

How Canada Handles the United States: Alliance Politics and John W. Holmes

Kazuhiko Okuda

International University of Japan
Yamato-machi, Niigata

“As Adlai Stevenson once said, the
technological instrument Americans
most need is a hearing-aid.”

John W. Holmes, *Life with Uncle*.

No other dyad of nations in the world comes so close to paralleling the intensity of the relationship between Canada and the United States. One has aptly called it ‘pervasive interrelationship’.¹⁾ Because they share a continent, their relations have been bound by history, geography and the enormous volume of trade across the border.²⁾ Particularly after the Second World War, the intensity has been greatly amplified as Great Britain has largely withdrawn from North America and the United States has emerged as the uncontested superpower.

Although John Holmes, a former senior diplomat, now a professor, contends that the debate on Canada-United States relations is never ending and a final solution cannot be found, the issue in Canada has been hotly debated among politicians, academics and citizens in recent years. And economists and political scientists began in earnest to document and analyse the phenomenon applying, among others, the integration paradigm.³⁾ Unlike Western Europe where international integration is generally assumed to be a good thing, North America is so disparate in population and wealth that, for many Canadians,

the word 'integration' evokes the fear of 'absorption of the smaller by the larger', or what might be termed, the sovereignty syndrome.

In this short essay, I attempt rather liberally to reconstruct Professor Holmes' views and perspectives on the relationship between Canada and the United States and suggest that, despite the sound and fury of Canadian nationalism on the one hand, and an easy assumption of continental union (continentalism) on the other, the 'middle power' diplomacy with the Canadian version of functionalism⁴⁾ has been and still continues to be the most viable strategy for approaching the problems of integration in North America. This would be an alternative to the politics of integration and of conquest in the broader context of international relations. I would also draw some lessons from Canada-U.S. alliance politics for Japan-U.S. relations, namely that a Japan's shift from bilateralism (with the U.S.) to multilateralism with its economic power on the functionalist ground would best promote its political credibility and national interests in an untidy world. In an essay of this sort, however, one may keep in mind Holmes' notion that, although history can tear countries apart, it can be *therapeutic*.

Alliance Politics

As the end of the last war came closer, Canada's place in the world became clearer. Though prime minister Mackenzie King did not support the middle power status in world politics, Canada began to assume and cultivate the middle power diplomacy as, in the immediate postwar period, it was the world's third largest trader. It was not by conscious design, but by being ideologically inclined towards the middle of the road and geographically on the fringe of contested areas, Canada turned into a middle power 'by doing what came naturally'. Gradually, however, Canada became conscious of the basic parameter of international politics, namely that the unequal power is the fact among nations. It is for this reason that Canada opposed misconceptions about the equality of sovereign states, and on this issue, Lester Pearson spoke of 'sovereign equality'. For him, absolute equality meant absolute futility, and power in the conduct of international relations must be related in some way to responsibility.⁵⁾

In the immediate postwar period, Canada recognized that there existed a gap between the mythology (ideology) and *realpolitik* of the superpowers, and that the middle power could work in the intermediate space, the space in which a country like Canada could breathe and act. It was a space in which the medium power like Canada could preserve its own domestic identity as well as cultivate its own identity abroad. It follows from this that the medium power like Canada should not transgress its practical principles by overloading its foreign policy with the political ideologies of nationalism, continentalism, separatism, bilateralism, leftism and above all, anti-Americanism. Thus, the basic fact to be faced and a force to be contended for Canadians are seen in their balancing act between a special relationship with the United States (bilateralism) and multilateral social and trade arrangements in which Canada's own interests could be best promoted. Their balancing act is founded on the so-called 'functionalism', or the pragmatics of middlepower alliances. This working hypothesis of Canadian diplomacy was initially laid out and practiced by shrewd but enlightened diplomats such as Hume Wrong, Lester Pearson, and John Holmes in the 40's and 50's.⁶⁾

