

**A NEW TREND IN THE REALM
OF ARAB THOUGHT**

by

TSUTOMU SHIRAKAWA

WORKING PAPERS SERIES NO. 4

**THE INSTITUTE OF MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES
INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF JAPAN**

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I	INTRODUCTION.....	1.
II	ANALYTICAL VIEWPOINT AND FRAMEWORK.....	14.
III	CONCEPTUAL UNDERSTANDING OF ISLAM AND 'URUBAH.	
	1. Comparison of the Concepts of the State in Christianity and Islam.....	23.
	(1) Christian Concept of State.	
	(a) Position of Jesus Christ in Trinitarianism.....	24.
	(b) 'Civitas' in Christianity.....	25.
	(2) Islamic Concept of State.	
	(a) Position of the Prophet Muhammad....	29.
	(b) Islamic concept of the world.....	30.
	(c) 'Ummah Islamiya and Shari'a.....	31.
	2. Inseparability of Islam and 'Urubah.....	34.
IV	HISTORICAL ANALYSIS.....	42.
	1. Nationalism as the Analytical Framework.....	44.
	2. Analysis of the First Upsurge of Arab Liberation Nationalism.....	48.
	(1) The Image of the Threat.....	52.
	(2) The Image of the Arabs.....	55.
	(a) The Literary Renaissance of the Arabs.....	56.
	(b) Islamic Modernism.....	58.
	(3) The Result.....	65.

3. Analysis of the Second Upsurge of Arab Liberation Nationalism.....	65.
(1) The Image of the Threat.....	66.
(2) The Image of the Arabs.....	68.
(3) The Result.....	71.
 V THE POSSIBILITY OF A THIRD UPSURGE OF ARAB LIBERATION NATIONALISM.....	78.
1. The New Trend in the realm of Arab thought	
(1) The Image of the Threat.....	81.
(2) The Intellectuals and the Masses.....	83.
(3) The Image of the Arabs.....	85.
2. The Possibility of a Third Upsurge of Arab Liberation Nationalism.....	87.
 VI CONCLUSION.....	94.
 BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	100.

I. INTRODUCTION

In the contemporary socio-political environment in the Middle East, we can find a phenomenon called Islamic resurgence. Iranian people succeeded in their Islamic Revolution under the leadership of the Ayatolla Khomeini. "The rulers of Saudi Arabia, where Islam has been in power for a century, call for a Jihād (Holy War) to resolve the conflict between the Arabs and Israel." (1) Within Saudi Arabia, however, the Great Mosque in Mecca was occupied by a Muslim group which accused the rulers of a lack of Islamicity. Anwar as-Sādāt, the former president of Egypt, decreed that "the sources and basis of all legislation henceforth shall be the Qur'ān and the Sharī'a (Sacred Law)." (2) On the other hand, the Muslim Brotherhood strongly condemned Sādāt's visit to Jerusalem and bitterly criticized the Camp David peace treaty. He was assassinated by Muslim soldiers who, according to the official statement, were members of a fanatical Islamic sect. Thus, while the governments of the Middle Eastern countries promote policies in the name of Islam, their opponents condemn rulers in the name of Islam. It is very difficult for Westernized people to reach an exact understanding of

the status quo in this region, although these events occur in the international society which is, without doubt, the same society that we belong to.

At the same time, the people of the Middle East themselves appear to be embarrassed in the face of that phenomenon. Witnessing "a mushrooming of Islamic movements and ideas which was described variously as Islamic revival, Islamic resurgence and Islam on the march,"(3) they have raised questions about the causes and nature of this circumstance, and its impact on international society:

What are the causes and nature of this Islamic resurgence? Is it a purely religious revival? Or is it a social and political movement that must be understood in the context of the Muslims' conditions and milieu? Or is it a combination of both? What are the social classes to whom Islamic group appeal most? Will it really lead to the establishment of an Islamic socio-political order or will it end up as an instrument of struggle between Muslim ruling elites and their opposition? And finally, what are the foreign policy implications of these developments? Do they necessarily lead to a more militant and hostile attitude towards the West?(4)

Muslims seem to try to analyze Islamic resurgence and put it to use re-discovering their identity. It should be noted that all of these questions about the present condition are based on questions which have haunted Muslims for a long time. 'Isām al-Attār articulates such questions in his article entitled, "Al-Ghiyāb al-Islāmi al-Mudhḥil (The Astonishing Absence of Islam) as follows:

Where is Islam now in the life of the Arabs and the Muslims? Where is its important hoped-for role? Where are its movements and its men, or those who claim they are its men?

Where is the daring Islamic statement? Where are the noble Islamic positions? Where is the effective true existence, if there is for those who work for Islam a true effective role?

Where is the impact of this existence on the official level? Where is the impact of this existence on the popular level? Where is the impact of this existence on the local and international level?

Where, where is the impact of this existence?

It is the astonishing absence.....

Is it written for the Muslims to live in their land and their world marginal lives? Is it written for them to live outside the scope of time and the important events and outside the scope of effective influence on time and its important events?

Government in our countries is not for Islam. The opposition in our countries is not from Islam. Our rulers talk as Americans or Russians, as Westerners or Easterners or something else, this or that, but it does not proceed from Islam.

The opposition to the rulers talk in a similar language as that of the rulers, they are as the rulers warring against Islam, distant from it or ignoring it.

Where, where is Islam in our lives?(5)

We have to realize that, behind Muslims' efforts to understand contemporary Islamic resurgence, there are, verbally or nonverbally, not only the socio-political consciousness of international relations but also their historical Islamic consciousness. In other words, they have continued to infer their position in international society in which most of the relations among the members are influenced by Western values. As a result they have continued to compare Western values with Islamic values at each of the point of contact not only among themselves but also between themselves

and the rest of the world.

Therefore, when we study the contemporary Islamic resurgence in the Middle East, we first have to understand the basic thought of Islam which permeates into what Gregory Bateson call the "common character-determining factors sui generis"(6), and then we have to study the history of the Middle East, investigating the way in which its relations with the West have changed in the course of history.

There is another concept in the Middle East which has also permeated into common Muslim character-determining factors . It is called 'Urūbah (the Arab character or Arabism). From the viewpoint of political ideology, it is true "that those who speak Arabic form a 'nation' and that this nation should be independent and united, are beliefs which only became articulate and acquired strength during the present century."(7) Such an ideology is called 'al-qaumiyyah al-Arabiyyah'.

Standing on the ideology of al-qaumiyyah al-Arabiyyah, Nasser and the Arab Ba'th Socialist Party could proceed with their work, and the Arabs have fought against Israel and Western imperialism. After their defeat in the Six-Day War in 1967, however, some questions were raised. "Who was responsible for it? What did the defeat say about the basis of Arab society, the quality of the Arab as an individual? How should the

Arab world be organized to cope with the defeat and its consequence?"(8)

The Moroccan scholar Abdallah Laroui calls the situation after the 1967 defeat a moral crisis which "culminated in a period of anguished self-criticism, a searching re-appraisal of postwar Arab culture and political practice."(9)

It should be noted that behind the ideology or the socio-political movements of al-qaumiyyah al-Arabiyyah, there must be an ethos which has made the Arabs recognize themselves as one ethnos. "Something eternally and unchangeably Arab persisted throughout history and by so doing, this Arab essence gave identity to the Arab stream and continuity to the events that make up its history."(10) The word "'Urūbah (Arab nature)' is indicative of such an ethos.

In many arguments concerning Middle Eastern politics, "'Urūbah', 'al-qaumiyyah al-Arabiyyah as an ideology' and 'nationalistic movements against imperialism' have been confused with the term 'Arab nationalism'. Under this condition, some people assert that Arab nationalism died when Sādāt visited Jerusalem and concluded a peace treaty with Israel. At least, we should reconsider the assertion on three different levels in the context of the term <Arab nationalism>.

What died in the recent history of the Arab world:

nationalistic movements or their ideology or Arab ethos?

Thus, it is important for us to study, using the appropriate terminology, what Abdallah Laroui calls, the contemporary Arab moral crisis.

As I discussed above, we can find two important "sub-universes"(11), Islam and 'Urūbah in the Arab-Islamic world . Both permeate into the value hierarchy of the individuals of this region. For this reason, the Arabs have found their identity and dignity in one or both of these in their history. Basically, these two thoughts are necessarily inseparably related to the value system of each individual in the Arab-Islamic world.

On the other hand, in the realm of existence, Islam and 'Urūbah have been used as slogans of "the struggle against the foreign occupier or invader."(12) In the process of such political movements, two political groups were born. I would like to call one <the political vanguard of Islam> and the other <the political vanguard of Arabism>. They have not succeeded in the complete unification of the front in the struggle against Western colonial Powers and imperialists. Moreover, many members of the political vanguard of Islam attack the political vanguard of Arabism while they are embarrassed at contemporary Islamic resurgence,

and more than a few members of the political vanguard of Arabism attack the political vanguard of Islam while they are embarrassed at the contemporary moral crisis.

We can see the obvious differentiation between them in a recent political scene. Because of the conflict between the political vanguard of Islam and that of Arabism, Islam and 'Urūbah gradually came to be understood separately. And as a result, many Arab intellectuals misunderstood Islam apart from its principle of the monistic world view of Tawhīd, and 'Urūbah apart from the Arab ethos. (The Islamic monistic world view of Tawhīd and 'Urūbah as the Arab ethos will be discussed precisely in the following chapter.) Arab intellectuals seem to have lost confidence in Arab-Islamic culture.

This kind of misunderstanding occurred in relation to the understanding of the meaning of <modernization>. When the Arabs encountered the modern West for the first time in the nineteenth century, many of them were amazed and admired its strength. At that time, however, the Arabs did not lose confidence in the Arab-Islamic culture.

It is true that liberal modernism was born in the nineteenth century.

Liberal modernism gained in influence amongst the intelligentsia, the working class and even in the countryside. The stress was on the scientific approach, philosophical rationalism and political

liberalism. The aim was to create a modern society, similar to those of Europe and North America, resolutely forward looking and open to progress, yet preserving those aspects of past traditions and customs which would not hamper the envisaged advance."(13)

However, liberal modernism was supported by the people who wanted the Ottoman Empire to enter the modern world.

Before the Arabs digested the meaning of <modernization> into their value system, most of them had been occupied by Western colonists. After experiencing two world wars, they began to try again to internalize the meaning in a new international perspective. Because of the relationship with Western societies, discrepancies in the interpretation of the word <modernization> influenced the people in the Middle East and divided them into two groups.

One group insists on complementary relations with the West which contain two principal attitudes, acceptance and denial. The other group insists on one-sided relations which encourage two main behaviors: acceptance and imitation. The former group tends to be able to distinguish <modernization> from <Westernization>. The latter group, however, tends to be unable to do so. I would like to give the latter the name <new liberal modernists>. Especially since "the oil-related social change"(14) occurred in this region, too rapid a social change has increased the differentiation between these two groups. We can find

many new liberal modernists among the Arab ruling elite and intellectuals who misunderstand the real meaning of Islam and 'Urūbah.

Since the nineteenth century, the Arabs have fought in order to preserve Arab-Islamic culture, against the Ottoman Empire, Western colonial Powers and the occupiers. In all the struggles against their enemy, from the political, economic and military point of view, the Arabs have always been weak. Therefore, even after the independence of the Arab nation-states, basically they could not develop their struggle against the modern West beyond the boundaries of Arab territory.

Under such conditions, patriotism for each nation state, <wataniyyah> has been encouraged for the reason that "there lay the secret of European strength and basis of civilization".(15) Each nation-state in the Middle East promotes its own modernization program within its own territory, and some nation-states fight each other in order to pursue national interests.

While the masses have been, whether consciously or not, aware of the inseparability of Islam and 'Urūbah in their value system, the ruling elite and the educated have argued about the Arabs without paying attention to the nature of Islam and 'Urūbah. When contemporary Arab intellectuals consider what the Arabs are they tend to follow the dualistic way of thinking,

that is, they tend to talk politics and economics apart from Arab-Islamic culture. As a result, in their opinions about modernization, the dualistic ruling elites and intellectuals appears to have fallen into the following paradox:

1. The Arabs should fight against Western imperialism in order to preserve their own culture.
2. In order to fight against Western imperialism, the Arabs should regain a strong civilization.
3. In order to regain a strong civilization, the Arabs should modernize themselves.
4. In order to modernize themselves effectively, the Arabs should promote Westernization.

Here is a new trend whose thinkers advocate <takāmul (complementary progress)> between the political vanguard of Islam and that of Arabism, insisting on the inseparable nature of Islam and 'Urūbah. They grieve over the current situation of the Arabs in which educated people have lost their affiliation to the Arab liberation movement, and condemn the conflict between the two political vanguards, standing on the real understanding of the nature of Islam and 'Urūbah. According to their assertion, the conflict between the two is desired by contemporary imperialism and keeps the Arabs subordinate to the modern West.

The thinkers of the new trend urge Arabs to regain

confidence in their own culture. They are aware of the friction between the monistic value system and the dualistic value system in Arab individuals. We will be able to understand the importance of the study of the new trend from two different points of view. One is from the realm of thought. Some thinkers in Western societies are seeking the way toward post-modern monistic thought rejecting the dualistic way of thinking of the modern West. The thinkers of the new trend in the Arab-Islamic world emphasize the importance of regaining the monistic way of thinking. There should be a common understanding concerning their world view. The other is from the viewpoint of the rising Arab liberation movement. The thinkers of the new trend insist on the unanimous cooperation of the two vanguards of Islam and Arabism against the modern West.

In this thesis, the assertion of the new trend will be examined in the context of the relationship between the Arab-Islamic world and the modern West, paying attention to the friction between the monistic and the dualistic value systems.

NOTES.1.

1 P.J.Vatikiotis, "Islamic Resurgence: A Critical View," in Islam and Power, ed. Ali E Hillal Dessouki (London: Croom Helm, 1982), p. 169.

2 Ibid., p. 169.

3 Ali E.Hillal Dessouki, Islam and Power, p.5.

4 Ibid., p. 5.

5 Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad, Contemporary Islam and the Challenge of History (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1982), p. 3.

