

## **The Japanese Peace Settlement of 1951 The American Perspective\***

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The State Department (the Borton group) began consideration of a peace settlement with Japan in October 1946, and completed a preliminary draft on August 5, 1947, providing for demilitarization and disarmament of, and post-treaty supervision by a Council of Ambassadors of the Allied Powers over, Japan. The Policy Planning Staff (PPS) of the Department was first to voice objection to the draft, arguing that an American proposal for a peace "should be formulated in conformity with U.S. objectives" toward Japan.<sup>1)</sup> After securing approval from Under Secretary Robert A. Lovett, the PPS began its own study of the problem in the framework of the future of Japan and of the postwar position of the United States in the Far East. This move by the PPS also constituted a challenge to the military. As a historian of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) noted, the State Department had been concerned "over the broad influence exercised on foreign policy by U.S. military governors in the defeated Axis countries," and attempted "to reassert its proper role."<sup>2)</sup>

The conflict that developed between the State Department and the military over a peace settlement with Japan can also be explained by the "positions" a la Graham T. Allison. As John Gaddis correctly pointed out with reference to NSC 49, even though both the State Department and the JCS agreed on "the importance of ensuring a pro-Western orientation for post-occupation Japan," they differed on the potential threat to Japan: the JCS accorded "high priority to the danger of external attack," while the State Department concentrated "on the risks of external political, economic, and social disorder."<sup>3)</sup>

In this game of peace making with Japan, in which the State Department consistently took the initiative, the JCS was disadvantaged at least for two reasons. One was the presence of General Douglas MacArthur in Tokyo. Since there was a tradition in the United States to allow broad prerogatives to field commanders in their respective fields, the JCS attempted to persuade MacArthur to adopt JCS's position. MacArthur, however, did not share views with the JCS, and often sided with the State Department, thus making it possible for the State Department to form a kind of alliance with MacArthur.

The other reason was the inflexible decision-making process of the JCS known as the "flimsy-buff-green-red striped procedure." As Korb points out, "[t]he JCS has become so bogged down in the cumbersome process which is so concerned with protecting each chief's own service which it has been addicted to the status quo and has never been a source of innovation in the national security policy-making process."<sup>40</sup> When the State Department requested a quick opinion of the JCS on certain strategic issue, the JCS either merely repeated its previous position or delayed its response. This irritated the State Department, but it could not ignore views of the JCS on security matters.

Other high officials in the Departments of Defense, the Army, and the State participated in the peace-making, namely Dean Acheson, George Marshall, George F. Kennan, Tracy Voorhees, John Foster Dulles, and Louis Johnson, and conflict of their positions as well as idiosyncracies further complicated the game.

Since there are many excellent works on the peace settlement with Japan, this paper does not intend to make a comprehensive review of American perspective. Our purpose here is to analyze selected cases on security matters, and offer somewhat different interpretations on some fine points.

## I. NSC 13 and NSC 44

### 1. NSC 13

**The Position of the PPS** The PPS, with the approval of Under Secretary Lovett, began consideration of a peace settlement with Japan, and produced a draft entitled "Assumptions for Japanese Peace Treaty," which set out the following objectives in the peace settlement:

A. In political terms, 1) internally stable, and under a responsible government friendly to the U.S., and 2) in foreign affairs a sovereign entity and a member of UN, but amenable to American leadership;

B. In economic terms, 1) industrially revived as a producer primarily of consumer goods and secondarily of capital goods, 2) commercially active, and 3) prosperous and contributing to a rise in standards of living in non-Communist Asia;

C. In military terms, 1) dependent upon the U.S., its security from external attack guaranteed by the U.S. but with sufficient constabulary, coast guard and police forces to prevent mass violence and to be susceptible of expansion and use in accordance with American military decision.

The above security arrangement would be provided in a bilateral treaty between the United States and Japan, which would be signed and ratified immediately following a peace treaty. It further recommended that even though the disarmament and demilitarization of Japan, to which the United States had already committed, had to be provided in the peace treaty, the provision should be made flexible enough to allow future revision. Other states would most likely object to this arrangement. If the United States could not secure their concurrence, then it should unilaterally proceed to a bilateral settlement with Japan.<sup>4)</sup>

These recommendations of the PPS, which challenged the assumptions underlying the August 5 draft by the Borton group, inevitably invited criticisms from the group and others in the Department particularly on the proposed unilateral action.<sup>5)</sup> PPS 10 of October 14, "Results of Planning Staff Study of Questions Involved in the Japanese Peace Settlement," recommended that a peace treaty "should provide for complete Japanese disarmament, with a reservation that Japan should be permitted to maintain a civil police force," and that post-occupation Japanese military security "must rest primarily on the proximity (or in extreme event, the presence in Japan) of adequate U.S. forces."<sup>6)</sup>

