

## The Decision Not To Intervene In Indochina

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In the past two years, voluminous documents and two studies on Indochina have become available, so that we can now reconstruct fairly accurately the process that led to the decision not to intervene in Indochina in the spring of 1954. We now have, in addition to the Defense Department edition of the *Pentagon Papers* (Book 9), two volumes of *Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS)* series on Indochina, one volume on the Geneva Conference of 1954, a *History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff* volume on Indochina, 1940-1954, and a well-researched paper by Richard Immerman.<sup>1</sup> In spite of all these, however, there still remain certain gaps in the documents, thus leaving room for different interpretations.

Our purpose here is to analyze the decision making process in the United States government during the period from French Army Chief of Staff Paul Ely's visit to Washington on March 20, 1954 to April 7 when a French informal request for direct United States intervention to Indochina to save the besieged fortress of Dien Bien Phu was dismissed on the basis of the so-called "united action." We will first summarize the situation before Ely's visit, and then analyze the formulation of the united action and the demise of "vulture." On the basis of these analyses, we will suggest two alternative interpretations of decision making in the United States.

### The Situation in Mid-March, 1954

The situation in mid-March, 1954 can be briefly summarized as follows. Firstly, the United States perceived that the then French government led by Laniel was probably the last government that would have the will to bring victory in Indochina. If his government were to fall, the next government would surely bow to popular and parliamentary demand for some kind of negotiated settlement. It was primarily to prevent this eventuality that Secretary Dulles reluctantly agreed at the Berlin Conference to hold the Geneva Conference on Indochina.

Secondly, the United States had concluded that "Communist domination, by whatever means, of all Southeast Asia would endanger in the short term, and critically endanger in the long run, United States security interests." Therefore, the first objective of the United States was "to prevent the countries of Southeast Asia from passing into the Communist orbit."<sup>2</sup> In order to achieve this objective, the United States had been giving aid to France, but on the following conditions: granting the political and economic independence to the three Associated States of Indochina; adoption of a plan for dynamic military action that would break the back of the Viet-minh by the 1954-1955 fighting season; and expansion and training of indigenous armies which would ultimately take over the prosecution of the war against the Viet-

minh forces. These conditions were embodied in the Navarre Plan, which was used by the Eisenhower administration to justify the aid to France before Congress.

So long as the Laniel government was in power and the Navarre Plan seemed to succeed, it was thought that there was no danger of French military defeat in Indochina except in the event of over Chinese Communist intervention. The National Security Council (NSC) and its Planning Board concluded in mid-January, 1954 that they should not even mention the possibility of a French abandonment of Indochina (NSC 177). Though the Special Annex to NSC 177 requested consideration of the contingencies in which the United States might directly intervene in Indochina, it was withdrawn from the NSC for further consideration by a newly established Special Work Group on Indochina. NSC 177 did, however, provide possible United States action in the event of overt Chinese Communist intervention. In such a case, the United States, following consultation with France, the Associated States, Great Britain, New Zealand and Australia, would appeal to the United Nations, and, should the United Nations fail to act, would seek "the maximum international support for participation in military courses of action required by the situation."

Thirdly, though the Special Annex to NSC 177 was put aside for further consideration, its content was orally reported to the NSC meeting on January 8, and the major portion of the discussion of the meeting was devoted to the question of possible direct United States intervention in Indochina. Eisenhower made it clear at the very beginning of the discussion that he was utterly opposed to putting American ground forces "anywhere in Southeast Asia, except possibly in Malaya, which we would have to defend as a bulwark to our off-shore island chain." He, however, did not rule out Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Radford's proposal of a single air operation by American pilots to save Dien Bien Phu, which is usually called "vulture" (I use this word for lack of better word). Eisenhower thought that the operation could be carried out by using American volunteers. Thus the operation vulture was the only option mentioned at this time.

Finally, we have to keep in mind the domestic situation in the United States. This was the time of the Bricker Amendment and McCarthyism. Also, the Korean experience had shown that dispatch of troops to another war in Asia would certainly arouse strong public opposition. In fact, a disclosure of sending maintenance personnel to Indochina was followed by congressional and public uproar in early February, and Eisenhower felt compelled to assure the public that he was bitterly opposed "to ever getting the United States involved in a hot war" in Indochina, and that there was "going to be no involvement in the war unless it is a result of the constitutional process that is placed upon Congress to declare it."<sup>3</sup>

It has to be emphasized here that in January and February there was no suggestion from any quarter of United States armed intervention. The NSC discussion in January was merely on possible contingencies which were not considered very likely to occur.

