

Search for Theories of North-South Relations in the 1980s

Yoshitaka OKADA

I Introduction

Incessantly changing and altering socio-economic and political reality creates fruitful grounds for a scholar to reevaluate, refine, or advance social theories. Dialectically interacting theories and the reality, anomalies found in theories often compell scholars to review existing theories and in some cases to search for a new one that can comprehend anomalies.¹ In the 1970s and the early 1980s we have witnessed drastic changes in North-South relationships. Prior to the 1970s developed countries, supported by their strong economic power and political hegemony, and developing countries, backed by their strong love and hate feelings inherited from their colonial experiences, often refused to sit at negotiation tables with each other. Contrary to the trend, changing world power structure and the increased bargaining power of some developing countries, especially oil producing countries, triggered a move toward North-South negotiations and compromising relationships between the two groups. In the first half of the 1970s there clearly was evidence of increased political struggles of some developing countries and of defensive postures of some developed countries. However, in the latter 1970s and the early 1980s such movements started dwindling. Diversified international stratification and, as its consequence, diversified national interests created fragmentation among the nations in both the North and the South. Such fragmentation, enhanced by a stagnating international economy, created complexity in North-South relationships and even in relationships among the countries in each group.² The condition may be reaching to the point where in some aspects of negotiations the North-South division is becoming too simple and to some extent meaningless, suggesting the lagging nature of conceptual developments in dealing with North-South issues.

This paper, first, briefly traces recent developments in the relationships, and then critically evaluates the applicability of current existing theories in the sociology of economic change.

II Developments in North-South Relationships

The first half of the 1970s may be characterized by the increasing bargaining power of some developing countries, creating favorable conditions for them in North-South relationships. Some developing countries such as Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, Korea, Greece, Portugal, Spain, Yugoslavia, Brazil, and Mexico,³ now being called the Newly Industrialised Countries (NICs), showed evidence of success in industrialization. Their success in internal accumulation of resources, technology and

capital provided them with stronger economic bargaining power, and they are sometimes even considered as a threat to developed countries.

Such successful internal accumulation resulted in increasing direct investments from some developing countries to others. If a multinational corporation is defined as a corporation which owns or controls production or service facilities outside the country in which it is based,⁴ there are quite a few so-called Third-World multinational corporations. The contributions of these corporations to the developmental processes of developing countries are considered unique and significant. These corporations tend to 1)prefer joint ventures with local capital, 2)use proper technology for local contexts, 3)transfer technology, 4)import less materials from other countries, 5)have less control from parent companies, and 6)indigenize much faster.⁵ In Thailand there are nine Indian, six Taiwanese, two Singaporean, and three Malaysian investments.⁶ In Indonesia 288 foreign-owned manufacturing projects operated between 1967 and 1975, and that sixty-four of these were found to be from developing countries.⁷ Their influence is becoming unignorable in relationships among developing countries and even to North-South relationships.

Dynamic movements of some developing countries seemed to appear in the increase of exports of manufactured goods from developing countries to developed countries. The value of these exports grew at 15% annually between 1958-1960 and 1969-1971. The boom years of 1972 and 1973 saw an additional annual increase in value of over 30%. Manufactured exports accounted for over one half of the total increase in the volume of exports from developing countries in 1973.⁸ Such expansion and diversification of trade were achieved by a considerable number of developing countries. On the basis of these changes, developing countries that had capability to expand manufactured goods began to criticize the restrictions sometimes placed by industrialized countries on imports of manufactured goods from developing countries.⁹

The rise of economic nationalism and the increasing demands for changes in inequitable internal social systems, the abolition of poverty, and the establishment of full employment created a threat to the legitimacy of the governments in developing countries. Such internal movements led to the rise of new political elites who lended less sympathetic ears than their predecessors to the interests of developed countries. Such movements resulted in changes in attitudes of developing countries to promote or protect their own interests against the exploitative relationships with developed countries. Even though this shift is less conspicuous, it has become apparent in their actions relating to the exploitation of their natural resources by outsiders, to new trade in manufactured goods, and to the activities of multinational corporations operating within their borders.

Above all, the most drastic impact upon the Third World bargaining power was found in the formation of the OPEC oil cartel. As the OPEC nations' accumulation of domestic skills and capital advanced, these countries started their own fields, refining

capacities and tanker fleets.¹⁰ In 1963, 82% of the crude oil production in market economies was dominated by the seven majors,¹¹ only 9% was owned by the oil-country governments, and the remaining 9% was owned by others. By contrast, in 1975 the oil-country governments owned 62% of crude oil production, and the domination of the majors was reduced to 30%.¹² Even though this movement did not quite result in the economic disintegration of the international petroleum oligarchy, it created some instability in the international economic order. It is not only the accumulation of capital and technological know-how, but also the formation of an organization in order to increase bargaining power, that has enabled OPEC nations to squeeze a larger share for their countries.

