Bulletin of the Graduate School of International Relations I.U.J. No. 3. July 1985

The Anglo-Japanese Alliance and Japan's Imperial Expansion

John Welfield
International University of Japan
Yamato-machi, Niigata

"For they have sown the wind and they shall reap the whirlwind." (Hosea, 8:7).

Introduction

Historians, like politicians, are apt to interpret the past in the light of present circumstances. Before World War II, as the Anglo-American powers and the Soviet Union prepared themselves for the oncoming clash with the Third Reich, Mussolini's Italy and the Japanese Empire, the old Anglo-Japanese alliance was widely believed to have provided a major catalyst for Japan's career of imperial expansion. Britain's long association with Japan, whatever its motivation, was thought to have been the outcome of a disastrous political and strategic misjudgement. With the collapse of the Fascist powers, the absorption of western Germany, Italy and Japan into the Anglo-American sphere of influence, the onset of the American-Soviet Cold War and the division of much of the world into two mutually hostile power *blocs*, views changed. In the Anglo-American world it is the wartime alliance with the Soviet Union and its inevitable strategic consequences in Eastern Europe which have now fallen into disrepute. The former Anglo-Japanese alliance, in contrast, is widely believed to have provided, during the two decades of its existence, the framework for a stable and essentially peaceful international order in the Far East, checking the Russian advance into Asia and the Pacific, curbing Japan's own imperial ambitions and establishing the politico-economic basis

for the emergence of a "responsible," "cooperative" and "internationally minded" Japanese leadership. The abrogation of the Anglo-Japanese alliance at the Washington Conference in 1921 is thought to have accelerated Japan's drive to establish regional hegemony, contributed significantly to the nation's drift towards military fascism, stimulated interest in association with Germany and Italy and made eventual confrontation with the British Empire and the United States difficult to avoid. Continuation of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, some would even argue, might well have prevented the Pacific War.

A careful analysis of East Asian international politics in the decades before the Washington Conference gives little support to these revisionist views. On the contrary it seems clear that British policy in the Far East, based on the assumption that Russia posed a mortal threat both to the Indian Empire and to British interests in China, played a critically important *rôle* in establishing Japan as the paramount Northeast Asian state, with a strong position on the continent and an expanding sphere of influence in the Western Pacific.

Once Japan began to play an active *rôle* in the regional military balance her relations with all the surrounding Great Powers underwent a fundamental change. The road that began in the early 1890s, when Japan, with the tacit approval of the British Empire, intensified her penetration of Korea, led, through a process of relentless geopolitical logic, to a breakdown in relations, first, with China, then with Russia and finally with the United States. This occurred not because the Japanese were especially wicked or irrational, because they had a faulty constitution, because they had adopted a variant of the capitalist system, because they lacked democracy or because the civilian authorities found it impossible to control the armed forces. It occurred simply because the geopolitical map of Asia, in the Age of Imperialism, when viewed from Tokyo, through the prism of Japanese historical traditions, looked rather different to the same map when viewed from London, St. Petersberg, Washington or Peking, presenting a different set of strategic problems and seeming to impose a different set of solutions. The Age of Imperialism has doubltess run its course. Yet some essential elements in the situation have not changed much, as General Douglas MacArthur discovered when he shifted his seat of power to Tokyo in 1945 or as some future Japanese Government will find if it succumbs to American

pressure and agrees to assume a more active strategic *rôle* in Northeast Asia and the Western Pacific.

Japan and Great Britain in East Asia: From the Meiji Restoration to the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895

Nineteenth century Japanese leaders, like most of their contemporaries in Europe, North America and Australasia, were unashamedly imperialist in outlook. Yoshida Shōin, the Tokugawa anti-Bakufu thinker whose ideas exercised an extraordinary influence on all the Meiji leaders embodied the spirit of the new age:

> If we dispose of sufficient naval vessels and cannon it should be possible for us to bring the (Western) barbarians under control, subdue the feudal lords, to seize Kamchatka and the Sea of Okhotsk, to absorb the Ryūkyūs, teach the Koreans a lesson, extract tribute from them and restore our relationship with that country to what it was in the glorious ages of the past, to divide up the territory of Manchuria in the north, to absorb Taiwan and the Philippines in the south. In fact, it will be possible for Japan to establish herself as a power with a gradually expanding sphere of influence. In this way, by carefully guarding our perimeters, we will be able to preserve the greatness of Japan and bring up samurai devoted to the people"[1]

The Restoration Government had scarcely established itself in Edo when, on 26 January 1869, Kido Kōin, one of its most prominent members, wrote a memorandum recommending immediate military action against Korea "to extend the authority of the land of the gods."[2] The dominant groups in Japan's new leadership were, however, acutely conscious of their country's economic backwardness and military weakness. It is therefore quite possible that the Japanese Government, in the absence of external encouragement, might have continued to remain aloof from continental affairs, despite the agitation of the expansionist lobby. Isolationism, not imperialism, has been the dominant Japanese historical tradition. In the mid-nineteenth century the home archipelago, remote from the centres of British, Russian, American, French and German power, was relatively easy to defend. The historical record did not auger well for the success

of Japanese expansionism on the Asiatic continent. In the past, other newly established Japanese governments had been tempted to embark on policies of expansionism in Korea but had eventually decided that discretion was the better part of valour.

For twenty years after the Meiji Restoration the British Empire based its East Asian diplomacy on an equidistant relationship with China and Japan. The British had established themselves as the dominant external power in China. They had begun to play a major *rôle* in Japan's industrial development and military modernisation programme. The policy of equidistance was designed to ensure that no other European power challenged the British position in the China Seas. It was also intended to discourage the major indigenous powers from attempting to assert regional hegemony. Whitehall's policy, while undoubtedly designed to serve purely British interests, made a significant contribution to peace and stability. Great Britain did not encourage the Japanese to press their claims to Korea, the Ryūkyūs and Sakhalin. Whitehall made energetic efforts to defuse the Taiwan crisis of 1874, when the Meiji Government, under intense pressure from Saigo Takamori and other bellicose elements, dispatched an expeditionary force to this large Chinese island "to colonize it and to consolidate that area as the southern gate of the Japanese Empire."[3] Great Britain opposed the initial Japanese dispatch of troops, attempted to mediate between the parties and designed the shape of the final compromise, whereby Japan renounced her territorial claims to the island, China recognised Japan's conduct as "righteous" and consented to pay an indemnity of 750,000 Mexican dollars.[4] The British also adopetd a generally neutral attitude during the Korean crises of 1882 and 1884.