The siege by Vietminh of Dien Bien Phu, which began about March 13, however, "opened new chapter in Indochina."<sup>4</sup>

The Vietminh captured positions from which its forces could threaten directly the airfield on which the isolated fortress depended for reinforcements and supplies. In mid-March, CIA Director Allen Dulles estimated that the Navarre Plan had only a 50-50 chance of holding out. Ely came to Washington at Radford's invitation to report on the situation in Indochina which he had recently visited and to discuss the scope of United States assistance, but his visit on March 20 forced the Eisenhower administration to face squarely the issue of United States intervention in Indochina.

### **The United Action**

Ely wanted not only additional aircraft but also a firm statement by Washington as to how it would react to Chinese intervention. A series of off the record meetings were held at the White House on March 20 and 21 between Eisenhower, Dulles, Secretary of Defense Wilson, Allen Dulles and Radford, but we have no record of these meetings. Probably no definite decision was made there, for when Dulles met Ely on March 23, he told that he could not give, at once, a definitive answer to such a serious question of United States intervention. Dulles made it clear, however, that "if the United States sent its flag and its own military establishment ... then the prestige of the United States would be engaged to a point where we would want to have a success." This in turn would call for a greater degree of partisanship than had prevailed up to the time on the part of those concerned, "which among other things should insure the patriotic participation of the local population and their effective mobilization and training." Dulles reported on the conversation with Ely to Eisenhower, who agreed basically with Dulles on the political preconditions for United States intervention.<sup>5</sup>

In his talk with Radford, however, Ely went further. He requested not only whether American aircrafts would intervene to counter Chinese air intervention, but also generally how American intervention would occur, and implied that France would request it when the military situation required it. Perhaps Eisenhower knew this French request, for when Dulles met Eisenhower on March 24 he stated that he did not wholly exclude the possibility of a single strike, if it were almost certain this would produce decisive results."<sup>6</sup>

At this point, therefore, it seems that Eisenhower and Dulles were merely repeating what had been decided prior to Ely's visit. The political preconditions for United States intervention that Dulles told Ely were a logical extension of the underlying assumptions of the Navarre Plan, and Eisenhower still thought that "vulture" was a viable option. There was no mention of the united action. On March 22, Dulles was not even certain whether he would accept an offer from CBS to make a speech at the Overseas Press Club on March 29. It was not until the next day that Dulles began to give serious thought to his speech.<sup>7</sup>

When Dulles started to draft the speech, two considerations were of utmost importance to him. One was the political situation in France. Radical-Socialist Deputy P. Mendes-France was calling on his government to negotiate immediately with Ho Chi Minh without waiting for the international conference at Geneva. In addition, the French government was requesting the United States to make concessions including recognition of Communist China as a *quid-pro-quo* for a satisfactory settlement of the Indochina war. As Dulles himself explained to British Ambassador Makins on March 27, his "speech was designed in part for consumption in France when the idea seemed to be growing that the United States should buy peace in Indochina by concession perhaps in the form of negotiation of the Communist regime and its admission to the United Nations." Naturally Dulles would never make any such concession.<sup>8</sup>

The other consideration was, again according to Dulles, "a unanimous position paper" of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "who took a very serious view of the situation." In early March upon his return from the Berlin Conference, Dulles had requested the view of the Defense Department on the military implications of a negotiated settlement to terminate hostilities in Indochina. Wilson in turn requested the JCS's views. In a memorandum dated March 12 to Wilson,<sup>9</sup> the JCS reaffirmed the importance of Indochina to the security interests of the United States and rejected the following possible settlements: the *status quo*, a coalition government, partition, and self-determination through a plebiscite. None of these, said the JCS, would preserve Indochina for the free world. The only acceptable alternative was military victory. Therefore, the Chiefs recommended that the United States urge France not to abandon "aggressive prosecution of military operations until a satisfactory settlement has been achieved."

