

# TOWARD A MODERN ISLAMIC KINGDOM

---

A SOCIO-POLITICAL ANALYSIS  
OF CONTEMPORARY SAUDI ARABIA

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Yukihiro Takabayashi  
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# Preface

The present volume is No. 8 in Working Papers series of the Institute of Middle Eastern Studies(IMES) of International University of Japan(IUJ). In this volume, an analysis of social trends in Saudi Arabia is attempted from the viewpoint of sociology, mainly spotlighting the growth of the so-called "new middle class" in Saudi Arabian society. Indisputably, Saudi Arabia is one of the most important countries in the Middle East whose political, social and economic changes have a great influence upon all the Middle Eastern Countries. Therefore, careful watching of this country is always required.

Mr. Y. Takabayashi, the author of this volume, is a research fellow of IMES. He is an energetic researcher of Middle Eastern Affairs with an excellent linguistic talent in Arabic. I believe, he has made a great contribution to the studies on Saudi Arabia affairs in this work.

Akiro Matsumoto  
General Editor

# Introduction

## Introduction

Adeed I. Dawisha rings an alarm bell regarding the promotion of rapid modernization in Saudi Arabia:

Saudi wealth has been the primary catalyst of the country's economic and social modernization. -- a process that could itself be disruptive, because it is bound to lead to clashes with traditional values upon which the fabric of the society and the political system rests.(1)

When the regime of the Shah of Iran, which had proceeded with nation building in the form of pure westernization excluding traditional powers from the regime, was overthrown by the Islamic Revolution led by Ayatollah Khomeini in 1979, a number of western scholars began to entertain apprehensions about the future of Saudi Arabia.

However, contrary to those expectations, the Saudi

monarchy has not yet been overthrown. Does this mean that the nation building of Saudi Arabia is different from that of Iran? This dissertation makes a positive analysis of the way in which Saudi political economic modernization has been promoted and of the direction in which present Saudi Arabia is moving by examining the unification work of Ibn Sa'ūd, the achievements of King Faisal who continued his work and the problems of present-day Saudi Arabia.

The author believes that there are two crucial keys to solve the theme. One is that Prince Faisal, who was the son of Ibn Sa'ūd and was ordered to rule Hijaz as a Viceroy of Hijaz, succeeded in expanding the rational ruling system of Hijaz to the whole kingdom when he was king. He promoted the political economic modernization of Saudi Arabia, making success its basis.

The other is that the Islamic consciousness and ideal of modernization of the New Middle Class as a product and promoter of modernization should be analyzed. Is the New Middle Class contrary to traditional values? Does the New Middle Class regard westernization as the ideal way of modernization by receiving secular education? Is the New Middle Class trying to cause a repetition of what happened in Iran?

If not, is the New Middle Class starting to realize that proceeding with modernization by making the most use of traditional values is the best way for the prosperity of Saudi Arabia?

As for the structure of this dissertation, it is composed of four chapters. The first two chapters discuss the process of the building of the Saudi nation so far. The second two chapters discuss the impact of this nation building and its future direction. It should be noted that the first half discusses not only historical facts but also their present implications.

In chapter I, it is shown that Ibn Sa'ūd started the work of unification of the Arabian peninsula from the beginning of the present century. Among his achievements, the conquest of Hijaz was very significant in the sense that it became the basis of the establishment of the present Saudi ruling system. In other words, the conquest introduced to Ibn Sa'ūd, who knew only the tribal way of ruling, the existence of the rational administration which had been applied in Hijaz. Hijaz contained the two holy cities, Mecca and Medina, and an international commercial city, Jiddah. He realized the necessity of rational administration to rule there. It was also important that Prince Faisal, who was named the Viceroy of Hijaz, extended its administration to the whole kingdom and

established the present Saudi ruling system. In this sense, the conquest of Hijaz in 1925 should not be treated as a mere historical event.

Chapter II examines the kind of nation building King Faisal pursued after establishing the basis of the present administration. I analyze his achievements by dividing them into five aspects. What should be noticed here is that his achievements still work as a system in present Saudi Arabia, even after his death in 1975. In this sense, I believe that the achievements of Faisal, which can be called the 'Faisali System,' fixed the direction of present Saudi nation building. At the same time, the first two chapters research the historical conditions which caused the emergence of the New Middle Class discussed in the following two chapters.

In chapter III, I discuss the transformation of the politico-social structure under the Faisali System and its consequences. I regard the most crucial transformation under the Faisali System as that of the political system from the self-willed absolute rule by the king of Āl al-Sa'ūd (the House of Sa'ūd) to the rational monarchy including non-Sa'ūd people. I discuss how the traditional tribal society has been influenced as a result of this change.

In chapter IV, I discuss the Islamic consciousness, the ideal of economic modernization and the political attitude of the New Middle Class, which has been formed in the process of the politico-social transformation. The power source of the New Middle Class, differently from other people, is personal qualifications obtained by receiving higher education. The New Middle Class relates itself to others through performance and service rather than material wealth or personal connections. At the beginning of this chapter, I introduce the idea that the goal of Saudi education is changing. The New Middle Class realizes the necessity for a third educational system composed of the traditional (first) and modern western (second) educational systems, with Islām as the basis. Then I consider the attitude of the New Middle Class toward the political economic modernization of Saudi Arabia. This is very significant because the New Middle Class is not only the product but also the promoter of modernization.

Though each theme of the first two chapters and the second two chapters is clearly different, they agree with each other in the sense that they analyze the process of the building of the Saudi nation from the past to the future.

## Notes

1 Adeed I. Dawisha, "Saudi Arabia's Search for Security," Adelph Paper, No. 158, The Institute for Strategic Studies, (London and Reading: The Eastern Press, 1979), p. 7.

## Chapter I.

# The Basic Foundation of Saudi Arabia : The Conquest of Hijaz and its Present Implication

Saudi Arabia is now the biggest oil producing country in the Middle East. As a result of its financial power it was made an executive of the IMF (International Monetary Fund) in 1979, the first Arab country to be honored. In the political sphere, Saudi Arabia played a very important role as a mediator in intra-Arab conflicts in the 1970s. The more oil Saudi Arabia has produced, the more political power it has obtained, especially since the middle of the 1960s when oil almost completely replaced the use of coal in the industrial countries. The fact that Saudi Arabia initiated the oil embargo during the Fourth Middle East War in 1973 was a typical example which showed Saudi Arabia's political and economic influence not only in the Middle East but also in the world.



As mentioned above, Saudi Arabia is a very crucial actor in the political and economic scene in the present world. However, Saudi Arabia has received attention as the object of study only in very recent times since the oil crisis in 1973. Before oil was found in Saudi Arabia in the 1930s, none of the imperial powers showed any interest in putting Saudi Arabia under colonialism because it was thought to be too far from them and to have nothing but desert.

Most of the studies on Saudi Arabia since the oil crisis have devoted many pages to very recent matters such as its oil diplomacy, modernization policy, and the consequences of modernization. Even when accounts are given of the unification of Saudi Arabia by King 'Abd al-'Azīz (Ibn Sa'ūd), the founder of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, they are usually merely historical accounts. In most of them, it is not clear how the present Saudi administration was formed, or how the present ruling system was influenced by the old one.

In this chapter, I will discuss the process of the Saudi ruling system by analyzing the conquest of Hijaz which was very important in the sense that the conquest led to the establishment of indirect rule in the form of the Council of Deputies and the Consultative Council in Saudi Arabia. The indirect rule was developed into

the form of the Council of Ministers in 1953. Prince Faisal, who is the key actor in this dissertation, gave the Council of Ministers legislative and executive power to a certain degree in 1958 when he became the Prime Minister. Given those powers, the Council of Ministers assumed the present form.


## A. Unification of Saudi Arabia by Ibn Sa'ūd

### 1. Prior to the Conquest of Hijaz

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was declared independent in 1932 by 'Abd al-'Azīz Ibn 'Abd al-Rahman Āl Faisal Āl Sa'ūd who became well known to the world by the plain name, Ibn Sa'ūd. The literal interpretation of Saudi Arabia is the Arabia of the House of Sa'ūd (Āl al-Sa'ūd) whose principal territory was only the central Arabian province of Najd. How did that local chieftain enlarge his territory and unify many other tribes?