Having witnessed the successful formation of the OPEC oil cartel, other developing countries came to recognize that they no longer need be marginal to the interests of the industrialized nations.¹³ In due course, developing countries started demanding a new international economic order in which more benefits would accrue to developing countries rather than to developed countries. In April 1974 immediately after the oil crisis, the United Nations General Assembly concluded the Sixth Special Session by committing itself "to work urgently for the establishment of a new international economic order ... which shall correct inequalities and redress existing injustices ..."¹⁴ As an extension of this effort, the United Nations drafted a charter in 1974 that guarantees economic rights and duties of states to regulate the activities of the multinationals within their jurisdiction.¹⁵ Furthermore, in 1976 OECD declared guidelines for multinational corporations.¹⁶ As a result of increasing bargaining power of developing countries and encouragement by international organizations, an increasing number of developing countries began to impose stronger controls over the behavior of multinational corporations. Regulations such as the requirement of governmental evaluation of and approval for entry of foreign investment, registration of technology contracts, indigenization policies, and control over some aspects of transfer pricing are found in many developing countries.¹⁷ Thus, in the first half of the 1970s developing countries started showing their increased bargaining power vis-a-vis developed countries and in global negotiations they successfully obtained some concessions from developed countries.

Despite the success in obtaining concessions from developed countries, in the 1980s North-South global negotiations started facing deadlock. UNCTAD conferences in 1976 and 1979, a new cocoa agreement in 1979, UNIDO conference in 1980, conference on patents, negotiations on a new tin agreement, and 11th special session of the UN in 1980, all resulted in conflict between developed and developing countries and no successful negotiation was achieved. Naturally, agreements between developed and developing countries are not at all easy to obtain, but some new developments in global situations are contributing to this difficulty. Increased and diversified international economic stratification is creating rather more complex relationships among

and between nations than what the word, North-South relationship, portrays. Fragmentation among developed countries and more complex stratification taking place in developing countries provide difficulty not only in creating the solidarity of the North or the South nations, but also in even identifying similarities in interests and needs.

Especially, diversified economic stratification among developing countries is throwing some shadow over the conceptual validity of the North and South division. It is often argued that developing countries are divided into four groups: 1) oil-exporting countries, 2) newly industrialized countries (NICs), 3) oil-importing countries with potential energy sources to supply all or a large part of their needs, and 4) oil-importing countries with no energy sources of their own.¹⁸ Their characteristics are: in the category 1) oil revenue is expected to bring a strong process of industrialization; countries in the category 2) show high GNP per capita, and a high percentage of manufactured goods constitute their exports; countries in the category 3) earn their foreign currencies in primary products, and often faces economic troubles because of price fluctuations of primary commodities; and countries in the category 4) are the poorest nations in the world. The economic conditions of these four groups clearly show different needs and interests for their development, and it is the difference that hampers the consolidation of developing countries. For example, through North-South negotiations rich oil-exporting countries result in demanding a more foreign aid that they do not need, low income countries demand trade liberalization for manufactured products that they do not produce, and the middle income countries demand a reform in international financial arrangements which they do not need.¹⁹ There are clearly differences in needs and demands among developing countries, and the differences are clearly indicative of the lagging nature of institutional and conceptual developments in North-South relationships.

Even among developed countries world-wide economic stagnation, the declining economic power of the U.S.A, and the increasing economic power of Japan and West Germany create schisms among the developed countries through trade wars and political conflicts. Recognition of weakening economic power of the U.S.A forced Americans to defend their global status quo by using protectionism, resource diplomacy, and attack against the creeping power of developing countries.²⁰ And furthermore the world-wide economic stagnation is causing all developed countries to be conservative and apologetic. Such economic condition is hampering developed countries to adopt a more beneficial or appropriate role for the development of developing countries, but simultaneously it is weakening the economic consolidation among developed countries, creating a vacuum which some developing countries may possibly use to their advantage. For example, increased trade wars and economic competition among multinational corporations from developed countries may possibly enhance bargaining power of some developing countries, creating keener conflicts over the permission for investment entry into developing countries, or in some cases allowing

some Third World multinational corporations to creep into markets previously dominated by developed countries.