The JCS recommended further that if France elected to accept a negotiated settlement in spite of American pressure, the United States should refuse to associate itself with the terms and should seek ways and means of continuing the struggle directly with the Associated States and other allies. Finally, they recommended that "the NSC should immediately consider the extent to which the United States would be willing to commit its military resources in Indochina in concert with the French or, if the French withdrew, in concert with other allies or unilaterally."<sup>10</sup>

The Subcommittee of the Special Committee on Indochina (the Erskine Group), in its report dated March 17, confirmed the JCS report, and recommended that "If France insisted upon negotiating peace that jeopardized the political and territorial integrity of Indochina, then the United States should pursue measures for continuing the war with the help of the Associated States and other allies, particularly Britain."<sup>11</sup> Perhaps at Dulles' request, Secretary Wilson sent the two reports to Dulles on March 23 with his opinion that he was in agreement with their recommendations.<sup>12</sup>

On March 23 Dulles met with the House Foreign Affairs Committee and sounded out their reaction on the desirability of publicly calling for united action in Southeast Asia. Then, the next day, he reported to the President that "he had in mind saying (in

his forthcoming speech) in a paraphrase of the Monroe Doctrine address that the freedom of the Southeast Asia are important from the standpoint of our peace, security and happiness, and that we could not look upon the loss to communism of that area with indifference." Eisenhower agreed, and told Dulles that "we must stop pleading etc. and we must have policy of our own even if France falls down. We could lose Europe, Asia and Africa all at once if we don't watch out."<sup>13</sup> Thus, Dulles took the initiative, and Eisenhower approved it and encouraged Dulles to pursue it. It should be noted that the Monroe Doctrine was Dulles' favorite concept of deterrence. It should also be noted that Eisenhower still did not rule out "vulture" at this stage.

Thus by March 24 Dulles was devising a policy which was different from Radford's "vulture." On that day he told Radford that "We must do some thinking on the premise that France is creating a vacuum in the world wherever she is." The question was how the United States could fill that vacuum." The decision in this regard," said Dulles, "is one of the most important decision the United States has made in a long time." Whether the United States, with the Associated States and other allies including Britain, would commit itself to the defense of Southeast Asia was indeed an important decision. To be sure, the United States had drawn the line in Indochina in early 1950 and had been giving material aid to the French, but a commitment to defend Indochina with armed forces if necessary was entirely something else. Such a commitment would go far beyond the established policy to limit its commitment to the defense of the off-shore island chain, as stated by Eisenhower in January.

In the NSC meeting on March 25,<sup>15</sup> Dulles took up the recommendations of the JCS and the Erskine Subcommittee that the NSC study immediately the question of military intervention in Indochina. Eisenhower, however, criticized the recommendations by saying that "there were certain omissions" in the memorandum. He specifically pointed out that there was no reference to appealing to the United Nations. Without U.N. approval and assistance, he said, he could not see how the free world nations could commit themselves to intervention in Indochina. When Dulles interjected that it might not be possible to obtain the necessary two-thirds vote in the United Nations on this issue, Eisenhower replied that if Vietnam called for assistance and particularly cited Communist Chinese aid to the rebels, then the United Nations would intervene.

Eisenhower continued that there were only two possible ways of carrying out a broadened effort to save Indochina. One was to induce the United Nations intervention, as stated above, and the other was "to get Vietnam to induce certain specific nations to come to its assistance on the basis of a treaty between Vietnam and each of the assisting nations." Perhaps, he said, this could be done by expanding the ANZUS Treaty. He thought he could get the necessary two-thirds majority vote at the Senate on such a treaty. In any case, he added, "the Congress have to be in on any move by the United States to intervene in Indochina. It is simply academic to imagine otherwise."

Though the NSC formally decided to direct its Planning Board to consider and make recommendations on the JCS's request, the guideline of such a study had already been set by the President. In the course of its implementation, however, the President's guideline was revised, and in the end it became practically indistinguishable from the one proposed by the JCS, the Erskine Group and Dulles. Dulles considered bringing the case before the United Nations as instructed by Eisenhower, but it was not followed up.<sup>16</sup> On the question of concluding a formal treaty, there was the question of timing. As Secretary Wilson asked at the NSC meeting of March 25, the suggested treaty might mean that "it would be sensible to forget about Indochina for a while and concentrate on the effort to get the remaining free nations of Southeast Asia in some sort of condition to resist Communist aggression against themselves." Perhaps with Eisenhower's approval, Dulles took the only logical course. As he explained to Ambassador Makins, Dulles was thinking "more in terms of a temporary arrangement which might or might not in time take on a permanent form like NATO."<sup>17</sup>

Immerman contends that the united action speech of Dulles was "apparently conceived bilaterally between just the President and his chief adviser" (Dulles). This may be a slight overstatement. As we have seen, Dulles took the initiative, and Eisenhower gave his approval and encouragement. There was also an important input from the JCS and the Erskine Group. The words "united action," however, were first used in the context of Indochina by Eisenhower in his speech on April 16, 1953 on "Chance for Peace."