In the early 1890s British policy in the Far East underwent a subtle but very significant change. During the latter part of the 1880s imperial rivalries among the European powers had intensified. The British themselves had completed their conquest of Burma. The United States had begun to display increasing interest in Hawaii, the Western Pacific and Korea. Germany had launched a major political and economic offensive in China and had

acquired colonies adjacent to Australia. The French had absorbed Indochina. Russia, having consolidated her control of Central Asia and the Caucasus, turned her attention to the Far East. The Franco-Russian *entente* of 1891, broadened into a more general alliance in 1894, raised the possibility of wide-ranging political, economic and strategic cooperation between two of Great Britain's most formidable competitors.

British views of Russian capabilities and intentions have been founded, as often as not, on prejudice, misinformation and somewhat hazy notions of geography. In the late ninteenth century Russia posed little threat to British power in India. The Indian Empire was more than adequately defended from the north by the immense natural barriers of the Central Asian deserts, the Pamirs and the Himalayas. A Russian conquest of India was about as probable as a British conquest of the Turkistan. In the Far East, Russian interest centered on Siberia, Manchuria and Mongolia. Construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway, begun in 1891 with massive loans raised on the French money market, made it inevitable that Russian influence in these regions would increase. The French position in Indochina made it theoretically possible that Paris and St. Petersberg would coordinate their Asian-Pacific military strategies. The British, and to some extent, the Japanese, assumed that the Russians intended to establish a dominant influence in Korea. This issue was much more complex than it seemed. After the events of 1882-1884 the Korean monarchy, conscious of the ever-present threat of Japanese invasion and anxious to assert greater independence from China, had seen some advantage in the cultivation of friendly ties with the Romanov Empire. The Royal Family enjoyed amicable relations with the Russian Ambassador Karl Waeber. By the spring of 1885 rumours of a secret Russo-Korean treaty, possibly involving Russian acquisition of a warm water port on the peninsula, had become sufficiently strong to cause the British to dispatch a military force to Komun Island, at the entrance to the Tsushima Straits, an unnecessarily provocative act which prompted St. Petersberg to talk of occupying other areas of Korea in retaliation. In reality, Russia had no interest in Korea other than preventing its domination by a potentially hostile power. On 8 May 1888 the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Governor General of the Amur convened a special committee to examine the

Korean question. The views of the Governor General, Adjutant General Baron A. N. Korf, and I .A. Zinoviev, Director of the Asiatic Section of the Foreign Ministry, had met with general approval. "Acquisition of Korea," they argued, "would not only not give us any advantage, but would not fail to produce very unfavourable consequences . . . It would spoil our relations not only with China but also with England, which has her own designs on that country. In view of the Sino-Japanese coalition, our position might become extremely embarrassing in all respects."[5]

The British eventually came to appreciate that Russian interest in Korea was essentially defensive. Nevertheless, the strategic debate touched off by the Franco-Russian *entente*, the shift in Russian interest from Central Asia to the Far East and the construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway had far reaching consequences. Those who believed that the Indian Empire and the China trade, centered on Hong Kong and the Yangtse Valley, constituted Britain's principal interests in the East, considered that Russia's new emphasis on Siberia, Manchuria and Mongolia could only work to their advantage. The vast Eurasian continent could be divided into British, Russian and French spheres of influence, preserving the solidarity of Western civilization and reducing the liklihood of a dangerous clash between these global *imperiums*. Others argued that Britain needed a strong regional ally to counterbalance the potential threat posed by the emerging Franco-Russian coalition.[6]

As the situation developed, opinion in London, at the highest level, drifted inexorably in favour of the latter alternative. Whitehall's positive response to the Japanese Foreign Minister Mutsu Munemitsu's overtures on revision of the Unequal Treaties, in the summer of 1893, at a time when Japanese agitation for intervention in Korea was again gathering momentum, represented, in essence, a decision to discard the idea of an *entente* with Paris and St. Petersberg, abandon the traditional policy of equidistance between Tokyo and Peking, build up Japan as a counterweight to Russia and tacitly encourage Japanese expansion on the continent in areas away from the center of British interset. This decision made a Japanese war with China, already highly probable, virtually inevitable. Whitehall could have prevented the Japanese advance into Korea, at any time after the middle of 1893, by the simple

expedient of suspending negotiations on the Unequal Treaties. This was a matter to which the Japanese Government attached the greatest importance. As it was, when the Anglo-Japanese Commercial Treaty, abolishing extra-territoriality and restoring Japanese customs autonomy, was signed on 16 July 1894, Japanese forces had already landed in Korea and hostilities with China (largely provoked by Tokyo) were about to begin. Britain gave Japan additional encouragement by formally assuring Foreign Minister Mutsu of her neutrality in any Sino-Japanese conflict over Korea. The contrast to Whitehall's attitude at the time of the Taiwan crisis of 1874 was striking. No doubt Great Britain's subsequent efforts to bring the conflict to a speedy end were not entirely lacking in sincerity. A prolonged Sino-Japanese war might have been extremely damaging to British interests in the Far East. Great Britain's tacit encouragement of Japan, however, ensured that her efforts to play the *rôle* of honest broker would have little chance of success.

The Consequences of the Sino-Japanese War

Victory in the Sino-Japanese War, whereby the Meiji Government gained possession of Taiwan and the Pescadores, forced Peking to conclude trade and navigation agreements on the model of China's unequal treaties with the Western Powers and extracted an indemnity of 200 million taels from the Manchus, established Japan's position as a major imperial power. Japanese control of the strategic Liaotung peninsula was only averted by the combined intervention of Russia, France and Germany.

By the end of the decade the Japanese Government had succeeded in renegotiating all its unequal treaties with the West. Japan, in turn, had been invited to become one of the "Open Door" powers. She attended the Disarmament Conference at the Hague. The Meiji oligarchy, the armed forces, industrial, financial and commercial interests, the intellectual establishment and large sections of the Japanese people were dazzled by the prospects for further expansion. "In order to become the leader of East Asia," Yamagata Aritomo announced in 1895, "Japan must consider expansion of her line of interest,"[7] Numerous colonial societies were founded. An extensive literature on the merits of imperialism began to appear. Tokutomi Sōhō

wrote enthusiastically about "the expansionist character of the Japanese people."[8] Fukuzawa Yukichi recommended Japan embark on a grandiose scheme to partition China in collaboration with the Western powers.[9]

The postwar years inevitably saw further increases in Japanese military strength, a national preoccupation with strategic matters and considerable growth in the political influence of the armed forces. In 1896 the Government embarked on a ten year naval expansion programme. The following year a three year programme to expand and modernise the army was put into effect. By the turn of the century Japan possessed a standing army of 181,114 men and a fleet of 212,933 tons. Military expenditure was consuming over 40 per cent of the annual budget. By 1902 the Japanese maritime forces had emerged as the decisive factor in the naval balance in the Far East. It was not simply that victory had brought the military forces new prestige. The army was now directly responsible for the administration of a sizeable colony. The island of Taiwan, while not as extensive or populous as India, or as rich as Indochina, was, nevertheless, a valuable prize, strategically located at the crossroads of South China and Southeast Asia. Its colonial govenors, resplendent in their tropical whites, the military forces dispatched to garrison the towns and quell rebellious natives, the educators sent to propagate the Imperial Way and teach the Japanese language, the entrepreneurs who developed a flourishing business in sugar cane, tea, camphor and other subtropical products, constituted a new and significant pressure group in Japanese society.