The formulation and practice of functionalism were initiated during the war by the allied powers to create the world organization at which Canada was present. The creation of an international organization such as the United Nations grew out of, and at the same time, was conditioned by the experience of the World War II. The alliance against the aggression of the 'Axis powers' became the basis on which to build the alliance for peace. Although Canada accepted the war time alliance as the core of a new security institution and a special obligation and responsibility of the great powers, Canada immodestly insisted to insert a functionalist principle in the alliance "a proper relationship between the size of the contribution and the voice in decisionmaking."⁷⁾ In other words, the great powers are not always accorded the major voices in decisionmaking on the functional ground. In terms of contribution and responsibility, Canada could not and should not expect to sit in a permanent seat in the Security Council whose function was primarily military, but it should be given a voice and responsibility in the economic and supply side where it could make a greater contribution. Holmes recounts the stage set for Canadian

presence in the international political drama:

When Roosevelt talked in the early stages of a 'World Council,' consisting, of course, of the great powers at the apex of the new structure, Canada among others resisted. We regarded it as acceptable for the great military powers, on functionalist grounds, to have the decisive say in a Security Council, but not, for example, the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration to which Canada would be one of the largest contributors. Canada not only wanted to carve out a place for medium powers like itself; it also wanted to break up this hierarchical concept of a world government run by a great-power executive.⁸⁾

Canada's balancing act on the functionalist ground, furthermore, was coupled with its search for 'counterweight' to the United States and other major powers as seen in Canada's preference and persistence in other multilateral organizations such as NATO, Commonwealth, World Bank, IMF and the like. Canada's instinct for counterweight runs deep in its history, from the time of the 'Atlantic Triangle' where Canada played the British off against the American and *vice versa*. Nevertheless, Canada's instinct for counterweight and the recent upsurge of Canadian economic nationalism cannot be understood fully until we have a clear picture of its special bilateral relationship with the United States, or what Holmes calls, the 'Life with Uncle'. When one speaks of continental relationship, whether it is of defense or of free trade, Canadian nationalists tend to employ the categorical terms such as 'dependency', 'protectorate', 'satellite', and the like to describe the relationship. But, those who describe it in these terms are, one can argue, acting as a mouth-piece, if not a paid-piper of American new left, or a revisionist historian. Canadian academics have been infiltrated by the American historiography. As Holmes succinctly puts it, "the history of postwar period has been unwittingly written from a perspective in which the US role is always central."⁹⁾

It was in the best interest of Canada, one must recall, to have erected bilateral institutions between the two countries (e.g., the International Joint Commission, the North American Air Defence Agreement, the St Lawrence Seaway, etc.). The creation of bilateral institutions such as these with the United States was always based on the joint principle in which neither party

could preempt or dominate the other. Essentially, these institutions like the IJC consist of two commissions, one in Washington and one in Ottawa, with two chairmen who act together to seek agreed solutions to border problems and recommend to the two governments without questioning their rights of sovereignty. This formula reflected in bilateral relations with the United States has been Canada's attempts to regulate the force of continentalism, for, in fact, if Canada were left alone with more territory than it can manage, it could be easily absorbed by the United States with the 'Manifest Destiny' lingering in the air. Being allied to the United States after 1945 for the first time in its history, Canada, to be responsible as a sovereign state, had to cope with governing too vast a territory, which was inherited from 'Imperial Canada'.

In calculating what we should expect of our allies, it is well to bear in mind that no one ever forced us to take over responsibility for far more land than we could ever control. Doing so has been the consequence of a very uncharacteristic recklessness and imperial instinct on the part of our own forefathers.¹⁰⁾

Being a liberal internationalist, these diplomats and politicians together sought ways and means to handle a colossus neighbour to the South by luring the United States into a multilateral net. It was for this reason that Canada cajoled the United States into joining NATO for a collective defence arrangement other than a bilateral NORAD, which could easily turn Canada into a docile partner. The Canadian instinct for counterweight is better expressed by Holmes when he said that "Canadian government, if not always the Canadian people, have recognized that international institutions, whether they be the UN General Assembly, the NATO Council, GATT, or the Summitry of the Seven, are essential for a country our size to act effectively vis-a-vis a great power." In the same vein, Holmes states it elsewhere that "the Canadian enthusiasm for multilateral creation was to some extent a wish to make continental institutions unnecessary. By entwining North America in multilateral institutions Canada would find greater flexibility, breathing-space, and counterweight."¹¹⁾