6 First of all, we have to consider whether we may say that the phrase <national character> is valid or not. There are two trends concerning the recognizability of national character. One is negative as differences in character depend on circumstances, or as differences cannot be observable. The other is affirmative like the idea developed by Gregory Bateson in the essay which appeared in Civilian Morale, edited by Goodwin Watson, copyright 1942 by the Society for the Study of Social Issues. In this thesis, I would like to follow his idea that the phrase <national character> is likely to be valid within certain conceptual limits. I would like to pay attention to the fact that Islam explains the relations not only between God and human beings but also between God and nature, between nature and the human beings, and among human beings, and that the Islamic world view of Tawhid is still alive in the relationship among Muslims. At the same time, I also pay attention to the recognizability of Arab ethos which the Arabs understand as the characteristics distinct from those of Western societies.

See Gregory Bateson, Steps to an Ecology of Mind (New York: Ballantine Books, 1972), p. 93.

7 Albert Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age 1798-1939 (London: Cambridge University Press, 1983), p. 260.

8 Fouad Ajami, The Arab Predicament (London: Cambridge University Press, 1981), P. 24.

9 Abdallah Laroui, The Crisis of the Arab Intellectual (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), pp. vii-viii.

10 Isma'il Ragi A al-Faruqi, On Arabism, 'Urubah and Religion(Amsterdam: Djambatan, 1962), p. 3.

11 James M. Edie, Kotoba to Imi: Gengo no Genshōgaku, (Speaking and Meaning: The Phenomenology of Language), trans. Shizuo Takiura(Tokyo: Iwanami, 1980), pp. 234-38.

12 Anouar Abdel-Malek, Contemporary Arab Political Thought(London: Zed Books, 1983), p. 9.

13 Ibid., p. 5.

14 Saad Eddin Ibrahim, The New Arab Social Order (London: Croom Helm, 1982), p. 2.

15 Albert Hourani, Arabic Thought, p. 206.

II. ANALYTICAL VIEWPOINT AND FRAMEWORK

Before we start our discussion concerning the new trend in the realm of Arab thought, I would like to make the basic analytical viewpoint and framework of this thesis clear. As I have point out in the introductory chapter, the assertion of the new trend arouses our interest in two ways. One is to probe the validity of the new thinkers insistence on the importance of regaining the Arab-Islamic monistic way of thinking based on the real understanding of Islam and 'Urūbah. The other is to foresee the possibility of the rising of an Arab liberation movement which will be developed by both political vanguards of Islam and Arabism having great confidence in Arab-Islamic culture. I would like to develop the discussion concerning the new trend from the viewpoint of friction between two value systems: the Arab-Islamic monistic value system and the modern Western dualistic value system.

We may say that the last two centuries, the modern Western dualistic way of thinking has made the Western people succeed in establishing politically, economically and militarily strong states. We can understood the relationship between the modern Western world and the Arab-Islamic world during the last two centuries as a

politically, economically and militarily <assertive-submissive> one.(1) Under such conditions, discrepancies in the interpretation of the word <modernization> caused Arab intellectuals to lose confidence in Arab-Islamic culture. This means that from the cultural point of view also, the relationship between these two worlds came to be understood as an <assertive-submissive> one. As a result, many Arab intellectuals fell into the paradoxical situation which I discussed in the previous chapter, that is:

1. The Arabs should fight against Western imperialism in order to defend their own culture.
2. In order to fight against Western imperialism, the Arabs should regain a strong civilization.
3. In order to regain a strong civilization, the Arabs should modernize themselves.
4. In order to modernize themselves effectively, the Arabs should promote Westernization.

We will be able to understand the paradoxical situation of Arab intellectuals more fully by referring to <the Double Bind Theory> developed by Gregory Bateson, paying attention to the features of Islamic culture.

According to the Double Bind Theory a set of ingredients makes an individual fall into a double bind situation in which he cannot escape from a certain

paradox. The necessary ingredients for a double bind situation are(2):

1. Two or more persons. Of these, we designate one, for the purpose of our definition as the "victim".
2. Repeated experience. We assume that the double bind is a recurrent theme in the experience of the victim. Our hypothesis does not invoke a single traumatic experience, but such repeated experiences that the double bind structure comes to be habitual expectation.
3. A primary negative injunction. This may have either of two forms (a)"Do not do so and so, or I will punish you," or (b)"If you do not do so and so, I will punish you." Here we select a context of learning based on avoidance of punishment rather than a context of reward seeking. [verbal injunction]
4. A secondary injunction conflicting with the first at a more abstract level. This is, like the first injunction, enforced by punishment or signals which threaten survival. [non-verbal injunction]

Once an individual falls into a double bind situation, he cannot escape from it. In order to escape from it, he has to understand his position by examining the communications between himself and the assailant not only at the verbal level but also at a more abstract level.(3)

Bateson developed the Double Bind Theory in dealing with schizophrenia while analyzing communications between a mother and her child. However, the theory is helpful to us in analyzing the current paradoxical situation of Arab intellectuals. Since the Ottoman Empire started to decline at the end of the eighteenth century, the Arabs have been exposed to the menace of

Western colonial Powers. Actually after World War I, most of the Ottoman territory was occupied and the Arabs experienced the rule of Western Powers. Many Arab intellectuals understood that one of the reasons for their occupation was backwardness. They thought that Arabs would be compelled to be content with their lot, unless they succeeded in regaining a strong civilization. In Bateson's terminology, Arab intellectuals accepted the primary negative injunction that "if they did not succeed in regaining a strong civilization, the Arabs would be occupied." This primary negative injunction was put on them repeatedly even after independence. Gradually Arab intellectuals began to promote modernization policies inside the territories of the nation-states. In most of the cases the occupiers helped to modernize these nation-states having great confidence in the dualistic value system.(4) The Arabs became completely involved in international society in which most of the relations were influenced by the Western dualistic value system.

Arab intellectuals and the ruling elite have regarded modernization based on the dualistic value system (i.e. Westernization) and involvement in international relations as the first step toward regaining a strong civilization. In Bateson's words, they believed that they could avoid punishment ' (being

occupied) through Westernization with the help of the Western occupiers.

However, a non-verbal secondary injunction conflicting with the first came to be enforced. It was a permeation of the Western dualistic way of thinking into the Arab-Islamic value system. The principle of Islamic thought is Tawhīd based on a monistic way of thinking. Basically Arab individuals have discovered their identity in their distinctive culture in which Islam has played an important part.

In contemporary Arab society, the permeation of Western values through Westernization made Arab intellectuals unconsciously (or at a more abstract, non-verbal level) feel that their way to regain a strong civilization is inconsistent with their final goal, that is, guarding their culture from Western imperialism.

In order to escape from the double bind situation, Arab intellectuals must examine communications not only among individuals in the Arab-Islamic culture but also with the modern West both in the realm of existence and on a more abstract level. It means that they have to reexamine the Arab-Islamic value system.

In this thesis, I will analyze the assertions of Arab intellectuals in the new trend in relation to intellectuals in the double bind situation.

In the next chapter, we will seek to understand the

basic Islamic world view of Tawhīd by comparing the concept of state in Christianity and Islam. We will then see the inseparability of Islam and 'Urūbah based on a clear definition of the word 'Urūbah.

In Chapter IV, we will analyze the process by which Islam came to be understood apart from its principle world view of Tawhīd and 'Urūbah came to be understood apart from the Arab ethos. As I have pointed out, this misunderstanding of Islam and 'Urūbah occurred in relation to the interpretation of the word <modernization> in the struggle against the modern West. Therefore, the history of the Arab liberation movement should be examined from the viewpoint of how Arab-Islamic culture was understood. I will prepare an analytical framework of <Arab liberation nationalism>.(5)

In Chapter V, the assertions of the new type of intellectuals in the realm of Arab thought will be discussed precisely. We will then probe the validity of these assertions and foresee the possibility of the rising of an Arab liberation movement by referring to Gregory Bateson's article concerning acculturation entitled "Culture Contact and Schismogenesis".(6)

Although it is not the main purpose of this thesis to discuss the new tendency in the realm of Western thought(7) for some thinkers to seek the way toward

monistic thought, the basic viewpoint of this thesis is closely related to this kind of post-modern Western thought.

NOTES. 2.

1 Gregory Bateson develops his idea of "national character" in the article entitled "Moral and National Character." In this article, he takes an affirmative stand on the observability of interaction between culture and individuals, paying attention to the effect of learning. He analyzes behavioral patterns of individuals and categorizes them into three bipolar characteristics: dominance-submission, succoring-dependence, and exhibitionism-spectatorship. He defines these three bipolar characteristics as the highest common factor of character. He develops these common behavioral patterns to the discussion of the relationship between two groups of individuals. There are two types of relationship: in one the relationship is chiefly symmetrical and in the other the behavior and aspirations of the members of the two groups are fundamentally different. In the latter case, he points out that bipolar characteristics of the relationship are observable. From this view point, he develops his discussion concerning the problem of acculturation which will be discussed in chapter five of this thesis. See Gregory Bateson, Steps to an Ecology of Mind (New York: Ballantine Books, 1972), pp. 61-106.

2 Bateson, Steps, pp. 206-78.

Bateson points out that any individual can respond appropriately to a message only by discrimination between Logical Types and understanding what sort of message is communicated. If someone falls into a double bind situation, there will be a breakdown in his ability to discriminate between Logical Types. He gives an example of the communication between a Zen master and his pupil as follows:

The Zen master holds a stick over the pupil's head and says fiercely, "If you say this stick is real, I will strike you with it. If you say this stick is not real, I will strike you with it. If you don't say anything, I will strike you with it." We feel that the schizophrenic finds himself continually in the same situation as the pupil, but he achieves something like disorientation rather than enlightenment. The Zen pupil might reach up and take the stick away from the master--who might accept this response, but the schizophrenic has no such choice since with him there is no not caring about the relationship, and his master's aims and awareness are not like the master's.

3 Confusion of two Logical Types, a literal level

and a metaphorical level, in understanding the appropriate meaning of a message can be resolved only by examining the context of the message in a higher order of abstraction. See also Bateson, Steps, pp. 206-78.

4 We have to pay attention to the principle on which Western political and economic theories are based. As we will show in chapter three, we can comprehend that the basic world view of Christianity is dualistic. Based on such a dualistic way of thinking, in which sacred and secular are divided, political and economic theories are developed. Concerning modernization, many leaders in the Third World accept Western economic theory. At the same time the main trend in international politics is realism whose basic attitude for understanding international relations attaches importance to economic power in relation to the balance of power in international societies after the two World Wars.

5 I will define the term <Arab liberation nationalism> in Chapter IV. Here, I simply express my opinion that Arab liberation nationalism is based on the cultural consciousness of the Arabs.

6 Bateson, Steps, pp. 61-72.

7 Contemporary developments in biology and quantum mechanics are causing the customary dualistic world view of the modern West to change. This new tendency is called the <Scientific Revolution>. Gregory Bateson is one of the important scientists in this new trend in the Western world.

III. CONCEPTUAL UNDERSTANDING OF ISLAM AND 'URŪBAH

First, we will discuss the distinguishing nature of Islam and make clear what 'Urūbah is. The main assertion of the Arab thinkers in the new trend in the realm of thought is that the Arabs should esteem their distinguishing characteristics and establish a united state or confederation in order to guard their culture from the threat of Western imperialism. They emphasize the importance of regaining a real understanding of Islam and 'Urūbah insisting on their inseparability. Therefore we should comprehend the real meanings of Islam and 'Urūbah, and the relationship between the two.

If we could take the position of observers, we could say that this kind of advocacy belongs only to the Arabs. However, that advocacy implies a more important issue, that is, whether the mutual prosperity of different cultures is possible or not. Therefore we cannot take the position of observers. In this sense too, we have to comprehend the monistic way of thinking of Islam and 'Urūbah as Arab ethos, and the relationship between them.

1. Comparison of the Concepts of State in Christianity and Islam

"It is a duty to consider the exercise of power as

one of the forms of religion, as one of the acts by which man draws near God." (Ibn Taymiyya, al-Siyāsa.)

The difference in the concepts of the state between Christianity and Islam causes their adherents to adopt different attitudes toward political activities. A real understanding of Christianity make the believers separate themselves from political activities, whereas such an understanding of Islam, makes them fight against their enemies for the purpose of increasing their solidarity and guarding their community. This is the reason why religion and politics are separated in Christian countries and not separated in Islamic countries. We will discuss how different these concepts of the state are, for the purpose of comprehending the distinguishing character of Islam.

(1) Christian Concept of State.

(a) Position of Jesus Christ in Trinitarianism.

When we examine the dualistic thought characteristic of the Christian concept of the state, we should start with the deification of Jesus Christ in trinitarianism, because the way in which the deification has been justified is based on the general idea of dividing everything into a sacred world and a secular world. Trinitarianism is the basic doctrine by which having faith in Jesus Christ corresponds with the monotheistic

thought of Christianity. In this we can see theoretical proof of 'dualism' as we can see in the thought of 'two kinds of people' and 'two kinds of Civitas' which will be discussed below.

Augustinus syllogized the deification of Jesus Christ in his Trinitarian theory. According to his syllogism, Verbum created everything and Verbum was born from the Virgin Mary in chrono-space. Therefore Verbum is Jesus Christ who created everything. As a result, Jesus Christ is not the created but the Creator, that is, He is the same substantia as the Father in Heaven.(1) Jesus Christ delivers the state to the Father without separating himself from the Father when He leads the believers to the contemplation of God.(2) We can clearly see the separation of the sacred and the secular in this syllogism. Christian doctrine teaches that though the physical body of Jesus Christ died on the cross, His divine nature has been alive and will remain alive in order to lead believers to 'De Civitate Dei' (The City of God). Until the Second Advent of Christ, believers have to walk on the road of suffering.

(b) 'Civitas' in Christianity.

While Augustinus analyzed the relation between the City of God and earthly states, the exact connection

between the two, and between church and secular power, is still controversial. 'Civitas' can be translated into English as 'state'. It should be noted, however, that this term differs from the word 'state' which we can use in modern thought. The Heidelberg theologian Ulrich Duchrow examines the three terms most commonly used in translation: 'citizen', 'a governing group', and 'society'(3). He propose that 'a governing group' is the most accurate translation. However, I will not examine this problem too closely, since my purpose is simply to demonstrate the duality of Christisn thought. It is enough for us to examine the theory of two Civitas and the relationship between believers and these two Civitas.

According to Duchrow, Augustinus understood De Civitate Dei (The City of God) as a kind of neo-Platonistic intellectual world (mundus intelligibilis) where belief, hope and love involve people as citizens. On the other hand, Civitas Terrena (the earthly state) is described as opposing De Civitate Dei. "God made it possible to realize the virtuous society in Rome without true religion in order to let us know that by adding true religion to the citizens of one state, citizens of another state will appear inside it."(4) We can see the existence of two definitions of human beings, religious people and non-religious people, in this expression.