The war had greatly stimulated the development of the Japanese economy. It also exerted a decisive impact on the direction of its future evolution. The indemnity extracted from China had paid for the cost of the conflict, enabled Japan to adopt the gold standard, financed a massive expansion of the iron and steel industry, armaments manufacture, shipbuilding and railway construction. The Treaty of Shimonoseki gave Japan a virtual monopoly of the Korean market. It also facilitated Japanese penetration of the markets of South Central China. The favourable economic conditions created by the war led to the establishment of new banks—the Nihon Kangyō Ginkō and the Nihon Nōkō Ginkō in 1896, the Taiwan Ginkō in 1899, the Hokkaidō

Takushoku Ginkō in 1900, the Nihon Kōgyō Ginkō in 1902. Around the turn of the century, spurred on by these developments, Japanese business began to show increasing interest in overseas investment. Railways were constructed in Korea, textile mills exported to China. Certainly, the emergence of a solidly based capitalist economy, linked to the Restoration structure, together with the growth of a new middle class, prepared the stage for a future challenge to the political dominance of the Satsuma-Chōshu oligarchy and a somewhat different emphasis in foreign and defence policies. For the moment, however, the dominant groups in the new middle class, like the Restoration leadership, remained committed to a policy of imperialism and saw cooperation with the dominant Western power as essential to the realisation of their ambitions.[10]

The Anglo-Japanese Alliance and the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905

Japan's victories over China, together with her penetration of Korea, accelerated the decline of the Manchus, stimulating European interest in new concessions and spheres of influence and paving the way for the revolutionary upheavals of the twentieth century.

The Treaty of Shimonoseki, the success of the Triple Intervention in frustrating Japan's claims to the Liaotung peninsula, along with the continued evidence of Anglo-Japanese strategic cooperation, encouraged both China and Korea to think of their long term security in terms of alliance with Russia. During the 1890s the new climate of opinion in Peking and Seoul provided St. Petersberg with numerous opportunities to improve its position in the regional constellation of power. This, in turn, led to intensified Russo-Japanese rivalry. In June 1896 the Russians concluded a secret alliance with the Manchu Court. In terms reminiscent of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of February 1950 the two allies pledged mutual assistance in case either was attacked by Japan.[11] They also promised joint action to frustrate Japanese military expansion into Korea. In Korea itself the struggle between "pro-Russian" and "pro-Japanese" factions in the Royal Family, the Court and the Government intensified. St. Petersberg, where advocates of caution generally held the upper hand during the 1890s, remained chiefly interested in extending its influence in

southern Manchuria, not Korea. Because of this the Russians were willing to make certain compromises with Japan. In 1896, 1897 and 1898 Russo-Japanese conventions, committing both parties to non-intervention in Korean affairs and promising that Russia would not obstruct legitimate Japanese commerial activity in the peninsula, were signed. On the basis of these agreements the Japanese rapidly consolidated their economic supremacy in southern Korea. Yet St. Petersberg, encouraged both by the Korea Royal Government and by Korean opinion, would not concede the peninsula as an *exclusive* Japanese sphere of influence. Japanese hopes to "exchange Korea for Manchuria" proved fruitless.[12]

This stalemate between St. Petersberg and Tokyo might have continued indefinitely, giving the Korean Royal Government an opportunity to implement a programme of political and economic reform, strengthen its military preparations and free itself from the clutches of all the surrounding Great Powers. The intensified strategic cooperation between Great Britain and Japan in the wake of the South African War and the Boxer Uprising, by encouraging further Japanese intervention on the continent and reducing the influence of moderate elements in Tokyo, made this eminently desirable outcome impossible.

The Boxer Uprising, itself a predictable consequence of the Sino-Japanese War and the scramble for colonies and spheres of influence that took place around the turn of the century, threatened the position of all the Imperial Powers in China. The initiative for the dispatch of an international force to suppress the Boxers, however, came almost entirely from Great Britain, whose military strength in the Far East had been seriously depleted as a result of the Boer War. As the situation deteriorated, Whitehall, fearful that the Russians would exploit the crisis to further consolidate their strong position in Peking, became increasingly convinced that British interests would best be served by enlisting the cooperation of Japan. The Japanese, as the German Ambassader so aptly put it, were to "pull England's chestnuts out of the fire."[13]

The Japanese Government was not unanimously enthusiastic about the *rôle* cast for it by Whitehall. The Prime Minister, Yamagata Aritomo, together with his War Minister, Katsura Tarō, recalling the advantageous

situation created by Great Britain's benevolent "neutrality" in the war of 1894-1895, and motivated by a strong sense of rivalry with Russia, inclined towards cooperation with England. Itō Hirobumi, on the other hand, argued that Japan's interests in China differed from those of the European powers. Japan would best be served, he maintained, by a policy of non-intervention. This line had considerable appeal in Pan-Asianist circles. Because of these divisions within the government Yamagata at first followed a compromise path. It was only after the murder of a Japanese embassy official in Peking, at the height of the crisis, that he decided to send a small force to China. Relentless pressure from Great Britain, including an unaccepted offer of "up to one million pounds sterling if they at once mobilise and send forwards without delay . . . . . twenty thousand troops," and the desire to participate fully in any future partition of China, eventually persuaded the Japanese Government to dispatch a sizeable army.[14] The end of the crisis found Japan maintaining by far the largest military force on the Chinese continent.

These events, and the ferocious Great Power rivalries that erupted once the immediate crisis had passed, stimulated British interest in a full formal alliance with Japan. Whitehall, understandably, viewed the Far Eastern situation in terms of the balance of power, both global and regional. The British Empire, it was felt, had passed its apogee. The Franco-Russian alliance remained a formidable combination. Germany and the United States, too, posed increasingly serious challenges to Great Britain's industrial, financial and commercial supremacy. The Boer War had revealed the underlying weakness of the Empire's military system. It had also exposed the dangers of isolation. British interests in the Far East could be preserved either through accommodation with St. Petersberg or alliance with Japan. A strategic *entente* with St. Petersberg, an idea not without its influential exponents, would inevitably entail agreement on mutually acceptable spheres of influence (eg. British supremacy in the Yangtse Valley in return for Russian preponderance in Manchuria). Alliance with Japan, too, would necessitate various concessions. As in 1893–1894, the strategic debate in Whitehall was won by exponents of association with Japan rather than accommodation with Russia. Japan, it was assumed, would be strong enough to control the Russians locally

in Northeast Asia but not strong enough to threaten Britain's own interests in the Far East.