PPS 10 reflected PPS Director George F. Kennan's concept of "containment." Kennan saw the fundamental problem for the United States in the post-World War II period rested in the "power vacuum" surrounding Russia, which had been created by the destruction of Germany, Italy and Japan, and by the weakening of England and China. Thus "the first and primary element of 'containment' . . . would be the encouragement and development of other

forces resistant to communism . . . as rapidly as possible in order to take off our shoulders some of the burden of bipolarity.” Likewise, PPS 10 emphasized that “Japan’s fortunes will . . . depend primarily on the stability of its internal political structure,” which in turn depends on both “the extent to which Japanese political psychology is adjusted to the political institutions inherited from the occupation regime,” and on economic conditions. Thus Kennan’s key concern was “to determine the directives under which SCAP is now operating are such as to make the maximum contributions to Japan’s eventual ability to meet the strain of renewed economic independence.” Since there were conflicting views on this question in Washington, Kennan proposed to send a high official to Tokyo for further discussion with SCAP.<sup>7)</sup>

Kennan himself visited Tokyo in early 1948 and met General MacArthur, and while waiting, under instruction from Washington, for a meeting with Under Secretary of the Army Williams H. Draper, visited Okinawa and Manila. This trip to the remote areas of the Far East gave Kennan time to think about an overall strategy for the United States in the Far East, which was conveyed to Washington in his letters to Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs Walt Butterworth and Secretary George Marshall.

Kennan found that the problem was SCAP itself, which was operated by MacArthur with an absolute personal power in a remote place separated from the main flow of government activities. “All this has endowed it,” he wrote, “with a certain stuffiness of atmosphere, a didactic authority of opinion, a sensitiveness to criticism, and a degree of internal intrigue which reminds me of nothing more than the latter days of the court of the Empress Catherine II, or possibly the final stage of the regime of Belisarius in Italy.” He thought that while the terms of surrender had been “substantially enforced,” SCAP was continuing occupation of Japan principally for lack of “international mandate to leave” and with “no definite objectives with respect to the military security of Japan in the post-treaty period.” Kennan thus volunteered to suggest a strategic concept for the Pacific area.<sup>8)</sup>

In thinking about the overall strategy, Kennan felt that because of America’s “congenial limitations” imposed by Congress, public opinion, and lack of personal on civil affairs, the United States should keep to a minimum exten-

sive garrisoning of civil affairs commitments. Thus, the mainland of Asia was not considered vital to the United States, and it should evacuate from Korea as soon as possible. He agreed with MacArthur that Okinawa was "the center of our offensive striking power in the western Pacific area," and was "the central and most advanced point of a U-shaped U.S. security zone embracing the Aleutians, mandated islands, and . . . Guam." Since Japan and the Philippines were outside this security area, Kennan suggested that the United States "would not attempt to keep bases or forces on their territory, *provided* that they remained entirely demilitarized and that no other power made any effort to obtain strategic facilities on them".<sup>9</sup>

In the meeting among Kennan, Draper, and Brig. General C. V. R. Schuyler (Chief, Plans and Policy Group) in Tokyo on March 21, 1948, it was agreed to hold an early conference in Washington "to reach overall basic policy decisions regarding the future of Japan in the light of broad United States strategic interests." Kennan was to write a paper on a broad policy, but the State Department was not to firm up its position until Draper's return to Washington and drafting of a paper of his own. Then either Kennan's or Draper's paper (or combination of both) would be presented to the National Security Council (NSC).<sup>10</sup>

On the basis of the agreement with Draper, Kennan prepared a report on "Recommendations with Respect to U.S. Policy Toward Japan" (PPS 28), and presented it to Under Secretary Lovett on March 25. Lovett, however, immediately approved Kennan's recommendations, and instructed Kennan and Butterworth to complete Departmental consideration of the paper *before* Draper's return from Japan. It was completed by the middle of April, and was presented "as the State Department position" paper to Draper "for his information and consideration." If approved by Draper, it was to be sent to the NSC as State's policy paper.<sup>11</sup>

On "security matters," PPS 28 recommended that the United States should not press for a treaty of peace, and "should concentrate its attention on the preparation of the Japanese for the eventual removal of the regime of control." As long as there continued to be the Soviet threat, the United States could not leave Japan defenseless nor was it desirable to maintain Amer-

ican troops in Japan after a peace treaty, nor to admit Japanese rearmament. The best alternative for the United States was to retain tactical forces in Japan until a peace treaty became effective, but it should make every effort "to reduce them to a minimum numbers, their cost to the Japanese economy, and the psychological impact of their presence on the Japanese population." On the post-treaty security arrangement for Japan, Kennan recommended not to formulate it until the time of peace negotiations.

The Department of the Army did not promptly respond to PPS 28, and at urgent requests of the State Department, Brig. Gen. Schuyler finally sent the Army's comments without obtaining Draper's final approval, noting, however, that "at least the majority of our suggested changes will meet his (Draper's) agreement."<sup>12</sup>

**The Position of the Army** What the Army objected most to PPS 28 were the timing of a peace treaty and the post-treaty security arrangement. On the first point, it was recommended that the United States should not agree to the conclusion of a peace treaty until the following conditions were met:

(a) Japan has reached the degree of stability to allow her to carry out her responsibilities in a manner satisfactory to U.S. interests; (b) overall relations with the U.S.S.R. have progressed to the point where the United States can afford, from a military security viewpoint, to allow a power vacuum to be created in Japan; or conversely (c) until other solutions, there being none apparent at the time that can be considered feasible, have been found to obviate the creation of such a vacuum after the treaty comes into effect.