The movement to unify the Arabian Peninsula was started in the middle of the eighteenth century by Muhammad b. Sa'ūd, the ruler of Dar'iyya.(1) He sympathized with the Wahhābī movement started by Muhammad b. 'Abd al-Wahhāb. In those days, the Arabian Peninsula was covered with conflicts among several tribes. The situation was similar to that in the time

# MAP OF SAUDI ARABIA



Source: Richard F. Nyrop et al., Area Handbook for Saudi Arabia, (Washington, D.C.: American Univ., 1977), p. xiv.

of Jāhiliyah (state of ignorance) before Prophet Muhammad founded Islām. Muhammad b. 'Abd al-Wahhāb grieved over the distress of the peninsula and

advocated Tawhīd, the unity of God.(2) Muhammad b. Sa'ūd calculated that an alliance with the Wahhābī movement would enable him to unite the bedouin and to enlarge his territory. He married the daughter of Muhammad b. 'Abd al-Wahhāb and established the first Saudi state.

However, that state did not last long because the Ottoman Empire, which ruled most of the Middle East in those days, regarded the Wahhābī movement as an idea against it. The Sultan of the Ottoman Empire told Muhammad 'Alī, the Ottoman Pasha in Egypt, to destroy Dar'iyya. Though the second state was built by survivors, they had been forced to flee from their home in Riyadh under the threat of capture by their rivals, the Rashīd clan, rulers of the Shammār tribe, early in 1891. Emir Muhammad of Kuwait, who was the retainer of the Sultan of the Ottoman Empire, received the refugees from Riyadh because the Sultan did not want a specific tribe like the Rashīd's Shammār to become too strong. He tried to rule the Arabian Peninsula by keeping the balance of power among tribes.

Ibn Sa'ūd, the son of the sheikh of Āl al-Sa'ūd, had been waiting for the chance to recover Riyadh. When he succeeded in killing the Rashīd ruler, 'Abd al-'Azīz Ibn Rashīd in 1906, he was twenty-six years old. He

declared himself Imām (religious leader) of the Wahhābīs and Emir of Najd. From that time on, Ibn Sa'ūd started his work of unifying the Arabian Peninsula. He made use of his position as Imām to make the bedouin tribes owe allegiance to him and form the Ikhwan army.(3) His army contributed to the conquering of all the tribes of both the northern and the southern part of the Peninsula and making them follow the Wahhābī movement. When he conquered Hasa in 1912, there was only Hijaz left.(4)

## 2. Significance of Conquering Hijaz

Hijaz included the two holy cities, Mecca and Medina, and one big commercial city, Jiddah, and had been ruled by King Husain of the House of Hāshim, who had been appointed sheriff of Mecca by the Sultan of the Ottoman Empire, but who suddenly declared himself the King of Hijaz by cutting his allegiance to the Sultan in 1916. He also declared himself the Khalīfah (Successor of Prophet Muhammad). The declaration amazed Ibn Sa'ūd and made him angry because he still regarded Husain as the retainer of the Sultan and a person who desecrated the sanctity of holy places. Ibn Sa'ūd thought that he had to recover the holiness of those places by defeating Husain.

Conquering Hijaz was very significant for Ibn Sa'ūd in other ways. First, ruling those holy places, Mecca and Medina, would give him prestige which would legitimate his position as ruler. Though he was Imām of the Wahhābīs, one of the schools of Islām, Mecca and Medina were for all Muslims. Ruling those holy places offered him credit from all the people of the peninsula.

Second, it would be possible to get a huge amount of income from Hajj (pilgrimage) to holy places. In fact, that income had been filling almost half of the national treasury till the oil was found in Saudi Arabia.

Third, Hijaz had been prosperous as an international commercial city since the era of Before Christ as it was located on the Spice Road from the south of the peninsula to the north. In Jiddah, there were many big merchants who had an international sense and who also contributed to the national treasury.

For these reasons, Ibn Sa'ūd conquered Hijaz in 1925.

### 3. Problems of Governing Hijaz

However, it seemed to be very difficult for Ibn Sa'ūd to govern Hijaz because Hijaz was quite different

from other districts in three aspects.

First, the two holy places were not only for Wahhābīs but also for Muslims all over the world. Muslims in foreign countries were anxious about who should be responsible for the administration of Mecca and Medina. Actually they criticized the administration of Ibn Sa'ūd. In response to these criticisms, Ibn Sa'ūd held the Islamic Conference in 1926:

He declared himself the head of the holy places. He showed his intention to own those holy places as the proxy of all Muslims and to make those places the center for the life and culture of all Muslims. He legitimated his position as the head of those places by the reason his country is free in contrast with other countries who were under the control of imperialism.(5)

Second, there were two interest groups, merchants and non-Wahhābī 'ulamā', whom Ibn Sa'ūd had never governed before. They were internationalized because they had the chance to associate with people in the outer world when they traded and with Muslims from foreign countries when they made Hajj. They were proud of being much better educated than the Wahhābīs. They were very afraid of being ruled by the traditional patriarchal pattern of government which they thought to be very uncivilized. Michael Field describes the contrast between the Najdī and the Hijazī in his book

as follows:

The foreign cultural influence made the Hijazis a relatively tolerant, easy going people. Despite their proximity to Mecca and Medina, they were not especially strict in their religious observances.

The Hijazis were totally different from the people of the Arabian interior. The central Arabians, most of whom lived on the upland plateau around Riyadh, known as the Najd, were a mixture of bedouin and townsmen. . . .

Both the townsmen and bedouin of Najd were desperately poor. . . . The Najidis had adopted the fundamentalist interpretation of Islam, commonly known as Wahhabism, and were only too willing to believe that the austerity of their lives made them more virtuous than the peoples of the richer regions that surrounded them. . . . The contrast between the austere culture of the Najd and the relative sophistication of Hijaz is still significant in Saudi Arabia today.(6)

Third, under the rule of King Husain, Hijaz had a system of self-government by the Hijaz National Party which was the committee of nobles. When Ibn Sa'ūd was about to conquer Hijaz, this Committee requested Husain's abdication and nominated 'Alī, son of Husain, King of Hijaz. They wanted to negotiate with Ibn Sa'ūd to achieve reconciliation. They sought "an accommodation with the Wahhābīs which preserved the autonomy of Hijaz."(7)



## B. Instruments for Ruling Hijaz

### 1. Constitution of the Kingdom of Hijaz

As mentioned before, governing Hijaz was very important but very difficult work for Ibn Sa'ūd. If he wanted to conquer Hijaz by force, it was possible. However, he realized that he should integrate those new interest groups into his administration as they were.

Ibn Sa'ūd promulgated the Constitution of the Kingdom of Hijaz as one of the instruments for ruling Hijaz. That was the only period when Saudi Arabia had a written constitution. Instead of a written constitution, present Saudi Arabia has the Qur'ān and its derivative, Sharī'ah (Islamic law) which is based not only on the Qur'ān but also on Sunnah (the traditional practices and sayings of Prophet Muhammad), on 'Ijmā' (the interpretations of the Qur'ān and of the traditions of the Prophet made by the unanimous consensus of opinion of qualified scholars), and on Qiyās (their deductions by analogy).

Part II of the Constitution delineated the administration of the kingdom, sentences, Agent-general and responsibilities of the administration:

#### Art. 5.

The entire administration of the Kingdom of Hijaz shall be in the hands of His Majesty

King 'Abd al-'Azīz I, Ibn 'Abd al-Rahman Āl Faisal Āl Sa'ūd. His Majesty is bound by the Shari'ah laws.

Art. 6.