The Japanese did not view international politics in terms of the balance of power. Unlike the British they had no tradition of opposing the hegemonic ambitions of the dominant continental state through alliance with its weaker opponents. The Japanese leadership was intent simply on absorbing Korea as a step towards creation of an extensive East Asian empire. The Japanese foreign policy debate at the turn of the century was a complex one, influenced by domestic political rivalries, conflicting currents of Westernism and Pan-Asianism, personal cultural affinities (Anglophiles vs. Slavophiles), prejudices and misconceptions. The main point at issue, however, was whether Japan could best realise her continental ambitions through alliance with England or accommodation with Russia. Central to this question was the relative strength of these two mighty European empires. Yamagata and Katsura remained convinced that the British Empire was still the paramount Western state, despite the evidence that it had entered a period of comparative decline. Great Britain, they argued, was also the dominant external influence in China. In was not especially interested in Northeast Asia. There were as yet no signs that Whitehall, alarmed by the growth of German power, intended to shift from a policy of opposition to France and Russia to one of cooperation with Paris and St. Petersberg. Yamagata and his group were thus confident that an alliance with Great Britain could enable Japan to absorb the Korean peninsula and extend her influence in China. The immense geographical extent of the British Empire raised even more exciting possibilities. Assured of England's goodwill, Japan might eventually establish herself as a truly global power. "British colonies," Foreign Minister Komura Jūtarō remarked, "extend to the five continents. The benefits which Japan could gain from emigration and trade in these colonies if relations between Britain and Japan became more friendly, would far exceed those to be derived from Manchuria and Siberia."[15] Conversely, British hostility could effectively confine Japanese influence to the home archipelago. Militarily speaking, it was the British navy, not the Russian Far Eastern Fleet or Russian ground forces in Siberia, that presented the chief obstacle to Japan's continental ex-

pansion. It would be extremely difficult for Japan to maintain parity with the Royal Navy. Alliance with England, however, would only require Japan to maintain naval parity Russia. Since the Romanov Empire was a continental, rather than a maritime state, this would prove an infinitely simpler task.[16]

Itō Hirobumi and Inouye Kaoru, in contrast, were not enthusiastic about the idea of alliance with the English. It was by no means self-evident, they argued, that the British Empire was more powerful than the combination of Russia, France and Germany, whose intervention had successfully opposed Japan's attempt to establish a bridgehead on the continent in 1894. Convinced that St. Petersberg would eventually be prepared to accept Japanese preponderance in Korea in return for recognition of her own supremacy in Manchuria, Itō and his followers argued for a policy of *rapprochement* with the Russians. In this way, Northeast Asia could be peacefully divided into mutually acceptable spheres of influence.[17]

The Anglo-Japanese alliance of 30 January 1902, whereby Great Britain and Japan agreed to act to protect their separate interests in China and Korea (Japan being interested in Korea "to a peculiar degree"), observe neutrality should the pursuit of these interests lead to complications with a third party and enter any future conflict should that third party be joined by one or more of its allies, was, in essence, a delayed declaration of war against Russia. With the signing of the alliance relations between Tokyo and St. Petersberg deteriorated rapidly. Japanese immigrants poured into southern Korea, Japanese advisers worked to strengthen their position at the Korean Court and Japanese interests assumed increasingly open control of key sections of the Korean economy. Russia, in response, strengthened its military position in Manchuria and intensified its economic activities in the Yalu river area. By 10 February 1904 Japan and Russia were at war. Within a little over a year the Japanese, by virtue of a series of military and naval victories even more spectacular than those they had won against China in 1894–1895, had temporarily eliminated the Romanov Empire as a major factor in Northeast Asian politics. Almost half Japan's war expenditure had been made up from loans raised on the British, American and German money markets. The lion's share had been provided by British interests.[18]

The Consequences of the Russo-Japanese War

By the terms of the Treaty of Portsmouth Japan obtained Russian recognition of her paramount political, economic and military interests in Korea. She also obtained ("with the consent of the goverment of China") the Russian lease of Port Arthur, Dairen and assorted rights on the Liaotung peninsula, Russia's railway interests in southern Manchuria and possession of the island of Sakhalin south of the 50th parallel.

In the years after the war Japan, with full British support, moved rapidly to incorporate the Kingdom of Korea into her Empire. The revised Anglo-Japanese alliance, signed on 12 August 1905, referred specifically to Japan's "paramount political, military and economic interests in Korea." Britain recognised Japan's right to "take such measures of guidance, control and protection in Korea as she may deem proper and necessary to safeguard and advance those interests." This gave Japan a virtual blank cheque in the peninsula. The second Japan-Korean Convention, signed on 17 November 1905, gave the Japanese Government complete responsibility for the management of Korea's external affairs. All foreign diplomatic representation in Korea was abolished. A Japanese Residency, with wide powers to intervene in Korean domestic political life was established in Seoul. In July 1907, after an unsuccessful appeal by the Korean King to the Hague Peace Conference, Japan abolished the Korean monarchy, disbanded the Korean army and revised the 1905 Convention to give the Resident General still wider powers. In the succeeding years Japan took over the police force and the administration of justice. Finally, on 22 August 1910, Korea was officially incorporated into the Japanese Empire.

The scale of Japan's victories over Russia, the acquisition of important interests in Manchuria and the annexation of Korea substantially altered her strategic environment. They also had a profound impact both on her relations with the imperial Western Powers and with the government in Peking.

Whitehall welcomed the new Japanese position in Northeast Asia whole heartedly, despite the British *rapprochement* with France and Russia in the face of growing German power in Europe. Imperially minded Englishmen, astonished by the martial qualities so recently displayed by their Japanese

protégés, came to believe that Japan could perform, on a grander scale, services similar to those already being rendered the Empire by the gurkhas of Nepal.[19] The operational scope of the second Anglo-Japanese alliance (12 August 1905) was thus extended to India. While the Japanese Government declined to assist Great Britain in military operations *beyond* the Indian frontiers and refused to make specific commitments about the number of troops available for service on the subcontinent, British authorities, happily ignorant of geography, felt confident that Japan could be requested to provide a "large contingent of (say) 150,000 troops . . . . which could arrive in India, by a safer route, in as many weeks as a numerically equal army from home would take months."[20]

The British were unreservedly optimistic about the future of the alliance. On 26 May 1911, a year after the incorporation of Korea into the Japanese Empire, Sir Edward Grey told the British Cabinet:

> I do not think there is the least chance of a quarrel with Japan, because I am quite convinced that the Japanese policy . . . . is to concentrate her people in Korea and Manchuria and the parts neighbouring to herself in the Far East, and she does not want to encourage them to go abroad, though she has some difficulty in preventing them. There will never be a quarrel between Japan and the United States out of any attempt of Japan to settle herself on the American side of the Pacific Ocean, that being so I am quite sure there will not be trouble.[21]