On the second point, the Army insisted on Japanese rearmament of "a strictly defensive character," and on reducing American tactical troops to a minimum her number only in "consistant with military security and the proper performance of the occupational missions."<sup>13</sup>

**NSC 13/2** Since MacArthur had been strongly opposing Japanese rearmament, and even the Secretary of the Army considered it unadvisable "for a long time to come,"<sup>14</sup> the paper submitted to the NSC (NSC 13/1) did not

contain provisions for Japanese rearmament. Prior to the consideration by the NSC, NSC 13/1 was routinely referred to the JCS. Replying to it four months later (September 1948), the JCS recommended that the policy of Japanese demilitarization be given "careful scrutiny" when negotiations for a peace treaty passed beyond the preliminary stages. The paper remained unrevised, and was approved by the President as NSC 13/2 in October 1948.<sup>15)</sup>

## 2. NSC 44

A month after submitting the comments on PPS 28 in April 1948, Schuyler prepared a paper, "Limited Military Armaments for Japan," recommending planning for "the eventual establishment of limited Japanese armed forces" and exploration of "obtaining an amendment to the Japanese Constitution with a view to permitting eventual Japanese military armaments for defense." Two weeks after the approval of NSC 13/2 in October 1948, Defense Secretary Forrestal referred it to the JCS for study. The JCS submitted its report in March 1949 (NSC 44),<sup>16)</sup> that is, approximately five months after the referral and ten months after Schuyler submitted his paper.

The PPS was not convinced of the necessity of such preliminary planning, but agreed to it on two conditions, believing that they would "serve useful purpose": that the plan should be made "under the most stringent security precautions," and that "no steps to implement such plans shall be taken except upon decision by the NSC."<sup>17)</sup> The consideration of NSC 44, however, met an unexpected end because of a leak by the *New York Times*.

The *Times* reported on May 20, 1949 when NSC 44 was still on the agenda of the NSC that a plan to establish Japanese armed forces of 125,000 to 150,000 men, which was first proposed by Lt. General Robert L. Eichelberger, a former commander of the U.S. Eighth Army and then an advisor to the Department of the Army, was under "vigorous study" in the government. Under Secretary of State James Webb immediately called attention of the NSC and requested it to investigate the leak. This leak seems to have sealed the fate of NSC 44.<sup>18)</sup>

## II. The Decision to Promote an Early Peace

The death of NEC 44 did not of course mean that the military abandoned its position on security matters. The conflict of the JCS and the Departments of Defense and the Army with the State Department continued, and it was not until the visits of Defense Secretary Louis Johnson, the JCS and John Foster Dulles in June 1950 and the outbreak of the Korean War that an agreement was reached to press for an early peace settlement with Japan.

### 1. Conflict over NSC 49

In mid-1949, the State Department began reexamination of the decision in NSC 13/2 to postpone negotiations of a peace settlement with Japan for several reasons. The State Department, which had been preoccupied with the Berlin crisis, could now turn its attention to Japan, but found that political and economic deterioration there seemed to indicate that the United States occupation had reached the stage of "diminishing return," the situation which the Soviets might try to exploit to its advantage by offering a more favorable peace terms to Japan than the United States. Kennan, the architect of NSC 13/2, had left the PPS, and Secretary Marshall had been replaced by Dean Acheson, who was more responsive to the geographical bureaus of the Department than to the PPS.<sup>19)</sup>

In May 1949, following recommendations of the Bureau of the Far Eastern Affairs, Under Secretary Webb requested the NSC to obtain the JCS's evaluation of security requirements for the post-treaty defense of Japan. Surprisingly, the JCS replied to the request in two weeks (NSC 49), but it merely repeated what it had consistently been advocating, namely that a peace treaty with Japan would be "premature" in view of the presence of the Soviet threat. If negotiations for an early peace were to be undertaken, the JCS demanded that the following safeguards had to be included: "prior assurance of Japanese stability, democracy, and western orientation; existence of Japanese security forces capable of maintaining integral order and guarding against sabotage; ready plans for limited Japanese armed forces that could be implemented before the departure of occupation forces or in war emergency; and a gradual



withdrawal of occupation forces when conditions permitted and with no deadline set for their departure."<sup>20)</sup>