Sentences in the Kingdom of Hijaz shall be given according to the Qur'ān and the Sunnah of the Prophet.(8)

Though the Constitution was promulgated, it can be said from these articles that the character of the Constitution was like a basic national law. The Qur'ān, like today, was the real constitution. Then, why did Ibn Sa'ūd dare to promulgate the Constitution of the Kingdom of Hijaz? The important parts of the Constitution in this sense were Part IV (Assemblies: The Legislative Assembly, The Council of Medina, The Council of Jiddah, District Councils, Tribal and Village Councils) and Part VIII (General Municipal Councils). Ibn Sa'ūd wanted to show that he would give people in Hijaz some autonomy. For example, Art.28 delineated the 'Legislative Assembly' in Mecca. That assembly consisted of the Agent-General, Ibn Sa'ūd's advisors and six notables. According to Michael Field, ". . . it was accepted by Ibn Sa'ūd that all the civil servants of the Hashimite government should be kept in their posts. . . ." (9) Art.32 described the existence of the qaimaqam under the "Administrative Council" of Jiddah and Medina. Ibn Sa'ūd modeled the Constitution

after the Ottoman form of government. Art.68 announced the right of The General Municipal Councils in Mecca, Medina and Jiddah:

The General Municipal Councils have full right to examine everything in connection with the municipalities and to pass resolutions to ensure their good administration and order.(10)

This type of administration was not seen in the rule of Ibn Sa'ūd before he conquered Hijaz. He ruled other places on a personal basis without ministerial intermediaries because the traditional partriarchal pattern of government served most effectively.

The Najd is directly under the supervision of the King. . . .

In Al Hasa, the Amir, whose family has long been in the confidence of the rulers of the Najd, speaks for the King, in certain matters, but is subject to supervision in Finance and Defence. . . .(11)

## 2. The Consultative Council (Majlis al-Shūrā)

Another instrument was the Consultative Council which was established in 1925. Ibn Sa'ūd emphasized the importance of the Consultative Council by quoting a popular saying:

'The people of Mecca know best about Mecca's mountain passes,'. . . All complaints should be addressed to this consultative committee which will be the connection between me and the people.(12)

The Council consisted of the 'ulamā', the dignitaries and the merchants. Though the Council did play some minor role in the coming decades at least in Hijaz, the expansion of the Council to include the whole country has been promised by some Kings since then but has not yet been carried out.

### 3. The Council of Deputies (Majlis al-Wukalā')

In December of 1931, a Royal Decree established the Council of Deputies as an additional body of the Consultative Council in Hijaz. The Council consisted of a President, the Viceroy of Hijaz (then Prince Faisal), the Deputy for Foreign Affairs, the Deputy for Finance, and the Vice President of the Consultative Council. The Council of Deputies was a strong government body. According to Charles W. Harrington:

The Council issued all instructions to government departments whether the instructions originated in the Council or were decrees promulgated by the King. This authority was spelled out as being delegated directly by the King. . . . When the Council reached a decision, it issued its resolutions directly to the governmental agency concerned

rather than sending them to the King to be sanctioned. . . . It had been acting as an executive group in the Hijaz government. . . . Any legislation or important act of government required its approval, particularly when the King was absent from the Hijaz.(13)

In this sense, the Hijaz government had its autonomy though Hijaz was part of the Kingdom of the Hijaz, Najd and its dependencies which was declared in 1927. And that was what people in Hijaz wanted and Ibn Sa'ūd had in his mind:

He [Ibn Sa'ūd] wanted the careworn Abdullah [Governor of Jiddah] to remain at his post to reassure the citizens of Jiddah and to lend continuity to the life of the city under the new government. . . . Ibn Sa'ūd agreed to the proposal . . . that the Hijaz should not be incorporated into the Sultanate of Najd, but should be part of a new state, the Kingdom of Najd and Hijaz.(14)

The executive groups of the Council of Deputies managed Hijaz with some assistance from the Consultative Council; Ibn Sa'ūd ruled the rest of the Kingdom. This type of administration, dual administration, continued till the early 1940s, even after the foundation of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 1932.

### C. Faisal as the Viceroy of Hijaz

Ibn Sa'ūd appointed his second son, Faisal, later to be King, as the Viceroy of Hijaz.(15) Though Faisal was only twenty years old at that time, he had learned how to govern the state from his father since his childhood. It was said that he was a modernist or a progressivist in the royal family. In 1925, he had a chance to go to Europe, and intensified his intention.

In addition to the post of Viceroy, he was appointed President of the Council of Deputies, President of the Consultative Council, Minister of the Interior, and Minister of Foreign Affairs. According to Charles W. Harrington, his jurisdiction was very great:

. . . in his capacity as Minister of [the] Interior he had jurisdiction over the Departments of Public Health, Education, Posts and Telegraph, Maritime Health and Quarantine, and Public Security, as well as the Shariah Courts and Municipalities. Moreover, in his capacity as President of the Council of Deputies he was the authority referred to by these agencies: the Royal Cabinet, Foreign Affairs, Finance, Interior, Consultative Council, Military Affairs, Presidency of the Judicial Courts and the Governor of the Amirates.(16)

Concerning his policy to govern Hijaz, Michael Field says:

Faisal was always mindful of the need to foster national unity. While he administered the Hijaz he did what he could to prevent his subjects becoming resentful of Najdi rule. He made it part of his policy to seek out the friendship of the Alirezas and other leading Jiddah merchants. Those families had a wealth of contacts and a web of influence in the Hijaz; they were rich and therefore powerful, and Faisal thought that their money and the influence that went with it would be a barrier against the return of the Hashimites or pro-Hashimite sympathies. It was also necessary for the prince and his father to draw on the merchants for 'loans'. Those were seldom repaid, but they earned the lenders the favour of the Sa'uds.(17)

It can be said that Faisal realized the limits of direct rule and the necessity of governmental machinery. Having the experience of governing Hijaz by the Council of Deputies and the Consultative Council which were the inheritance of Husain, the former King of Hijaz, Faisal thought that he should develop the administration of Hijaz to include the whole kingdom. Actually, as Hijaz was increasingly integrated, there was less need for a separate government of Hijaz within the government of the whole kingdom.

#### **D. Development of Saudi Administration**

##### **1. Vertical Development (From the Council of Deputies to the Council of Ministers)**

Though the Council of Deputies was the first

governmental machinery in Saudi Arabia, it was only for Hijaz. Ibn Sa'ūd enlarged that Council by establishing the Council of Ministers (Majlis al-Wuzarā') in 1953. He issued a Royal Decree in December 1953; however he died in the same year. King Sa'ūd, who succeeded to his post and was the elder brother of Prince Faisal, continued his work in organizing the Council of Ministers. King Sa'ūd approved the Constitution of the Council of Ministers which was discussed in the first meeting of the Council of Ministers.

The Constitution of the Council of Ministers provided an adequate framework within which the body could carry out its functions. Jurisdiction of the Council was very wide and comprehensive which enabled the Council to achieve a great deal in the administration of the Kingdom.(18) However, what should be noticed is that the Council of Ministers did not have independent authority. "The Council derived its powers from the King. He has delegated to the Council authority to examine, decide and recommend on almost any phase of Saudi government administration."(19) Art.8 of the Constitution stated that, "The decisions of the Council of Ministers do not become effective until after they have been sanctioned by the King."(20)

On the other hand, the Council of Deputies, though



its jurisdiction was limited to Hijaz, had more independent authority than the Council of Ministers as mentioned before. Its decisions were not subject to a Royal sanction. Fouad Al-Farsy says about the reason why the Council of Deputies could have such wide authority:

This can be attributed to the events and circumstances that surrounded the creation of the Council of Deputies. First its authority was geographically limited; secondly, it existed at a time when need was great for a direct and prompt decision making process. Also, the fact that King 'Abd al-'Aziz used to spend most of his time governing the Central and Eastern provinces while his son, Prince Faisal, was his viceroy in Hijaz, justified the extra measure of authority granted to the Council of Deputies. (21)

The person who gave the authority to the Council of Ministers was Prince Faisal.