One of the controversial issues in the postwar Canada in which both

nationalists and continentalist involved was concerned with the Canada's entry into the Marshall Plan. Nationalists argued that Canada's participation in the Marshall Plan did make Canada dependent on the U.S. economy by, what Jack Granatstein called, 'exemptionalism'. It means that Canada's entry into the Plan was prompted by its pursuit of favouritism or the most-favoured nation treatment from the United States, whereby Canada was locked in the U.S. economy and became dependent on it. It was true, as a key participant in the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, A.F.W. Plumptre recalls, that Canada in 1947-48 was in financial difficulties, which were in fact greatly relieved by the legislative provision for 'offshore purchases' under the Marshall Plan. But, that provision which later approved by the U.S. government, was to avoid the inflationary pressures in the U.S. economy not to concentrate purchases in the United States from starving European countries at that time. Rather it was in the interest of the United States to diffuse European purchases through Canada, Latin America and others to open up the normal channels of world trade. The inclusion of 'offshore purchases', therefore, as Plumptre has argued, constituted both "a concession to, far less a special exemption for, Canada" and "an effective means of alleviating damage to U.S. interests."¹² Canada's attempts in alliance politics to move away from bilateralism to multilateralism as reflected in the inclusion of the provision for off-shore purchases in the Plan, and also in the inclusion of Article 2 in the NATO alliance were their means to the 'harmonization of economic policies' among allied countries, i.e., the Canadian anxiety to create a space in which its interests as a trading nation could be better served. This spirit of liberal internationalism is better expressed by Holmes himself: "It was taken for granted that there was no national interest greater than the preservation of a world in which Canadians could survive and prosper . . . That internationalism, one must recall, was based on a very hard-boiled calculation of the Canadian national interest rather than on woolly-minded idealism."¹³

The reality of the Canadian-American relationship cannot properly be described in the nationalist and continentalist discourses, which at the height of Canadian nationalism in the 60's and 70's even obscured and blocked a hard thinking in Canada. What Holmes has been telling us over the years on the

'special' nature of the relationship, which has been obscured by the continentalist and lamented by the nationalist, is the fact of unequal powers between Canada and the United States. Canada's alliance politics must begin with this fact without clogging it with the use of unfounded rhetoric and metaphors: "The reality of the relationship, which is labyrinthine, has been obscured too long in indiscriminate metaphors of domination or equal partnership. Whatever it is, it is not equal, and we must never be seduced by a weakness for symmetry and sentimentality into designs which ignore inequality."¹⁴

In the world of alliance politics then, it is less real and immodest to speak of 'independent' foreign policy, which belongs only to the nationalist discourse in world politics. In a good tradition of Canadian functionalism, power is not absolute, but functional. In other words, Canada in alliance politics regarded independence functionally. As Holmes notes, "independence was a Yankee word that even Mackenzie King rejected. In practice we acted independently when we wanted to and joined a term when that was more useful."¹⁵ On this point there are several cases to be illustrated when the U.S. cooperation was requested, but Canada went in its bold way to launch the Chalk River Project to produce CANDU, St. Lawrence Seaway Project, the Arctic Waters Pollution Act, the Law of the Sea Conference, and even the National Energy Program, and so on. The point to be stressed here is that in the present world of 'intervulnerability', no country has an independent foreign policy as clear as a blue sky, for we are reminded an indubitable fact that "the inequality must be accepted, philosophically but not meekly. Not even the superpowers, after all, can get their own way."¹⁶ It is therefore a mistake to assume the practice of power and influence in world politics as if they are billiard balls. In the language of functionalism in alliance politics, power must be related proportionately to responsibility and capabilities. This means that the middle power diplomacy seeks and demands its place and influence when it has a resource and objectivity to back that claim. The end of alliance politics is not neutrality or abstention, but is reflected in its sober recognition that the strength of an alliance is its own defence, provided of course that an alliance is based on the idea of community rather than on a guarantee of one country.¹⁷

Culture and Polity

In the present world of increasing integration and harmonization of politics and economy, we tend to be forgetful of a conventional knowledge that nation's economy and politics are part of a national culture. Despite the fact that the world economy is becoming increasingly interdependent, bilateral and multi-lateral disputes on trade and defence, for instance, must be considered from a national context, for it is in this context that we can ascertain a real significance of the domestic thrust and sway of an international issue and conflict of interests. In other words, the national perspective, one may add, is not meant to undermine the international relations perspective,¹⁸⁾ but is meant to insist, once again, on the complementarity of both assessments. Because of our age of a fashionable 'global village', or 'one-worldism', we often disregard the basic facts that competition and conflict are natural and perpetual, which are too often concealed by the undue emphasis on 'common interest'. In fact, the major difference between Canadians and Americans on the subject of their relationship, as Holmes asserts, is the intensity of their perceptions.¹⁹⁾ It is in this context too that both Canadian and American nationalisms are better understood for their bilateral and international implications.