Probably the Department of State had expected this kind of reply from the JCS, and did not care immediately to rebut it, but in mid-September, Acheson promised British Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin to give him a draft peace treaty in time for a scheduled conference of the British Commonwealth nations in January 1950 so that Bevin could persuade these nations to support it. This time Acheson sought support of President Truman to ensure a reasonable reply from the JCS. In a meeting with Acheson and Under Secretary of Defense Stephen T. Early, Truman suggested Acheson to make a formal request to the Defense Department for "a statement of the essential security requirements of the United States in a peace settlement with Japan," which was made on October 3. In addition, the State Department put another pressure on Defense by announcing that a draft peace treaty was near completion.<sup>21)</sup>

In preparing for a reply to the State Department request, Under Secretary of the Army Tracy Voorhees, who had replaced Draper, played the key role. He was concerned that a peace treaty concluded without Soviet and Chinese participation would give them a legal pretext to argue that such a treaty was in violation of the Potsdam Declaration and the surrender terms, and it would thus invite them to take harassing tactics against Japan. He argued, therefore, that Soviet and Chinese participation was essential to avoid such an eventuality, but since a treaty acceptable to the United States would not be so to the Soviet Union and China, a peace treaty was premature. Besides, Voorhees was not convinced that the need for a treaty on account of political conditions in Japan was nearly as acute as the State Department believed it to be. He felt that "Japanese could obtain much of their desired freedom without any treaty but merely by the non-existence of SCAP controls."<sup>22)</sup> After securing the JSSC's (Joint Strategic Survey Committee) agreement to his proposal, he met Acheson, and proceeded to Tokyo to obtain MacArthur's reaction to his idea. Though MacArthur strongly opposed it and emphasized the necessity of a treaty, the JCS approved the conclusion of the JSSC.<sup>23)</sup>

Acheson, infuriated with the decision of the JCS, stated in a meeting with

the JCS on December 24, 1949 that the JCS's decision was "a masterpiece of understatement." President Truman himself supported Acheson in a NSC meeting by stating that "he had no doubt that the United States and the United Kingdom could negotiate a peace treaty with Japan whether U.S.S.R. participated or not." In his meeting with Ambassador Philip C. Jessup in Tokyo, MacArthur stated that the JCS was merely expressing the view of Defense Secretary Johnson, and that it "expected to be overruled." As Acheson recalled, however, "a public battle with Louis Johnson over a wholly false claim that the projected settlement neglected essential defense requirements, while appeasing the Japanese aggressors and perpetrators of the Bataan Death March, would be fatal to the treaty."<sup>24</sup>

## 2. Pacific Pact

In order to break the deadlock, the State Department itself began study of post-treaty security arrangements for Japan. It first considered concluding an "Agreement on the Restoration of Normal Political and Economic Restorations with Japan" while continuing unchanged the occupation arrangements with respect to security matters, and "a Peace Treaty which authorizes the maintenance of U.S. or Western Allied bases in Japan."<sup>25</sup> The first plan was considered to be too legally based, while the second plan had "serious political drawbacks." As a third plan, a NATO-type Pacific pact was proposed, and Acheson obtained Truman's approval to prepare a paper on the pact to be presented to the NSC.<sup>26</sup>

On the other hand, Under Secretary of the Army Voorhees, after meeting MacArthur's objection to his original idea, searched for a plan to reconcile conflicting views, and presented in late March a plan quite similar to the first plan considered by the State Department. This similarity gave some hope to the State Department that perhaps the Defense Department might accept a Pacific security pact. Earlier on February 27 when Assistant Secretary of State Dean Rusk met the JCS to discuss the pact, they had decried "the manifold evils of . . . pactonomia." Now with the Voorhees plan, "it may well be possible to carry out the Defense Department along with us in taking the next step which we, by a process of self-education, have already developed within

the State Department. That is, the merits of a Pacific off-shore security arrangement might impress the Defense Department as a satisfactory, more permanent solution of the political and military problem with which the United States is confronting in relation to Japan."<sup>27)</sup>

This hope dissipated in a meeting of April 24 between Acheson and Johnson. After a heated debate, Johnson agreed only to reevaluate military situation. In a meeting in early May, it was agreed that a final decision would be made after Johnson's scheduled visit to Tokyo in June.<sup>28)</sup>

### 3. Tokyo Conference and NSC 60/1

**Tokyo Conference of June 1950** Secretary Johnson and his party stayed in Tokyo from June 17 to 23, while Dulles's party stayed there from June 21 to 27. Available records do not show that during the three days that both parties stayed in Tokyo, they and MacArthur conferred to discuss post-treaty security arrangements for Japan. William J. Seabald, Political Advisor to SCAP, relates that because of "the acuteness of the differences over Japanese security," they did not meet at all. Dulles's report on the trip to Secretary Acheson, however, states that the security problem was "thoroughly discussed" by Johnson, General Bradley (Chairman of the JCS) and Dulles, but it does not say that they together met MacArthur. Later on August 3, 1950, Johnson told Dulles that "MacArthur had reversed his original position as a result of the talks that he and Bradley had had with him and that MacArthur's present position was embodied in a second, high secret, memorandum which MacArthur had given Johnson but which we (the State Department) had not seen."<sup>29)</sup> From the above records, it can be reasonably assumed that MacArthur met separately with Dulles and Johnson.

