communities). The former is a religious community with or without *dhimmah* status, even if not under Islamic rule, while the latter signifies *millahs* which came under Islamic rule and were recognized politically, legally and administratively. In other words, with the former we are referring to the perspective of recognizing people in terms of religious communities, and with the latter the resultant institution and status in it. It is important to see, therefore, that the latter is related to a political and legal framework, while the former

represents a perspective which can persist even without that framework. In this sense, it is valid to refer to *millah* as a contemporary term, while *ahl al-dhimmah* belongs to either legal theory or history.

It goes without saying that the term *millah* is the Arabic origin of the Turkish term *millet* from which stems the term of *millet* system in the Ottoman Empire. Although a recent survey in Japan<sup>7)</sup> casts doubt on the extent of validity in using this term in Ottoman history, it is apparent that the so-called *millet* system is the *dhimmah* system in Islamic legal terms, and it is certainly based on the *millah* perspective of religion as we have named it in this article. Obviously the Ottoman *millet* system prolonged the *millah* perspective to recognize oneself and others in terms of religious communities in the regions under its influence. And the *millah* perspective, after many centuries of prominence, has persisted even after the abolition of the *millet* system following the collapse of the empire.

Looking into history, one may argue that mobility between different *millahs* during Islamic periods occurred less frequently than today, except for conversion to Islam, and that most of the members were born into their *millahs* and used to stay in them throughout their lives. This does not deny, however, the principle that *millah* is changeable.<sup>8)</sup> It must be more so when there is no freedom of not belonging to any.

To sum up, religion in the Middle East should be understood as something communal, not individual. Hence, *millah* means a socio-religious community, into which members of a society are born. And in the sense that a *millah* for everyone comes with one's birth, like blood relations and locality of birth, but can be changed later, like a political affiliation, we can put it between the two categories of association. It

has at the same time both an involuntary and voluntary nature, and this spells out particularities of religion in the Middle East. By defining it in this way, we can locate properly the place of religion in the Middle Eastern contexts, without compromising our general understanding of religion.

## II. How Religions Color their Members in the Socialization Process

When the Ottoman empire collapsed, the *millet* system ceased to function as a political and administrative institution. The *millah* perspective of religion, however, persisted. How can we interpret this?

With the end of the Ottoman empire, the "Islamic" history ended. The Caliphate (*khilāfah*) and Sultanate (*salṭanah*) as well as many other Islamic political institutions were dismantled. The Islamic law, which had functioned in Islamic states with its theoretical comprehensiveness, started to loose ground with secularization of the legal system. However, there was one stronghold left. The last field left for the Islamic law and other equivalent religious laws of *millahs* was the personal status law (*qānūn aḥwāl shakhṣīyah*).

This field has proved to be vital for the persistence of religious identity, hence, the *millah* perspective. As it is sometimes called family law, it regulates marriage, divorce (if divorce is permitted in a given *millah*), inheritance and the like. It regulates, in other words, how families are made, since marriage creates the core of a family—a husband and a wife, the would-be parents.

By definition, religiously sanctioned family laws produce couples according to religious perspectives. Inter-religious marriages are usually discouraged by religious laws, if not totally forbidden. The net result is that most couples share their *millahs*. This means that children come into this world having parents with a certain *millah* background. At the very moment of birth, each one comes into a family which already has a *millah* color, though the strength of the color may differ from one couple to another.

Of course, this needs an assumption that couples follow religious sanctions when they marry. It should be noted that because personal status law of the Middle Eastern countries reflect the religious laws, most of them don't actually provide a choice for a "secular civil" marriage. Even Lebanon, which was once celebrated as the region's model country for modernization, does not have a system for "civil" marriages.

Empirical data show that more often than not these parents give their children names which have *millah* connotations. Or, we should say that many of the Middle Eastern names have religious connotations, and choice of popular names inevitably carry these connotations, without parents being necessarily religious at all. For Middle Easterners, it is not usually very difficult to guess someone's *millah* affiliation by his/her name.<sup>9</sup> For example, "Muḥammad" is always a Muslim, "Abū Bakr," a Sunni, "Abd al-Ḥusayn," a Shiite, and "Jūrj," a Christian, to pick some of the more notable cases.