The theoretical incapability of comprehending the recent fragmentation of solidarity and the rise of complex relationships in North-South relationships pinpoint the lack of conceptual developments and the lagging nature of institutional developments in understanding social reality. The limitations and anomalies that we may find in the existing developmental theories evince the clear needs of new frameworks for understanding North-South relationships. For this purpose, in the next section I shall critically evaluate the validity of some developmental theories in interpreting the current complex relationships.

III Critical Review of Theories

There are two major models in the sociological study of development.²¹ One model, sometimes referred to as an equilibrium model, typically includes several approaches including the behavioral, psychodynamic, and diffusionist approaches.²² The other model, sometimes referred to as a conflict model, also typically includes several approaches including the Marxist and structural-non-Marxist approaches.²³ In this section I shall present critical evaluations of the equilibrium model, the Latin American dependency theory in the Marxist approach, Galtung's dependency theory and the bilateral monopoly theory in the structural non-Marxist approach.

1. Equilibrium Model

The equilibrium model typically assumes that a country evolves from a "traditional society" into a "modern society," that resembles present developed countries. The assumption was that all societies were similar in their socio-economic structures at one stage, and that they pass through a similar set of social changes, eventually resulting in achieving a modern society. Thus, a country wishing to achieve development should imitate the developmental path of the current developed countries and should apply the past experiences and strategies of Western countries.²⁴ The leading figures in the equilibrium model have been Parsons and Eisenstadt, and they have sought to identify a series of evolutionary patterns that characterize each stage of social evolution.²⁵ Hoselitz, the follower of Parsons, tries to describe the process of development by using pattern-variables.²⁶ Learner identified three stages of development, while Rostow in his *Stages of Economic Growth : A Non-Communist Manifesto* used the five-stage scheme.²⁷ The psychodynamic approach within the equilibrium model tries to identify the factors that bring transition from "tradition" to "modernity."²⁸ These equilibrium-model assumptions, however, ignore important dissimilarities between developed and developing countries in the historical experiences, ontological conditions of their "take-offs,"²⁹ and psychological and behavioral patterns of people who lived under different historical circumstances. There is no reason to

believe that the dynamics of change are the same in societies at similar developmental stages. And such dynamics are captured in this equilibrium model simply as endogenous to the society, disregarding the relationships between endogenous and exogenous factors.

Within this theory confusion is found not only in the historical contexts, but also in the horizontal dimension where the diversity of existing ontological conditions is creating different needs and interests even among developing countries situated in a similar developmental stage. Furthermore, due to the failure in identifying the importance of exogenous factors to the society and the relationships between exogenous and endogenous factors, this model completely ignores the role of North-South relationships in the developmental processes of developing countries. Such theoretical orientation fails to provide any framework for interpreting the fragmentation of solidarity and the rise of complex relationships among the North or the South and between the two groups.

2. Latin American Dependency Theory

The conflict model seems to provide more conceptual handles with which to theorize on relationships between developed and developing countries. Within a conflict model, both structural-non-Marxists (such as Galtung) and Marxists (such as Latin American dependency theorists) focus their attention on North-South relationships. Using such categories as "center" and "periphery" to indicate the conditioning and dominating nature of the international economic processes. Dependency theorists, such as the Latin American writers, provide insights into the formation of the relationships and mechanisms of domination and conditioning of the "periphery" by the "center." However, even though dependency theorists have been successful in showing the nature and process of "center-periphery" relations, most of them have not been successful in predicting newly rising dynamic movements of the "peripheries" in the 1970s and, needless to say, in predicting fragmentation and complexity of North-South relationship in the latter 1970s and the early 1980s.

The dependency theory focuses upon the problem of economic penetration of developed countries, and its influence upon economic, political, and social aspects of developing countries. It is argued that the consequences of this foreign penetration and influence create an "underdevelopment" of developing countries.

The originator of the Latin American School of dependency theory, Andre Gunder Frank, argues that capitalist expansion, which is necessary for the production and reproduction of capitalist economy in developed countries, generates an underdevelopment of developing countries.³⁰ Using a dichotomous categorization of "metropolis-satellite," he shows in his historical study of Brazil and Chile that the mechanisms of exploitation and appropriation of economic surplus by "metropolis" over "satellite" nations has generated past underdevelopment and continuous underdevelopment of

"satellite" nations. Thus, according to his argument, the underdevelopment of developing countries is largely determined by the capitalist expansion of developed countries.