Since MacArthur thought it important to bring the Departments of State and Defense together, he might have thought that the visits of Dulles and Johnson offered him a good chance to do so. He drafted on June 14 the following alternative security arrangement, and showed it to Dulles:

That a normal treaty be consummated embodying, however, a security reservation to the effect that so long as 'irresponsible militarism' exists in

the world as a threat to 'peace, security and justice' in Japan, the pertinent security conditions of the Postdam Declaration shall be deemed unfulfilled and, in view of the attendant threat to unarmed Japan's 'new order of peace, security and justice,' points in Japanese territory continue to be garrisoned by the Allied Powers signatory thereto through United States forces; that when such threat from 'irresponsible militarism' ceases to exist, all provisions of the surrender terms shall be deemed fulfilled and all Allied garrisons shall be permanently withdrawn from Japan.

MacArthur cleverly altered the meaning of "irresponsible militarism" in the Postdam Declaration, which referred to the threat of Japanese militarism, to embrace the Sino-Soviet threat to Japan.

In early December MacArthur had told Voorhees that if neutralization of Japan did not accord real security for Japan, then he would propose the granting of a limited number of bases in Japan to the United States, with a total force not exceeding 35,000 men.<sup>31)</sup> MacArthur's memorandum, therefore, did not signify that he changed his position. At Dulles's request, MacArthur elaborated his earlier memorandum on June 23, and showed it to Dulles and Johnson. This second memorandum, which Johnson called "a second, high secret memorandum," stated that "[t]he entire area of Japan must be regarded as a potential base for defensive maneuver with unrestricted freedom reserved to the United States," and that "despite Japan's constitutional renunciation of war its right to self-defense in case of predatory attack is implicit and inalienable."<sup>32)</sup>

**The Korean War and NSC 60/1** MacArthur's June 23 memorandum laid a foundation for agreement between State and Defense, and the Korean War further facilitated it. Between July and September 1950, American occupation troops in Japan were committed to Korea, leaving Japan undefended except by air and sea power. The State Department began discussion of rearmament of Japan seriously, which led the Department much closer than before to the position of Defense. For example, the PPS, which had not pressed for the immediate remilitarization of Japan, now recommended that "the Departments of State and Defense should immediately seek means (a) to strengthen the Japanese internal security forces, and (b) to provide for a con-

tribution by the Japanese themselves to the defense of their own security.”<sup>33)</sup>

Dulles thought that the Korean War “shocked the Japanese people into realization of the need of acceptance of United States defense strength in Japan so that it will be now easier than before to get full satisfaction without Japanese resentment.” He therefore recommended “to move quickly while the Japanese are in this mood.” Acheson accepted this recommendation and obtained Truman’s approval to discuss the matter with Defense. Thereupon Dulles prepared a paper on the basis of the June 23 memorandum, and submitted it to the NSC. According to Dulles, the paper “gave the United States the right to maintain in Japan as much force as we wanted, anywhere we wanted, for as long as we wanted.” He failed, however, to provide for Japanese rearmament. All Japan would do in case of emergency was to offer facilities: “Japan on its part will provide such facilities and the United States will provide such forces on behalf of the other treaty powers as may be determined by the United States after consultation with the Japanese Government.” Johnson thought that the Dulles paper was based on the first memorandum by MacArthur, and refused to consider it until Defense examined it carefully.<sup>34)</sup>

Replying on August 22, the JCS withdrew its objections to a treaty concluded without participation by the Soviet Union and China, but criticized the Dulles paper for not meeting their requirements. They advanced several conditions for a peace treaty, repeating the necessity of eventual rearmament of Japan, and adding a new condition that a peace treaty “must not become effective until after favorable resolution of the present United States conditions in Korea.” The State Department objected to certain parts of the JCS paper (for example, including in a peace treaty such provision as that “the war potential of Japan should be available to the United States”), but otherwise accepted the JCS proposal. The detailed implementation of security arrangements was to be provided in a supplementary bilateral agreement between the United States and Japan. A joint State-Defense memorandum for the President was drafted, and with Truman’s approval, became NSC 60/1 on September 8, 1950.<sup>35)</sup>

On the basis of NSC 60/1, Dulles carefully drafted a seven-point statement of general principles of a peace treaty with Japan. Point 4 on “security”

provided that “[t]he Treaty would contemplate that, pending *satisfactory alternative security arrangements* such as UN assumption of effective responsibility, there would be continuing cooperative responsibility between Japanese facilities and U.S. and perhaps *other forces* for the maintenance of international peace and security in the Japan area.” (my italics) One of the “satisfactory alternative security arrangements” could include “the existence of adequate Japanese defense forces,” and “other forces” could be Japanese.<sup>36</sup> Because of the Korean War, NSC 60/1 and the seven-point statement went further than the June 23 memorandum on Japanese rearmament.