On March 29 Dulles made a speech at the Overseas Press Club.<sup>18</sup>

Under the conditions of today, the imposition on Southeast Asia of the political system of Communist Russia and its Chinese Communist ally, by whatever means, would be a grave threat to the whole free community. The United States feels that that possibility should not be passively accepted but should be met by united action. This might involve serious risks. But these risks are far less than those that will face us a few years from now if we dare not be resolute today.

The last sentence is a direct quotation from the JCS memorandum of March 12.

### **The Demise of "Vulture"**

While Dulles was working on the united action speech, Radford and Ely were meeting frequently. Radford suggested to Ely to form an international air group (as suggested earlier by Eisenhower), and improve maintenance, invited France to accept American participation in unconventional warfare activities, and offered to send additional American officers to assist the French in training Vietnamese. If Ely had accepted Radford's offers, that would have met not only the conditions for United States intervention set out by Dulles on March 23, but also the consistent demands of the JCS. The JCS was convinced that if only the French would allow the United States

to increase its aid in training, planning and unconventional warfare, a quick victory would be possible.<sup>19</sup> If Radford could get Ely's approval on these offers, then he might be able to mobilize his government behind him. Besides, Radford thought that "vulture" could be carried out without using American carriers. As he recalled later: "We had the opportunity to use French planes if we'd sent in pilots. We had pilots right there. We didn't have to use carrier planes."<sup>20</sup> Ely, however, agreed only to consider and investigate Radford's offers.

Radford was frustrated by Ely's stubbornness, but warned Eisenhower and Dulles separately on the gravity of the situation in Dien Bien Phu and the necessity of "vulture." In a written report on his conversations with Ely, Radford warned the President of the psychological effects of the fall of Dien Bien Phu: "If Dien Bien Phu is lost, this deterioration may occur very rapidly due to the loss of morale among the mass of the native population." "In such a situation," he continued, "only prompt and forceful intervention by the United States forces could avert the loss of all Southeast Asia to Communist domination. I am convinced that the United States must be prepared to take such action."<sup>21</sup>

Radford's report of March 24 may have had some effect on Eisenhower. As noted above, Eisenhower did not rule out the possibility of "vulture" in his talk with Dulles on the same day. Still on the same day, Eisenhower in his press conference described the Southeast Asia as being of "the most transcendent importance." Probably feeling assured by the President, Radford told Dulles on March 25, the day the crucial NSC meeting was held, that the military would go ahead on planning work on "vulture" without, however, making a commitment to the French. Dulles reluctantly agreed.

There is no document to show that the JCS had expressed their views on "vulture" before that time. In the JCS-State meeting on March 26, Radford summed up the JCS's conclusion that "the present situation in Indochina was the result of too little too late, and that it might involve the loss of all of Southeast Asia." And then he emphasized, as he did to the President, that the United States "must be prepared to act promptly and in force to a last minute French request for help." Ridgway, who would later oppose "vulture" bitterly, merely stated that he did not agree with Ely's estimate of the situation at Dien Bien Phu. "The men there had no alternative to fight," he said. "Their lives were at stake."<sup>22</sup>

On March 31, two days after Dulles' speech on the united action and one day after the Vietminh launched the second stage of the battle of Dien Bien Phu by increasing military attacks on outlying French positions, Radford called a special meeting of the JCS to ascertain their views on "vulture." Perhaps to his surprise, the JCS unanimously recommended against such an offer.

Immerman suggests that "Radford sought a coalition against Dulles and Eisenhower," perhaps feeling that "a united JCS advocacy of a unilateral strike could be organized and would influence the former general."<sup>23</sup> It is also quite possible to

hypothesize that Radford was trying to build up a coalition against Dulles only, assuming that Eisenhower still remained uncommittal. On March 24 he had an argument with Dulles. When Dulles said that "we must stop pleading" the French, Radford replied that "we must stop being optimistic about the situation." At the time Dulles told Radford that he had the President's backing, but the next day's Presidential remarks seemed to support Radford.