Dos Santos, criticizing Gunder Frank's ignoring "internal structures conditioned by international relationship of dependence," theorizes that the internal social structure is determined by the formation of dependency relationships.³¹ The external relationship generates internal social structures, and the latter function to maintain and perpetuate the dependency relationship between developed and developing countries.

Dos Santos describes different types of dependency situations, and argues that the dependency situation in the present time is "techno-industrial" dependence which is formulated by multinational corporations. Multinational corporations are considered to be the major economic organizations that perpetuate dependency relations between "center" and "periphery" nations and that perpetuate certain social and political structures inside the "periphery" nations.

Oswald Sunkel further elaborates the dependency situation caused by multinational corporations.³² He argues that the infiltration of capitalism with multinational corporations can be identified neither as an external relationship between "center" and "periphery," nor as an internal aspect of "periphery." Rather a segment of internal structure that belongs to multinational corporations is merged into a part of the external structure, splitting the "periphery" into integrated and disintegrated segments of multinational corporations. It is the internationalization of the "center in the periphery" by multinational corporations that destroys the national boundary and integrates one small segments of the "periphery" into the international market. This internationalization creates a disintegrated "periphery" and marginalizes the "periphery of the periphery."

These theorists identify dependency structure with mechanico-formal economic determinism and consequently argue that there is a permanent underdevelopment of developing countries due to the exploitative nature of economic determinism. This theoretical orientation inevitably identify developing countries passive and powerless, predestined to be exploited in the capitalist economic order. Consequently, the theoretical orientation leads to a search for a solution in the immediate negation of the dependency relationship, namely, in immediate revolution.

In the latter 1970s the theoretical aspects of those dependency theorists faced some sharp criticisms.³³ Due to their theoretical orientation on the totality of relationships rather than the specificity of historical facts,³⁴ the Latin American dependency theorists were criticised that the "mechanico-formal" nature of the theory produced only static and unrealistic descriptions of history and social reality.³⁵ Hence, the theory is found incapable of comprehending the dynamic movements of developing countries and the complex relationships taking place between North and South.

Within the Latin American school of dependency, dependent development theorists are capable of capturing dynamic social movements taking place within developing countries.³⁶ They see the relationship between external and internal forces as forming a complex whole in determining the socio-economic structure of dependency. External forces and social structures impose limits on social processes and reinforce established forms of behavior. Consequently, these internal and external structures generate contradictions and social tensions, opening the possibilities for social movements and ideologies of change. Even though the dependent development theorists may allow one to grasp social movements, it defines them as the manifestation of contradictions within capitalist dependent development and as the dialectic processes of changing existing social structures. However, the dynamic movements of developing countries in the 1970s seem to manifest struggles to change contradictions within existing social structures, not the contradictions of social structures themselves. The movements rather manifest struggles to increase bargaining power of some developing countries, and reflect a changing distribution of bargaining power between developed and developing countries even within "dependent development." They do not necessarily signify dialectic processes of negating the capitalist socio-economic structures of developing countries. Even the theoretical framework of dependent development has difficulty in interpreting the new tendencies of North and South relationships.

3. Galtung's Concept of Dependency

Johan Galtung, who approaches conflict as a structural-non-Marxist, provides quite a comprehensive framework to analyze the situation of dependency relationships between North and South countries.³⁷ Dependency (imperialism in his term) as he sees it is essentially a matter of power relationships of dominance.³⁸ Galtung's framework allows one to comprehend dependency situations in both capitalist and socialist modes of production. Furthermore, it allows observations of not only economic aspects, but also political and social aspects in the interactions between "center" and "periphery" countries.

Galtung focuses upon collectivities existing in both "center" and "periphery" nations rather than exclusively upon their class structures. The concept of collectivity allows an analyst to deal with the fluidity of social groups or class formations in developing countries. With this concept of collectivity Galtung identifies four different types of collectivities. They are "the center in the center," "the periphery in the center," "the center in the periphery," and "the periphery in the periphery." Each collectivity has their own interest which is based upon living conditions of the collectivity. Dependency is briefly described as "a system that splits up collectivities and relates some of the parts to each other in relations of harmony of interest, and other parts in relations of disharmony of interest, or conflict of interest."³⁹ Thus, it is the degree of harmony or disharmony that links or divides these four collectivities. To be

specific, dependency is defined by Galtung as a relation between a "center" and a "periphery" nation so that:⁴⁰

- 1) there is harmony of interest between the center in the center nation and the center in the periphery nation;
- 2) there is more disharmony of interest within the periphery nations than within the center nations;
- 3) there is disharmony of interest between the periphery in the center nation and the periphery in the periphery nation.