The former are called 'new people' and the latter 'old people'. The new people are the inner and divine existence and the old people are the outer and earthly existence. These two kinds of people coexist until the Last Judgment. In the history of the earthly world, however, the new people continue to walk towards De Civitate Dei, the old people towards eternal death.

When Augustinus distinguished between De Civitate Dei and Civitas Terrena, he thought that there were two kinds of governing groups: one was an earthly governing group too filled with egoism to believe in God; the other was a divine governing group filled with great love for God (amor Dei). According to what we have seen, Civitas Terrena is summarized as follows: Civitas Terrena is governed by a group filled with selfish love (amor sui) and there, the old people and new people coexist, the former walking towards eternal death and the latter towards eternal life. In this basic structure, it is necessary to examine the position of the Church, since at least in the earthly world, the Christian Church may occupy the same position as the 'Ummah Islamiyyah, which will be examined later.

The Church is defined as a community of people who are fighting against much persecution believing that God must have mercy on them. Augustinus divided churches into two categories: churches which still have old

people inside them and churches which are filled with new people. Although this was no more than a theoretical classification, Luther later applied the concept of the two civitas to criticize the medieval ecclesiastical status quo. Originally, in the stage of Augustinus, all the earthly governing powers had been regarded as bad. They were permitted to exist as a means of Judgment, it being understood that they had also been created by God. The believers were required to live in peace (pax) which meant they should not disturb the earthly order. After the collapse of the Roman Empire, however, the earthly order changed considerably. The church had been involved with the earthly governing powers as an ordained power in order to defend the ecclesiastical properties against the sovereign power. Luther later criticized this aspect of the medieval church.

Luther insisted on regaining the religious purity which was believed to have existed in the age of Augustinus. According to his belief, the false church and the true church were fighting each other. He stated that "the Church would continue to be a mixture of these two kinds of churches till the day of the Last Judgment." (5) Any attempts to realize De Civitate Dei in this world through establishment of the ordained power and through controlling sovereign power were

excluded by Luther, and as a result, the concept of outer peace was revived. According to the recognition that laws of Civitas Terrena had been given by God for the old and impious people, and that the faithful should not expect them to do more than maintain their lives, believers started again to understand that the most pious life might be the monastic life.

As I discussed above, Christianity requires the faithful to live with the Platonic or Aristotelian concept of state in order to make them abandon concern with secular issues. Here the Christian way of thinking had prepared the ground on which later laissez faireism succeeded in organizing its theoretical framework.

(2) Islamic Concepts of State.

(a) Position of the Prophet Muhammad.

In about A.D. 570, Muhammad was born in Mecca. When he was forty years old, he accepted the revelation of Allāh (Qur'ān) and began to propagate Islam. Islam is a religion based on monistic thought. We can see this in the position of the Prophet in the Qur'ān and realize the differences with Christianity.

In the name of Allāh, the Gracious, the Merciful. Say, "He is Allāh the one; Allāh, the Independent and Besought of all. He begets not, nor is He begotten; And there is none like unto him." (Qur'ān 112:1-4)

Say, "I am only a man like yourselves; but I received the revelation that your God is only one God. So let him who hopes to meet his Lord do good deeds, and let him join no one in the worship of his Lord." (Qur'ān 18:110)

"Muhammad was chosen to be the messenger of God. Clearly, he was a man of special talents, but no Muslim believes that he was anything other than a man, or that he was the author of the Word of God, which he passed on by reciting it to his fellow human beings. (The word Koran, or Qur'ān, means 'recitation'.) That is why Muslims do not like to be called Muhammadans. They do not regard themselves as followers of Muhammad, but as people who have accepted the Word of God and surrendered themselves to His will."(6) In the history of Islam, the ten-year period of rule of the Prophet Muhammad is regarded as the ideal form of administration from both the political and the religious points of view.

(b) Islamic Concept of the World.

Before we examine the Islamic concept of state, we should understand the principle of the Islamic world view. This is called Tawhīd. The word Tawhīd is the verbal noun of <wahhad> which means <to unify> in Arabic. Thus we can understand Tawhīd as the basic principle of the world view in which everything is reduced to "one". Although Allāh created the universe in order to manifest His Majesty, there is no split between Allāh and His creatures. As organs of a human

body are deeply related to the will, all things in the universe are related to the will of Allāh. The material world and the spiritual world evolve at the same time, and all creatures harmonize with each other under the will of Allāh. Everything owes its existence to some external cause. For example a chair owes its existence to wood, and the totality of all causes goes back to Allāh.

In Christianity, by applying the dualistic thought to chronological space, human history is seen as being separated into two streams, and we can see the discontinuity between this world and the next world. On the contrary, in Islamic thought we cannot see such discontinuity. In Christianity human beings are regarded as not having atoned for original sin. In Islam, human beings are regarded as having atoned and will be judged by the extent to which they have been faithful to Islam in their earthly lives. To be pious in Islam requires believers to try to establish an ideal community in the earthly world.

(c)'Ummah Islamiyyah and Sharī'ah

The Qur'ān teaches that believers should always approach the phenomena of the world with an inquiring mind, constantly aware of the existence of Allāh. They

should also attempt to establish the ideal state of <'Ummah Islamiyyah (Islamic community).> The Islamic divine law is Sharī'ah, which has four sources, the Qur'ān, Sunnah, Qiyās and 'Ijmā'. Sunnah is the example illustrated by the words of Muhammad and through his behavior. Qiyās is the legal prescriptions provided by the analogies in the Qur'ān and Sunnah. 'Ijmā' is the legal opinion based on the consensus of Islamic scholars. The earthly laws provided by states are regarded as the detailed rules of Sharī'ah for the construction of the ideal 'Ummah. Therefore, they must coincide with Islamic thought.

"In course of time the text of the Qur'ān was fixed and the tradition of what the Prophet did and said were collected and examined, and scholars devoted themselves indeed to distinguishing the true among them from the false. In course of time too there evolved from Qur'ān and hadīth a comprehensive system of ideal morality, a moral classification of human acts which would make clear the way (Sharī'ah) by which men could walk pleasingly in the sight of God and hope to reach paradise....The Sharī'ah covered men's relations with each other as well as with God, and these also therefore were acts of religious significance commanded or forbidden."(7)

As we can see in the discussion above, there is a clear difference in the way of thinking between Christianity and Islam. The former is dualistic and the latter is monistic. Originally, Western success in the economic field started when the bourgeoisie succeeded in overthrowing the powers which had restricted their

freedom, such as monarchies and the Church. It is true that from a technological point of view, the Industrial Revolution was a big turning point in the history of European development. However the conceptual change had occurred centuries earlier. The Renaissance movement had influenced all western countries since the fourteenth century, and the feudalistic concept of property changed into the modern concept of property. After the Reformation, the dualistic way of thinking of Christianity prepared the ground for John Locke to develop his philosophic work for the law of nature. At the same time, Adam Smith established the basic idea of The Wealth of Nations.

In the present century, most of the relations in international societies are strongly influenced by the ideas of capitalism or socialism, both of which are based on the Christian dualistic way of thinking. On the other hand, Muslims believe that if politics and religion are separated, human beings will not prosper.

Though there are many schisms in Islam such as Sunni and Shi'ah, all of the divisions of Islam agree that Islam is "totality, legislating for all of man's earthly activities, not just his spiritual needs." (8) The Islamic monistic way of thinking permeates into Muslims' value hierarchy, which has defined the characteristics of their culture for a long time.

Islam for Muslims is not a mere religion which defines the relationship between God and human beings. The main principle of Islam, Tawhīd, defines all the relations in this universe based on the monistic way of thinking, that is, the relationships between God and nature, God and human beings, nature and human beings, and among human beings. There is no priesthood in Islam. Therefore, separatism is understandable only in line with the dualistic way of thinking of Christianity in the Western ethos.

2. Inseparability of Islam and 'Urūbah

We can find many <descriptions>(9) (when I use this word, I follow Bateson's idea of a scientific definition,) which attempt to fix the meaning of the term <the Arabs> and to categorize the individuals concerned. Descriptions of this kind cannot be free from the practical interests of the describers. The Arabs described are commonly a higher order of abstraction than the Arabs in the realm of existence, where we can see the describers' <punctuation>(10) of experimental sequence. Basically, "language bears to the objects which it denotes a relationship comparable to that which a map bears to a territory."(11)

There are many ways to describes the Arabs.

Linguistically speaking, it is possible to describe them as all the people who speak the Arabic language. Geographically speaking, the Arabs can be described as those who live in the Arab fatherland which is "that part of the globe inhabited by the Arab nation which stretches from the Taurus Mountain, the Pocht-i-Kouth Mountain, the Gulf of Basra, the Arab Ocean, the Ethiopian Mountains, the Sahara, the Atlantic Ocean, and the Mediterranean." (12) Historically speaking, as H. A. R. Gibb expressed, "all those are Arabs for whom the central fact of history is the mission of Muhammad and memory of the Arab Empire." (13)

Generally speaking in political argument, all of the contexts of the term <the Arabs> are more or less based on the combination of the ways of punctuation from the viewpoint of language, geography, history and so on. It is worthless to consider which description is the best of all, if we do not bear in mind that each of the described images of Arabs always depends on the describer's punctuation of the Arabs in the realm of existence and that, therefore, the notion of the Arabs contains the describer's hypothesis. Moreover, it should be noted that the Arab stream of being contains both peculiarity and similarity in its nature compared with non-Arab streams of being. Therefore, making an extreme argument, we can describe the Arabs in a higher

order of abstraction as if they were the same as another nation by punctuating the Arabs paying attention only to characteristics in which they are similar to the other. To describe one nation is to induce peculiarity and similarity in comparison with the other nation, standing on a certain punctuation of the nation in the realm of existence.

What we have to consider is the recognizability of 'ethos' in <the Arabs as the object (Gegenstand(14)) of describers> which is a lower order of abstraction than <the described Arabs>. In this study, 'Urūbah (Arab character) will be understood as the Arab ethos. Before starting the discussion about 'Urūbah, I would like to make the meaning of 'ethos' clear.

I will use the word 'ethos' as a complete set of distinguishing characteristics concerning one group of individuals. It means that basically ethos can be recognized only when we compare more than two streams of being. In other words, the idea of ethos presupposes the existence of more than two coexisting cultures. In that sense, ethos is a <class>(15) whose members are distinguishing characteristics of individuals concerned. Therefore, 'Urūbah as the Arab ethos can never be described completely.

I.R.A. al-Faruqi analyzes many 'described features of 'Urūbah', which is a higher order of abstraction than

'Urūbah as the Arab ethos itself, and pointed out the following:(16)

'Urūbah is the soul of the Arab stream of being, its 'pneuma'. Its metaphysical status is not that of a 'concept' or representation. Nor is it that of a Platonic idea. It belongs to the realm of real existence, though it is not material. It is a spiritual real-existent sui generis, belonging to an order of being different from that of matter, organic life or consciousness.

This may be the best explanation of the denoting function of the word 'Urūbah.

Distinguishing characteristics of individuals are formed and maintained through communications. And, as Bateson points out, "in any culture the individuals acquire quite extraordinary skill in handling not only the flat identification of what sort of a message a message is but in dealing in multiple identification of what sort of a message a message is." (17) Identifying <what sort of a message is> is based on the value system in the culture. In this sense, 'Urūbah as the Arab ethos (i.e. the class of distinguishing characteristics) has been maintained by the value system of Arab-Islamic culture.

In the political scene, however, 'Urūbah has been used as a political slogan. We can find a barrier which has prevented the Arabs from understanding the real meaning of 'Urūbah and the relationship between 'Urūbah and Islam. The political vanguard of Arabism

misunderstood the important position of Islam in the Arab-Islamic culture. Although 'Urūbah is closely related to the monistic value system of Arab-Islamic culture, more than a few politicians have insisted on separating politics and religion in the name of Arabism. They could not have understood the real meaning of Islam.

Gregory Bateson describes the relationship between the feel of a culture and the native behavior of an individual in Bali where he conducted field research. "The feel of the culture was in some way causative in shaping native behavior... there was one sort of phenomenon which I could call 'ethos' and another sort which I could call 'cultural structures' and ... these two worked together [having] a mutual effect one on the other." (18)

Islam is causative in creating the distinguishing monistic value system in Arab-Islamic culture. The feel of Arab-Islamic culture is in some way causative in shaping the native behavior of the Arabs. 'Urūbah as the Arab ethos is maintained in the extraordinary skill of Arab individuals in handling the identification of what sort of a message a message is. Maintained 'Urūbah is the important determinant of the character of Arab-Islamic culture. From such a point of view, we can understand that Islam and 'Urūbah cannot be separated

within the value system of the individuals concerned.

Such a statement as "Islam has worn well because it has guided and sustained and strengthened social structures and institutions -- the 'Ummah, the extended family, the clan, the tribe, and these in turn have sustained and nourished Islam,"(19) must be understood in relation to the inseparability between Islam and 'Urūbah.

The new thinkers emphasize first of all that the educated should become aware of the inseparability of Islam and 'Urūbah. A lack of this sort of consciousness causes the educated to argue with each other using their own terminology which is far removed from the essence of Islam and 'Urūbah. At the same time the new trend is to believe that the masses keep the combined nature of Islam and 'Urūbah inside their value system. "No one who considers Islam today in any country whatsoever can fail to realize that it is an oppressed value and hence a revolutionary force. That is precisely what makes Islam the historical twin brother of the Arab liberation movement....'Urūbah is never weak when Islam is strong, only when reaction, regionalism, provincialism and cosmopolitanism prevail, 'Urūbah is weakened."(20)

Warning the educated and believing the Arab masses, the new trend insists on the liberation movement against hypocritical rulers and Western imperialism.

NOTES.3

1 Augustinus, Sanmi Ittai Ron, (Trinitarianism), trans. Norio Nakagawa (Tokyo: Tokyo University Press, 1980), p. 13.

2 Ibid., p. 29.

3 Ulrich Duchrow, Kami no Shihai to Konoyo no Kenryoku no Shiso, (Christenheit und Weltverantwortung), trans. Akira Satake (Tokyo: Shinchi Shobo, 1980).