In the case of Egypt, this author utilized a phone book in Cairo as something containing a large number of personal names to examine this question.<sup>10</sup> As an example of urban Arab setting, this survey illustrates some interesting points. The 1983 edition of the phone book for Greater

Cairo contained nearly 140,000 names in its three volumes.

Since they represent owners of telephones, the majority were male names (so the survey was limited to this criterion).<sup>11</sup> After examining the first (given) names, two main characteristics drew our attention. First of all, the variety of names was not very diverse. Surprisingly 20 names cover half of the entire sample, 45 personal names three-fifths, and 60 names almost two-thirds. Secondly, many of these names imply something religious, or more precisely something of a *millah* affiliation, for example, names of prophets, saints or names meaning "worshippers" of God (with different Divine Names), followed by names implying virtues and praiseworthy human attributes in the Arab culture, such as nobility and perfection. Among the top 60 names, names with religious implications covered more than two-thirds of the sample.

In terms of different *millahs*, Egypt has a simple composition. Nine-tenths of the entire population belong to the Sunni Islam, while the rest are mostly Coptic Christians.<sup>12</sup> Countries in the Arabian peninsula also have simpler compositions, with Muslim dominance, than countries in the fertile crescent. Lebanon and Syria have the most complicated compositions.

Both countries can be described by "confessionalism," though it is more explicit in Lebanon and more implicit in Syria. Confessionalism is a system based on confessional socio-political arrangements. Lebanon is best to illustrate what this is. Lebanon, as an independent state since 1943, has a parliament where seats are distributed along the confessional lines. For convenience of this "confessional" system, all religious communities are divided into Christian and Muslim. Christian communities used to hold six out of every eleven seats, while Muslim communities

five (the total number of seats, therefore, has always been a multiple of eleven). With amendments in 1989, the ratio was changed to 5:5 for Christian-Muslim communities. The fundamental idea, that is, to distribute seats among religious communities, remains intact. It is not only a legislative function (parliamentary seats), but also a function of the executive branch, which are distributed according to a confessional balance of power.

The unwritten “National Covenant” of 1943 gives the formula of a Maronite president and a Sunni prime minister. My survey of ministerial posts between 1945 and 1984 reveals further points in this respect: The post of deputy prime minister goes to a Greek Orthodox; ministers of finance and interior affairs go mostly to Maronites and Sunnis; ministers of justice and foreign affairs go to Christian communities, while the minister of defence goes to a Muslim community.<sup>13)</sup>

Under this confessional system, even the distribution of governmental posts for engineers, which should be based on pure merit, is restricted by the “confessional” balance. It is no wonder that the confessional system has contributed to maintaining Lebanese’s consciousness of *millah* affiliation. Yet, the confession (*ṭā’ifāh*) in the confessional system (*ṭā’ifiyah*) is quite different from *millah*, since the confessional system is to maintain confessional distribution of power and wealth as defined through Lebanon’s independence with a “nation-state” framework of the country. It is a system of, so to say, confessional competition over what is essentially a secular state and its resources of power and wealth. While *millah* is fundamentally religious, and transnational/ethnic, confession (*ṭā’ifāh*) is an internal sect/interest group. While the Sunni as a *millah* includes Sunnis in any country, the Sunni as a *ṭā’ifāh* is relevant only in

the Lebanese framework. The latter can be said to be a small piece of the former, theoretically and practically speaking.

What is interesting in the Lebanese scene is the recent appearance of religious opposition to this system. Previously, the opposition to the confessionalism was basically secularist or leftist. There were, and still are, confessional oppositions to the prevalent form of confessionalism, that is, movements to change the balance of distribution in favor of this confession or that. This is not, of course, a fundamental opposition to the system itself. In the 1980s, we started to see radical religious opposition to the system as a whole. The best example is *Ḥizbullāh* (Party of God).<sup>14)</sup> What is important is that this organization, aiming for an Islamic revolution in Lebanon, is based on *millah* in a more general sense rather than confession which is a Lebanese formulation (or, distortion) of *millah*. In a sense, a religious revival in the 1970s onward brought, in Lebanon too, an opposition to the current system.