That 'the most acute crisis in the Canadian-American relationship in living memory' as Stephen Clarkson in a recent book declares²⁰⁾ is a clear-cut example of a clash between two nationalisms. Holmes points out two factors that push the world at large and the United States in particular to a mood of restriction and protection. When the United States was in an economic prosperity, it would be confident enough to be generous, but today, as it turns out, Americans are inclined to see themselves as "victim of their own generosity to other countries and Canada as a rich hoarder of resources and industrial competition rather than a junior partner deserving particular consideration in the mutual interest."²¹⁾ Another, perhaps, more serious factor, one that undermines all international regimes which many in the past strove to establish, is the declining governability of Western democracies. At the time of economic crisis, democracies need to direct and intervene in their political economies more actively than, let us say, their philosophy of free enterprise would admit. Canada faces

the problem of national unity in the contradiction of regional economic cleavages. Similarly, even if President Reagan would insist free enterprise in the national and world economy, his freedom of action is severely curtailed by a shifting balance of economic and political power in a nation. As Robert Gilpin has observed:

Over the past several decades, there has been a rapid and significant shift of industrial, financial and political power to the American south and southwest. The so-called Eastern establishment is in partial eclipse; the center of power in the United States has shifted considerably southward and westward to this new industrial-financial core . . . Mr. Nixon's so-called southern strategy had as much an economic as a racial basis; it was responsive to the new industrial-financial elites of the South, Texas, and southern California.²²⁾

On the other hand, Canada's long-standing tradition of governmental support (irrespective of political parties) of essential national services would be resented by Americans as socialistic, and unfair, if not subversive to free enterprising Americans. It is thus important to point out, though the argument may not be understood by most Americans, that such a policy of governmental support (e.g., the National Energy Program) has been "simple Canadian pragmatism to sustain life in an unequal relationship and is not applicable to a superpower."²³⁾ To Canada's National Energy Program, furious Americans responded with an epithet, 'the blue-eyed Arabs of the North.' In assessing the bilateral relationship, it is important to keep in mind that there is a real difference of philosophy, which can turn nasty and brutish when either side gets ideological about it. But, what has been disturbing the rational management of Canada-United States relations in recent years is the domestic spillovers. Holmes expresses it thus: "The new hot gossellers [of free enterprise] in Washington, who disapprove of our misbehaviour, will, of course, be demanding that the government they want to get off their back climb on to ours."²⁴⁾

Under the Reagan administration, it is increasingly apparent that Canada-United States relation is being plagued by, what one former Canadian ambassador has called, 'legislative imperialism', whereby the United States is incapable of keeping its international commitments. "Herein lies the gravest

cause for worry about the future of the Canada-US relationship.” As Holmes continues, “what is the use of rational negotiation of joint institutions with a US administration which cannot act on behalf of its country and which cannot determine what Congress will do?”²⁵⁾ For Canadian negotiators, congressional ascendancy since Watergate and Vietnam has become very critical with its use of vetoes and ‘capricious addenda’ in the treaty making. Coincided with the congressional assertion and control over foreign policy, U.S. foreign policy problems are closely linked with domestic and local interests. On bilateral and multilateral issues then, we are bound to deal with matters that are domestic and international at the same time. This shift of practice, the shift from executive agreements, memoranda of intent or exchanges of notes, would raise serious problems in negotiating with the United States. It is certainly legitimate for Congress to reflect and defend regional interests, but the problem with Congress in the process becomes one of inaction, or of the advocate and architect of local actions which complicate Canada’s relations with the United States. It should be obvious that, at a time of economic difficulties, a balance in the American polity is bound to shift in favour of, and a greater emphasis on the protection of regional and local interests.²⁶⁾ Canadian exasperation in such a situation is better noted by Holmes himself:

What must we do in such situation? Must we go through another set of negotiations with the US Senate, a mindless body with which one cannot deal? Should we be asked to make further concessions? If so, should we in future hold back a whole set of barter points for the second stage? If this is the way the US wants it, should we now move to what is being called a COD policy? Should we refuse to make any agreement with the US administration without assured delivery or at least signed pledges by the appropriate senators that they will support it?²⁷⁾