4 Ibid., p. 269.

5 Augustinus, Sanmi Ittai Ron, p. 407.

6 Edward Mortimer, Faith and Power; The Politics of Islam (London: Faber and Faber, 1982), pp. 31-32.

7 Albert Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age 1798-1939 (London: Cambridge University Press, 1983), p. 2.

8 G.H.Jansen, Militant Islam (London: Pan Books, 1979), pp. 29-30.

9 Bateson rates Margaret Mead's article "The Comparative Study and the Purposive Cultivation of Democratic Values," as the new habit of scientific thought and states:

In every case the anthropologist is concerned not with mere description but with a slightly higher degree of abstraction. His first task is the meticulous collection of masses of concrete observation of native life--but the next step is not a mere summarizing of these data; it is rather to interpret the data in an abstract language which shall transcend and comprehend the vocabulary and notions explicit and implicit in our own culture. It is not possible to give a scientific description of a native culture in English words; the anthropologist must devise a more abstract vocabulary in terms of which both our own and the native culture can be described.

Gregory Bateson, Steps to an Ecology of Mind (New York:

Ballantine Books, 1972), p. 161.

10 Bateson develops his concept of learning by an application of Russel's Theory of Logical Types. In his concept of learning, he explains that the notion of repeatable context contains the implicit hypothesis. He states:

This notion [of repeatable context] is not a mere tool of our description but contains the implicit hypothesis that for the organisms which we study, the sequence of life experience, action, etc, is somehow segmented or punctuated into subsequences or "contexts" which may be equated or differentiated by the organism.

Bateson, Steps, p. 163.

11 Ibid., p. 180.

12 "Constitution of the Arab Ba'th Socialist Party, Article 7," trans. Sylvia Haim, in Arab Nationalism: An Anthology (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1962), pp. 233-241.

13 H.A.R. Gibb, The Arabs, (Oxford, 1944), p. 3.

14 James M. Eddie, Kotoba to Imi, (Speaking and Meaning: The Phenomenology of Language), trans. Shizuo Takiura (Tokyo: Iwanami, 1980), p. 296.

15 I use the word <class> to mean logical or mathematical class. According to Russell's Theory of Logical Types, "no class can in formal logical or mathematical discourse, be a member of itself: that a class cannot be one of the classes which are its members; that a name is not the thing named...." See Bateson, Steps, p. 280.

16 Isma'il Ragi A. al-Faruqi, On Arabism, 'Urubah and Religion (Amsterdam: Djambatan, 1962), p. 206.

17 Bateson, Steps, p. 196.

18 Bateson, Steps, pp. 82-90.

19 G.H. Jansen, Militant, p. 30.

20 Munah al-Sulh, "Al-Tamaiz wa al-Takamul baina al-Qaumiyyah al-Arabiyyah wa al-Islam," in Al-Qaumiyyah al-Arabiyyah wa al-Islam, Munah al-Sulh, et al. (Cairo: Marukaz Dirasah al-Wafdah al-Arabiyyah, 1981) pp. 226-227.

IV. HISTORICAL ANALYSIS

In the last chapter, we discussed the inseparability of Islam and 'Urūbah within the realm of Arab real existence. This can be summarized as follows.

Islam is causative in shaping the distinguishing characteristics of individuals. In addition, 'Urūbah is the Arab ethos which we can consider a class whose members are distinguishing characteristics of individuals in the Arab stream of being. Thus, Islam and 'Urūbah cannot be comprehended separately in the value system of individuals.

In the history of the struggle against the modern West, however, Islam and 'Urūbah came to be understood separately. Islam came to be understood apart from the principle world view of Tawhīd, and 'Urūbah apart from the Arab ethos. Two political vanguards of Islam and Arabism in the Arab liberation movements have fought with each other, lacking confidence in their own culture. In this chapter, we will analyze the history of Arab liberation movements, and examine how Islam and 'Urūbah were understood in relation to the way in which the Arabs were described. Although the Arabs have basically been prevented from developing their united struggle against the modern West for various reasons, we can recognize at least two extensive upsurges of the

Arab liberation movements. The first was recognized in the nineteenth century when the literary renaissance of the Arabs was founded and Islamic modernism occurred. The second upsurge was symbolized by Nasserism in the twentieth century. Before the first upsurge of the Arab liberation movement in the nineteenth century, "explicit Arab nationalism, as a movement with political aims and importance, did not emerge." (1)

It should be noted that the Arabs have strived to achieve real independence in severe circumstances for a long time. We can comprehend how they have been dealt cruelly in the struggle for independence, wataniyyah nationalistic movements and the Palestinian problem. I would like to discuss these subjects in detail on another occasion. In this discussion, we pay attention to the fact that although the Arabs were in severe circumstances, we can recognize two extensive upsurges of the Arab liberation movements. Our purpose in this thesis is to probe the position of <the new trend> in the history of Arab-Islamic culture from the viewpoint of friction between two value systems: the monistic value system and the dualistic value system. In order to do so, we will discuss two extensive upsurges of the Arab liberation movements paying attention to the distinguishing characteristics of Arab-Islamic culture.

For the purpose of making historical analysis, an

analytical framework must be prepared. Now, we need not hesitate to understand that the Arab liberation movements in the past two extensive uprisings and the assertion of the Arab thinkers in the new trend are in the dimension of nationalism. I will understand them as <Arab liberation nationalism>. Arab liberation nationalism is nationalism which can be recognized beyond the field of regional wataniyyah nationalistic movements. In other words, Arab liberation nationalism is recognizable in the field of Arab-Islamic culture. For the purpose of avoiding confusion, I will call the analytical framework prepared in this chapter <nationalism>, and current regionalistic nationalism as <wataniyyah nationalism>. In this framework of nationalism, the first and the second uprisings of Arab liberation nationalism will be examined. The purpose of this chapter is to examine the way in which Islam as the spirit of Tawhīd and 'Urūbah as the Arab ethos were understood, how the Arabs was described by thinkers and politicians, and the result of each upsurges of Arab liberation nationalism. To analyze Arab liberation nationalism is to deal with the relationship of the Arabs with the modern West.

1. Nationalism as the Analytical Framework.

The definition of the word <nationalism> is still

controversial. For example, American historian Louis L. Snyder finds difficulty in defining nationalism and proposes to use adjectives. He categorizes nationalism in history using the adjectives listed below:(2)

aggressive nationalism, economic nationalism,
 hegemony nationalism, humanitarian nationalism,
 integral nationalism, irredentist nationalism,
 Jacoban nationalism, liberal nationalism, marginal
 nationalism, messianistic nationalism, negative
 nationalism, particularistic nationalism, positive
 nationalism, precautionary nationalism, prestigious
 nationalism, spiritual nationalism, sub-conscious
 nationalism, traditional nationalism, transferred
 nationalism, xenophobic nationalism, and so on.

In this analysis, I also use some adjectives like <Arab liberation>, and <wataniyyah>. It does not mean that I am following Snyder's way of analysis. We are going to set a general idea of nationalism. Originally, all that is called nationalism requires three elements. The first element is recognition of a certain threat in the group of individuals concerned. The second element is a certain described image of the group by the describer's punctuating the group in the realm of existence. Usually, more influential described images of the group are produced by people who have greater power. (By the word <power>, I mean power in general as force, energy, strength, might, potency and so on.) And the third element is organizing individuals for a certain socio-political movement. Which individuals are involved in certain nationalism depends on how the

threat is described and how the image of the group is described. In other words, who produces an influential image of the group, and how he describes the image of the group are indicators of the scale and the type of nationalism.

As for the member of the group, he examines a described image of the group in his value system and in communication not only with the other members but also with people outside his group. A described image of the group is a higher order of abstraction than the group in the realm of existence, and cannot be free from the describer's punctuation and socio-political bias. If the member of the group examined the described image of a group and did not feel a incongruity, and if he actually recognized a certain threat to his real life, he would accept the described image of the group and the describer's message, and would learn how to understand his own group and his enemy. When a certain describer succeeds in organizing a movement toward his own socio-political ends, we can see the phenomenon of nationalism.

Originally, the foundation and maintenance of a state require a described image of it in relation to some of the racial, geographic, linguistic, religious, political, economic, and cultural features. The governor of a state has to produce a described image of

the state according to his punctuation of it in the realm of existence in order to organize the members in the state system. Similarly, a leader in a certain nationalistic movement has to produce a described image of the nation or the ethnos according to his punctuation of it in the realm of existence, in order to organize the members in the nationalistic movement. Leaders in nationalism are not necessarily governors of states although more than a few nationalistic movements in the modern age have been promoted by the governors of nation-states. For example, if socialism succeeded in organizing people by presenting a socialist ideology of the nation, we could comprehend class struggle in the dimension of nationalism. At least, however, in the face of nationalism among socialist states, it is irrelevant for socialists to regard such phenomena as being caused only by the theoretical weakness of Lenin's description of the nation.(3) Nationalism is occurable wherever a threat is recognized by a specific group as coming from outside that group.

Thus standing on this basic understanding of nationalism, we can define <Arab liberation nationalism> as follows:

(i) The image of the threat is described as the modern West.

(ii) The image of the Arabs is described having

confidence in the distinguishing characteristics of Arab-Islamic culture.

(iii) The organized socio-political movement is struggling to preserve the distinguishing characteristics of Arab-Islamic culture against the modern West.

We should comprehend nationalism from the viewpoint of relations among individuals; among describers of the nation and individuals concerned; and among the nation and the other nations. In this thesis we intend to analyze the new trend which insist on the inseparability of the nature of Islam and 'Urūbah. In order to do so, we will investigate the reason why the political vanguard of Islam and that of Arabism have come to fight each other, by analyzing the descriptions of the Arabs of these two groups in order to discover the way in which Islam as the spirit of Tawhīd and 'Urūbah as the Arab ethos were understood.

2. Analysis of the First Upsurge of Arab Liberation Nationalism.

We can recognize the first upsurge of Arab liberation nationalism in the nineteenth century when <the literary renaissance of the Arabs> and <Islamic modernism> played important roles in the struggle to preserve Arab-Islamic culture against the modern West. When we analyze the first upsurge of Arab liberation

nationalism, a subject worthy of study is the way in which the modern West has changed and the effect of the Western dualistic way of thinking in the nineteenth century.

It should be noted that the nineteenth century was a very important period in European history. Behind the development of European civilization, a great qualitative change was under way during that century. In 1814, the order of Europe, which had been disturbed by the expansionism of Napoleon, was restored during an international conference in Vienna. The result of this conference was to suppress the spirit of the French Revolution and revive despotism. Pre-revolution despotic rulers came to life again under the principle of legitimism advocated by a French politician, Charles Talleyrand Perigord. There was no reconsideration of the cause of Napoleon's expansionism. Through the nineteenth century, nationalistic and democratic movements took place on the one hand, while on the other hand Western colonialism was formed. Ethnically speaking, Western liberalism and democracy gradually came to show ambivalence, domestically establishing liberal nation-states, and internationally legitimating the occupation of colonies.

World War I broke out based on such changes in the realm of Western societies. Lenin analyzed World War I

and pointed out that:(4)

The war of 1914-1918 was imperialistic (that is, an annexationist, predatory, plunderous war) on both sides; it was a war for the division of the world, for the partition and separation of colonies, 'spheres of influence' of finance capital, ... Finance capital is such a great, it may be said, such a decisive force in all economic and all international relations, that it is capable of subjecting, and actually does subject, to itself even states enjoying the fullest political independence... Of course, finance capital finds most 'convenient' and derives the greatest profit from, such control as involves the loss of the political independence of the subjected countries and people.

In the Middle East, as the result of World War I, the territory of the Ottoman Empire was divided and occupied by the Western Powers.

The ambivalence of Western liberalism and democracy also influenced the Versailles Treaty after World War I. Woodrow Wilson's fourteen points were well known as ideas emphasizing the humanistic spirit. Standing on it, he offered the defeated nations easy armistice terms, no annexations, no punitive damage, no contributions and so forth. However, he was fooled by the Versailles Treaty. Gregory Bateson sees the Versailles Treaty from an anthropologist's point of view:(5)

This was one of the great sellouts in the history of our civilization and a most extraordinary event which led fairly directly and inevitably into World War II.... It also led to the total demoralization of German politics.... From the demoralization of Germany, we, too became demoralized... It was generally assumed that compromise and a little hypocrisy are a very important ingredient in the

ordinary comfortableness...But after the great deception, this philosophy is untenable. The general good smells of hypocrisy to the rising generation.

As for the Middle East, it is well known that the Western Powers, England and France, were two-faced in their dealings with the Arabs as is demonstrated in the Husayn-McMahon correspondence and the Sykes-Picot agreement. It is true that the Western people succeeded in releasing the energy of the masses and utilizing it for technological development based on the Christian dualistic way of thinking. However, the ambivalence of their value system caused colonialism and the resulting demoralization of relationships in international society.

At first, when the Arabs saw the modern West, they could not recognize such a tendency in the Western societies. They were amazed and admired the advancement of the modern West. Generally, it takes a long time for the masses concerned to come to take in the meaning of historical affairs. Gradually the Arabs began to feel the menace of being occupied by the modern West in relation to the decay of the Ottoman Empire, and some kinds of wataniyyah nationalism occurred. Under such conditions, the literary renaissance of the Arabs and Islamic modernism emerged. We can recognize the difference between the characteristics of the Arab-Islamic culture and the modern Western culture in the

assertions of the founders of the literary renaissance of the Arabs and the Islam modernists. We will analyze the images of the threat and the Arabs described by one of the founders of the literary renaissance, al-Butrus al-Bustānī, and four Islamic modernists, Rifā'a Badawī Rāfi' at-Tahtāwī, Jamāl ad-Dīn al-Afghānī, Muhammad 'Abduh and Rashīd Ridā.

(1) The Image of the Threat.

We can imagine that the threatening image held by the Arabs in the first Arab liberation nationalism was double: the Sublime Porte and the Western Powers. The relationship with European Powers was not described as a dangerous one at the beginning, "when Europe was seen through the eyes of the generation of at-Tahtāwī ... and al-Bustānī. Europe then was a promise discovered with joy and excitement; there was still no cause for alarm;...the good things it had to offer were to be adopted without question, and the bad things simply discarded. Europe, in short, was something to be used and exploited." (6) At-Tahtāwī and al-Bustānī understood the modern West in relation to the idea of the 1789 Revolution. They reconsidered the situation of the Ottoman Empire, and thought that modernization promoted by political leaders with the support of the Powers could resist the growth of Western influence over

the Empire. Therefore, they described the image of the threat more as the Sublime Porte which had had no capability to maintain a moral, economic and political social base, than the Western Powers.