Washington saw matters in a different light. United States Far Eastern policy, like that of Great Britain, was designed to preserve a regional balance of power. American officials, however, did not view the map of East Asia from Delhi, with one eye on the Khyber Pass and another on the Indian nationalist movement. They were chiefly concerned with preventing any challenge to their supremacy in the Philippines and with advancing their commercial interests in China. In their view, China included the three provinces of Manchuria. The Russian collapse of 1905 had seriously disturbed the regional equilibrium as seen from Washington. "From my point of view." Theodore Roosevelt had told the French Ambassador, "the best would be that the Russians and the Japanese should remain face to face balancing each

other, both weakened."[22]

The United States responded to the establishment of an effective Japanese hegemony of Northeast Asia at two levels. The Taft-Katsura Agreement of 29 July 1905 and the Root-Takahira Agreement of 30 November 1908 extended American recognition of Japan's new position in Korea. In return the United States secured Japanese recognition of their own preponderance in the Philippines. At the same time, from 1906 onward, American naval planners began to posit Japan as the chief hypothetical enemy in the Pacific. The world tour of Theodore Roosevelt's Great White Fleet in 1906-1907, at a time when Californian racial legislation and Manchurian railway politics had introduced additional tensions into Washington-Tokyo relations, was largely intended to alert the Japanese leadership to the new emphasis in American policy and the terrible potentialities of American military might.[23] By 1908 Roosevelt was attempting to interest the British in the idea of "an Anglo-American coalition against Japan."[24] He was also attracted to Kaiser Wilhelm II's concept of a German-American-Chinese alliance against the Japanese Empire.[25] This growing American antagonism toward Japan was a harbinger of future events. For some time, however, it came to nothing. As Sir Edward Grey remarked:

> The Americans talk angrily but they have no means of getting at the Japanese unless they build a much larger fleet. It is true that Japan cannot materially hurt the Americans, except in the Philippines, which would be no great loss, but unless America could bring Japan to her knees, she would lose prestige and Japan would gain it.[26]

In the years after the Russo-Japanese war the Japanese, too, thought carefully about their new position in the Asian Pacific region. They saw matters in an entirely different light to either the British or the Americans. On 4 April 1908 the Army Section of the General Staffs submitted the first major postwar review of Japan's strategic environment to the then Prime Minister, Prince Saionji Kimmochi. This review, like those that followed, had been undertaken, in accordance with constitutional practice, by order of

the Emperor. It was subsequently discussed by Cabinet, accepted, then submitted to the Emperor for his approval. In its final form it thus represented, in every sense, an authoritative statement of national policy.

The Defence Statement of 1908 categorically rejected the view that Japan, her national territory now safe from attack, established, for the first time in her history, as a continental power, should adopt a cautious and conservative foreign policy. There was no thought of enhancing the security of the Empire through manipulation of the balance of power. The Chiefs of Staff, inspired by the imperialist aspirations of the Restoration movement, saw no alternative to continued expansion.

> It is apparent, if we review Japanese history from a military point of view, that only the Tokugawas have based their policies on cautious, conservative principles. All other governments have adopted progressive policies. Thus it was that in the recent campaigns of 1894-1895, 1900 and 1904-1905 Japan went over to a totally offensive position and gained spectacular victories. This clearly demonstrated the character of the Japanese people.[27]

In the field of diplomacy

> The main thrust of Imperial policy should be directed not merely towards the protection of the interests acquired in Manchuria and Korea, at considerable cost in life and resources, in the war of 1904-1905, and towards the protection of the ever growing activities of our people in South Asia and the Pacific, but also towards extension of these interests.[28]

Geopolitical considerations alone made it imperative that Japan devote equal attention to her interests on the Asian continent and to the wider problems of the Pacific. The two regions were inseparable:

> It is not permissible for us to adopt a defence policy, as we are at the moment, which, overlooking the importance of the oceans, concentrates on the development of our interests in Manchuria and Korea, and which may, as a result, one day oblige us to defend our island Empire on our own shores. Certainly, our defence policy may be regarded as completely adequate only when we are in a position to take the offensive overseas.[29]

The Anglo-Japanese alliance was seen as essential for the successful implementation of Japanese policies in Asia and the Pacific. Despite its continued decline, the British Empire remained the world's greatest power. The Chiefs of Staff were, however, conscious that the costs of maintaining the alliance could be considerable:

> The new Anglo-Japanese alliance will cause further bad blood between Great Britain and Russia. The origins of the [next] war between them will lie in East Asia, in India and in numerous areas beyond these regions. We must be constantly conscious of the fact that we have a commitment to stand up and come to the aid of the British. However this may be, wherever the origins of the next war may lie, Russia will turn her attention towards India and apply pressure in that region. If this occurs, we should be prepared to bear immediately the burdens imposed by our treaty obligations. Also, when we contemplate the present situation in Europe we fined Germany emerging as a new and ambitious power, anxious to challenge Great Britain not only in commercial and industrial might but in naval power as well. Great Britain cannot, under any circumstances, take this challenge lightly. There is no predicting when conflicts over the Baghdad Railway, over Turkey and Persia might trigger off a clash of interests between Britain, Germany and Russia . . . . . [If this should happen] we should again be prepared to fulfil our obligations under the Anglo-Japanese alliance.[30]

The chief threats to Japan's newly acquired position in the Far East, and to the further extension of her regional influence, were seen to come from Imperal Russia and the United States. The Romanov Empire was believed to be planning a war of revenge. In any future conflict with Japan, the Russians, it was thought, would endeavour to forge an alliance with Germany, extend the operational scope of the Franco-Russian alliance to the Far East, thus compensating for the weakness of their position at Vladivostok by acquiring access to facilities in French Indochina, then make new overtures to Peking. Despite the overwhelming strength of the Anglo-Japanese coalition Japan needed to exert the utmost efforts to ensure that neither a Russo-German alliance nor any special understanding between St. Petersberg and Peking materialised.