Although Canadian foreign policy likewise involves many issues and matters that Federal and Provincial politicians must contend with, “in our system of government,” as Holmes notes, “we can stand by the policies on which we are able to agree with foreign governments even if it gets more and more difficult to make up our own national mind.”²⁸⁾

What has been noted here is the differences of political culture between the two democracies. Political creed spelled out in respective constitutions is 'Peace, Order and Good Government' for Canadians, and 'Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness' for Americans. Canadians had pursued self-government from Britain, and Americans independence. 'Legislative Imperialism' illustrates the American penchant for Pop government, which is increasingly vocal about their narrow local interests, which is unable to take a balanced view of the relationship as a whole. Lloyd N. Cutler, currently Counsel to the President offers a solution to this congressional impasse by proposing to consider changes in the American Constitution: "The separation of powers between the legislative and executive branches, whatever its merits in 1793, has become a structure that almost guarantees stalemate today."²⁹ Whatever the merits the above arguments and proposals have, it should be clear that Canada needs the informal political links with the United States because U.S. executive cannot count upon Congress and the Senate to ratify its policies. That Congress appears to be increasingly wedded to restrictionism and protectionism may make good domestic politics, but on the international scene, it makes the United States a poor ally, which is destined to create in an international space a credibility gap. By contrast, Canada is a better ally on the international scene precisely because federal government, though it still faces the problem of national unity encroached upon by the regional economic disparity and cleavages, is better able to coordinate the internal and external policies afforded by parliamentary and executive supremacy. Looked from the national context, no solutions are found simply by having the rest of the nations adjust or succumb to the congressional control of U.S. foreign policy. Perhaps we need a better historian like Holmes to assess the unique differences among nations amidst a homogenization of mankind: "As a result of our eccentric past we don't think in all things like Americans even if we chew the same gum."³⁰ Recognizing the differences of national life should not, however, lead to a claustrophobic nationalism: it should, on the contrary, lead to the awareness that the sense and relevance of a national history are weighted on its own terms. As Holmes states it more succinctly: "We are no more virtuous, just different. Seeing our history through American prisms is as dangerous to our self-awareness as tacking habits of the US pre-

sidential system, however effective in their own context, on to a parliamentary system which they could seriously distort.”³¹⁾

Some Lessons

In the postwar years, Canada, with its skillful diplomacy of functionalism, has emerged as the middle power *par excellence* in world politics. Its success has been due essentially to its discriminating assessments of issues according to one's resources, capabilities and interests. Canada's alliance politics is such that, given the inequality of power in the world, the establishment of multilateral institutions (e.g., the U.N., NATO, GATT, etc.) is a sure road to creating a more flexible space for the medium size country like Canada. Of course, the presence of a giant neighbour to the South creates for Canada a special problem with which it must cope. To a large extent, Canada has been successful in this by first recognizing the facts of unequal power without being anti-American. In coping with a larger power like the United States, Canada avoids creating a precise and permanent bilateral (continental) institutions where its breathing space could easily be narrowed or closed even inadvertently. Canada knew that no mechanisms could replace the 'rough and tumble' of diplomacy, therefore, when there was a need for creating continental institutions, Canada pursued it on an *ad hoc* basis. In this way, Canada itself preserves its political self image as a country that is not nationalist, but is multicultural, humane and here to stay.

A question as to if Japan can be considered a middle power may be unimportant, for Canada's 'middlepowermanship' in world politics is seen not so much in its rank in the world power hierarchy as in the quality of its diplomacy, resourcefulness and objectivity. Nor is it, in the strict sense of the term, a philosophy of foreign policy either. It is essentially a sum of Canadian habits and customs whose maxim of conduct can be called the middlepowermanship. It is in their coping with a giant neighbour and a given predicament that gives Canadians a distinct quality. Nonetheless, without stretching an analogy too far, the lessons for Japan from the Canadian-American relationship can be provisionally drawn. It can be easily seen that Japan-United States relations have some special features not unlike those of Canada-United States relations, namely in