### III. “Negotiations” with Japan

#### 1. The Chinese Intervention and the Revision of NSC 60/1

On November 24, 1950, General MacArthur launched a large scale offensive in Korea “to end the war”, but two days later Chinese “volunteers” intervened in the war, thus making it an entirely new war. In mid-December the Eighth Army crossed back the 38th parallel and continued to retreat. Washington feared that troops might be expelled entirely from the Korean Peninsula, and, in fact, the JCS gave permission to MacArthur to retreat to Japan, saying that Japan’s defense was his primary responsibility. On December 15, President Truman proclaimed the existence of a national emergency. “The first weeks of 1951,” a historian noted, “were the most hazardous of the Cold War.” In mid-January 1950, however, American troops slowly began advancing northward again, and by the end of March retook Seoul and reached the 38th parallel.<sup>37</sup>

Under this acute crisis, the timing of peace treaty with Japan was seriously discussed within the State Department. Dulles, Rusk and others in the Department for while toyed with an idea of delaying a peace treaty, but then concluded that they should press for an early treaty before the Japanese became alarmed over military and political implications of the situation in Korea, and to definitely commit Japan to the cause of the free world. If Japan was not willing to so commit, then the United States would have to make an “agonizing reappraisal” of its relations with Japan. If Japan was willing to commit itself

to the free world on certain terms, however, then these terms should be ascertained to see whether the price was practical and worth paying.<sup>38)</sup>

The prices Dulles had in mind were a non-punitive peace treaty, American commitment to defend the off-shore island chain, of which Japan is a part, and a certain economic assurance. A Pacific security pact was also thought necessary in order to get support from Asian allies a peace treaty which contained no restriction on Japanese rearmament, and also to make it possible for Japan to circumvent Article IX of the Japanese Constitution. As Dulles wrote to MacArthur, the pact "would provide a framework within which a Japanese forces, if developed, could have an international status rather than a purely national status and this might ease reconciliation with the present Japanese Constitution." The Japanese government was hesitant to amend the Constitution for rearmament, but since it was interested in collective security, it would be willing to go ahead with rearmament if the United States provided a framework to evade the Constitutional issue.<sup>39)</sup>

The State Department thus proposed to the Defense Department to change the decision in NSC 60/1 that a peace treaty would not be concluded until after a successful resolution of the Korean War. The JCS, while agreeing to exploring the possibility of a Pacific pact (but to be limited to the island chain), strongly opposed to the change. Fortunately for the State Department, however, Truman had replaced Louis Johnson with George Marshall as Secretary of Defense. Johnson had enthusiastically cut down defense spending, but the defeat and retreat in Korea "belied Johnson's claim that he had been trimming fat without touching muscle."<sup>40)</sup> Marshall was highly esteemed by Truman, and could get along well with Acheson. With Marshall's support, it was finally agreed on January 8, 1951 to go ahead with a peace treaty without awaiting for a favorable outcome of the war in Korea.<sup>41)</sup>

## 2. Tokyo "Negotiations"

In early 1951, Dulles visited Tokyo to commit Japan to the cause of the free world and to encourage development of Japanese defense capabilities. Before Dulles's arrival in Tokyo, Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida sent his confident Jiro Shirasu to convey his thought to Robert Fearey of the Dulles party.

On Japanese rearmament, Yoshida said through Shirasu that for various reasons he “had to adopt the public position on rearmament,” but “[t]he ‘no-war’ provisions of the Constitution should and can without great difficulty be amended at an early date to permit rearmament.” Reporting to Dulles, Fearey commented that he “obtained the impression, as has long been suspected, that Yoshida’s equivocal position on rearmament has been a matter of public policy rather than of personal opinion.”<sup>42)</sup>

If the amendment of the Article IX of the Constitution was easy, then a Pacific pact would not be necessary for securing Japanese rearmament. Dulles first thought that he could use the idea of a pact as selling point with the Japanese, but stated later that “he did not consider it as important from the Japanese point of view that there be a Pacific Pact as he had before he went to Japan.”<sup>43)</sup> By February 2, Dulles was “simultaneously considering a bilateral U.S.-Japan security agreement . . . for reasons not solely connected with the British attitude towards a regional ‘off-shore Pacific Pact’” (the British strongly opposed to idea of the pact which would exclude them).<sup>44)</sup> The remaining problem for Dulles was whether Yoshida was in fact willing to agree to rearmament. From Fearey’s comment referred to above, Dulles must have thought that because of the Korean War Yoshida had changed his position, but this possible optimism was completely betrayed in the ensuing talks with Yoshida.