The United States was viewed as a young, brash and ambitious imperial

power, determined to make its presence felt in East Asia. Its political, strategic and economic interests were potentially incompatible with those of Japan. Its racial philosophies and sense of religious mission were likely to exacerbate any friction which might in future arise. The Chiefs of Staff appeared to believe that, for the time being at least, conflicting imperial interests made collaboration between Great Britain and the United States improbable. From Japan's point of view, however, the United States was a dangerous potential adversary:

> The size of the Navy needs to be determined with a view to taking offensive action against the naval forces that the United States can bring into the Far East. Among our potential adversaries America is the country to which we should pay the greatest attention as far as the operations of our Navy are concerned.[31]

China posed no threat to Japan. Nevertheless, Japan's new position on the Asian continent, together with the growth of revolutionary Chinese nationalism made it necessary to contemplate military intervention in support of acquired rights. In 1908 the Chiefs of Staff still felt the need for some caution in these matters. Geopolitical logic might well require continuous intervention in China's domestic affairs. Japan, however, was still not strong enough to act alone:

> Although it is true that China has a great many interests in Manchuria and Korea that conflict with our own rights and interests there, it is almost impossible to imagine that China, by herself, would be in a position to go to war with us . . . . . China has no navy to speak of. It could almost be said that her army is an army in name only, an army without substance . . . All the odds would be in favour of a Japanese victory if the Chinese decided to go to war with us on their own . . . . . However, as a result of the [agitation for] the recovery of rights, the sudden increase in anti-foreign, revolutionary and other sinister movements, it has recently become impossible to predict when disturbances similar to the Boxer Rebellion might break out in China. The measures that the Imperial Japanese Army should take on these occasions are dependent on extremely complex problems involving our relations with the Great Powers. It is thus not possible to make a final decision on these matters in advance.[32]

The Prime Minister, Prince Saionji, concurred wholeheartedly with the views of the Chiefs of Staff. There was absolutely no conflict between the civilian and military leadership on these matters. In the palmy days after the Russo-Japanese war the vision of an ever expanding empire, rich, powerful, feared and respected, linked, through a mutually advantageous strategic alliance, to its counterpart in the Western Hemisphere, was shared by "liberals" and "militarists" alike. As at the time of the debate over conquest of Korea, disagreements were about tactics, not objectives. According to Prince Saionji:

> "It is to be expected that Japanese rights and interests in Manchuria and Korea, and the increasing influence of our people around the shores of the Pacific, will develop further in the future. Faced with this expansion of the Japanese Empire there will be countries that will seek to frustrate our peaceful policies. It is necessary, if we are to expect others to heed our views, . . . to have sufficient armaments to carry weight in the counsels of the Great Powers, to have enough real power to keep the peace of the world courageously . . . . . the views of the Chiefs of the Army and Naval Staffs are not at all mistaken.[33]

Immediately after the war the Chiefs of Staff requested an increase in the size of the army from thirteen to nineteen divisions and an expansion of the fleet from 260,000 to 500,000 tons. The Government endorsed their proposals without hesitation.

Japanese Policy towards the Chinese Republican Revolution of 1911. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance as a Moderating Influence?

In the years after the Russo-Japanese War Tokyo's attention focussed increasingly on events in China. A major revolutionary upheaval on the continent seemed imminent. The dominant elements in the Meiji oligarchy were convinced that Japan's interests would best be served by preservation of the Manchu Dynasty, inefficient, corrupt and weak. A successful revolution would almost inevitably threaten Japan's position in Manchuria and have profound repercussions in Korea. In May 1911, on the eve of the

Wuchang Uprising, the Army Section of the General Staffs made the following observations:

> If we examine the situation in China it is apparent that the Chinese are in no position to pose a military challenge to our Empire. However, if we consider the state of affairs within China . . . . it will be seen that the country is threatened, externally, by the [constant pressure] of Great Power [imperialism] and that, internally, the alienation of the people from the Court and Government is rapidly making the authorities impotent. The Government is lacking in unity. In addition, anti-foreign movements and revolutionary ideas are quickly spreading everywhere. Moreover, the financial situation continues to deteriorate, loans continue to multiply—and not simply because large numbers of industrial concerns and strategic places are under foreign control. The trend has reached a nadir and it will be difficult to preserve the tranquility of China. Once disturbances break out there will be no power to curb them at the top and no desire to restrain them at the lower levels of society. They will rapidly extend to all parts of the country and develop into a great uprising."[34]

The Western Powers, it was believed, would certainly attempt to exploit the situation to their own advantage. Yet even if they did not, the Army contended,

> Even if, for arguments sake, we assume the Great Powers will exercise restraint, we ourselves have extremely involved relations with the Chinese in Manchuria. This will necessitate at least a partial mobilisation of our military strength. For this reason it is difficult to expect that we will be able to forestall a demonstration of sabre rattling between Japan and China. In order to safeguard our rights and interests in situations of this kind we must make preparations to act immediately they arise.[35]

The Twenty One Demands Crisis, the Manchurian Incident and the Sino-Japanese War of 1937-1945 were all implicit in the thinking that lay behind this document. The armed forces assumed that Manchuria had already become, like Korea, a geopolitical extension of Japan. Their view was, in fact, perfectly correct. The Chiefs of Staff were conscious that this situation would lead, sooner or later, to a head-on collision with the forces of revolutionary Chinese nationalism. Once again, their understanding was completely accurate.

If Japan were to maintain a position on the continent it would eventually have to be defended by force of arms, not against the imperial Western Powers but against the Chinese, the Koreans and other indigenous peoples. Detailed plans for military operations on the Asian mainland were subsequently drawn up. One plan envisaged action against China herself. Another contemplated the possibility of intervention to break up a Sino-Russian alliance. Such a combination, it was thought, could conceivably emerge in the wake of a successful revolutionary upheaval in China.[36]

The Chinese Revolution of 1911, however, elicited a confused Japanese response. While the Saionji Cabinet formally decided to supply military aid to the Manchus, exploit the crisis to have Japan's "preeminent position" in China recognised by the Powers and consolidate her existing interests in Manchuria,[37] large scale armed intervention was not undertaken. In the end, the Army had to be content with participation in a five power force to protect railway installations in Manchuria and with the dispatch of a small contingent to Hankow, under strict orders to confine its activities to "the protection of the life and property of Japanese residents."[38]

The attitude of the British Government no doubt had some influence on Japanese policy. The British, hoping to preserve their commercial interests in South China, where support for Sun Yat-sen and the Republicans was strong, were not especially anxious to come to the aid of the embattled Manchus. The Japanese Prime Minister was concerned about the possibility of adverse international reaction to the independent interventionist policies advocated by the Army. In Europe, Great Britain, France and Russia had now closed ranks against the German Empire. It was no longer so easy to exploit Anglo-Russian rivalry to advance Japan's continental interests. Japanese efforts to enlist British support for projects to set up a constitutional monarchy in China ended in failure. The British attitude, which struck the Japanese Government as opportunistic, dangerous and contrary to the principle of monarchical solidarity, placed considerable strains on the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.[39] Yamagata Aritomo, among others, began to think that Japan's interests might best be served by negotiating some special arrangement with Russia, a reliable, conservative monarchy whose policies were less influenced by base commercial

motives or fashionable liberalism.[40]