its defence (Japan-U.S. Mutual Security Treaty; NORAD) and a closer economic tie through bilateral and multilateral arrangements. But, it seems increasingly apparent that too close a tie with the United States' economy and defence build-up including a joint research on 'Star Wars' etc., might pose a danger to a smaller power. Canada avoided this by creating and joining multilateral institutions, NATO, for instance, in which a community spirit for consensus-building overrides a domineering few. The goal for Canada of multilateral institutions is consensus, not a majoritarian rule which can easily be congealed into a ganging-up of nations. "It was healthy, however," as Holmes noted, "to have small, middle, and great power assessments, as well as a second view from North America, fed into the NATO calculations."³² It is in this multilateral arrangement and management of the issues too that Canada could find a greater flexibility, breathing-space, and counterweight. This so-called 'liberal internationalism' is, as we have seen, no idealism, but is based on a crude calculation of Canada's own national interests.

It follows that if we place Japan's external relations strictly in a bilateral framework, a closer tie with the superpower may pose a threat to Japan's identity as well. It has to do with the discourse production of American culture in international politics. This is why I tried to stress the differences of national culture, because our need to understand the national context in the international relations is critical in view of the American media power in the world. The problem of national identity for Canada can easily become one for Japan, because the discourse production by the American multinational's media is closely tied to the structure of power in world politics. We tend to be mesmerized by the 'all American headlines' in the media substituting an American discourse for Japanese and Canadian ones for that matter.³³ Coping with the all American headlines, Canada as well as Japan need to produce a discourse of its own, a new language to describe and express their new world horizons. At the same time, a real test and success of alliance politics are measured by the extent to which a partner can resist the temptation of nationalism and American universalism, and frankly tell its major ally when 'their breath is bad'. While Americans need a hearing-aid, a good ally remains "Number One exhibit to prove that American influence is limited by moral inhibitions,"³⁴ and if I may

add, its credibility gap in the world.

Becoming a major economic power and high-tech society, Japan can show to the world that modernization is not the same as Westernization or Americanization. And to repeat, Japan could sell its technology and know-how without *Japanizing* the recipient countries or trade partners. In so doing, Japan or the middle power can become a 'model' power in which the world order becomes truly *inter-national* rather than *super-national*. In short, Japan may, in a not too distant future, have to steer its own course which is neither nationalist nor bilateralist with the Americans just as Canada finds its place in the middle between nationalism and continentalism. What each nation should pursue first in a precarious world is the rationalization of its own needs rather than being content with an abstract rhetoric of *supra-nationalism*.

NOTES

- 1) William R. Willoughby, *The Joint Organizations of Canada and the United States*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1979. See Chapter 1. See also John W. Holmes, *The Better Part of Valour: Essays on Canadian Diplomacy*. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1970, Part. V.
- 2) In 1970, the trade between them totaled about U. S. \$ 20 billion, which represented 67% of Canada's total trade, about 23% of its GNP. The equivalent U. S. figures were 16% and 2.5%. And perhaps surprising to many, this ratio has not changed in 1981 amounting to 65.3% of Canada's total trade as compared with 17% for the U. S. In 1983 alone, Canada sold more than U. S. \$ 50 billion in exports to the United States which constituted almost 70% of all Canadian exports, while about 19% of U. S. exports crossed the border to the North, nearly twice the amount exported to Japan, American's number two trading partner. See Charles Pentland, "Political Integration: A Multi-dimensional Perspective," in *Continental Community?: Independence & Integration in North America*, eds. by Andrew Axline, James E. Hyndman, Peyton V. Lyon & Maureen A. Molot. Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1974, p. 55. Cf. Earl H. Fry, "Sectoral Free Trade," *International Perspectives*, September-October 1984, and Anthony Westell, "Economic Integration with the USA," *International Perspectives*, November-December 1984.
- 3) See also, Peyton V. Lyon, *Canada-United States Free Trade and Canadian Independence*, Economic Council of Canada, 1975.
- 4) It should be pointed out that the Ottawa version of the term functionalism whose meaning is not the same though not essentially inconsistent as the one

advanced by David Mitrany in his *A Working Peace System*, Chicago, 1943, 1966. The former version mainly elaborated by Hume Wrong shall be called functionalist internationalism while the latter functional representation. The variation is spelled out thus: "The essence of functionalist internationalism as distinct from functional representation, is a belief in international economic and social co-operation as a means of reducing the likelihood of conflict in the building of human accord, ultimately to the point of world government." See John W. Holmes, *The Shaping of Peace, 1943-1957, Vol. 1.*, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1979, pp. 72-3.