### III. Nature of *Millah* and Political Culture

The premise that everyone is affiliated with one of the *millahs* implies that religion in the Middle Eastern sense is an integral facet of the society, and that, therefore, it forms an important part of the political culture, among other components of a society. If so, it is also apparent that this contradicts with the secular premise of a “modern” society. There are various ways to define “secularism,” and as secularist apologetics in the region argue, partly against Islamist criticism of secularism,<sup>15)</sup> this term does not have to be defined according to the Western model. But

in any case, it implies the separation of politics and religion in one form or another, and lesser involvements of religion in public political life than previous centuries. Separation of politics and religion may take a form of violent opposition, as in the case of France, or a form of moderate separation, as in the case of the United States. So, it could very well take a form of very moderate separation in the Middle East as exponents of secularism say, in their desperate political campaign against Islamist criticism.<sup>16)</sup> But the premise of *millah* may not be compatible even with this argument. *Millah*, being a socio-religious community, and all members of a society belonging to some *millah*, make the society religious by definition (“religious” according to *millah* perspective). The question seems to be one of paradigms. Raising a question of whether something is secular or not might not fit with the nature of Middle Eastern societies, in general, and *millah*, in particular.<sup>17)</sup>

Secularists in the West as well as in the East tend to agree, in general, that a “modern” society ought to be secular, and that “modernization” is accompanied by secularization. These presumptions were without doubt behind the policies of the Middle Eastern governments and the developed countries to assist in these countries’ developments after the second World War. Those who tried to develop these countries along secularist lines, imagined that with the policies’ success, Islam, as well as other religions in the region, would cease to be a political force, even though they would continue to play an important role in the private life of, especially, the uneducated classes in society. Given the general triumph of secularist trends in the former half of the 20th century in many countries in the region, and the gradual decline of Islamic political powers, this understanding could not be proved to be flawed until the late

1970s.

Modernity necessarily accompanied by secularization, or by separation of religion from secular nation-states, has historical roots in the West with painful memories of Mediaeval wars and civil wars caused by religions and attempts to overcome them. If this is simply interpreted as "Western experiences," however great its significance is, it would have resulted in a more sound position. Instead, "[T]he essential thesis of modernization theory is the existence of a global unilinear social history in which the West advances along continuum and the non-West remains behind."<sup>18</sup> We should remember, however, the first notable success of modernization of non-Western countries, that is, Japan, did not follow the Western approach in this respect. After entering the modern era with the Meiji Restoration, Japan made Shintoism a state religion while it geared toward a rapid modernization. Although the position of the Imperial Shintoism was not appreciated by many Japanese for religious or political reasons, this is not a place to make an evaluation on that aspect of the policy. What is important here is that Japan made a successful modernization and that it did so with a position contrary to secularization. In other words, the Japanese case may indicate that secularization is not an inevitable component of modernization. Of course, it does not indicate that modernization can always be successful without secularization.

In any case, if policy makers in the Middle East, and their supporters in the capitals of the developed countries, predicted the inevitable decline of Islam in political and public spheres, we can conclude that, looking from the subsequent course of political developments, they were wrong in their understanding, and that their negligence to prepare a proper place

for Islam and other religions proved to be fatal. This negligence, with other causes, brought repercussions: failure of Lebanese democracy based on confessionalism and the religious revival with its first and most dramatic manifestation in the Islamic Revolution in Iran. We agree with Lisa Anderson, examining the American works of political science on the region, that the “unexpected collapse of Lebanese democracy, the eclipse of Arab nationalism, and the rise of what became known in the West as Islamic fundamentalism had been completely at odds with modernization theory’s confident prediction of increasing democratization and secularization, of course, and occasioned a flood of efforts to describe and explain them.”<sup>19)</sup>

As a result of socio-political developments and changes during the last five decades, the social and political situation in many countries today is quite complicated. On the one hand, secularization has progressed to a great extent, even if it failed to eliminate political forces of religions, and secularized the Middle Eastern countries in many respects. On the other hand, the religious revival has advanced significantly in the last two decades, partly being helped by the remaining strength of *millah* culture, and partly by strengthening that culture. It has not so far become strong enough to change the picture totally; hence polarization, as we have observed.