## 2. Horizontal Development (From the Council of Ministers in 1953 to that in 1958)

King Sa'ūd, who became the President of the Council of Ministers following the death of his father in 1953, issued a Royal Decree appointing his brother, Faisal, President. According to Harrington, "[t]he new President of the Council of Ministers took with him his former staff, the Cabinet of the Viceroyalty of the

Hijaz,"(22) and "[t]his group, by a royal decree in September 1954, became the Cabinet or administrative staff (diwan) of the President of the Council of Ministers."(23)

The year 1958 of Saudi Arabia was a critical date in the political history. Faisal, who was appointed Prime Minister, gave the Council of Ministers some direct executive and legislative powers.(24) Art.18 of the New Statute of the Council of Ministers delineated its functions:

The Council of Ministers shall draw up the policy of the state, internal and external, financial and economic, educational and defense, and in all public affairs; and shall supervise its execution; and shall have legislative authority. . . . And the decisions of the Council of Ministers shall be final, except such of them as require the issue of a royal command or decree, in accordance with the rules of this Statute.(25)

The Council of Ministers acquired authority over the whole state in the same way as the Council of Deputies had over Hijaz. Prince Faisal, who took part in both the vertical and the horizontal development of the Council, started promoting the modernization of Saudi Arabia with the help of the Council of Ministers especially after he became King in 1964. He initiated the Five Year Development Plan in 1970. Since then

Ministers have been appointed among higher educated people so that the Council of Ministers will work well to promote the plan. In this sense, the Council of Ministers has been developing horizontally since 1958.

#### **E. The New Interpretation of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia**

The present Saudi administration, as mentioned before, is based on Hijazi government. Prince Faisal played a very important role in establishing the Council of Ministers which covered the whole kingdom as a result of his experience of governing Hijaz as the Viceroy of Hijaz and the President of the Council of Deputies. Considering this fact, the interpretation of the kingdom of Saudi Arabia should be revised. Saudi Arabia is usually regarded as a simple tribal society with Wahhābism at the center of the nation's ideology, uniting the nation toward the king.

However, the rulers are mostly from Najd, the central peninsula, the administration is from Hijaz, the western peninsula, and the source of revenue is from Hasa, the eastern peninsula coming mostly from oil wells. Concerning Islām, any schools are acceptable in Hijaz, Wahhābism is dominant in Najd and Shī'ah are the majority in Hasa. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia consists

of three different components. I will interpret Saudi Arabia as follows: "The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is the kingdom which is operated by Āl al-Sa'ūd from Najd using Hijaz governmental machinery and oil income from Hasa."

When we study Saudi Arabia, it is crucial to realize this interpretation. Furthermore, the royal family who governs the state should be aware of these three different components. The stability of Saudi Arabia depends on how well they can keep the balance of interests of each district of the peninsula.

## Notes

1 Dar'iyya was the capital of the central peninsula, Najd, which was located next to Riyadh, the present capital of Saudi Arabia.

2 Toshio Kuroda, Director of the Institute of Middle Eastern Studies at the International University of Japan, explains the dynamic and positive meaning of the Tawhīd in his book, Isurāmu Jiten, (Tokyo: Tokyodo-shuppan, 1983), pp. 2-3, 15, 38. Every creature owes its existence to other causes. Each cause needs the next causes to exist. Who makes the last cause is God. God is the absolute cause of being. God needs no outer causes to exist because God is the absolute existence itself. In this sense, God is called the creator of the world. Every creature is directly connected with God, under whom every creature is equal.

3 The word "Ikhwan" means literally brothers. Ibn Sa'ūd made bedouin settle in the hujar (agricultural settlements) and play a military role in the expansion of the Saudi state.

4 Hasa was once a famous pearl breeding center; now this district has become very famous and important because most Saudi oil is produced in Hasa.

5 Jacques Benoist-Miechein, Ibn Seoud, ou la Naissance d'un Royaume, trans. Tsuruyo Kono and Yoshiro Mutaguchi, (Paris, Albin Michel, 1955), p.187, p.192.

6 Michael Field, The Merchants: The Big Business Families of Arabia, (London: John Murray, 1984), pp. 20-21.

7 Randall Baker, King Husain and the Kingdom of Hejaz, (N.Y.: The Oleander Press, 1979), p. 211.

8 Helen Miller Davis, Constitutions, Electoral Laws, Treaties of States in Near and Middle East, (Durham, N.C.: Duke Univ. Press, 1953), p. 374.

9 Field, p. 28.

10 Davis, p. 382.

11 Davis, p. 373.

12 Baker, p. 213.

13 Charles W. Harrington, "The Saudi Arabian Council of Ministers," The Middle East Journal, Vol. 12, No. 1, Winter 1958, pp. 2-3.

14 Field, p. 29.

15 Actually Faisal was the third son of Ibn Sa'ūd. However the eldest brother, Turki, died in 1919.

16 Harrington, p. 2.

17 Field, p. 30.

18 Jurisdiction of the Council was delineated in Art.7 of Part III of the Constitution. See Harrington, p. 10, and Fouad Al-Farsy, Saudi Arabia: A Case Study in Development, (London and Boston: Kegan Paul International, 1982), p. 10.

19 Harrington, p. 12.

20 Harrington, p. 9.

21 Al-Farsy, p. 94.

22 Harrington, p. 12.

23 Harrington, p. 12.

24 The domestic and foreign circumstances which made Sa'ūd appoint Faisal Prime Minister in 1958 are summarized in Tim Niblock, "Social Structure and the Development of the Saudi Political System," in State, Society and Economy in Saudi Arabia, ed. Tim Niblock, The Centre for Arab Gulf Studies, Univ. of Exeter, (London: Croom Helm, 1982), p. 99.

25 H. St. John B. Philby, "Saudi Arabia: The New Statute of the Council of Ministers," The Middle East Journal, Vol. 12, No. 3, Summer 1958, p. 321.

## Chapter II.

### Political Transformation under the Leadership of King Faisal (Faisali System)

As shown in chapter I, Faisal succeeded in arranging the Saudi ruling system. In this chapter, I will discuss the political and economic modernization which was led by him using that system until his death in 1975. The achievements of Faisal can be summarized as follows: a) the consolidation and the systematization of the ruling system; b) the integration of religious groups into the administration; c) planned economy by technocrats; d) institutionalization of the royal succession keeping the balance of royal powers; e) foreign policy as strategy in the regional and domestic setting. These features did not exist in Saudi Arabia before Faisal and still influence the present Saudi political scene. In this sense, the achievements

of Faisal support the present Saudi monarchy as a system.

#### A. The Consolidation and the Systematization of the Ruling System

The kings of Saudi Arabia are apt to be described as absolute monarchs:

The monarch combines religious and tribal leadership with his role as head of state: he is imām and guardian of Mecca and Medina; Shaykh al-masha 'ikh (leader of the tribal shaykhs); and king.

Moreover, ultimate responsibility for all legislative, executive, and judicial functions resides with the king. Since the Qur'an is seen as the constitution of the kingdom, and since the Shari'ah (Islamic law) is the legal code, there is theoretically virtually no restriction on the king's power.(1)

However, apart from Ibn Sa'ūd who unified Saudi Arabia, have any kings ever managed the administration alone? John A. Shaw describes the role of the king of Saudi Arabia as follows:

Saudi decision making in general is based on two traditional concepts: shūrā or consultation, and 'ijmā' or consensus. The role of the king, in this context, is to guide the consultations to a favorable consensus on which to base decisions. Thus the king is neither an absolute monarch nor a figurehead.(2)



King Faisal really understood the role of the king and tried to systematize the ruling system while maintaining the merits of the tribal ruling system. His reform of the ruling system did not involve the importation of the western system but the institutionalization of the traditional decision making process of consultation leading to consensus. Moreover, he had to modernize the ruling system in order to cope with the rapid social changes which accompanied the Five Year Development Plan which he had instigated. But again the modernization was not equal to westernization but was one in which the flexibility of Islām, the most vital tradition for them, was widely incorporated.(3) His intention concerning the direction of development of Saudi Arabia was described in the Ten-point program which was issued in 1962 when he was Prime Minister.(4) According to Tim Niblock:

. . . the key to understanding the direction of development in Saudi Arabia -- and to explaining the paradox of a traditional regime undertaking a vast programme of economic modernization -- is not to be found in competition between the forces of modernism and traditionalism, but rather in the attempt, by leading elements (whether 'traditionalist' or 'modernist') to ensure the continued viability of the regime. The concern of the next stage of Saudi history, therefore, may be as follows: how to ensure the continued viability of the regime in the changing conditions created by the development programmes of the 1960s and

1970s.(5)

Next, the discussion proceeds to concrete examples of the reform of the ruling system. This topic is well described by Abdulrahman M. Al-Sadham.(6) Among these reforms, one should notice in particular the establishment of the Institute of Public Administration in 1960, the inauguration of the Administration Reform Program in 1963 and the formation of the High Committee for Administrative Reform in 1964. These reforms were carried out with the help of foreign people such as experts from the World Bank, a UN management specialist and a three-man team assigned by the Ford Foundation. King Faisal himself was the chairman of the High Committee for Administrative Reform and this committee was commissioned by the Council of Ministers to undertake legislative functions relative to administrative matters, i.e. the reorganization of government agencies; the review of existing structural and procedural arrangements and recommendations for proper measures to be enacted.