- 5) John W. Holmes, *The Shaping of Peace, 1943-1957, Vol. 2.*, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1982, p. 38.
- 6) Cf. Jack L. Granatstein, *The Ottawa Men: The Civil Service Mandarins 1935-1957*, Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1982.; Robert Bothwell and John English, "The View from Inside Out: Canadian Diplomats and Their Public," *International Journal*, Vol, XXXIX, No. 1 (Winter 1983-4), pp. 47-67.
- 7) John W. Holmes, *The Shaping of Peace, 1943-1957, Vol. 1*, p. 22.
- 8) *Ibid.*, pp. 35, 72, 236., and *Life with Uncle: The Canadian-American Relationship*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981, p. 13.
- 9) *Life with Uncle*, p. 20.
- 10) *Ibid.*, p. 50.
- 11) *The Shaping of Peace, Vol. 1*, p. 160.
- 12) A. F. W. Plumptre, *Three Decades of Decision: Canada and the World Monetary System, 1944-75*, Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, pp. 84-5.
- 13) "Most Safely in the Middle," *International Journal*, Vol. XXXIX, No. 2 (Spring 1984), p. 369, and also see his *Canada: A Middle-Aged Power*. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1976, p. 6.
- 14) *Life with Uncle*, p. 78.
- 15) "Most Safely in the Middle," p. 370.
- 16) *Life with Uncle*, p. 134, and also see *The Shaping of Peace, Vol. 1*, Chapters 3 and 7, and *Vol. 2*, Chapter 3.
- 17) Holmes states it elsewhere: "What we want is an equitable relationship, intricate and complex, of two disparate states. Even when we seek the necessary protections for a more vulnerable culture and economy we ask for a functional approach to specific predicaments, not kindly concessions to the weak. Strength and weakness are facts of life, not evidence of injustice. We do not ask the Americans to stop bullying us but to consider conflicts of interest on their merits." *Life with Uncle*, p. 132.
- 18) Cf. Charles F. Doran, *Forgotten Partnership: U.S.-Canada Relations Today*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984, pp. 1-4. See also William T.R. Fox, *A Continent Apart: The United States and Canada in World Politics*.

Toronto: University of Toronto Press, forthcoming.

- 19) "Impact of Domestic Political Factors on Canadian-American Relations: Canada," in *Canada and the United States: Transnational and Transgovernmental Relations*, eds. by Annette Baker Fox, Alfred O. Hero, Jr., and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., New York: Columbia University Press, 1976, pp. 19, 20.
- 20) *Canada and the Reagan Challenge*. Toronto: James Lorimer & Company, 1982.
- 21) *Life with Uncle*, pp. 59–60.
- 22) "Integration and Disintegration on the North American Continent," in *Canada and the United States*, *op. cit.*, p. 281.
- 23) *Life with Uncle*, p. 60.
- 24) *Ibid.*, p. 61.
- 25) *Ibid.*
- 26) Cf. Peter C. Dobell, "Negotiating with the United States," *International Journal*, Vol. XXXVI, No. 1 (Winter 1980–81), pp. 17–38.
- 27) *Life with Uncle*, p. 65.
- 28) *Ibid.*, p. 63. A discussion of how differently Canadians and Americans view their politics and political system, see Charles Doran, *op. cit.*, pp. 75–108, part. p. 91.
- 29) See Cutler's "To Form a Government," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. LIX (Fall 1980), pp. 126–143.
- 30) *Life with Uncle*, p. 83.
- 31) *Ibid.*, p. 126. See also his "Impact of Domestic Political Factors on Canadian-American Relations: Canada," and "Vive la Différence—Reflections on Canada-United States Relations," *Round Table*, 285 (January 1983), pp. 3–20., part. pp. 12–3.
- 32) *Life with Uncle*, p. 34. See also *The Shaping of Peace*, Vol. 2., Chapter 5.
- 33) Cf. Harold A. Innis, *The Bias of Communication*, Intro. by Marshall McLuhan, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1951, 1982., and Jeremy Tunstall, *The Media are American*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1977.
- 34) *Life with Uncle*, p. 137. Also Holmes' criticism of bilateralism, which undermines the spirit of fraternity, see his "The Dumbbell Won't Do," *Foreign Policy*, Number 50 (Spring 1983), pp. 3–22.