Whitehall's attitude, however, was not the principal reason for Saionji's hesitation. The Republican Revolution in China had opened deep fissures in the Japanese Establishment. While Sun Yat-sen's programme alarmed the dominant groups in the Satsuma-Chōshū oligarchy, the Republican cause was popular among the Japanese people. More importantly, Terauchi Masatake, the Governor General of Korea, Nakamura Korekimi, President of the South Manchurian Railway Company, together with Tōyama Mitsuru, Uchida Ryōhei and other members of the Pan-Asianist secret societies, had decided that a policy of supporting Sun Yat-sen's Republicans might serve to weaken the Ch'ing Dynasty's grip on Manchuria.[41] Tōyama fondly believed that "because the objective of Sun Yat-sen's revolution is to overthrow the Manchus and revive the Han it is possible that he may base his state on territories south of the Great Wall, permitting Japan to take Manchuria."[42] The Mitsui Company, too, began supplying arms and equipment to the revolutionary forces in return for promises of economic concessions on various parts of the Chinese continent.[43]

When these policies failed to bear fruit the Japanese expansionists returned to more conventional approaches. The unwillingness of the Japanese Government to take decisive action against the infant Chinese Republic caused outrage in sections of the military leadership. The parallel with the attitude of conservative British imperialists to the Russian Revolution of 1917 was striking. The Manchu monarchy had not been salvaged. Valuable opportunities for continental expansion had been lost. The virus of revolution had not been contained. The chief problem, as seen by the more militant expansionists, had certainly not been the attitude of Japan's British allies. The future Prime Minister Tanaka Giichi, the most notable exponent of hardline interventionist policies on the Asian continent in the 1920s and 1930s, at this time Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau in the War Ministry, explained the issue in the following way:

> I am writing especially to report on why the Goverment has committed a serious blunder of this kind [i.e. the failure to intervene and crush the

> Chinese Republic]. There are certain people who are not enthusiastic about the expansion of the Empire on the continent. There are people who think of nothing but enlarging their own gardens, who give no thought to the affairs of the nation. There are people who seem prepared, out of jealousy or doubt, to sacrifice the nation's destiny in order to block the way for expansion in other areas. These people have colluded with their bedfellows in the Government and, at the present time, it seems to me that the central positions in the Government have fallen into their grasp. In any case, this kind of disaster has occurred because the Government's hands have been tied, its actions rendered futile.[44]

The Anglo-Japanese Alliance and World War I

The outbreak of the European War in August 1914 provided new opportunities for Japanese expansion in Asia and the Western Pacific within the framework of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. On 23 August 1914, in response to specific requests from Great Britain, Japan declared war on Germany. Within a few weeks Japanese troops, accompanied by a small British contingent, had captured the German fortress of Tsingtao and occupied other German concessions in China. They had also greatly extended Japanese influence in Shantung, taking Weihsien, Tsinan and the Kiaochow-Tsinanfu Railway. In September and October Japanese forces took the Marshalls, the Marianas, the Carolines and Yap. Australian and New Zealand troops had captured the German islands south of the equator.[45]

While Japanese actions in China caused some disquiet in London and while Japan's occupation of the German Pacific islands, especially Yap, alarmed the United States, Australia and New Zealand, Tokyo's contributions to the British war effort were much appreciated. In February 1915, in response to urgent British requests, Japan dispatched a cruiser squadron to the Indian Ocean. By 1916 the defence of the British Indian Empire was in the hands of the Imperial Japanese Navy. In February 1916, in response to further appeals from Great Britain, Japan dispatched two light cruisers to the Cape of Good Hope to pursue German raiders and two flottilas of destroyers to the Mediterranean to deal with German submarines. In April 1917 four more destroyers were sent to the Mediterranean and Japan took over all convoy duties for British shipping sailing between Aden and Colombo.[46]

In these circumstances it would hardly have been appropriate for Great Britain to have opposed the vast expansion of Japanese influence in China contemplated by the Ōkuma Cabinet when it drew up the Twenty One Demands. The objective of the Twenty One Demands was to reduce China to the status of a Japanese colony. Yet as Sir Edward Grey was later to observe:

> If we had not made it clear that we should not bar Japan's expansion of interests in the Far East it would clearly have been to Japan's advantage to throw in her lot with Germany. Japan is barred from every other part of the world except the Far East and the Anglo-Japanese alliance cannot be maintained if she is to be barred from expansion there also and if we are to claim German concessions in China as well as taking German colonies in Africa and elsewhere.[47]

Grey's attitude was logical and consistent. In any case, the British could not have prevented Japan's new advance in Asia and the Western Pacific even if they had wished to do so. Yet the consequences of that advance were more clearly recognised by the Japanese than by their British allies. The new *Principles of Imperial Defence Policy* drawn up by the Chiefs of Staff and approved by the Hara Cabinet in February 1923, shortly after the dissolution of the Anglo-Japanese alliance and its replacement by the Four Power Pacific Treaty, saw a future conflict with the United States and the forces of Chinese nationalism as virtually inevitable. The Great War, the Chiefs argued, had merely intensified the conflicts among the imperial powers:

> As the wounds left by the war heal the focus of economic rivalry among the Great Powers will shift to Eastern Asia. It is not simply that East Asia is vast, endowed with abundant natural resources and many things awaiting development by the other Powers but also that its immense population makes it one of the great markets of the globe. Herein lies an incompatibility of interests between our Empire and the other Great Powers, and, as the situation develops, there is no guarantee that a lot of sabre rattling will not take place . . .
>
> The Power most likely to collide with the Empire is the United States. In recent years the United States, having developed its national power,

and disposing of limitless natural resources, has embarked on a policy of economic aggression. In China, especially, American owned facilities have engaged in unscrupulous anti-Japanese propaganda and the United States threatens the position that the Empire has acquired as a result of many risks and sacrifices. The United States is in this way seeking to test the patience and caution of the Empire . . . . . The ostracism of Japanese residents in California will soon spread to other States and gradually develop a broader base. There are no grounds for optimism concerning the position of our people in Hawaii. These conflicts, growing out of years of economic problems and racial prejudice will be difficult to solve. In the future their feelings of alienation are bound to grow and the clash of interests become more intense. It is probable that the United States, which possesses immense armaments and has many bases throughout East Asia and the Pacific will, as part of its Asian policy, soon provoke a conflict with the Empire . . . . . From the view point of our national defence we must pay the greatest and most careful attention to the United States. . .