Moreover, a large number of important regulations were gradually issued by King Faisal.(7) These were very useful in the sense that they contributed to the enhancement of the financial and economic progress of Saudi Arabia.

TABLE 1

## THE YEAR OF ESTABLISHMENT OF EACH MINISTRY

---

30	Foreign Affairs * +
32	Finance and National Economy
44	Defence and Aviation * +
51	Interior * +
53	Education *
53	Commerce
53	Agriculture and Water *
53	Communication *
54	Petroleum and Mineral Resources
54	Health
62	Labor and Social Affairs
62	Pilgrimage and Religious Endowment
62	Information
63	National Guard +
70	Justice
75	Higher Education
75	Industry and Electricity
75	Municipal and Rural Affairs
75	Planning
75	Posts, Telegrams and Telephones
75	Public Works and Housing +

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\* Portfolios occupied by the royal family in 1953.

+ Portfolios occupied by the royal family in 1983.

## Various Sources

As for the Council of Ministers, to which some direct executive and legislative powers were given by Faisal in 1958, he increased the number of ministers in response to the various demands of the changing society. However, as table 1 shows, in the 1960s when the Faisali system was about to start, "portfolios relating to security or enjoying large budgets have

remained firmly in Āl al-Sa'ūd hands." (8) It was in the 1970s, the time when the Five Year Development Plan was actually put into effect, that some of those crucial ministerial posts were opened to non-royal families.

#### **B. The Integration of Religious Groups into the Administration**

The nation of Saudi Arabia is completely composed of Muslims except for the immigrant workers, so every part of their lives is under the regulation of Shari'ah (Islamic law). However, concerning Islām there is a great variation of schools among the regions of the state. For example, Hijaz (the western peninsula) has the two holy cities, Mecca and Medina, which are open for pilgrimage to Muslims from all over the world; in Najd (the central peninsula) Wahhābism, which belongs to the Hanbali school, the most strict interpretation of Islām, is dominant; Shi'ah is the majority in Hasa (the eastern peninsula). Thus, it has been very important, though difficult, for successive Saudi kings to rule the whole peninsula keeping the balance of power among the schools.

Fatwā (legal opinion) is also very important for the king. Fatwā is rendered by the 'ulamā' (Muslim religious scholars) called muftī by adapting the Shari'ah to present-day requirements. Most Fatwā deal

with ritual duties, theological questions, the position of women, and matters of personal status. For the king, the most important aspect of Fatwā is that on political questions.(9) The 'ulamā' have been playing a very important role by issuing Fatwā to legitimate the king's deeds. Consequently, "[t]he royal house . . . does its utmost to institutionalize them, to integrate them into the ruling elite. . . ."(10)

However, a special religious family called Āl al-Shaykh, which is descended from Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhāb, the founder of Wahhābism, exists in Saudi Arabia. They have "the religious-moral authority legitimizing the government. This successful partnership . . . was the main source of the strength of the religious leaders who belong mostly to the al-Shaykh family."(11) Though Āl al-Shaykh has been very helpful for the king in the sense that it has legitimated his policy, it has been very difficult to integrate them into his ruling system because their influence has been very strong.

Since the 1940s the relationship between Āl al-Sa'ūd and Āl al-Shaykh has changed:

. . . almost no intermarriages between young Saudi princes of the reigning branch and girls of Āl al-Shaykh origin have taken place since the 1940s. Thus the descendents of Āl al-Shaykh have been losing ground on two levels: their representation in top religious

positions has been declining and their personal access to the house of Sa'ūd has been reduced.(12)

Though Āl al-Shaykh still occupied the crucial posts of top Saudi 'ulamā', such as the Grand Muftī, his deputy, and the Head of the Committee for Public Morality, it was clear that their influential power had been weakened.(13) Finally, Āl al-Shaykh received a fatal blow in 1970, on the death of the Grand Mufti. Faisal, who had pledged to establish a ministry of justice in his Ten-point program, appointed a Jiddah judge the first Minister of Justice instead of naming a new Grand Mufti from Āl al-Shaykh.(14) The fact that the Grand Mufti, who had highly influenced the courts and the educational system, was not appointed from Āl al-Shaykh meant "the responsibility for definitive interpretation of the Sharī'ah (Muslim law), which had been the prerogative of the Grand Mufti, was then being transferred outside the religious system" or it was dispersed to the whole religious circle.(15) As the next institutional change within the 'ulamā':

. . . King Faisal announced the creation of the "Council of Senior 'Ulamā'".(16) . . . It comprised seventeen members, only one of whom was a descendent of Muhammad b. 'Abd al-Wahhāb. . . .(17)

Moreover, Faisal thoroughly reorganized the judicial system in 1974 in order to make it completely independent and nonpolitical.(18) Thus, Āl al-Shaykh which had supported the strong framework of Wahhābism became one of the power-balanced religious groups, and the judicial system was integrated into the Council of Ministers. However, Āl al-Sa'ūd did not forget to give them some portfolios to keep up their appearances.(19)

The integration of the whole 'ulamā' as well as Āl al-Shaykh had been attempted in the field of hajj (pilgrimage), waqf (religious endowment), da'wa (religious propaganda) and education where 'ulamā' had been playing a very crucial controlling role. Since the Ministry of Pilgrimage had been established in 1962, the government had "tried to weaken the link between the 'ulamā' and endowed property by increasing the involvement of government departments in waqf management."(20) Concerning da'wa, conferences had been held by the 'ulamā' to discuss how they should disseminate the Wahhābī doctrine in the state. Moreover, "the decision taken in these forums [had been] implemented by the Waqf Department of the Ministry of Pilgrimage."(21) As for education, it had been supervised by the Ministry of Education since 1953. Modern universities established in the 1960s,

specializing in the humanities and social and natural sciences, were outside the control of the 'ulamā' from the beginning.

### C. Planned Economy by Technocrats

The economic situation in the 1950s, when Faisal was still the Crown Prince, was terrible:

The revenues derived from oil exports were initially modest; in the 1950s Saudi Arabia was still a recipient of American economic aid, and until the 1960s the budget was seldom balanced. The revenues that accrued were administered in a haphazard fashion. ... A council of ministers was not convened until 1954; no distinction was made between the public treasury and the privy purse of the king; and the ineffectiveness and conspicuous consumption of the royal family . . . resulted in serious domestic and external weakness.(22)

It is said that the rapid decrease of oil income as a result of the Suez War in 1956 and the financial crisis from 1956 to 1957 caused by the waste of King Sa'ūd made Faisal keenly realize the necessity of a planned economy. Though Saudi Arabia had severe problems, these hastened the time when Faisal obtained supreme political power and led to "the beginning of a long and intensive process of reform."(23) Drawing up the first governmental budget in 1958 as a beginning, Faisal



invited a mission from the International Monetary Fund to enforce the plan to stabilize the national economy. Finally, he tided over the financial crisis by applying a super-balanced budget and a dual exchange rate.(24)

Then Faisal started establishing the system in order to aim at a planned economy. "As early as 1961 the Supreme Planning Board had been set up," though it did nothing.(25) In 1962, the General Petroleum and Mineral Organization (which has come to be known as Petromin) was established. Petromin contributed not only to the development of oil but to that of various industrial and commercial activities.(26) In 1965, the Central Department of Statistics began publishing a comprehensive statistical yearbook.