For his part, Prime Minister Yoshida thought that the North Korean attack and the Chinese intervention in Korea considerably strengthened his bargaining position vis-a-vis the United States by virtue of Japan’s strategic importance. As far as he was concerned, the question of a non-punitive treaty had already been settled. The major issue would be Japanese rearmament, but it could be exchanged for United States’ right to station its troops in Japan. In order to strengthen his bargaining position, Yoshida publicly withdrew his earlier offer to invite the United States government to station troops in Japan after the peace treaty, prepared “A Proposal for the Advancement of Peace and Security in the North Pacific Region,” a plan to establish a demilitarized zone in the Far East, and welcomed opportunities for Dulles to meet Japanese opposition leaders, who were advocating a total peace and non-stationing of United States troops in Japan. Presumably if Dulles became convinced that



the neutralization of Japan or the total peace was the only available alternative for the United States, then Dulles would agree to Yoshida's proposal.<sup>45)</sup>

In the negotiation with Yoshida, Dulles stubbornly insisted that Japan should contribute to collective security, and finally succeeded in getting a written promise from Yoshida to establish a 50,000-man national defense force composed of land and sea units. This force would be in addition to and independent of the National Police Reserve, would be armed with superior weapons, and would be the nucleus of democratically reconstructed military force in Japan. This force would presumably be used for the regional defense.

Under the circumstances, the best Yoshida could do was to request Dulles to make the agreement secret. With MacArthur's help, Yoshida succeeded in obtaining concurrence from Dulles in not making any reference to the agreement in documents. Thus the Security Treaty, in its Preamble, provided that

Japan will itself increasingly assume responsibility for its own defense against direct and indirect aggression, always avoiding any armament which could be an offensive threat or serve other than to promote peace and security in accordance with the purpose and principles of the United Nations Charter.<sup>46)</sup>

In spite of his promise on rearmament, however, Yoshida failed to secure from Dulles a formal United States commitment to defend Japan. For Dulles, the mere promise of rearmament was not sufficient for obligating the United States to the defense of Japan. Referring to the Vandenburg Resolution of 1948, Dulles argued that until Japan amended its Constitution and put itself in a position formally and publicly to pledge a certain number of divisions to regional security, the United States would not make such a commitment.<sup>47)</sup> Thus, the United States obtained the right to station its troops in Japan as long as it felt it was in its interest without any obligation so to station them. The situation became worse for Japan when later on the State Department, at the request of the JCS, inserted what is called the "Far Eastern clause" to Article I of the Security Treaty. It was now provided that the United States forces stationed in Japan "may be utilized to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East."<sup>48)</sup>

#### IV. Conclusions

The final peace treaty arrived at in 1951 was closely based on the “objectives” listed in the PPS paper of 1947, but the PPS had to win over the “Borton group” within the Department. This was done rather easily due to the support from Lovett and Marshall, but, as Acheson later recalled, among “four groups [that] had to be reckoned with” in planning content and method of a peace treaty with Japan (the Communists, the Pentagon, allies, and Japan), “the Communists gave the least trouble,” and “[t]he most stubborn and protracted opposition to a peace treaty came from the Pentagon.”<sup>49</sup> In the course of the “negotiations” with the Pentagon, MacArthur with his June 23 memorandum and the Korean War intervened. As a result, United States’ objectives towards Japan were to create a Japan rearmed under strict control of the United States, spiritually and politically committed to the cause of the free world, willing to contribute to the regional defense, and economically prosperous and able to contribute to the economic and political development of South and Southeast Asia.

In concluding this short paper, let me point out some of my differences in interpretation of some fine points from the latest and an award-winning book on the peace treaty by Chihiro Hosoya.<sup>50</sup>

Hosoya asserts that there is a strong probability that Dulles and Johnson together met MacArthur to discuss post-treaty security arrangements of Japan in June 1950,<sup>51</sup> but I think it more likely that they met separately. On the role played by MacArthur in getting a compromise between the State and Defense Departments by presenting the June 23 memorandum, I agree, but I also pointed out the impact of the Korean War on the State Department, and referred to the security clause of the seven-point statement of general principles by Dulles, which was a very carefully drafted document fully reflecting NSC 60/1.

A more substantive difference is on the reason why Dulles did not discuss a Pacific security pact in the “negotiations” with Yoshida in early 1951. Hosoya argues that Dulles did not do so because of the British objection to the pact,<sup>52</sup> but my point is that this was not the only reason. One of the two major ob-

jectives of the pact was to get Japan rearmed by giving it a framework to circumvent the Article IX of the Japanese Constitution. Since Shirasu assured Fearey that the amendment of the Article could be done without great difficulty, Dulles could not use the pact as a price for Japanese rearmament.