In the aftermath of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, for example, we witnessed a massive exodus of highly educated people from the country. They were already so secularized, or accustomed to a secular way of life, that they could not tolerate the return of an Islamic state. One might be tempted at this point to argue that, if the monarchy before the revolution pursued a modernization policy more appropriate to the indigenous

culture, especially in religious aspects, rather than one based on the premise of the inevitability of secularization along strong Westernization lines, it would not have alienated the masses, who eventually found nothing but an Islamic revolution as their choice, nor created a class of elite who had grown so alien to the masses.

### Concluding Remarks

When the Middle East was under Islamic rule, religious communities as a source of identification had an apparent primacy, though there were other sources of identification as secondary ones. Dismantling Islamic states and installing "units" of the Western model, first as colonial states, then as post-colonial "nation-states," were supposedly creating a new set of sources for identification, in which national or patriotic ones should attain priority while religions declined with modernization and subsequent secularization.

This position was not really challenged until the late 1970s. With the Islamic revival and resurgence of religious sentiment among members of Islamic and non-Islamic communities, we started to inquire into conceptual questions related to religion. As an attempt to answer them, this article raised the concept of *millah* as a tool to define and analyze characteristics of religion in the Middle East. *Millah* being a socio-religious community, and Middle Easterners being always born into *millahs* while they may be able to change *millah* affiliations later, make *millah* an unseparable part of a society and its political culture.

Rather than beginning with secularist presumptions, we should take

a starting point more appropriate to an indigenous culture, for whichever area we are studying about. Being religious may not be something negative, if a given society values it highly. And “being religious” should not be interpreted by the concept of religion in other societies. It would lead to misinterpretations. *Millah* is a conceptual tool to understand religiousness in the contexts of the Middle East. It might be of some use in other areas of the Islamic world. It is hoped that it will contribute to making a more balanced picture of contemporary society and politics in the region.

#### NOTES

- 1) L. Carl Brown, *International Politics and the Middle East: Old Rules, Dangerous Games*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1984, pp. 7-10.
- 2) Islamic civilization is not civilization of the Islamic religion nor Muslims' civilization. Under Islamic hegemony, it integrated Islamic and non-Islamic religions, and many members of non-Islamic religions contributed greatly in building a new civilization which came to inherit all civilizations in the West Asian-Mediterranean areas flourishing before Islam. Institutions which were created under this civilization developed mostly along Islamic principles, but beyond principles they were responding to particular needs of a time or of a local area. If we are referring to Islam as seen in social reality, Islamic principles are manifested only in temporal and local contexts, while the principles usually give these particular manifestations a universal element common to each other. In a sense, Islam is localized in any locality when it converts that locality. We can speak of, hence, Iranian Islam that is Islam in the Iranian fashion, which certainly differs from the one in Egypt. Researchers tend to see the issue from one of these aspects, and emphasize

either the universal aspect of Islam or the local aspect of Islam. It will be more appropriate and precise if we see them as complimentary in a dynamic way.