Despite the fact that his theorization on the basis of power enables Galtung to deal with many different contexts of dependency situations, his theory is ultimately static and descriptive without the ability to explain how and why dynamic changes between developed and developing countries take place.⁴¹ Even though Galtung theorizes that dependency is a power relationship, he has never given any indication of the way in which power formulates dependency and creates splits in collectivities. Instead, the concept of power is taken over by other concepts of harmony and disharmony of interest. The degree of harmony and disharmony of interest between collectivities is actually the end result of power interactions among collectivities: the degree of harmony is the end result of powerful collectivities providing or withholding benefits to less powerful collectivities, and of less powerful collectivities influencing or rejecting powerful collectivities.

The descriptive and static nature of Galtung's theory comes partially from his lack of elaboration about the concept of power, and partially from focusing only upon structures rather than the process of the formation. He states that "to have power is to be in the center, and to be powerless is to be in the periphery"⁴² He sees the power system as being essentially static, and perceives the international system as analogous to a feudal system. At the top are powerful countries, called topdog nations. Under these nations are underdog nations.⁴³ It is assumed that underdog nations will remain weak, topdog nations will remain powerful, and underdog states in a particular subsystem will remain in that system. This structural system of power does not quite seem to fit the reality. The current topdog nations can become weak, and other topdog nations may come to possess more power. Even among underdog nations there is a constant rise and fall of the power positions in the world, and underdog nations in a subsystem often change their "center" nation. Therefore, Galtung's concept of dependency is unable to explain the dynamic nature of developing countries, the capacity of developing countries to increase its political bargaining power against developed countries, needless to say about the complexity of current relationships between North and South nations.

4. Bilateral Monopoly Theory

Even though their focus is limited to the roles of multinational corporations in

the power relationship between developed and developing countries, bilateral monopoly theorists⁴⁴ argue that there is a dynamic interaction in the process of bargaining between oligopolistic power holders of multinational corporations and monopsonistic power holders of governments of developing countries.

Bilateral monopoly theorists argue that foreign direct investments were primarily born from oligopolistic conditions of the home country economy. The concentration of production factors and access to capital caused imperfect competition in factor markets, and provided opportunities to control foreign goods markets through international trade as well as to dominate domestic markets. Facing importing nations' efforts to curtail their imports, oligopolistic corporations started investing in foreign countries so as to maintain the oligopolistic control of production factors, to prevent the decline of profits, and to maximize profits. Because of the oligopolistic needs, foreign direct investment is characterized by continued control of investors over the decision-making of invested unit,⁴⁵ and the effective mechanisms of international control and coordination by parent companies become the major element of multinational operations and global strategies.⁴⁶

In contrast, developing countries urgently need oligopolistically controlled production factors (capital, managerial and technological know-how, etc.) in order to obtain their desired goals of development. Despite the urgent needs, however, the socio-economic effects of the multinationals are often found contradictory to the developmental goals of developing countries. The fear for the multinationals' domination of economic activities and the consequent distortions in developmental processes compel governments of developing countries to be defensive and to exercise countervailing power against the multinationals. Power on the part of developing countries is derived from the legitimacy of the governments and their monopsonistic control over the access into markets and necessary production factors (raw materials and inexpensive labor). Thus, the oligopolistic power holders of multinational corporations and monopsonistic power holders of developing countries' governments engage in bilateral bargaining.

The importance of bilateral bargaining lies in distributional aspects; a participant's final returns from bargaining depend on the relative strength and exercise of bargaining power among the parties involved. "Bargaining power" suggests that advantages in the process of bargaining accrue to the powerful, and the distributional results obtained are legitimized in relation to the prevailing power configurations and the established inequalities.⁴⁷ The bilateral monopolists argue that unfair distribution between multinational corporations and developing countries is conditioned by unequal bargaining power distribution rather than inherent capitalist world structure. This premise theoretically allows developing countries to achieve their development within capitalist or reformed-capitalist economic structures rather than providing only socialist alternatives. Development through bargaining is possible, because oligopo-

listically controlled production factors are transferrable to developing countries and because the non-zero-sum game of the bargaining suggests that the degree of collaboration and conflict between participants determines the total gains and the proportions of the shares that have to be distributed. Incidentally, a bilateral theorist even predicts that not only the increased bargaining power of developing countries but also the increased spread and competition among multinational corporations of diverse national origins may strengthen rather than weaken the positions of developing countries.