The Ottoman sultans and governors in the Sublime Porte themselves promoted policies for reforming the Ottoman Empire.(7) However, these reforms were intended to strengthen centralization and change the Empire from an Islamic sultanate into a modernized Power based on a despotic monarchy. At the same time it meant relinquishing the legitimacy of the Ottoman domination of the State.(8)

The clearer the threat of the Western Powers became, the more widely advocated the necessity of unity of the people in the Ottoman Empire became. It was no longer valid to think that modernization promoted by political leaders with the support of the Powers could resist Western influence over the Empire. Three Islamic modernists al-Afghānī, Muhammad 'Abduh and Rashīd Ridā, keenly felt the necessity of awakening the masses and concentrating around a center of Islamic unity. These three Islamic modernists clearly described the threat as the Western Powers. By the end of the nineteenth century the political stance of the governors of the Ottoman Empire had changed from a Muslim sultan to a despotic monarch and then to the Ottoman constitutional

monarch.(9) In a sense, they described the threat as the Western Powers and the Westernized governors of the Ottoman Empire who had been promoting the reforming policies in order to become one of the Powers.

Thus, as for the image of the threat, stress reversed from being less on the Powers and a great deal on the Sublime Porte, to being less on the Ottoman governors and a great deal on the Western Powers. It is very important for us to comprehend this change of stress in describing the image of the threat correctly. In the first generation of al-Bustānī and at-Tahtāwī, the Arabs did not reach a full understanding of the nature of the Western Powers, and at the same time, they still regarded the Ottoman Empire as the state of the Islamic sultanate. Under such conditions the literary renaissance occurred and played an important role criticizing the incapability of the Sublime Porte and awakening the Arabs as one ethnos. And Islamic reformists like at-Tahtāwī began to insist on the importance of regaining the real meaning of Islam. In the second generation of al-Afghānī, Muhammad 'Abduh and Rashīd Ridā, the Arabs understood to a considerable extent the nature of the Western colonial Powers, and at the same time, regarded the Ottoman Empire as the state of a Western kind of despotic monarch or constitutional monarch. Under such conditions, Islamic modernists

strongly insisted on the necessity of modernizing Islam based on the basic world view of Tawhīd.

When we consider the change of stress in describing the image of the threat, we can comprehend that the first upsurge of Arab liberation nationalism consisted of two phases. In the first phase, the leaders of Arab liberation nationalism awakened the Arabs as one ethnos. In the second phase, the leaders of Arab liberation nationalism made the Arabs aware of their true enemy. All of the leaders in both phases were aware of the importance of respecting the distinguishing characteristics of Arab-Islamic culture.

(2) The Image of the Arabs.

Before the threat of the Western Powers became recognized clearly, the most influential described image of the Arabs might be characterized as modernistic and to a certain extent regional. Some modernist describers came on stage from both the Muslim and Christian side, at-Tahtāwī in Egypt on the former, and al-Bustānī in Beirut on the latter.

After the underlying motive of the Powers was revealed, some thinkers of Islam modernism gained the support of the Arabs. The Islam modernists, Al-Afghānī, Muhammad 'Abduh and Rashīd Ridā described the Arabs standing on their firm belief in Islam not as a mere

religion but as the spirit of Tawhīd.

(a) The Literary Renaissance of the Arabs--Al-Bustānī.

Al-Bustānī understood the word <watan> as Syria as a whole, but played an important role for uniting Arabs of all creeds in the service of their Arabic language and in the pursuit of knowledge. In Syria, there were many Christians who had acquired Western culture through religious missions and schools. In the eighteenth century many Christians in Aleppo learned the Arabic language from Muslim groups, but they did not work with Muslims and Druzes for rediscovering common feeling of love of their <watan>, because "religious prejudice was still dominant." (10) In the nineteenth century the literary renaissance of the Arabs was founded owing to Bustānī's great effort of removing such prejudice. His lifelong exertion was devoted "to revive [Arab] ancient culture." (11)

Simply stated, Arabic speaking Christians were doubly organized as members of two classes: the Christian religious hierarchy and the Ottoman Empire. In the former, they had been obliged to be in the lower classes, and in the latter the minority. The independence of Greece in 1829 and the Gulhane decree in 1839 caused them to feel a kind of tension in the religious hierarchy and consider the meaning of their rights in the Ottoman Empire. Under such circumstances,

they acquired a new interest in the Arabic language, which rapidly became widespread in the 1860s and many periodicals were published, chiefly by Lebanese Christians.

"New interest in the Arabic language had of course, a profound influence on their mental life. It led first of all to a new stirring of historical self-awareness."(12) Al-Bustānī also discovered the greatness of the past civilization and had much pride in it. He carefully observed the situation of the Ottoman Empire, and judged that the most serious cause of the decline of Arab civilization was deficiency of learning. He advocated that it was necessary to reestablish the Arab way of learning to learn Western civilization. Al-Bustānī put stress on religious freedom, equality and mutual respect. He prepared not only Arabic speaking Christians but also Muslims for rediscovering their splendid culture by developing new interest in one of the members of the class of 'Urūbah as the Arab ethos: the Arabic language. There was a possibility of causing the Arabic speaking Christians to change from being members of the minority in the religious hierarchy to being the majority in the Arab-Islamic culture, and of causing the Arab Muslims to change from being members of the religious unity to members of Arab liberation nationalism. As far as al-Bustānī's idea was concerned,

there was no controversy about the relationship between Christians and Muslims. He was conscious that what made him develop his thought was not the characteristics similar to the West but the distinguishing characteristics of their culture. For the purpose of further developing their civilization, al-Bustānī advocated Westernization which in his days seemed achievable with the help of the Western Powers. Although the Christians had lived in a closed society and had been influenced by Western culture from early times, they discovered in the Arabic language more than an instrument of promotion in the administrative system of the Ottoman Empire. They discovered one of the distinguishing characteristics of Arab-Islamic culture and took pride in their history in which Islam as the spirit of Tawhīd played an important role in creating 'Urūbah as the Arab ethos.

Al-Bustānī and the other founders of the literary renaissance of the Arabs occupied important parts in the history of Arab liberation nationalism. They made the Arabs become conscious of being an ethnos by rediscovering the greatness of Arab-Islamic culture through the literary renaissance of the Arabs.

(b) Islamic Modernism-- at-Tahtāwī, al-Afghānī, Muhammad 'Abduh and Rashīd Ridā.

At-Tahtāwī understood the word <watan> not only as

Egyptian society but as French 'patrie'. "In classical Arabic the word <watan> means the place of birth and/or residence.... But the <watan> at-Tahtāwī urges his contemporaries to love and to work for, is more than their birthplace." (13) He is the first person to understand <watan> from the socio-ethnic viewpoint. He reconsidered brotherhood in love of the <watan> and declared that "brotherhood in love of the <watan>, in patriotism, is the equivalent of brotherhood in religion." (14) Although he appraised the role and position of the Arabs in the history of Islam, there was little consciousness of the Arabs in his mind. It was the modernized Islamic state that filled his mind. He comprehend the causes of the fall of the Ottoman Empire as being the unlimited power of the sultan, the unsuitability of Shari'ah to the new environment and out-dated 'ulamā.

He advocated that 'ulamā should devote themselves to learning about Western civilization in order to obtain a full understanding of the new circumstances, and that by so doing Shari'ah could become suitable for Western civilization. Besides, a ruler should hold 'ulamā in honor and his power should be laid within the limit of Shari'ah. He regarded Islamic law as the same thing as natural law.

At-Tahtāwī was strongly influenced by the thought of

Montesquieu. Concerning Christians, he followed the traditional thought which understood Christians and Jews as 'protected people' (ahl ad-dhimma), and he showed liberal attitude toward them. "He writes, for example, the love of Moslems for their religion is equivalent to love of country in the West, although he adds, love of country for us Moslems is one of the branches of the Faith."(15)

He thought that the most important things for the people in the community were to adapt the Western liberal political system to the Muslim state, i.e. the Ottoman Empire, introduce modern civilization, and that to do so was not incompatible with true Islam. He was fully conscious of the existence of Christians inside the community. He, however, took the traditional stance of Islam toward them and emphasized the importance of the unity of the state.

Some may consider that at-Tahtāwī's idea was to transfer Montesquieu's thought into Islamic society, and that he therefore described the Arabs paying attention not only to factors sui generis but also to factors of the similarity with the West. However, it is obvious that at-Tahtāwī had already been aware of a moral danger of positivism.(16) We can comprehend that at-Tahtāwī felt a kind of ambivalence about the Western values from

the ethical point of view. Although he put stress less on the Powers and a great deal on the Sublime Porte, he was aware of the distinguishing characteristics of Arab-Islamic culture. Therefore, he described the people in the Ottoman Empire as an ethnos in which Islam ought to occupy an important part.

Jamāl ad-Dīn al-Afghānī, Muhammad 'Abduh and Rashīd Ridā preached the real meaning of Islam as the spirit of Tawhīd, and asserted the necessity of reforms to regain the vital power of their civilization. Al-Afghānī and Muhammad 'Abduh published an Arabic periodical, al-'Urwah al-Wuthqa (The Firm, Reliable Tie), and warned of the danger of the Western Powers and the importance of regaining true Islam. Rashīd Ridā started a reform movement called salafiyyah "whose influence was felt throughout the Muslim world." (17)

The common understandings of the three Islamic modernists was that Islam had degenerated into no more than a religion which existed only in the relationship between God and human beings. They asserted that the real meaning of Islam was the spirit of Tawhīd which existed in the relationship not only between God and human beings but also between God and nature, between nature and human beings, and among human beings. Therefore more than a few sources of the great Western civilization were of Islamic origin to say nothing of

their being compatible with Islam.

They followed and developed at-Tahtāwī's thought of Sharī'ah and advocated the necessity of a broad scope for 'ijtihād: independent judgment in legal or theological questions based on the interpretation and application of Qur'ān and Sunnah. At the same time, their common opinion concerning the state was that "the specially qualified 'ulamā should work with a supremely qualified Khalīfah", and that Khalīfah with "the help of the 'ulamā would deduce from the unchanging principles of Islam laws appropriate to the changing conditions of the world."(18)

As for the relationship with non-Muslims, they referred to it in connection with their idea of jihād (Holy War), stating that to force 'people of the book' (Christians and Jews) to become Muslims would be inconsistent with the principle of freedom in the faith.

Witnessing the political change of the Ottoman Empire from a sultanate to a despotic monarchy and then to a Turkish secularist state, Rashīd Ridā criticized the Turks and formed his opinion about the Arabs in relation to Islam. In other words, Ridā punctuated the Arabs in the context of Islamic culture.(19)

These three Islam modernists described the Arabs by paying attention to the distinguishing characteristics of Arab-Islamic culture. They were confronted with the

situation in which Islam had fallen into the position of being a mere religion. They realized that the sultanate had reduced Islam to a hollow shell. In a sense, Islam for the people in the community ('Ummah) had come to be dualistic, therefore, the position of Islam in the age of the Ottoman Empire was similar to that of Christianity in Western societies. They intended to raise the level of Islamic consciousness of the people by using Western terminology and to move the position of Islam back from a field of similarity with the West to one of distinguishing characteristics.

As we discussed above, we can find common features in the ways of punctuating the Arabs in the descriptions given by the founders of the literary renaissance of the Arabs and the Islamic modernists. All of them respected the distinguishing characteristics of Arab-Islamic culture, and described the Arabs by drawing attention to them. The founders of the literary renaissance of the Arabs respected Arab-Islamic culture and described the Arabs by drawing attention to the Arabic language. The Islamic modernists respected Arab-Islamic culture and described the Arabs by drawing attention to the real meaning of Islam. As far as these describers of the Arabs in the first upsurge of Arab liberation nationalism are concerned, we cannot find any differentiation in the understanding of 'Urūbah and

Islam. They were aware of the characteristics which made Arab-Islamic culture different from Western culture.

(3) The Result

The Western Powers also caused the upsurge of nationalism in Turkey. It took only a few decades for the Ottoman Empire to change into a constitutional monarchy. There was not enough time before the outbreak of World War I for the leaders of the nationalist movements who had regained respect for Arab-Islamic culture to unite the Arabs for the struggle under their united image of both the threat and the Arabs. After the Young Turks succeeded in their revolution, they carried out a plan of centralization. Thus, the Arabs were obliged to develop the socio-political movement to oppose the centralization, even before they had fully examined the context of the described images of the Arabs.(20)

In 1913 in Paris, an 'Arab Congress' was held. The following statement is one of the reports of its discussion:

We Arabs, the speakers declared, want to reform the empire because we want to participate in modern civilization, and we look to Europe for help. There were complimentary references to France, appeals to the European conscience, hopes expressed of European pressure on the Ottoman government, refutations of the idea that Europe was a danger; the real danger

lies within, in our own decay... Ottoman government must be really democratic, and in a multi-national empire this implies provincial liberty. There should be effective participation by Arabs in the central government, and administrative autonomy in each Arab province; Arabic should be an official language, in parliament as well as local government; within the national community, Christians and Muslims are as one.(21)

We should note that in this statement the emphasis concerning the image of the threat was again only slightly on the Western Powers and a great deal on the Ottoman government. Although the founders of the literary renaissance of the Arabs and Islamic modernists did not miss the importance of having confidence in the distinctiveness of their culture from that of the modern West, the members of this congress seem to have missed it. So rapidly and severely did the circumstances change, that the Arabs were prevented from organizing a united socio-political movement having confidence in the hidden capabilities of Arab-Islamic culture.(22)

The first upsurge of Arab liberation nationalism was frustrated. From that time on, gradually Islam and 'Urūbah came to be understood separately in the Arab political scene, since intellectuals and a ruling elite who lacked confidence in Arab-Islamic culture increased in number.

3. Analysis of the Second Upsurge of Arab Liberation Nationalism.

The second upsurge of Arab liberation nationalism is symbolized by Gamal 'Abd an Nasser. After the experience of two World Wars, new order was established in international relations. Political and economic differentials between the leading Western countries and the rest of the world including newly independent countries became wider.(23) The center of international politics changed from Europe to the United States and the Soviet Union, and the bipolar system emerged. The Western dualistic way of thinking became more influential in international relations. At the same time most international affairs came to be understood within the framework of East-West relations. Under such conditions, the distinguishing features of cultures came to be understood apart from political and economic affairs.