The Supreme Planning Board, with the help of the Ford Foundation which was invited to improve it, was replaced by the Central Planning Organization (CPO) in 1964. It "was responsible for the plan in cooperation with the Stanford Research Institute of USA, which was hired for the purpose in 1968."(27) One of the important roles of the CPO was to make the Five Year Development Plan from 1970. Thus, several planning functions were centralized in the CPO.(28)

"Before the Development Plans there had been no attempt to create any coherent programme for economic development" because there had been some oil revenues

to pay for imports.(29) But the Saudi people had to be serious about their future without oil since they faced a financial crisis. After succeeding in modernizing the administration in the 1960s, Faisal proceeded to the next target, which was carrying out the Five Year Development Plan.

"The major emphasis of the plan was on agricultural and industrial development and on communications. . . ."(30) Though all projects were not finished according to schedule, the Plan did make some significant progress at the level of infrastructure. Thus Faisal "started the establishment of the planning process, collecting reliable statistics and created the possibility of measuring the degree of progress, defined in terms of modernization."(31)

Concerning the process of planning, there is one fact which should be noticed. More than half the members of the CPO staff belonged to the stratum which we could call technocrats:

Members of the Organization's [CPO] staff, as of May 1975, numbered 194 persons. Work in the CPO was divided into two categories, administrative and technical. Out of the total number of CPO employees, ninety-three held administrative jobs; their educational level was beneath that of Bachelor's degree. Another 101 occupied technical or specialized positions in the CPO. All of these were university graduates and a moderate

percentage had a Master's degree in various fields.(32)

Thus we can define one of the aspects of the Faisali System as 'Planned Economy by Technocrats.'

#### **D. Institutionalization of the Royal Succession Keeping the Balance of Royal Power**

Though Āl al-Sa'ūd had succeeded in building a very strong kingdom since Ibn Sa'ūd unified the Arabian peninsula, "[t]he Saudi monarchy [had] not developed any fixed constitutional succession pattern. No heir can be fully secure in his succession, and no certain predictions can be made as to the identity of future kings."(33) After the death of Ibn Sa'ūd, the throne was abdicated by his sons. The line of 'Abd al-'Azīz has been firmly entrenched since then. Alexander Bligh focuses on the matter of Saudi royal succession in his book entitled From Prince to King. He says that "a few ground rules have been established in the twentieth century," in the succession where previously there had been no rules:(34)

1. The rule of primogeniture (inheritance by the first-born son) does not apply in Saudi Arabia.

2. . . . succession proceeds within a generation. (Successions were between

brothers.)

3. The available field of candidates for the succession has been progressively narrowed since the late nineteenth century.

4. The succession can skip over a senior brother if he is uninterested in or obviously unsuited for rule, or if he lacks a power base within the family.

5. The division of the sons of 'Abd al-'Azīz into factions and coalitions is usually temporary.

6. The process has become institutionalized by the creation of the official positions of heir designate and second deputy prime minister.(35)

Among the above rules, the sixth, institutionalization of the royal succession, established by King Faisal, should be noticed.

Deciding the order of succession was not always easy, and "various challenges emerged along the way, particularly as the memory of 'Abd al-'Azīz faded and the cohesive group of the Sudairi Seven emerged." (36) Actually it was very hard for Ibn Sa'ūd to select his successor among his thirty-four sons even when he tried to choose him from the line of 'Abd al-'Azīz.(37) Moreover, his brothers were also eligible for selection. Although it is often argued that maternal origin is regarded as a very important criterion, "[i]t would be a mistake to overemphasize the categorization of sons according to maternal origin, or to postulate

any advantage based on maternal family ties." (38) What is important is the personal relationship to the king including the prince's character and achievement, not the blood line of his mother.

Ibn Sa'ūd named his eldest son, Sa'ūd, as his heir. (39) Although "Saudi tradition did not require a ruler to name his successor," it was clear that Ibn Sa'ūd anticipated problems of royal succession and he took measures for the prosperity of Āl al-Sa'ūd. (40) However, in place of Sa'ūd who landed Saudi Arabia in the crisis of bankruptcy, Faisal was selected as king by the agreement of the princes in 1964. The succession was very natural because Faisal had been playing an important role as the Viceroy of Hijaz since his young days and he had shown remarkable results as the Prime Minister of the Council of Ministers during the era of King Sa'ūd.

Faisal's first act as king was to select an heir. On 29 March 1965, Faisal issued a decree naming Khālīd as heir designate. (41) Later, on 17 Oct. 1967, Faisal appointed Interior Minister Fahd b. 'Abd al-'Azīz as the second deputy prime minister and second in line to the throne after Khālīd. "It was the first time a second in line had been officially designated. . . . Fahd's designation was an attempt to consolidate the

major factions within the family."(42) Fahd was the eldest member of the Sudairi Seven, whereas Khālid belonged to the non-Sudairi group.

Moreover, Faisal established the Higher Committee of Princes "to create an institutional framework in which family disputes could be peacefully resolved."(43) Members of the committee were chosen from various blood lines in order not to create any complaints on succession matters. Furthermore, Faisal divided the top military positions, Minister of Defence and the commander of the National Guard, between the Sudairi Seven and non-Sudairi to keep the balance of power.(44)

When King Khālid died in 1982, "[a]ll factions of the family closed ranks, and the prearranged order of succession was implemented without a hitch."(45) Fahd became king and named 'Abd Allāh (non-Sudairi) as heir designate and Sultan (Sudairi) as the next in line after 'Abd Allāh. Thus the balance of royal power was kept as Faisal had intended.

#### **E. Foreign Policy as Strategy in the Regional and Domestic Setting**

In the era under the leadership of Faisal, Saudi Arabia paid attention to international affairs and interconnected domestic and foreign policy more than

had been the case when the domestic politics was the main concern of the country's political scene. King Faisal regarded the stability of Āl al-Sa'ūd as the basis of domestic policy. At the same time, he had to keep the characteristics of Saudi Arabia, Islām and Arab, in his mind when he decided foreign policy in order to maintain the support of the Saudi people. Moreover, success in foreign policy resulted in domestic stability. His many experiences of going abroad, including the Soviet Union, since his youth when he was foreign minister of the Kingdom of Hijaz enabled him to grasp the international situation properly and to cope with it flexibly.(46)

Faisal's biggest achievement in the field of foreign policy was the advocacy of Pan-Islamism. Abdullah M. Sindi analyses the cause of that advocacy as follows:

King Faisal's frustration over his inability to solve the conflict in Yemen, together with the rising tide of Soviet influence and radicalism in the Arab world, led him to adopt a counter-strategy in the form of an appeal for Pan-Islamic solidarity.(47)

Why did King Faisal advocate Pan-Islamism or why did he feel obliged to do so? In order to get a clear answer to this question, it is necessary to analyze

the structure of the regional politics of the Middle East in the 1960s and how this structure came into being. In the Middle East after World War II, the Arab nationalist movement developed, which advocated the unity of Arab states disrupted by imperialism in order to revive the Arab nation. Nasserism emerged in Egypt and Ba'athism in Syria played a very important role in consolidating Arab unity. In the Suez War of 1956, Egypt achieved a political victory against imperialism and succeeded in driving out both Great Britain and France. The Arab nationalist movement reached its peak in 1958 when the United Arab Republic (UAR) was established. However, Nasser's Egypt turned into a radical direction when the UAR failed with the withdrawal of Syria in 1961. He "encouraged the masses in other Arab countries to rise against their leaders. . . . [and] required the prior overthrow of Arab monarchies and conservative regimes." (48) He aimed at socialism ideologically and was moving closer to the Soviet Union politically against the United States which continuously supported Israel. On the other hand, the Ba'ath Party came into power in both Syria and Iraq. However, they soon turned against each other. In this way, the Middle Eastern countries became caught in the radical revolutionary wave at the beginning of the



1960s.