On April 1, Eisenhower raised the issue of "vulture," and gave an opportunity for Radford to express his views. Radford explained that the United States could save Dien Bien Phu, and added that "some help could be got there by United States forces as early as tomorrow morning if the decision were made." When Radford finished, however, Eisenhower called the meeting off and asked some of the members of the NSC to meet with him at his office.<sup>24</sup>

We have no record of this crucial meeting at the White House. We know, however, that it was decided to call a meeting with Congressional leaders either on April 2 or 3. But we do not know what the original purpose of the meeting was. Dulles spoke over the telephone to Radford that "it was necessary to consider methods for restraining the Chinese Communists by means of air and sea power." They agreed that "Congress must be convinced that the job which the administration wanted to do could be done without sending manpower to Asia."<sup>25</sup> The "job" referred here could have been the "diversionary tactics" that Eisenhower mentioned to Senator Knowland and Congressman Martin on March 29, that is "a landing by Chiang's Nationalist forces on China's Hainan Island or a naval blockade of the Chinese mainland," but Hagerty's diary (entry of April 1) notes that Eisenhower was still thinking of "vulture. At lunch with two reporters he said that "U.S. might have to make decision to send in squadrons from aircraft carriers off coast to bomb Red at Dien Bien Phu." "Of course," he said, "if we did, we'd have to deny it forever."<sup>26</sup> We do not know whether Eisenhower was just thinking out loud or whether he was serious about it.

It seems that the question of "vulture" was finally settled by April 2, when Secretary Wilson formally requested JCS's view on "vulture." This time the JCS replied individually in a formal memorandum to Wilson. Only the Air Force Chief of Staff responded positively, but with such conditions that the French would have found unacceptable.<sup>27</sup> On the same day, Dulles, Willson, Radford and Robert Cutler of the NSC discussed the forthcoming meeting with Congressional leaders scheduled for the next day. They would ask for a joint resolution from Congress similar to the Tonkin Gulf resolution of 1964. In the meeting Dulles pointed out his difference with Radford on the meaning of the joint resolution. While he considered that the joint resolution "was designed to be deterrent" and to give the United States "a strong position to develop the united action, Radford might be looking upon the authority as something to be immediately used in a unilateral "strike." Radford denied this, and said that he had nothing specific in mind.<sup>28</sup> Therefore, as Immerman points out, the Eisenhower



administration did not seek Congressional approval of "vulture" but a joint resolution to be used as deterrent and a means to build up the united action.<sup>29</sup>

It is well known what the Congressional leaders replied to the request. The consensus of the leaders was that "there should be no Congressional action until the Secretary (Dulles) had obtained commitments of a political and material nature from our allies. The feeling was unanimous that we want no more Korea with the United States furnishing 90% of the manpower." Dulles reported Eisenhower that "The meeting on the whole went pretty well. Congress would be quite prepared to go along on some vigorous action if we were not doing it alone."<sup>30</sup>

The next day, an off the record meeting at the White House decided to send American forces to Indochina under the following conditions: a joint action with an expanded ANZUZ pact to include Britain, the Philippines and Thailand; French continuation of the war; and a guarantee of future independence of the Associated States.<sup>31</sup> The same day, the French informally requested U.S. intervention, but it was turned down.

### **Alternative Explanations**

From the above reconstruction of the formulation of the united action and the demise of "vulture," it is difficult to arrive at a definite conclusion. We can, however, tentatively suggest two alternative explanations, both of which can not be proved or disproved at this time. On the one hand, this might be another case of Eisenhower's roundabout way of leadership, which is so skillfully explained by Fred I. Greenstein.<sup>32</sup> While letting Dulles publicly take a position which he himself fully supported, Eisenhower withheld a full-fledged consideration of "vulture" until the JCS expressed their view against it, and then let the JCS and possibly Dulles persuade Radford to give it up.

The other explanation might be that Eisenhower took what John Steinbrunner calls "uncommitted thinking."<sup>33</sup> Perhaps Eisenhower did not integrate the united action and "vulture" to the end: he genuinely supported the united action and encouraged Dulles to express it publicly, but he also did not completely give up "vulture." While he was taking the uncommitted position, the proper timing of "vulture" just slipped away.

### **NOTES**

- 1) Richard Immerman, "The Anatomy of the Decision Not to Fight: Multiple Advocacy or Presidential Choice?" Paper presented at the annual meeting of APSA, 1982.
- 2) NSC 177 (later renumbered 5405), January 16, 1954, *Foreign Relations of the United States 1952-1954 (FRUS)*, Vol. XIII, Part 1, p.971-976.
- 3) *Ibid.*, p.1106.