We can comprehend that Nasserism was the phenomenon which emerged in opposition to the bipolar system and symbolized the cultural consciousness of non-Western people.(24) In this section we will discuss the position of Nasserism in the history of the Arabs from the viewpoint of Arab liberation nationalism.

(1) The Image of the Threat.

Nasser made it clear in his book The Philosophy of the Revolution (Falsafah ath-Thaurah), that the threat

for him and his fatherland came from Israel(25), Western imperialism and its puppet government.(26) Puppet governments for him were not only King Faruq's regime at that time but all governors since the middle of the thirteenth century, Mamluk, Ottoman and England. Moreover, he discovered puppet governments of Western imperialism in other Arab nation-states. At the same time, Nasser was aware of the seriousness of differentiation among the vanguards of Arab liberation nationalism. Such differentiation had become wider since the frustration of the first upsurge of Arab liberation nationalism when the Arab intellectuals and ruling elite had lacked confidence in their own culture and its potential power. Nasser became aware that some of the Arab masses were in the same situation as the intellectuals by experiencing the Western occupation.

He expressed his opinion about the masses who assumed an indifferent attitude toward the revolution. He could not define their attitude except to say that the people had become senseless under the bad rule of Mamluk. However, he defended the masses by stating that they were sick people who had lived in a room shut away from the outside. Though they wanted a gentle wind, the cool wind of European culture had blown into the room.(27) Nasser had to begin by making not only the Arab intellectuals but also some of the Arab masses

regain confidence in their culture in order to organize a united vanguard in Arab liberation nationalism.

(2) The Image of the Arabs.

As we discussed in the last section, Islamic modernists in the nineteenth century, at-Tahtāwī, al-Afghānī, Muhammad 'Abduh and Rashīd Ridā, attempted to move the position of Islam back by using Western terminology from a mere religion which defined only the relation between God and human beings, like Christianity in the Western societies, to the true Islam which was causative in creating the distinguishing characteristics of Arab-Islamic culture. On the other hand, one of the founders of the literary renaissance of the Arabs, al-Bustānī, discovered a distinguishing characteristics of the Arabs in the Arabic language. He took pride in their history in which Islam based on the world view of Tawhīd had played an important role in creating 'Urūbah as the Arab ethos. These thinkers had an intense consciousness of the respectability of their culture.

However, some thinkers of later generations came to prove by using Islamic terminology that Western civilization could be transferred into Arab culture, by understanding Islam as a mere religion in the same way as Christianity was understood in Western culture. By doing so, they turned their followers to the other trend

which understood the Arabic language without paying attention to the influence of the Arab-Islamic culture behind it. Thus they confronted the followers of the Islamic modernists in the nineteenth century.

Nasser promoted Nasserism for the purpose of economically and politically reconstructing Egypt, through which he appealed to the Arabs to follow his idea of al-qaumiyyah al-Arabiyyah, that is the ideology of uniting or confederating all the Arab nation-states. Based on the idea of al-qaumiyyah al-Arabiyyah, Nasserism and Arab Socialism of the Arab Ba'th Socialist Party in Syria were united. At the same time, he called back true Islam to the minds of his followers.(28) He did not aim at the establishment of a secular state by dissolving the Muslim Brotherhood but at the establishment of a united front for the revolution. He did not deny democracy by refusing the parliamentary system but denied the remnants of the exploiting class. He did not want to put Egypt under the influence of the Soviet Union by cooperating with the founders of Arab Socialism but to produce a substitute ideology which could unite the Arabs beyond the differentiation among the political vanguards of Arab liberation nationalism.(29)

Al-qaumiyyah al-Arabiyyah was to be based on confidence in the culture of the Arabs. Nasser

cooperated with the founders of Arab Socialism to bridge the gap between the two vanguards of Islam and Arabism, clearly describing the image of the threat as Western imperialism. He clearly understood the meaning of 'Urūbah as the Arab ethos and Islam as the spirit of Tawhīd, but more importantly the history of Arab liberation nationalism. He was required to be realistic in order to realize his ideal in the face of mutual distrust among the vanguards of Arab liberation nationalism.

Nasser's ideal was consistently directed toward the struggle against foreign oppression of not only Egypt but also the Arabs as a whole. Nasserism combined with Arab Socialism was a magnificent attempt aimed at resolving all established vanguards, uniting them all, recovering the confidence of the Arabs in their culture and organizing vanguards and the masses toward the movement of Arab liberation nationalism. His ideology of al-qaumiyyah al-Arabiyyah was based on the culture in which Islam and the Arabic language played an important role. Nasser described the Arabs by borrowing only the term <socialism> from the class of similar characteristics with the West, and adding to it the distinguishing characteristics of Arab-Islamic culture. A person who could not arrive at the understanding of the dangerous situation of Arab liberation nationalism

as Nasser had, would have misunderstood Nasser as a secularist or an ambitious person.

Nasser aimed to achieve three goals at once: to reconstruct Egypt backed by the strong self-confidence of the masses, to unite the vanguards of Arab liberation nationalism toward the struggle against Western imperialism and to impress upon them the greatness of their culture in which Islam had played an important role.

(3) The Result

Based on the ideology of al-qaumiyyah al-Arabiyyah, Nasser and the Ba'th Party in Syria formed the United Arab Republic in 1958. Though he had thought that the formation of the U.A.R. should be given careful consideration, the political environment did not allow such circumspection. Therefore, once the U.A.R. was formed he was obliged to risk drastic policies as he had done in Egypt just after the revolution. This resulted in the split of the separatist factions from the Ba'th Party in Syria. "On the morning on September 28, 1961, a group of army officers and conservative politicians carried out a coup d'etat that was to end the union between Syria and Egypt." They were "composed of merchants, landowners, and capitalists who saw in separation the only means of preserving their

interest."(30)

After the U.A.R. ended in failure because of Syria's secession, the political vanguards of Arab liberation nationalism began again to confront each other maintaining their own way of punctuating the Arabs in their description of the Arabs. Nasser could not unite the political vanguards of Arab liberation nationalism, and failed to secure a foothold. Under such conditions the Six-Day War broke out in 1967. "The quick defeat and almost complete destruction of Arab conventional forces, as well as the occupation of all of Palestine and substantial Egyptian and Syrian territories"(31) drove Arabs into <the moral crisis>. Nasser died in the midst of reorganizing the relationships among the Arab nation-states.

Although Nasser could not unite the political vanguards in Arab liberation nationalism and achieve the unity of the Arabs, Nasserism contributed considerably to making the Arabs regain self-confidence. Although Nasser could not wipe out the Western dualistic way of thinking, Nasserism played an important role in relaying the self-confidence of the Arabs to forthcoming new relations with the West based on a firm belief in the Islamic monistic way of thinking.(32)

NOTES.4.

1 Albert Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798-1939 (London: Cambridge University Press, 1983), p. 262.

2 Masaki Yagi, "L.Snyder ni yoru Nationalism Mondai no Sogo-teki Approach", in Nationalism no Kenkyu, ed. Sekai Chosa Kai (Tokyo: 1956), p. 763.

3 We can see a Marxian dilemma concerning nationalism in, Zenya Takashima, Minzoku to Kaikyū: Gendai Nationalism Hihan no Tenkai (Tokyo: Gendai Hyoron, 1970).

4 Elie Kedourie, Nationalism in Asia and Africa (New York: The World Publishing Company, 1970), pp. 6-7.

5 Gregory Bateson, Steps to an Ecology of Mind (New York: Ballantine Books, 1972), pp. 469-77.

6 Hisham Sharabi, "The Transformation of Ideology in the Arab World" in the Middle East Journal, Autumn, (1965), p. 471.

7 While some types of nationalistic feeling were awakened, and the Western threat had become increasingly clear, the Ottoman Empire set about renovation when Selim III came to the throne in 1789. He made strenuous efforts to reform the military system according to policies called <an-Nizām al-Jadīd (the New Order)>, which failed on account of the revolt of the Janissary corps. The political situation in Istanbul remained turbulent until Mahmud II succeeded in destroying the Janissaries in 1826. After the Greeks revolted against the Empire and became independent, full-scale reforms extending over a period of a half century were promoted, which were called Tanzimat.

8 At the end of the 1830s, Sultan Abdulmehid issued the Gulhane decree drafted by Resid Pasha, and defined the principle of reforms which antagonized the masses, not only Muslims but also Arabic speaking Christians, since it proved that the Sublime Porte, which had been undermined by the Powers, had defensively decided to work its way to a Westernized Power from the Muslim state.

9 The Gulhane decree in 1839, the Hatt-i Humayun decree in 1856, and the promulgation of the Ottoman constitution (Midhat Constitution) in 1876 made it clear for the masses that the political stance of their governor had changed from that of a Muslim sultan to a despotic monarch and then to the Ottoman constitutional monarch.

10 George Antonius, The Arab Awakening, (Beirut, Khayats), p. 53.

11 George Antonius, The Arab Awakening, p. 55.

12 Albert Hourani, Arabic Thought, p. 57.

13 Khaldun S. Al-Husry, Origins of Modern Arab Political Thought (New York: Caracan Books, 1980), pp. 29-30.

14 Charles Wendell, The Evolution of the Egyptian National Image (London: University of California Press, 1972), p. 128.

15 Khaldun S. Al-Husry, Origins of Modern Arab Political Thought, p. 31

16 At-Tahtāwī became aware of a moral danger of positivism and stated:

The French are of those who believe that it is human reason which ascribes goodness or badness to things. Moreover, they deny that miracles can occur and believe it is not possible for the laws of nature to be broken. They believe too that religions have come only to encourage men to do good and avoid what is opposed to it, that national welfare and human progress can take the place of religion, and that.... the intelligence of their learned men is greater than that of the prophets. Albert Hourani, Arabic Thought, p. 82.

17 Edward Mortimer, Faith and Power, The Politics of Islam (London: Faber and Faber, 1982), p. 244.

18 Edward Mortimer, Faith and Power, p. 246.

19 Ridā's opinion about the Turks and the Arabs was as follows:

The Turks are a warlike nation, but they are not of greater moment than the Arabs; how can their state lasted longer than all the states of the Arabs together? It is in the countries which were conquered by the Arabs that Islam spread, became firmly established and

prospered. Most of the lands which the Turks conquered were a burden on Islam and Muslims, and are still a warning of clear catastrophe. I am not saying that those conquests are things for which the Turks must be blamed or criticized, but I want to say that the greatest glory in the Muslim conquests goes to the Arabs, and that religion grew, and became great through them; their foundation is the strongest, their light is the brightest, and they are indeed the best 'ummah brought forth to the world. I do not deny that the Turks have virtue, intelligence, and nobility, and I do not like to continue the compassion of the import to Islam of the Arab contribution. A little knowledge of past and present history shows that most of the countries where Islam was established were conquered by the Arabs who were the active agents of the propagation of Islam.

Sylvia G. Haim, Arab Nationalism: An Anthology (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962), pp. 22-23.

20 In 1912 the Ottoman Party of Administrative Decentralization was founded by some of the members of the anti-Young Turks. The members of the party did not have a united image of <the Arabs>.

21 Albert Hourani, Arabic Thought, pp. 283-84.

22 When we seek to understand why the Arabs could not organize a united movement under the united image of the Arabs, we cannot put aside the Sikes-Picot agreement. Behind the empty promise of independence for the Arabs, the Allied Powers, France, Russia, and Italy, had reached an agreement to divide and colonize the territory of the Ottoman Empire. It may be appropriate to understand that before the territory of the Ottoman Empire was divided, the Arabs were psychologically divided by the foreign policies of the Western colonial Powers.

23 From an economic point of view, Samir Amin develops his theory of unequal development paying attention to the relations between the leading countries and the remaining countries.

Samir Amin, Sekaiteki Kibo ni okeru Shihon-Chikuseki I,II,III, (L'Accumulation A L'Echelle Mondiale), trans. Kinichiro Harada (Tokyo: Tsuge Shobo, 1981)

24 We should pay attention to positive neutralism in India and Yugoslavia where Nehru and Tito insisted on the importance of not being involved in East-West issues. We should not understand Nasserism and positive neutralism, in which Nasser also played an important

role, only from a political viewpoint.

25 The change of the center of international politics from Europe to the United States and the Soviet Union was reflected in the Middle East. The last arrangement of England in Palestine was to charge the United Nations with the Palestine problems, after the Palestines had been caught in an impossible situation throughout the mandate period. The Special Committee's recommendation of partition in September 1947 caused the first war between the Arabs and Zionists in Palestine, and resulted in the independence of Israel. Ann Mosely Lesch, "The Palestine Arab Nationalist Movement Under the Mandate," in The Politics of Palestinian Nationalism (London: University of California Press, 1973), pp. 7-42.

26 Under the pretext of defending the Arabs from the menace of the Soviet Union, John Foster Dulles proposed to establish the Baghdad Pact Organization in the Middle East and intended to connect it with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and South East Asia Treaty Organization. Whether directly or indirectly, the Arabs have always been exposed to the menace of being divided or being prevented from achieving unity.

27 Gamāl 'Abd an-Nāser, Falsafah ath-Thaurah (Cairo: dāla al-qāhirah li at-taba'i'), pp. 44-46.

28 Nasser proposed to establish an "Islamic Congress" and Anwar Sadat, who later succeeded Nasser, became the first chairman. Thus Sadat, in a Friday sermon delivered at al-Azhar in 1959, declared:

We Muslim possess a glorious revolution proclaimed 14 centuries ago, in order to restore to humanity its human sentiment, and dignity, and to give man his proper due. He [Muhammad] proclaimed his revolution to destroy despotism and to realize the high principles of God, namely, security and honor. This most grandiose of revolutions included many dimentions: a scientific revolution, a social revolution with which all men become equal before God, distinguished only by piety, and a spiritual revolution in the direct relationship between God and man...In the face of a world in conflict our answer must be: to return to our Islamic revolution proclaimed by the Prophet in 622, to inspire us by its scientific, moral, and spiritual import. Edward Mortimer, Faith and Power, p. 274.

29 When Gabr Gad 'Abd al-Rahman pointed out that socialism required socialists, Nasser replied and characterized Arab Socialism as <Socialism without

socialists>.

Kosheri Mahfouz, Socialisme et Pouvoir en Egypte(Paris: Libraire Generale de Droit et de Jurisprudence, 1972), p. 174.