Among Arab countries Saudi Arabia was in a delicate position: on the one hand, Saudi Arabia would not affirm Nasserism which threatened the Saudi monarchy; on the other hand, Saudi Arabia found it difficult to continue its traditional friendship with the United States which drove Saudi Arabia into the painful position as a member of the Arab countries. Faisal had no alternative to Pan-Islamism on which Saudi legitimacy is based in the Arab and Muslim world. He called for solidarity among Muslims to awaken their Muslim consciousness. At the same time, he tried to prevent the Arab nationalist movement from turning to a more radical course. In short, Faisal succeeded in being recognized as legitimate by the other Arab countries as well as by the Saudi people by advocating Muslim solidarity, "emphasi[zing] the religious and traditional elements in Arabism," in contrast with Nasser's solidarity by the unity of Arab states.(49)

"In May 1962, the government of Saudi Arabia sponsored an international Islamic conference in Mecca," and "the conference ended with the formation of an international Islamic organization called Rabetat al-Ālam al-Islāmi, or World Muslim League (WML), with permanent headquarters in Mecca."(50) However, the purely religious organization could not show its

political impact effectively.

Simultaneously, the Yemen War occurred. Faisal who supported the monarchy of Yemen had to fight with Nasser's Egypt which intervened in the war. The war, which suddenly ended with Egypt's defeat in the third Arab-Israeli War in 1967, caused the decline of Nasserism and resulted in the relative improvement of the Saudi position of Pan-Islamism. Faisal's call "culminated in the Islamic Summit Conferences in Rabat in 1969 and Lahore in 1974, as well as the annual Islamic Foreign Ministers Conferences. . . ."(51) In those conferences, it was decided that they would fight against Israel to liberate Arab territories occupied by Israel in the 1967 war, and to restore the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people. Thus, Faisal advocated anti-Zionism and stopped the radicalization of Arab nationalism.

However, Saudi's traditional friendship with the United States, which other Arab countries could not accept, did not change fundamentally. It was very hard for a country which advocated Pan-Islamism to maintain friendly relationships with the United States which supported Israel. Saudi Arabia became the target of blame by Arab countries. Furthermore, it was plain that the Saudi people would also have complaints

against the Saudi government for being unable to take a stronger position toward the United States.

The oil embargo of 1973, initiated by Faisal following the October War, was very crucial in the sense that Saudi Arabia which had taken a pro-American policy chose an independent policy for the first time. By initiating the embargo, King Faisal succeeded in gaining recognition for Saudi's legitimacy as a Muslim and Arab state in the regional and domestic setting. At the same time, he was able to maintain the relationship with the United States which realized the importance of Saudi Arabia in the Middle East.

Faisal's foreign policy, which coped with difficult circumstances while obtaining both domestic and regional recognition of the legitimacy of the monarchy, became a guide for his successors.

## Notes

1 R. D. McLaurin, Don Peretz and Lewis W. Snider, Middle East Foreign Policy: Issue and Process, (N.Y.: Praeger, 1982), p. 199.

2 John A. Shaw, Saudi Arabian Modernization: The Impact of Change on Stability, The Center for Strategic and International Studies. (Georgetown Univ. N.Y.: Praeger, 1982), p. 60.

3 James P. Piscatori describes the reason why rapid modernization could be advanced in Saudi Arabia where the Wahhābi Islām, which belongs to the Hanbali school and applies the severest interpretation of Islām, was dominant.

"One reason why they have been capable of changing is the flexibility of the Hanbali school of law. The conventional Western wisdom on this subject is exactly the opposite--that the Hanbalis are the most unbending of jurisprudents and that, accordingly, they have impeded legal development in the one country where they are dominant. However, this view misinterprets Hanbali conservatism: there must be faithful adherence to the Qur'ān and the hadīths (the traditions of the Prophet), but when these have nothing to say on a subject, there are no rigid guidelines. In practice this attitude has translated into the assumption that an innovation is permissible unless there is a clear textual prohibition of it."

See, James P. Piscatori, "Ideological Politics in Sa'udi Arabia," in Islam in the Political Process, ed., James P. Piscatori, (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1983), p. 62.

4 The whole context of the Ten-point program is recorded in H. St. John B. Philby, "Ministerial Statement of 6 November 1962 by Prime Minister Amir Faisal of Saudi Arabia," The Middle East Journal, Documents, Vol. 17, Nos. 1 & 2, Winter-Spring 1963), pp. 161-162.

5 Niblock, p. 101.

6 See Abdulrahman Al-Sadhan, "The Modernisation of

the Saudi Bureaucracy," in King Faisal and the Modernisation of Saudi Arabia, ed., Willard A. Beling, (London: Croom Helm, 1980), pp. 81-87.

7 Regulations created and implemented by Faisal were as follows:

- The Regulation on Commerce (1954)
- The Regulation for Nationality (1954)
- The Bribery Law (1962)
- The Mining Code (1963)
- The Regulations for Investment of Foreign Capital (1964)
- The Regulations for Companies (1965)
- The Labor and Workmen Law (1969)
- The Social Insurance Regulations (1969)
- The Foreign Law (1969)
- The Civil Service Regulations (1971)

See Farouk A. Sankari, "Islam and Politics in Saudi Arabia," in Islamic Resurgence in the Arab World, ed., Ali E. Hillal Dessouki, (N.Y.: Praeger, 1982), p. 185.

8 James Buchan, "Secular and Religious Opposition in Saudi Arabia," in State, Society and Economy in Saudi Arabia, ed., Tim Niblock, The Centre for Arab Gulf Studies, Univ. of Exeter, (London: Croom Helm, 1982), p. 110.

9 Among fatwās on political questions the most famous one dealt with the royal succession from Sa'ūd to Faisal. See Aharon Laysh, "'Ulamā' and Politics in Saudi Arabia" in Islam and Politics in the Modern Middle East, ed., Metin Heper and Raphael Israeli, (Beckenham: Croom Helm; Sydney: Croom Helm Australia Pty, 1984), pp. 48-49.

10 Laysh, p. 56.

11 Majid Khadduri, Arab Personalities in Politics, (Washington, D.C.: The Middle Eastern Institute, 1981), p. 37.

12 Khadduri, p. 39.

13 Among the twelve 'ulamā' who signed the Fatwā of the royal succession from Sa'ūd to Faysal, there were only four al-shaykh members. See "Document: Transfer of Powers from HM King Sa'ud to HRH Amir Faysal," The Middle East Journal, Vol. 18, No. 3, Summer 1964, pp. 351-354.

14 Article 3 of the Ten-point program is as

follows:

"A law will be promulgated to safeguard the immunity of the Judiciary. It will be directed by a Supreme Judiciary Council. A Ministry of Justice will be created, and attached to it will be the office of the State's Public Prosecutor."

See, "Ministerial Statement of 6 November 1962," p. 161.

15 Khadduri, p. 43.

16 'Abd al-Rahman ibn 'Abd al-Latif Al al-Shaykh, Mashahir 'ulama' Najd wa-ghayruhum, (Riyadh: Dar al-Yamamah, 1934: 1974/75), p. 179. (Quoted in Khadduri, p. 39)

17 Khadduri, p. 39.

18 Until the mid-1970s the shar'ī judicial system consisted of three grades: an expeditious court, a greater shari'ah court and the Commission on Judicial Supervision. In 1974, three grades of courts were established along the Western pattern: summary courts, general courts and a court of causation. See Laysh, p. 33.

19 In 1983, three members of Āl al-Shaykh still occupied a position of portfolio: Dr. 'Abd al-Rahman Ibn 'Abd al-'Azīz Āl al-Shaykh (Minister of Agriculture and Water), Ibrahim Ibn Muhammad Ibn Ibrahim Āl al-Shaykh (Minister of Justice), Hassan Ibn 'Abd Allāh Ibn Hassan Āl al-Shaykh (Minister of Higher Education). (Who's Who in Saudi Arabia 1983-1984)

20 Laysh, p. 38.

21 Laysh, p. 40.

22 Mark Heller and Nadav Safran, The New Middle Class and Regime Stability in Saudi Arabia, Harvard Middle East Papers, Center for Middle East Studies, (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1985), p. 8.

23 Al-Sadhan, p. 79.

24 Details of the measures are explained in Hideji Tamura, ed., Isuramu no Meishu Sauji Arabia, (Tokyo, Osaka and Kitakyushu: Yomiuri Shinbun-sha, 1976), p. 313.

25 Helen Lackner, A House Built on Sand: A Political Economy of Saudi Arabia, (London: Ithaca Press, 1978), p. 140.

26 The mechanism of Petromin and its policies are described in Ragaei El Mallakh, Saudi Arabia: Rush to Development: Profile of an Energy Economy and Investment, (London: Croom Helm, 1982), pp. 70-71.