China lacks unity and suffers from a decline in national vitality. She has no power to challenge us by herself. But while it might appear that this gives us no grounds for worry as far as our national defence is concerned, China's abundant resources are an indispensible element both in our economic development and in our defence. Because of this our policy towards China must be based on goodwill, mutual assistance, coexistence and mutual prosperity. The Chinese must be satisfied that we will put their resources to good use both in times of peace and in times of war. . . . [Nevertheless] the unstable political situation in China, the Chinese policy of using one barbarian to defeat another and China's traditional policy of trying to win back her rights make it unrealistic to imagine that our expectations will be rapidly realised. There is also no guarantee that China, taking advantage of a Japanese-American war, might not seek to ally with the United States against us. The Empire needs to be able to bring great pressure to bear in case these possibilities should arise.[48]

Retention of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance could not have affected these issues in any way. In Japanese eyes, the close political and military relationship with Great Britain had achieved its purpose. As Ishii Kikujirō remarked, by the end of the Great War the Alliance was "regarded by the leaders of Japanese thought as superannuated and useless. When the Third Alliance was concluded Japan already looked upon the alliance in perspective, but in view

of the trend of events in the world, considered that if it were retained as an ornament some good and no harm would result."[49]

NOTES

1) Senshi Kenkyū Shiryō, HRO-S, *Dai Hon'ei Rikugun Bu, Dai Tōa Sensō Kaisen Ni Kansuru Kosatsu*, Bōei Kenshūjo, Senshi Shitsu, 1976, p. 2.
2) Nihon Shiseki Kyōkai [ed.] *Kidō Kōin Nikki*, Tōkyō Daigaku Shuppan Kai, 1967, Volume I, Meiji Gennen, Jūnigatsu Jūyokka, p. 159.
3) Sophia Su-fei Yen, *Taiwan in China's Foreign Relations, 1836-1874*, Hamden, Connecticut, 1965, p. 161, quoted in Grace Fox, *Britain and Japan, 1858-1883*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1969, p. 283.
4) Grace Fox, op. cit., pp. 280-310.
5) A. Popov, "Pervye Shagi: Russkago Imperializma Na Dal'nem Vostoke, 1888-1903," *Krasnyi Arkhiv*, LII (1932), pp. 55-56. Quoted in Michael Underdown, "Russian Interest in Korea", Symposium on Korea, Australian National University, 25-26 August 1978.
6) For a detailed discussion of these debales see Ian H. Nish, *The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, The Diplomacy of Two Island Empires*, 1894-1907, The Athlone Press, 1966, pp. 1-17.
7) Fujimura Michio, *Nisshin Sensō*, Iwanami Shoten, 1974, p. 207.
8) Kusano Shigematsu, et al., *Sōhō Monzen*, Tōkyō, 1916, pp. 293-298.
9) Keio Gijuku (ed.), *Fukuzawa Yukichi Zenshū*, Volume 16, pp. 213-216.
10) For the economic impact of the Sino-Japanese War see Sakanō Junji, "Nisshin Sengo No Seiji Katei," in Rekishigaku Kenkyū Kai and Nihon Shi Kenkyū Kai (ed.), *Kōza Nihon Shi*, Tokyo Daigaku Shuppan Kai, 1975, Volume 6, pp. 95-129 and Shinobu Seisaburō (ed.), *Nihon Gaikōshi*, Mainichi Shimbunsha, 1972, pp. 184-191.
11) Ian H. Nish, op. cit., pp. 41-42. For the text of the Treaty see E. B. Price, *Russo-Japanese Treaties of 1907-16*, Baltimore, 1933, pp. 101-102.
12) For details see Ian H. Nish, op. cit., pp. 41-45, 57-62, 69-74; and Shinobu Seisaburō, op. cit., pp. 192-198.
13) Quoted in Ian H. Nish, op. cit., p. 81.
14) Ian H. Nish, op. cit., pp. 80-95., Shinobu Seisaburō, op. cit., pp. 205-209.
15) Quoted in Ian H. Nish, op. cit., pp. 283-285.
16) Ibid.
17) Ibid. p. 387.
18) The financing of the war is discussed in Nish, op. cit., pp. 287-289. Britain refused Japanese requests for a war loan. In view of the evolving situation in Europe the British Government was anxious, as Nish succinctly puts it, "to

obstruct Russia without assisting Japan too much." Whitehall did not, however, dissuade private corporations from lending money to Japan.

19) See, for example, Claude Lowther's speech in the House of Commons, 29 March 1905, as quoted in Ian H. Nish, op. cit., p. 303.
20) Ibid., p. 306.
21) Ian H. Nish, *Alliance in Decline, A Study in Anglo-Japanese Relations*, 1908-1923, The Athlone Press, 1972, p. 7.
22) Raymond A. Esthus, *Theodore Roosevelt and Japan*, University of Washington Press, 1966, pp. 38-39.
23) James Crowley, *Japan's Quest for Autonomy*, Princeton University Press, 1966, pp. 10-11.
24) R. M. Dawson (ed.), *William Lyon Mackenzie King*, Volume I, London, 1958, pp. 150-156., D. C. Gordon, "Roosevelt's smart Yankee trick," *Pacific Historical Review*, 30, 1961, pp. 351-358.
25) Luella J. Hall, "The abortive German-American Entente of 1907-8," *Journal of Modern History, I*, 1929, pp. 219-35.
26) Quoted in Ian H. Nish, *Alliance in Decline*, p. 23.
27) *Teikoku Kokubō Hōshin, 4 April 1908.* The present writer is deeply indebted to General Kinugasa Hayao, former Chairman of the Joint Staff Council, for providing the Japanese text of this document.
28) Ibid.
29) Ibid.
30) Ibid.
31) Ibid.
32) Ibid.
33) The writer is indebted to General Kinugasa Hayao for providing the Japanese text of Prince Saionji's letter.
34) The writer is indebted to General Kinugasa for providing the Japanese text of this report.
35) Ibid.
36) Ibid.
37) *Nihon Gaikō Bunsho*, Volumes 44-45, *Shinkoku Jiken*, pp. 50-51; 135-136.
38) Ibid., Volumes 44-45, pp. 46-48.
39) Ian H. Nish, *Alliance in Decline*, pp. 81-84.
40) *Katsura Tarō Kankei Bunsho*, Kokkai Toshokan Kensei Shiryōshitsuso, cited in Shinobu Seisaburō, op. cit., p. 246.
41) *Nihon Gaikō Bunsho*, Volumes 44-45, pp. 264-265, 270-271.
42) *Tōa Senkaku Shishi Kiden*, Volume 2, p. 453.
43) Yamaura Kanichi, *Tōa Shintaisei No Senkakusha Mori Kaku*, 1940, Quoted in Shinobu Seisaburō, op. cit., p. 245.

44) *Nihon Gaikō Bunsho*, Volumes 44-45, pp. 46-48.
45) For details of the campaigns see Ian H. Nish, *Alliance in Decline*, pp. 132-157.
46) Ibid. pp. 150-152; 162-177; 184-195; 202-209; 225-228 and 237-241. See also Shinobu Seisaburō, op. cit., pp. 266-268 and 272-274.
47) Quoted in Ian H. Nish, *Alliance in Decline*, p. 158, 180.
48) *Teikoku Kokubō Hōshin*, 28 February 1923. By courtesy of General Kinugasa Hayao.
49) Viscount Kikujirō Ishii, *Diplomatic Commentaries* (Translated and edited by William R. Langdon), The Johns Hopkins Press. Baltimore, 1936, p. 59.