30 Kamel S. Abu Jaber, The Arab Ba'th Socialist Party(New York: Syracuse University Press, 1966), p. 61.

31 William B. Quandt, Palestine Nationalism, p. 178.

32 Anouar Abdel-Malek understands the relationship between Western society and Eastern society as dialectical mutuality. He points out that contemporary Eastern society is not executing the policies of the West, but is relaying itself to a new age. Anouar Abdel-Malek, Shakai no Benschōho(La Dialectique Sociale), trans. Toru Kumata(Tokyo: Iwanami, 1977) pp.3-49.

V. THE POSSIBILITY OF A THIRD UPSURGE OF ARAB LIBERATION NATIONALISM

The founders of the literary renaissance of the Arabs and the Islamic modernists intended to organize a socio-political movement against the modern West describing the Arabs based on the confidence in Arab-Islamic culture. However, they were frustrated since there was not enough time for the Arab intellectuals to understand the context of their punctuation of <the Arabs>. In other words, most of the Arab intellectuals and masses were compelled to fight against the modern West before they understood that the founders of the literary renaissance of the Arabs and the Islamic modernists advocated the importance of having confidence in Arab-Islamic culture.

After the first upsurge of Arab liberation nationalism was frustrated, Islam and 'Urūbah came to be understood separately. The wider the differentiation of technological and material advancement with the modern West became, the more the Arab intellectuals and the masses came to lack confidence in their own culture. Under such conditions, Nasserism combined with Arab Socialism contributed to the regaining of self-confidence of the Arabs in the political and economic field and relayed it to the contemporary age.

The new thinkers in the realm of Arab thought comprehend the current situation as a crisis of Arab Islamic culture caused by conservatism and secularism. They point out that the political vanguard of Islam has fallen into conservatism which adheres to guarding the interests of the right wing, while the political vanguard of Arabism has fallen into secularism which restrict itself to guarding the interests of the Westernized left wing. The new thinkers in the new trend warn that the ideology of al-qauumiyyah al-Arabiyyah has changed its nature as if it had no relation with the national heritage.

The founders of the new trend interpret the cause of such differentiation between the two vanguards and the change of nature of al-qauumiyyah al-Arabiyyah as a cultural invasion of Western imperialism. They call contemporary Western imperialists 'cultural imperialists' who use cultural instruments to occupy the Arabs. In the field of international politics some scholars also discuss the instruments of imperialism as follows:

To attain imperialistic objectives, states may resort to military force or to cultural and economic means. Military conquest is the oldest and most obvious form of imperialism. Economic imperialism is not as effective a technique as military conquest. If one imperialistic state cannot gain control over another by military means, it may attempt to do so by economic capabilities. Cultural imperialism represents an attempt to influence the human mind as an instrument for changing the power relation between

two nations.(1)

Based on the conviction that Arab Islamic culture is now exposed to the menace of Western cultural imperialism, the new thinkers accuse the educated people in the Middle East and maintain that they "dread the call for interaction between these two different realities [being Arab and being Muslim] and the consequences of a revolutionary upsurge of both Arabicity and Islam, and of the Arab liberation movement, on the basis of such interaction."(2) They judge that because intellectuals harbor ill-will toward a revolution or are influenced by Western imperialistic culture, they hesitate to launch a revolutionary Arab liberation movement.

We can understand that the founders of the new trend emphasize the importance of regaining confidence in Arab-Islamic culture and insist on the inseparability of true Islam and 'Urūbah as the Arab ethos. In other words, they have confidence in the monistic value system in Arab-Islamic culture.

In Western societies, contemporary development in biology and quantum mechanics is causing the traditional dualistic world view of the modern West to change. This new tendency is symbolized by <the Scientific Revolution>. We can find even in the Western world new thinkers who develop their thought based on the monistic

way of thinking. In this chapter, we will analyze the assertions of the new Arab thinkers within the framework of Arab liberation nationalism and attempt to set the new trend in historical perspective paying attention to the relationship between the two cultures and to the qualitative change of the two.

1. The New Trend in the Realm of Arab Thought.

(1) The Image of the Threat.

According to the assertion of the new Arab thinkers, cultural imperialists attempt to convince on the one hand the political vanguard of Islam that there are some problems in the ideology of al-qaumiyyah al-Arabiyyah, and on the other, the political vanguard of Arabism that there are some problems in Islam. Cultural imperialists force their values on the Arab nation taking advantage of the differentiation between the two vanguards of Islam and Arabism. At the beginning, the cultural imperialists did not regard the power of the political vanguard of Arabism, which was separated from Islam, as too strong to fight against them. Therefore, the cultural imperialists even proposed the establishment of universities in the Middle East which were to help modernization or westernization. At the same time, the cultural imperialists judged that they could make the political vanguard of Islam, which was separated from

the ideology of al-qaumiyyah al-Arabiyyah, oppose in the name of religion all kinds of reforming movements. Therefore, it even encouraged some authoritarian 'ulamā. To tell the truth, the new thinkers say, the cultural imperialists themselves were aware that the interaction between Islam and the ideology of al-qaumiyyah al-Arabiyyah could release the peerless power of the masses for the struggle against them, since they were aware that Islam was not a mere religion like Christianity in Western culture because of the basic world view of Tawhīd.

Therefore the cultural imperialists have devoted themselves to preventing not only Arabs but also people all over the world from establishing a real understanding of Islam. Thus, the following two dangerous visions which are seemingly separate and contradictory, but which actually fundamentally serve the same ends, are proposed:

The first vision casts Islam either as the cause of the backwardness of the Arabs, and perhaps even of international life in general, or as a religion just like any other religion, with a role in Arab life identical to the role of other religions in other cultures.....Imperialism has succeeded in its efforts to convince certain revolutionary intellectuals that a revolution in Arab life would have to begin with a revolution against the rites and prescriptions of Islam... so that, according to this imperialistic logic, the first step the revolutionary must take before engaging in revolutionary activity is to proclaim his atheism or at least his rejection of Islam.

The second dangerous vision is the one imperialism has sought to implant through the orientalist schools, some of which proclaim the sacred character of the institutions of the past, especially in the fossilized forms they took during the era of decadence. These institutions are depicted as shining examples of perfection, as the *nec plus ultra* of life and as the only path compatible with the capacities, conditions and mentality of the Arabs. The idea is then that if the Arabs are to succeed, they owe it to themselves to revive these institutions, in their old form, confirming to the letter everything about them that is fossilized, rather than rediscovering their spirit, their ideas and the principles on which they rested....(3)

The thinkers in the new trend maintain that the interference of cultural imperialism in the understanding of the basic world view of Tawhīd has succeeded in bringing forth secularists and reactionists, and neither has been able to convince the masses or to reach out to the man in the street. The contemporary threat is portrayed by the new thinkers as a situation in which the cultural imperialists prevent the ideology of al-qaumiyyah al-Arabiyyah from creating a strong unity (as military unity among the socialist states, or the unity of capitalistic institutions among the capitalistic states), by proposing dangerous understanding of Islam.

(2) The Intellectuals and the Masses.

The founders of the new trend point out the estrangement between the Arab intellectuals and the Arab masses. Owing to cultural imperialism, the political

vanguard of Islam has become reactionary and the political vanguard of Arabism has become secularistic. Therefore, most Arab intellectuals are eager to try to draw the masses apart from Islam. The intellectuals themselves have been influenced by cultural imperialism and have become reactionary or secularistic. Thus the progressive Arab intellectuals say, "The popular masses are not yet Arab, they are still Islamic. However, they themselves have still not become as Arab as the masses and their sense of being Arabs lacks the intensity with which the masses feel themselves to be Muslims." (4) On top of that, certain intellectuals and progressive Arab circles have kept Islam as an issue out of the revolution. The new thinkers insist that this attitude of the intellectuals is brought forth by cultural imperialism, which has "convinced the vanguards that the Islamicity of the popular masses is qualitatively different from the Arabism of the vanguards." At the same time, cultural imperialists have convinced the popular masses that "the Arabism of the vanguards is of a different nature from Islamicity of the masses." (5)

While the intellectuals have fallen into the trap of the cultural imperialists, the masses have examined the role and the meaning of Islam and al-qaumiyyah al-Arabiyyah in their minds. As Islam and 'Urūbah are

originally inseparable in the value system of Arab individuals, the masses have gradually regained their confidence in Islam in the Arab liberation movement. They tell the intellectuals that they belong to one world and that the intellectuals belong to another, that they are different from each other. The new thinkers claim that the masses have already begun to feel themselves part of a historical and geographical whole, with their own values, roots and inheritance, and that they are therefore ready to sacrifice themselves in the realm of existence for the great cause of the Arabs (to achieve Arab unity), and their Islamic faith.

(3) The Image of the Arabs.

The founders of the new trend regard the contemporary age as the new phase in the history of the Arab liberation movements. They call the contemporary age <the age of new al-qaumiyyah al-Arabiyyah based on Islam>. According to them, all of the Arabs will not be freed from the political and cultural crisis unless they fight against Israel and Western imperialism with confidence in both the powers of Islam and al-qaumiyyah al-Arabiyyah. These thinkers describe the Arabs as a class of individuals who have faith in Islam as the spirit of Tawhīd and feel great respect for 'Urūbah as

the Arab ethos.

When the Arab masses refer to their being Muslims in the context of a political situation or of a civilization, they usually mean to underline that they refuse to be vassals of the West and that they feel themselves part of an historical and geographical whole....In a word, these masses share the same principles as the vanguards of Arabism and the Arab liberation movement. The only difference is the clarity with which they perceive reality and their ability to express it; their commitment and attachment to the national and human reality is no less....

It may even be that through their Muslim faith the popular masses experience a level of harmony with Arab aims and a willingness to serve those aims greater than the most sincere of nationalist intellectuals, so true is it that the content of the popular masses' attachment to Islam is, at heart, identical to the center of the Arab liberation movement.(6)

Accusing Arab intellectuals of falling into the trap of Western imperialism, the thinkers of the new trend state that originally both Islam and 'Urūbah were inseparable in the value system of the masses. Analyzing the cause of the differentiation between the two vanguards, Islam and Arabism, they clearly describe the threat as Western cultural imperialism. According to the founders of the new trend, once the Arab intellectuals escape from the trap and the two vanguards are united with confidence in Arab Islamic culture, the third upsurge of Arab liberation nationalism will show revolutionary expansion, and will pave the way for regaining a strong civilization based on Arab Islamic culture.

2. The Possibility of a Third Upsurge of Arab Liberation Nationalism

The founders of the new trend in the realm of Arab thought are clearly aware of the situation of Arab intellectuals (as we regarded them in Chapter II as in the double bind situation). They criticize the Arab intellectuals and insist on the inseparability of Islam and 'Urūbah in the value system of Arab individuals. They advocate that the political vanguards of Islam and Arabism must be united in order to fight against Western cultural imperialism. We will discuss the position of the new trend in the history of the Arab liberation movement with reference to Gregory Bateson's thought concerning acculturation.(7)

Bateson found three patterns in the result of contact between two culturally different groups: the first is <the complete fusion of the originally different groups>; the second is <the elimination of one or both groups>; and the third is <the persistence of both groups in dynamic equilibrium>. When we consider Arab-Islamic culture in relation to Western culture, we can understand the contemporary situation within the category of the third pattern of acculturation. He analyzes the possibilities of differentiation between

two groups and classifies these into two kinds. One is <symmetrical differentiation> in which the relationship is chiefly symmetrical, that is:

To this category may be referred all those cases in which the individuals in two groups A and B have the same aspirations and the same behavior patterns, but are differentiated in the orientation of these patterns. Thus members of group A exhibit behavior patterns A.B.C in their dealings with each other, but adopt the patterns X.Y.Z in their dealings with members of group B. Similarly, group B adopt the patterns A.B.C among themselves, but exhibit X.Y.Z in dealing with group A. Thus a position is set up in which the behavior X.Y.Z is the standard reply to X.Y.Z.(8)

The other is <complementary differentiation> in which the behavior and aspirations of the members of the two groups are fundamentally different, that is:

Members of group A treat each other with pattern L.M.N, and exhibit the patterns O.P.Q in dealing with group B. In reply to O.P.Q, the members of group B exhibit the patterns U.V.W, but among themselves they adopt patterns R.S.T. Thus it comes about that O.P.Q is the reply to U.V.W and vice versa.(9)

The relationship between the modern West and the Arabs can be characterized as politically and economically dominant-submissive. From the point of view of power balance in international relations, it is clear that the modern West has been taking advantage by military, political and economic confinement policies. These policies were able to achieve their purpose with the backing of the technological and material advancement of the modern West. Culturally speaking, many Arab intellectuals and ruling elite have become to

lack confidence in Arab-Islamic culture and to understand Islam apart from the basic world view of Tawhīd and 'Urūbah apart from the Arab thos. In the process of promoting modernization policies, many intellectuals tend to be unable to distinguish modernization from Westernization. Thus, we can find friction between the monistic value system and the dualistic value system. In that sense we can understand the relationship between the modern West and the Arabs as complementary differentiation, and at the same time the relationship between the Arab intellectuals and the masses also as complementary differentiation.

Bateson pays attention to the characteristics of the behavioral patterns of two groups, the relationship between which is categorized as complementary differentiation, and points out that:

If the series O.P.Q [group A exhibit the patterns O.P.Q in dealing with group B] includes patterns culturally regarded as assertive, while U.V.W [group B exhibit the patterns U.V.W in dealing with group A] includes cultural submissiveness, it is likely that submissiveness will promote further assertiveness. This schismogenesis unless it is restrained, leads to a progressive unilateral distortion of the personalities of the members of both groups, which results in mutual hostility between them and must end in the break down of the system.(10)

According to Bateson's analysis of complementary differentiation, it is natural for us to comprehend that the relationship between the Arabs and the modern West has a possibility of resulting in mutual hostility

ending in break down, since the relationship between them is characterized as assertive-submissive. However, many Arab intellectuals fell into a double bind situation, and still seem to lack confidence in their own culture, while the Arab masses have gradually regained self-confidence since the age of Nasserism.

As for the ruling elite, they also fell into the double bind situation. The relationship between the governors and the masses is also categorized as complementary differentiation. While the ruling elite govern the Arab masses without paying attention to the monistic value of Arab-Islamic culture and without distinguishing modernization from Westernization, the masses feel that the ruling elite belong to another world. In that sense, the Arab intellectuals and ruling elite in the double bind situation prevent the complementary relations with the modern West from breaking down.