- 3) In this respect, examination of de-Islamization and re-Islamization in the Islamic countries of former Soviet Central Asian is one of the most interesting areas today. I have started some research in this respect, and conducted my first field trip in 1993. I hope to present some tentative assessments in the near future.
- 4) "Milla" in *Encyclopedia of Islam* (2nd ed.).
- 5) The best work in this category is, of course, *Al-Milal wa al-Nihal* by M. A. Shahrastani. See its English translation: Shahrastani, A. K. Kazi and J. G. Flynn (trs.), *Muslim Sects and Divisions*, London, Kegan Paul International, 1984.
- 6) There have been discussions over whether "protected" communities implies "second class citizens" or not. In the modern periods, Arab nationalists, especially those with Christian backgrounds, advocated Arab nationalism under which Arabs from all religions can live as equal citizens. This claim was quite reasonable. The historical reality, however, was that this "solution" created a different kind of "second class citizens," that is, ethnic minorities. For example, the Kurds were not an ethnic minority under Islamic rule, but became so under Arab nationalism, while members of a "protected" minority of old days became a part of the dominant nation. From a realistic political point of view, therefore, the question of majority-minority framework for a state remains in any political formulation. This author does not attempt to deal with the question from an idealistic point of view.
- 7) According to Dr. Tadashi Suzuki, Professor in the Oriental Institute at the University of Tokyo.
- 8) Each *millah* does not justify its members' leaving the community. Islamic law categorically denies the right to leave. All *millahs*, however, accept newcomers from other communities, and it is a question of power

- for a *millah* to protect these newcomers, despite a disagreement with the former *millahs* from which they left.
- 9) There are parents who want to name their children with more “neutral” names. The choice would be one which is used commonly by many *millahs*.
  - 10) See Y. Kosugi, *Egypt: Tradition and Contemporary Society*, Tokyo, Nihon-hoso-shuppan-kyokai, 1989, pp. 30-40. [in Japanese]
  - 11) Foreign names were excluded from the survey.
  - 12) “Coptic” means Egyptian. The majority of them belong to the traditional Coptic Orthodox Church. There are members of other Churches, who arrived in Egypt only in modern periods.
  - 13) See Y. Kosugi, “Lebanon: Confessional Political Identity and Educational System,” in Kazuo Miyaji (ed.), *Development and Integration in the Middle East*, The Institute of Developing Economies, 1985, pp. 62-65. [in Japanese]
  - 14) See Y. Kosugi, “Ideals and Movements of Islamic Revolution among the Arab Shiites, with special emphasis on Hizbullah in Lebanon,” *Bulletin of I.M.E.S.*, Vol. 5, 1991, pp. 53-84. [in Japanese]
  - 15) Once in the hey days of secular nationalisms in the region, Islamists were defensive, but the tide seems to have changed. From the 1970s onward, with the advent of the Islamic revival, secularists are on the defensive. In Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, and other places, we have started to see an increase in publications with Islamic criticism of secularist ideas. For example, public debates on “secularism” in Egypt in the 1980s and the early 1990s, show respective positions of secularists and Islamists. See, Nancy E. Gallagher, “Islam v. Secularism in Cairo: An Account of the Dar al-Hikma Debate,” *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 25, 1989, pp. 208-215. I made an analysis on the same case and another public debate in my “Debates on Secular State in Egypt: An Interim Assessment,” *Middle East Studies*, No. 314, 1987, pp. 1-11. [in Japanese]
  - 16) This is on the plane of politico-religious thought, and not on the plane of

actual polity. For example, Egyptian *de facto* secular state is not seriously shaken as the position of secularist thinkers.

- 17) Separation of politics and religion presumes dualism of sacred and temporal, for both their union and separation. I have named it "horizontal differentiation," and the Islamic model "vertical differentiation." See Y. Kosugi "Restructuring Islamic Political Theories: Basic Concepts in a Contemporary Framework," in T. Kuroda and R. I. Lawless (eds.), *Nature of the Islamic Community*, Tokyo, Keiso Shobo, 1991, pp. 37-70.
- 18) Samih K. Farsoun and Lisa Hajjar, "The Contemporary Sociology of the Middle East: An Assessment," in Sharabi (ed.), *Theory, Politics and the Arab World*, p. 170. See the evaluation on failure of modernization theory to comprehend the Middle East in pp. 170-177.
- 19) Lisa Anderson, "Policy-Making and Theory Building: American Political Science and the Islamic Middle East," in Hisham Sharabi (ed.), *op. cit.*, p. 64.

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