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#### NOTES

- 1) "Assumptions for Japanese Peace Treaty," n. d. but probably August 1947, PPS Files, the State Department.
- 2) Kenneth W. Condit, *The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*, Vol. II, 1947-1949, pp. 495-496.
- 3) Thomas H. Etzold and John Lewis Gaddis, eds., *Containment: Documents on American Policy and Strategy, 1945-1950*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1978, p. 230.
- 4) Lawrence J. Korb, *The Joint Chiefs of Staff, The First Twenty-Five Years*, Indiana University Press, 1976, pp. 22-24.
- 5) "Assumptions for Japanese Peace Treaty," *op. cit.*
- 6) *Foreign Relations of the United States (FR)*, 1947, Washington: GPO, pp. 537-543.
- 7) *Ibid.*
- 8) Personal and secret letter to Butterworth, March 9, 1948; and Kennan to Marshall, March 14, 1948. PPS Files.
- 9) *Ibid.* (Italics original).
- 10) "Informal Summary of Conclusions of March 21 Conference on Japan" (amended 23 March 1948), PPS Files,.
- 11) PPS 28, *FR*, 1948, Vol. VI, pp. 691-719; Kennan to Butterworth, March 25, 1948; Hamilton to Butterworth, March 1948; and Butterworth to Lovett, April 16, 1948. All in PPS Files.
- 12) Butterworth to Lovett, April 16, 1948; and C. V. R. Schuyler to Butterworth, April 28, 1948. PPS Files.
- 13) *Ibid.*
- 14) NSC 44, "Limited Military Armament for Japan," March 1, 1949, PPS Files.
- 15) *The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*, *op. cit.*, p. 499; and NSC 13/2, *FR*, 1948, VI, pp. 857-862.
- 16) *FR*, 1949, Vol. VII, Part 2, pp. 671-673.
- 17) Butler to McWilliams, April 29, 1949. PPS Files.

- 18) Webb to Souers, June 2, 1948. National Archives.
- 19) See Miyasato, *Amerika no Taigai Seisaku Kettei Katai* (*American Foreign Policy Decision Making Process*), Tokyo: Sanichi Shobo, 1981, pp. 58–62.
- 20) *FR*, 1949, Vol. VII, Part 2, pp. 773–777.
- 21) Walter S. Poole, *The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*, Vol. IV. 1950–1952, p. 503; and Voorhees to MacArthur, November 12, 1949, MacArthur Library.
- 22) Memorandum for the Chairman of the JCS, CJCS 092.2 Japanese Peace Treaty (22 April 1950), National Archives.
- 23) Green to Hamilton, November 29, 1949, National Archives; JCS 1948–1950, CCS 383.21 Japan (3–13–45), Section 23, National Archives; CJCS 092.2 Japanese Peace Treaty (22 April 1950), National Archives; Voorhees to MacArthur, December 17, 1949, MacArthur Library; and Johnson to the Secretary of State, December 23, 1949, National Archives.
- 24) *FR*, 1949, Vol. VII, Part 2, p. 924; *ibid.*, 1950, Vol. VI, pp. 1111–1112; and Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation. My Years in the State Department*, New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1969, p. 431.
- 25) *FR*, 1950, Vol. VI, pp. 1118–1119.
- 26) *Ibid.*, p. 1139, footnote 4 in p. 1139, and p. 1150.
- 27) Howard to Butterworth, Jessup and Rusk, March 24, 1950, National Archives.
- 28) *The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*, Vol. IV, p. 439; *FR*, 1950, Vol. VI, 1175–1181; and CCS 388.1 Japan (9–1–1947), Section 2, National Archives.
- 29) *FR*, 1950, Vol. VI, 1264–1265: William J. Sebald with Russel Brines, *With MacArthur in Japan: A Personal History of the Occupation*, New York: W. W. Norton, 1965, p. 252; Chronological File, Dulles Papers, Box 3, Annex to a letter from Dulles to the Secretary, December 28, 1951, Princeton Library.
- 30) *FR*, 1950, Vol. VI, p. 1221.
- 31) Sebald to Butterworth, December 9, 1949, National Archives. See also, *FR*, 1950, Vol. VI, p. 1206.
- 32) *FR*, 1950, Vol. VI, p. 1227.
- 33) *Ibid.*, p. 1257.
- 34) *Ibid.*, pp. 1260, 1265, 1281 and 1283.
- 35) *Ibid.*, pp. 1278–1288, and 1290–1297.
- 36) *Ibid.*, pp. 1296–1297, and footnote 4 on p. 1329.
- 37) DA to CINCFE, January 23, 1951; and MacArthur to DEPTAR, January 10, 1951, both in MacArthur Library. *The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*, Vol. IV, pp. 79–80.
- 38) *FR*, 1950, Vol. VI, pp. 1359–1360.
- 39) Dulles to MacArthur, December 20, 1950, MacArthur Library.
- 40) *The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*, Vol. IV, pp. 60–61.

- 41) *FR*, 1950, Vol. VI, pp. 787–789.
- 42) *Ibid.*, 1951, Vol. VI, Part 1, pp. 810–811.
- 43) *Ibid.*, p. 155, and p. 815.
- 44) *Ibid.*, footnote 1 on p. 145.
- 45) See, for example, Chihiro Hosoya, *San Francisco eno Michi* (*The Road to San Francisco*), Tokyo: Chuo Koron, 1984, pp. 161–167.
- 46) *FR*, 1951, Vol. VI, Part 1, p. 1233.
- 47) *Ibid.*, p. 858.
- 48) *Ibid.*, p. 1259.
- 49) Acheson, *op. cit.*, p. 428.
- 50) Hosoya, *op. cit.*
- 51) *Ibid.*, p. 68.
- 52) *Ibid.*, pp. 187–192.