We can understand the contemporary new tendency in Arab thought and contemporary Islamic resurgence as the beginning of mutual hostility between the modern West and the Arabs as the result of the culturally assertive-submissive relationship. As the first step, the founders of the new trend insist on the inseparability of Islam and 'Urūbah and criticize the Arab intellectuals and ruling elite for lacking confidence in

the monistic value system of Arab-Islamic culture. They have two possibilities: one is to help the Arab intellectuals and ruling elite to escape from the double bind situation; the other is to accelerate the breaking down of the relationship between Arab governors in the double bind situation and the Arab masses.

As the second step, if the Arab intellectuals and ruling elite could escape from the double bind situation, or if Arab governors in the double bind situation were removed, the dynamic equilibrium of the assertive-submissive relationship with the modern West would lose balance and proceed toward the break down of the system.

It would require an enormous amount of energy to prevent the breaking down of the culturally assertive-submissive relationship, because the historical and cultural consciousness of the Arabs underlies the tendency. A third upsurge of Arab liberation nationalism will occur having a profound interest in the qualitative change (correctly speaking regaining the quality) of Arab-Islamic culture.

In the realm of Western thought, a qualitative change of the dualistic value system is currently being sought based on the monistic world view. If we may consider that Western culture itself is proceeding toward a monistic value system, we could understand that

not only the Arabs but also the people of the West are in the process of rejecting the modern West and attempting to establish new relations. However, if the governments of Western societies continue to promote policies based on the dualistic way of thinking, and intended to maintain the assertive-submissive relationship with the Arabs without paying attention to the new trend in the realm of Western thought, a third extensive movement of Arab liberation nationalism will develop from the new trend in the realm of Arab thought.

NOTES.5.

1 James E. Dougherty, Robert L. Pfaltzgraff Jr., Contending Theories of International Relations (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1981), p. 100.

2 Munah al-Sulf, "Islam and Arabism," in Contemporary Arab Political Thought, ed. Anouar Abdel-Malek (London: Zed Books Ltd, 1983), p. 152.

3 Munah as-Sulf, "At-Tamaiz wa at-Takamul baina al-Qaumiyyah al-Arabiyyah wa al-Islam" in Al-Qaumiyyah al-Arabiyyah wa al-Islam, Munah as-Sulf et al (Cairo: Mrrukazu Dirasah al-Wahdah al-Arabiyyah, 1981), pp.224-25.

4 Munah as-Sulf, "At-Tamaiz", p. 221.

5 Munah as-Sulf, "At-Tamaiz", p. 222.

6 Munah as-Sulf, "Islam", p. 151.

7 Gregory Bateson, Step to an Ecology of Mind (New York: Ballentine Books, 1972), pp. 61-72.

8 Gregory Bateson, Steps, p. 68.

9 Gregory Bateson, Steps, p. 68.

10 Gregory Bateson, Steps, p. 68.

VI. CONCLUSION

All kinds of political and economic thought are based on certain value systems. Introducing political and economic thought newly in a realm of existence is more or less accompanied by creating or changing the value system of the individuals concerned. On the other hand, the attitude of an individual toward life depends on his value system. Therefore, political and economic activities based on the newly introduced ideas cause the attitude of the individuals concerned toward life to change or develop. However, the value system of individuals cannot free itself from the influence of traditional culture which has been created over a long period of time. If the new political and economic ideas did not contradict the value system based on the traditional culture, it would be possible to release the creative powers of the individuals.

As for the Arabs, as we discussed above, Islam has played an important role in creating the Arab-Islamic culture. The main principle of Islam, Tawhīd, is based on the monistic way of thinking and requires the believers to devote themselves to probe all the relations: between God and nature, between God and human beings, between nature and human beings and among human

beings. The Islamic way of thinking is different from the dualistic way of thinking of Christianity. Arab-Islamic culture has influenced the value system of individuals in the Middle East.

However, during the period of the Ottoman sultanate, the Arabs gradually came to understand Islam as a mere religion which defines only the relationship between God and human beings. Thus the Arabs failed to create a strong civilization based on the spirit of Tawhīd. On the other hand, the Western societies divided sacred affairs from secular ones after the Reformation and created new political and economic thought based on that dualistic way of thinking.

Since the nineteenth century, new Western ideology has flowed into the Middle East with the threat of invasion of the Western colonial Powers. At first the Arabs were threatened by military colonialism and were actually occupied. After the independence of Arab nation-states, leaders of the Arabs fell into a double bind situation in the process of modernization. Originally, the founders of the literary renaissance of the Arabs and the Islamic modernists advocated that the Arabs should have confidence in its Arab-Islamic culture in which Islam as the spirit of Tawhīd had occupied an important position in creating the distinguishing characteristics of the Arabs and the Arabic language had

symbolized the distinguishing characteristics of Arab-Islamic culture. They insisted that the Arabs could reestablish a strong civilization by regaining self-confidence. In a sense they understood their problems in the relations with the West as the problems which occurred in the process of acculturation. Because they believed that Arab-Islamic culture had been created with a monistic way of thinking, they judged that such thinking in their culture could not harmonize with the Western dualistic way of thinking. Therefore, they described the image of the Arabs by drawing attention to the distinguishing characteristics of their culture.

However, two misunderstandings concerning the role of Islam and the Arabic language in their culture occurred and the differentiation of the two political vanguards of Islam and Arabism emerged. At the same time, because of the absence of arguments about the inseparability of Islam and 'Urūbah, both secularistic and reactionary intellectuals and ruling elite have not been able to escape from the double bind situation.

We should understand the new trend in the history of Arab liberation nationalism and contemporary Islamic resurgence as the harbingers of uprising of cultural consciousness of the Arabs. During these three decades, the Arabs have fully experienced the Western dualistic value system through the modernization process. Many of

the ruling elite in Arab nation-states are new liberal modernists who were educated at Western universities. They tend not to be able to distinguish modernization from Westernization. And in many cases, modernization programs have been helped by leading Western states. While the standard of living has improved, friction between the two value systems, the traditional monistic value system and the Western dualistic one, has become greater. Under such conditions, the Arab masses have begun to be aware of the differences between their monistic way of thinking and the Western dualistic way of thinking. At the same time they began to be conscious of the difference between modernization and Westernization.

Basically, a dominant-submissive relation between two groups whose members' behavior and aspirations are fundamentally different from each other comes to be regarded as culturally assertive-submissive by the members of both groups. Usually, this kind of complementary differentiation between two culturally different groups results in mutual hostility. Even after the independence of Arab nation-states, assertive-submissive relationship between the modern West and the Arabs has been maintained.

Contemporary Arab liberation nationalism, therefore, seems to occur in the form of the breaking down of this

type of culturally assertive-submissive relation. However, many of the ruling elite and intellectuals in the Arab nation-states still regard Western culture as the secret to creating great civilization. They punctuate the Arabs based on the characteristics both similar to and distinct from the West. Moreover, they regard characteristics similar to the West as superior to their own distinguishing ones. They described the Arabs by such punctuation without being aware of their two misunderstandings about the role of Islam and the Arabic language in their culture.

In that sense, the Arab ruling elite and intellectuals in this double bind situation prevent the Arab liberation nationalism from occurring in the form of the breaking down of the culturally assertive-submissive relation as the result of complementary differentiation in the acculturation process. On the other hand the Arab masses began to be aware of friction between the two value systems and have wanted to wipe out the culturally assertive-submissive relation with the West.

The assertion of the new trend in the history of Arab liberation nationalism accuses the Arab ruling elite and intellectuals in the double bind situation and describes again the Arab nation by drawing attention to only its distinguishing characteristics. It will be the interaction in the value system of the Arab masses that

make a third Arab liberation nationalism upsurge in the form of the breaking down of the culturally assertive-submissive relation in the acculturation process, that is, the interaction of the ideology of al-qaumiyyah al-Arabiyyah based on the confidence in 'Urūbah as the Arab ethos and Islam as the spirit of Tawhīd. Moreover, the founders of the new trend prepare a new context for the relationship between the post-modern Western world and the Arab world having confidence in Arab-Islamic monistic value.

BIBLIOGRAPHY.

- Abdel-Malek, Anouar. Ed. Contemporary Arab Political Thought. Trans. Michael Pallis, London: Zed Books, 1983.
- Ajami, Fouad. The Arab Predicament. London: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1981.
- Amin, Samir. The Arab Nation, Nationalism and Class Struggles. London: Zed Books, 1978.
- Antonius, George. The Arab Awakening, Beirut: Khayats.
- Arslan, Shakib. "Islam and Nationalism". in Nationalism in Asia and Africa. Ed. Kedourie, Elie, New York: The World Publishing, 1970.
- Asad, Muhammad. The Principle of State and Government in Islam. Gibraltar: Dar al-Andals, 1961.
- Avineri, S. Hegel's Theory of the Modern State. London: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1972.
- Bateson, Gregory. Steps to an Ecology of Mind. 1972; rpt. New York: Ballantine, 1983.
- . Seishin to Shizen. trans. Yoshiaki Sato. Tokyo: Shisakusha, 1979.
- al-Bazzaz, 'Abd al-Rahman. Islam and Arab Nationalism. trans. S.G.Haim, in Welt des Islams, iii (1954), pp. 201-18.
- Borthwick, Bruce Maynard. Comparative Politics of the Middle East. An Introduction. New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1980.
- Cudsi, Alexander S. and Ali E. Hillal Dessouki. Islam and Power. London: Croom Helm, 1981.
- Dessouki, Ali E. Hillal. Islamic Resurgence in the Arab World. New York: Praeger, 1982.
- Dougherty, James E. and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff Jr. Contending Theories of International Relations. New York: Harper & Row, 1981.

- Edie, James M. Kotoba to Imi, Gengo no Genshou Gaku.
trans. Shizuo Takiura. Tokyo: Iwanami, 1980.
- Enayat, Hamid. Modern Islamic Political Thought.
London: Macmillan, 1982.
- al-Faruqi, Isma'il Ragi A. On Arabism, 'Urubah and Religion. Amsterdam: Djambatan, 1962.
- Gibb, H.A.R. "Al-Mawardi's Theory of the Khilafah"
Islamic Culture, XI, No.3 (1937), p. 291.
- Goldziher, Ignaz. Introduction to Islamic Theology and Law Trans. Andras and Ruth Hamori, Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1981.
- Haddad, Yvonne Yazbeck. Contemporary Islam and the Challenge of History. New York: State Univ. of New York Press, 1982.
- Haim, Sylvia. Arab Nationalism: An Anthology. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1962.
- Holt, P. M. The Mahdist State in the Sudan 1881-1898. Kenya, 1977; rpt. Nairobi: Oxford Univ. Press, 1979.
- Hopwood, Derek. Egypt: Politics and Society 1945-1981. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1982.
- Hourani, Albert. Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age 1798-1939. 1962; rpt. London, Cambridge Univ. Press, 1962.
- Hourani, George F. "Ghazari on the Theory and Practice of Politics," Muslim World. 1958, p. 308.
- al-Husri, Khaldun S. Origins of Modern Arab Political Thought New York: Caravan Books, 1980.
- al-Husri, Sati. "Muslim Unity and Arab Unity," in Arab Nationalism. Ed. Sylvia G. Haim. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1964.
- Jaber, Kamel S. Abu. The Arab Ba'th Socialist Party: History, Ideology, and Organization. New York: Syracuse Univ. Press, 1966.
- Jansen, G. H. Militant Islam. London: Pan World Affairs, 1981.
- Keddie, Nikki R. Roots of Revolution, An Interpretive History of Modern Iran. New Haven: Yale Univ.

- Press, 1981.
- . An Islamic Response to Imperialism. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1967.
- Lenczowski, George. Oil and State in the Middle East. New York: Cornell Univ. Press, 1960.
- Mason, H. E. "On the Multiplicity of Language Games," in Wittgenstein and His Impact on Contemporary Thought: Proceeding of the Second International Wittgenstein Symposium. Vienna: H. P. T., 1978.
- Moon, Parker T. Imperialism and World Politics. New York: Macmillan, 1926.
- Mortimer, Edward. Faith and Power, The Politics of Islam. London: Faber and Faber, 1982.
- Nakaoka, Saneki, et al. Arab no Nationalism. Tokyo: Kobundo, 1961.
- an-Nāsser, Gamāl 'Abd. Falsafah ath-Thaurah. Cairo: Dala al-Qahirah li-l-Tabā'i'.
- Piscatori, James P. Islam in the Political Process. London: Cambdidge Univ. Press, 1983.
- Plamenatz, John. Man and Society. London: Longman, 1963.
- Priestley, Herbert I. France Overseas; A Study of Modern Imperialism. New York: Appleton, 1938.
- Quandt, B. William., et al. The Politics of Palestinian Nationalism. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1973.
- Recanati, Francois. Kotoba no Unmei. Trans. Tateki Sugano. Tokyo: Shinyosha, 1972.
- Rodinson, Maxim. Islam and Capitalism. Trans. Brian Peace, London: Allen Lane, 1974.
- Russel, Bertrand. Power. London: Unwin, 1975.
- . Outline of Philosophy. London: Unwin, 1979.
- . An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth. London: Unwin, 1980
- Smith, Charles D. Islam and Search for Social Order in

Modern Egypt: A Biography of Muhammad Husayn.
Albany: State Univ. of New York Press, 1983.

Suger, Peter F. and Ivo J. Lederer E.D. Nationalism in Eastern Europe. Washington: Univ. of Washington Press, 1969.

as-Sulf, Munah. "At-Tamaiz wa at-Takāmul baina al-Qaumiyyah al-Arabiyyah wa al-Islām". In Munah as-Salf et al, Al-Qaumiyyah al-Arabiyyah wa al-Islām. Cairo: Markazu Dirasah al-Wahdah al-Arabiyyah, 1981.

-----". "Islam and Arabism". In Contemporary Arab Political Thought. Ed. Anouar Abdel-Malek, London: Zed Books, 1983.

Takashima, Zenya. Minzoku to Kaikyū: Gendai Nationalism Hihan no Tenkai. 1970; rpt. Tokyo: Gendai Hyoron, 1976.

Taylor, Charles. Hegel to Kindai Shakai. Trans. Yoshio Watanabe, Tokyo: Iwanami, 1979.

Waterbury, John. Egypt Politics and Society 1945-1981. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1982.

Wendell, Charles. The Evolution of the Egyptian National Image Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972.