Economic nationalism plays an important role in promoting bargaining processes. It can help to cultivate new ideological directions and provide political elites with a new vision of development. Economic nationalism may have a permanent attractiveness for the bourgeoisie and compell them to promote local accumulation, while foreign investors may have a tactical appeal only for a limited duration when a country needs something from foreign investors. Hence, in the face of turbulent economic nationalism the relationship between foreign investors and local elites may become more fragile than dependency theorists predict.

Even though the bilateral monopoly theory captures important elements of interaction between developed and developing countries, because of its economic nature and its focus upon only multinational corporations and governments of developing countries, it tends to lack theoretical developments in the basic concept of power, determinants of power, and the process of formulating power relationships. Furthermore, because of its focus upon bilateral bargaining processes, the inadequacy of conceptual developments in multilateral bargaining processes weakens its theoretical applicability to the complexity of current relationships between North and South nations.

IV Conclusion

North-South relationships in the 1980s seem to be characterized by diversified international stratification, multipolarization, and fragmentation among developed and developing countries, formulating unprecedentedly complex relationships between the North and the South and even relationships within the North or South nations.

Such unprecedented developments in international social reality throw some scepticism and shadow over the conceptual developments of North-South relationships and over the lagging nature of institutional developments. A theoretical orientation often provides a conceptual framework for interpreting social reality, but a theory, lagging behind social reality, becomes incapable of comprehending the reality, producing simply a large number of anomalies. Sensitivity to time and social reality becomes the essential qualification for developmental theorists and even for the development of institutions themselves. Constant dialectic interaction between theories and reality becomes the essential means for attaining such qualifications.

Examining some theories, this paper provides ample evidence of institutional underdevelopment in interpreting and understanding North-South relationships in the 1980s. The equilibrium model theoretically ignores the importance of exogenous factors to the society and the relationships between exogenous and endogenous factors. North-South relationships are found to have no place in the theory. In contrast, the Latin American dependency theorists, mainly focusing upon the relationships between developed and developing countries, produced only static and unrealistic descriptions of history and social reality due to its "mechanico-formal" nature of the theory. Similarly, Galtung's theory of dependency (imperialism in his term), focusing upon the structural description of the relationships between developed and developing countries completely lacked dynamic elements in his theorization. Only the bilateral monopoly theory, using the concept of bargaining, provided explanation for dynamic movements of developing countries in the 1970s. However, because of its focus upon bilateral relationships between developed and developing countries, and upon multinational corporations and governments of developing countries, the theory tends to ignore developments in the basic conceptualization of bargaining, namely, the basic concept of power, determinants of power, and the process of formulating power relationships.

Bargaining theory with profound developments in conceptual theorization may provide some grip over the reality of existing North-South relationships in the 1980s. For this purpose the theoretical developments in the basic conceptualization of power is essential, and such efforts may lead to the identification of needs and power sources of each country, typology of bilateral and multilateral power relationships, and international power stratification. (The international power stratification is important, since often the power position vis-a-vis another country justifies their share of benefits.) These efforts may fruitfully result in formulating some consolidated concept of North-South relationships, and in providing some typological insight into the structure of international cooperation based upon the needs and sources of power of each country. Such inquiry may be able to identify an ideal network of international cooperation that can equally distribute the fruits of international cooperation by closely examining the needs and sources of power and their power positions.

NOTES

- 1) Thomas S. Kuhn, *Structure of Scientific Revolution*. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1970.
- 2) Ferdinand van Dam, "North-South Negotiations" *Development and Change* 12 (1981) p.481-503.
- 3) Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, *The Impact of the Newly Industrialized Countries on Production and Trade in Manufactures*. Paris,