- 4) An unpublished White Paper on "United States Policy on Armed Intervention in Indochina," August 2, 1954, Dwight E. Eisenhower Library, Dulles Files, Subject Series, Box 9.
- 5) *FRUS*, p.1141-1142; and the White Paper, p.5-6.
- 6) *FRUS*, p.1150.
- 7) Eisenhower Library, Dulles Files, Telephone Conversation Memorandum, Box 2, telephone conversation with Heren Sioussat (CBS) on March 22, 1954.
- 8) *FRUS*, p.1180-1181.
- 9) *FRUS*, Vol. XVI, *The Geneva Conference*, p.472-475.
- 10) *Ibid.*
- 11) *Ibid.*, p.475-479.
- 12) *Ibid.*, p.471.
- 13) *FRUS*, Vol. XIII, p.1150; and the White Paper, p.11.
- 14) *Ibid.*, p.1151.
- 15) *Ibid.*, p.1163-1168.
- 16) Cf. UPA to Dulles, "Possible Use of the United Nations in the Indochina Situation" *ibid.*, p.1174-1177.
- 17) *Ibid.*, p.1180-1181.
- 18) *Ibid.*, p.1182. The Policy Planning Staff also sent a background paper to Dulles. "Memorandum by Charles C. Stelle of the Policy Planning Staff" *ibid.*, p.1146-1148. The draft of Dulles' speech was widely circulated and there were many other inputs not indicated here.
- 19) *The Joint Chiefs and the War in Vietnam. History of the Indochina Incident, 1940-1954*, p.367-368.
- 20) Radford, Oral History, Princeton University.
- 21) *United States-Vietnam Relations 1945-1967: Study Prepared by the Department of Defense*. Washington, D. C., 1971, Book 9, p.288-289.
- 22) *FRUS*, Vol. XIII, p.1172.
- 23) Immerman, *op. cit.*, p.19-20.
- 24) *FRUS*, Vol. XIII, p.1200-1202.
- 25) *Ibid.*, p.1181.
- 26) *Ibid.*, p.1204.
- 27) *Ibid.*, p.1220-1223.
- 28) *Ibid.*, p.1210-1211.
- 29) Immerman, *op. cit.*, p.21-22.
- 30) *FRUS*, Vol. XIII, p.1224-1225.
- 31) *Ibid.*, p.1236.
- 32) Fred I. Greenstein, *The Hidden-Hand Presidency: Eisenhower as Leader*. New York, Basic Books, 1982. I am not implying here that Greenstein takes this interpretation on the Indochina case. Immerman, who has done a collective

work with Greenstein on the case, writes me that their work has not yet to reach the conclusion. My point here is just to list possible explanations.

- 33) John Steinbrunner, *The Cybernetic Theory of Decision. New Dimension of Political Analysis*. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1974.

\* I want to thank Professor Immerman for his valuable comments on the first draft of this paper.

## 要約

### インドシナへの不介入決定

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ここ2年の間にインドシナやジュネーブ会議に関する國務省文書(3巻)とインドシナに関する総合参謀本部(JCS)の歴史が公刊された。それに加えてイママンが1982年の米国政治学会年次大会ですぐれた研究を報告した。これらの資料や研究によってインドシナへの不介入決定の作成過程がより明らかになったが、それにもかかわらず資料はまだ不十分であり、さまざまな解釈の余地を残している。本論の目的はさきに挙げた資料の他にダレス文書等を用いて、エリー仏参謀長の訪米(1954年3月20日)から不介入決定(4月7日)の期間に限って決定の作成過程を再検討することにある。

本論ではまずエリー訪米当時の状況を要約し、ついでダレス國務長官の「統一行動演説」(3月29日)の作成過程とラドフォードJCS議長が提唱した「ハゲダカ作戦」の放棄にい

たる過程を再構成し、最後に二つの解釈を示唆した。一つの解釈はアイゼンハワー大統領がはじめから厳しい条件づきの介入を決めていて、それをダレスに「統一行動」演説で公的に提唱せしめ、さらにJCSやダレスにラドフォードを説得させたという解釈である。この解釈はグリーンスタインによるアイゼンハワーのリーダーシップに関するすぐれた研究にそうものである。(しかしそれは必ずしも彼がこの解釈を採っていることを意味しない)しかしこの解釈には資料上多少の無理がある。そこでこれに代わるものとして、アイゼンハワーはスタインブルーナーのいう「どっちつかずの態度」とったという解釈が成り立つ。すなわちアイゼンハワーは一方では「統一行動」を支持しながら、他方ではそれと対立する「ハゲダカ作戦」も最後まで放棄しなかったということである。

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