- OECD, 1979.
- 4) United Nations, *Multinational Corporations in World Development*. (ST/ECA/190) New York, United Nations, 1973.
 - 5) 江夏健一：中進工業諸国における Mini-Multinationals 「世界経済評論」 25巻 2号 (1981) p.44-51.
 - 6) D. Lecraw, "Direct Investments by Firms from Less Developed Countries" *Oxford Economic Paper* 29 (1977) p.442-457.
 - 7) Louis T. Wells, "Foreign Investment from the Third World: the Experience of Chinese Firms from Hong Kong" *Columbia Journal of World Business* 13 (1, 1978) p.39-49.
 - 8) General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, *International Trade 1973/74*. Geneva, GATT, 1974.
 - 9) Guy F. Erb, "The Developing World's "Challenge" in Perspective" In Guy F. Erb and Valeriana Kallab, ed., *Beyond Dependency: The Developing World Speaks Out*. New York, Praeger Publishers, 1975.
 - 10) Theodore H. Moran, "The Politics of Oil: Coups and Costs" *Foreign Policy* 8 (1972) p.129-137.
 - 11) The majors are British Petroleum, Exxon, Gulf, Mobil, Shell, Standard of California, and Texaco.
 - 12) United Nations, *Transnational Corporations in World Development: A Re-Examination*. (E/C. 10/38) New York, United Nations, 1978. p.55.
 - 13) Albert Fishlow, "A New International Economic Order: What Kind? In Albert Fishlow, et, al, ed., *Rich and Poor Nations in the World Economy*. New York, McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1978.
 - 14) United Nations, "U.N. General Assembly Resolution 3201 (S-VI), May 1, 1974" *U.N. Monthly Chronicle* 11 (1974) p.66.
 - 15) United Nations, "Resolution Establishing the Commission on Transnational Corporations and Charter of the Economic Rights and Duties of States" In George Modelski ed., *Transnational Corporations and World Order*. San Francisco, W. H. Freeman, 1979.
 - 16) Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, "Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises" In George Modelski ed., *Transnational Corporations and World Order*. San Francisco, W.H. Freeman, 1979.
 - 17) Constantine Vaitsos, "Foreign Investment Policies and Economic Development in Latin America" *Journal of World Trade Law* 7(1973)p.619-661; and Stefan H. Robock, Kenneth Simmonds, and Jack Zwick, *International Business and Multinational Enterprises*. Homewood, Ill., Richard D. Irwin, 1977.
 - 18) Ferdinand van Dam, *op. cit.* ; and 山本登：南北問題の趨勢と東西問題「海外事情」 24巻 3号 (1976) p.1-12.

- 19) Arturo L. Goetz, "Beyond the Slogan of South-South Cooperation" *World Development* 9 (6, 1981)p.583-585.
- 20) Scheveningen Report, "Toward a New International Development Strategy" *Development Dialogue* 1 (1980)p.55-67.
- 21) Eugene A. Havens, "Methodological Issues in the Study of Development" *Sociologia Ruralis* 12 (1972) p.252-272.
- 22) Scholars in the behavioral approach within an equilibrium model are J. H. Kunkel, *Society and Economic Growth* (New York, Oxford University Press, 1970); Talcott Parsons, *Structure and Process in Modern Society* (Glencoe, Free Press, 1960); and S. N. Eisenstadt, *Modernization : Protest and Change* (Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall, 1966). Scholars in the psychodynamic approach are E.H Hagen, *On the Theory of Social Change* (Homewood, Dorsey Press, 1962) and D. McClelland, *The Achieving Society* (Princeton, Van Nostrand, 1961). Scholars in diffusionist approach are W. W. Rostow, *The Stages of Economic Growth : A Non-Communist Manifesto* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1971); Albert O. Hirschman, *The Strategy of Economic Development* (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1958); E. M. Rogers and L. Svenning, *Modernization Among Peasants* (New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1969); and B. Hoselitz, *Sociological Aspects of Economic Growth* (Glencoe, Free Press, 1960).
- 23) Structuralist-non-Marxists are R.L. Heilbroner, *The Great Ascent : The Struggle for Economic Development in Our Time* (New York, Harper and Row, 1963); and R. Prebisch, *Change and Development : Latin America's Great Task*. (Washington, Inter-American Development Bank, 1970). Marxists are T. Szentes, *The Political Economy of Underdevelopment* (Budapest, Akademiai Kiado, 1971); Paul Baran, *The Political Economy of Growth* (New York, Monthly Review Press, 1957); Andre Gunder Frank, "The Development of Under-development" *Monthly Review* 18(1966)p.17-31, and *Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America* (New York, Monthly Review Press, 1967); Theotonio Dos Santos, "The Structure of Dependence" *American Economic Review* 60 (1970) p.231-236; and Osvaldo Sunkel, "National Development Policy and External Dependence in Latin America" *Journal of Development Studies* 6 (1969-70) p.23-48.
- 24) Karl Hoerning, *Secondary Modernization : Societal Changes of Newly Developing Nations : A Theoretical Essay in Comparative Sociology* (Monograph Series No. 4-1969-70, Vol.7) Denver, The Social Science Foundation and Graduate School of International Studies, University of Denver, 1970.
- 25) S. N. Eisenstadt, *op. cit.*, and Talcott Parsons, *op. cit.*
- 26) B. Hoselitz, *op. cit.*
- 27) Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society*. London, Free Press, 1965.
- 28) E. Hagen, *op. cit.*

- 29) W. W. Rostow, *op. cit.*
- 30) Andre Gunder Frank, *op. cit.*
- 31) Dos Santos, *op. cit.*
- 32) Gabriel Palma, "Dependency: A Formal Theory of Underdevelopment or A Methodology for the Analysis of Concrete Situations of Underdevelopment?" *World Development* 6 (1978) p.881-924.
- 33) Fernando H. Cardoso, "Current Theses on Latin American Development and Dependency: A Critique" paper presented to the III Scandinavian Research Conference on Latin America, Bergen, 1976; Sanjaya Lall, "Is Independence A Useful Concept in Analysing Underdevelopment?" *World Development* 3 (1975) p.799-810; and Gabriel Palma, *op. cit.*
- 34) James A. Caporaso, "Dependence, Dependency, and Power in the Global System: A Structural and Behavioral Analysis" *International Organization* 32 (1, 1978) p.13-43.
- 35) Gabriel Palma, *op. cit.*
- 36) Fernando H. Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, *Dependency and Development*. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1979.
- 37) Johan Galtung, "Structural Theory of Imperialism" *Journal of Peace Research* 8 (1971) p.81-118.
- 38) *Ibid.*, p.81.
- 39) *Ibid.*, p.81.
- 40) *Ibid.*, p.83.
- 41) Godefried van Benthem van Den Bergh, "Theory or Taxonomy?" *Journal of Peace Research* 8 (1971)p.77-85.
- 42) Galtung, *op. cit.*, p.36.
- 43) Marshall Singer, *Weak States in a World of Power: The Dynamics of International Relations*. New York, Free Press, 1972.
- 44) Stephen H. Hymer, *The International Operation of National Firms: A Study of Direct Investment*. Cambridge, Mass., M.I.T. Press, 1976; Charles P. Kindleberger, *American Business Abroad*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1969; Constantine Vaitsos, *op. cit.*, and Theodore H. Moran, *Multinational Corporations and Politics of Dependence: Copper in Chile*. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1974; and "Multinational Corporations and Dependency: A Dialogue for Dependencistas and Non-Dependencistas" *International Organization* 32 (1978) p.79-100.
- 45) Charles P. Kindleberger, *op. cit.*
- 46) Yoshitaka Okada, *Multinational Corporations and Indonesianization: Dependency and Struggles for Interdependency* (Ph. D. thesis, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1981); and "Dilemma of Indonesian Dependency upon Foreign Direct Investments" *Development and Change* (Forthcoming).

- 47) Constantine Vaitsos, "Foreign Investment and Production Knowledge" In Guy F. Erb and Valeriana Kallabed., *Beyond Dependency*. New York, Praeger Publishers, 1975; and Moran, "Multinational Corporations and Dependency: A Dialogue for Dependistas and Non-Dependistas" *op. cit.*

要 約

80年代の南北問題における理論的考察

岡田 仁孝

1970年代には、OPEC諸国のカーテルの成功、国連における新経済秩序の要求、多国籍企業の行動規制等に見られるように、発展途上国が先進国に対して政治、経済的バーゲンを強め、先進国は南北交渉において歩み寄らざるをえない立場に立たされた。しかし、その傾向は長続きせず、1970年代後半から1980年代初頭にかけて、南北交渉は対立、混迷、そして、複雑さを深めるに至った。それは、南と北の団結の基盤であった各国の社会経済状態に、以前にも増して、多様化と多極化の傾向が顕著になってきた為である。南側においてはNICsと産油国の台頭により、北側への交渉の内容に多様化が見られ、また、北側においては経済活動のリーダーシップにおける多極化の傾向が顕著になり、先進諸国間の団結どころか貿易摩擦を起こさせるまでに至っている。

この論文では、1960年代からの南北関係の動きを捉え、その上で、経済社会学における理論が、現在の新しい南北関係を説明する事ができるであろうかと問うてみた。

Equilibrium Model, Dependency Theory, Galtung's Theory, Bilateral Monopoly Theoryを吟味したが、現在の多様化と多極化の中における南北問題を適格に捉えられる理論は見つからなかった。これは、1つには、南と北という二極間の関係として問題を捉ええる概念に根本的に誤りがあり、また、もう1つには、学術面における理論的發展が現実から遠ざかり、学者が現状把握に遅れをなしているためのように思われる。

(社会変動論 講師)