27 Lackner, p. 140.

28 Details of the functions of CPO are given in Tamura, p. 314.

29 Lackner, p. 137.

30 Dawisha, "Saudi Arabia's Search for Security," p. 10.

31 Lackner, p. 146.

32 Al-Farsy, P. 73.

33 Alexander Bligh, From Prince to King: Royal Succession in the House of Saud in the Twentieth Century, (N.Y. and London: New York Univ. Press, 1984), p. 102.

34 Bligh, p. 102.

35 Bligh, p. 102.

36 Bligh, p. 55. Among princes, the strongest ties tend to occur among those who have the same mother, thus forming a number of competing power centers within the royal family. The most prominent of these coalitions is the Sudairi Seven, named after the members' mother, Hussa al-Sudairi, and including Crown Prince and First Deputy Prime Minister Fahd, Minister of Defense Sultan, Minister of Interior Nayif, Deputy Minister of Defense Turki, Governor of Riyadh Salman, Deputy Minister of the Interior Ahmad and Counselor of Royal Family Affairs 'Abd al-Rahman. See Adeed I. Dawisha, "Internal Values and External Threats: The Making of Saudi Foreign Policy," Orbis, Spring 1979, p. 131.

37 Bligh divides princes into five groups according to relative royal prospects:

1. Senior princes with secure claims to the

throne.

2. Senior princes who either voluntarily relinquished their claims or were disqualified.

3. Princes who were born about the same time as the first grandsons of 'Abd al-'Azīz.

4. Junior princes who were indisputably born later than several prominent members of the next generation.

5. Junior princes who were for various reasons disqualified from the succession even apart from consideration of age and generation.

See Bligh, p. 54.

38 Bligh, p. 41.

39 As the reasons why Ibn Sa'ūd named Sa'ūd, Bligh lists the following:

Sa'ūd was a descendent of the Mandil family of the powerful eastern region tribe of Banu Khālid through his mother (p. 21).

Besides being the eldest, he had . . . been born on the day Riyadh was recaptured (p. 22). There is no doubt that the king, especially in his declining years, was influenced by the physical resemblance between himself and his eldest son (p. 42).

40 Bligh, p. 22.

41 Concerning the reason why Faisal selected Khālid, see Bligh, p. 85.

42 Bligh, p. 87.

43 Bligh, p. 88.

44 Fahd's full brother Sultan became Minister of Defense. On the other hand, Faisal put 'Abd Allāh in charge of the National Guard.

45 Bligh, p. 96.

46 He was the first Saudi official ever to travel to the Soviet Union. He was dispatched by Ibn Sa'ūd in May 1932. See, Bligh, p. 43.

47 Abdullah M. Sindi, "King Faisal and Pan-Islamism," in King Faisal and the Modernization of



Saudi Arabia, ed., Willard A. Beling, (London: Croom Helm, 1980), p. 188.

48 Sindi, p. 185.

49 Sindi, p. 189.

50 Sindi, p. 186.

51 David E. Long, "King Faisal's World View," in King Faisal and the Modernisation of Saudi Arabia, ed., Willard A. Beling, (London: Croom Helm, 1980), p. 181.

## Chapter III.

### New Dimensions of the Politico-Social Structure and their Implications

As shown in chapter II, Faisal promoted political and economic modernization. During his ruling era (1964-75), how was Saudi Arabia's economic development?

TABLE 2

**OIL REVENUE OF SAUDI ARABIA  
IN FAISAL ERA (1964-75)**  
(millions of dollars)

Year	Amount	Year	Amount
64	523.2	70	1,214.0
65	662.6	71	1,884.9
66	789.7	72	2,744.6
67	909.1	73	4,340.0
68	926.8	74	22,573.5
69	949.0	75	25,676.2

Source: Arthur N. Young, Saudi Arabia: The Making of a Financial Giant, (N. Y.: New York Univ. Press, 1983), p. 125.

The oil income of Saudi Arabia, which is the main source of National Treasury revenues, increased rapidly by about fifty times. (See, Table 2) With the help of this revenue, Faisal promoted nation building, laying emphasis on the development of infrastructure. During the five years of the First Development Plan (1970-75), the purpose of which was building the basis of the non-oil sector for the balanced development of Saudi Arabia, government expenditure swelled by about 6.6 times. (See, Table 3)

**TABLE 3**  
**GOVERNMENT REVENUES AND EXPENDITURES**  
**IN THE FIRST PLAN**  
(SR billions)

Year	1970/1	71/2	72/3	73/4	74/5	Total
Revenue	7.9	11.1	15.4	44.8	101.4	180.6
Expenditure	6.4	8.3	10.1	19.5	42.2	86.5
Recurrent	4.1	4.9	5.9	9.2	27.2	51.3
Projects	2.3	3.4	4.2	10.3	15.0	35.2

Source: El Mallakh, p. 157.

The problem of promoting such a rapid development plan was that of manpower. Skilled and semi-skilled workers were lacking in Saudi Arabia. As the natural increase of the labor force and the inflow of labor from rural

areas were hopeless, the Saudi government had to depend on huge numbers of immigrant workers. (See, Table 4) The Saudi government tried to develop human resources by promoting education and training so that the various elements of society would be able to contribute more effectively to production and participate fully in the process of development.

**TABLE 4**  
**EMPLOYMENT OF MIGRANTS IN SAUDI ARABIA**  
**1962/3 to 1975**

Year	Migrant Employment
1962/3	60,000
1966/7	240,400
1975	723,400

Source: J. S. Birks and C. A. Sinclair, "The Domestic Political Economy of Development in Saudi Arabia," in State, Society and Economy in Saudi Arabia, ed., Tim Niblock, The Centre for Arab Gulf Studies, Univ. of Exeter, (London: Croom Helm, 1982), p. 203.

In the process of such rapid economic modernization, how was the politico-social structure of Saudi Arabia influenced? In this chapter, after discussing two particularities of the politico-social structure in the pre-modernized era, the impact of the modernization on the politico-social structure is

discussed. The modernization, in this case, includes not only the economic development mentioned before but also politico-social transformation as follows. The ruling system has transferred from the self-willed absolute rule by the king of Āl al-Sa'ūd to a rational monarchy including non-Sa'ūd people.

#### **A. Particularities of the Politico-Social Structure in the Pre-modernized Era**

Pre-modernized Saudi Arabia had two particularities in its politico-social structure. One was the resiliently structured society and the other was Āl al-Sa'ūd, which had once been a tribe among many tribes in the Arabian peninsula, as the ruling class.

Before proceeding with the discussion, it is necessary to define the concepts of class, group and stratum which are used in this study. Needless to say, the concept of class was devised in order to analyze the structure of industrialized western societies. Marx placed "[t]he ultimate emphasis upon the economic in defining and determining class."<sup>(1)</sup> In his analysis, economic parameters were used to divide a society clearly into upper, middle and lower classes. However, traditional Saudi society is not an industrialized one. In traditional Saudi society, "[t]he sources of power can be found in the political, economic, social,

educational, religious, or psychological systems."(2)

In the analysis of Saudi society, which is completely different from western society, the definition of the concepts of class, group and stratum must be changed. I will define such aggregate as has its own rules and is composed by the same ideology, goal and sharing of value as 'group.' On the other hand, such aggregate as has its own sharing of value throughout the whole society surpassing the category of 'group', stands at the same level of power (although sources of power differ) and has a strong consciousness of belonging to the same aggregate is defined as 'class.' Finally, such vague aggregate as is the prior step of 'class' is defined as 'stratum.' Class, in this case, means the class which is now being produced as a result of the transformation of traditional Saudi society.

To analyze the social structure of traditional Saudi society, it is proper to explain the power relationship using classification by tribal elites and tribal masses. Besides that, it should be added that a very small middle class composed of government officials, 'ulamā', teachers, and merchants with a middle level of power and an upper class which included high 'ulamā' and successful wealthy merchants had already been formed. The concept of class, in this

case, is similar to that of Marx in the sense that people are classified according to their occupations. However, such people did not exist in the whole kingdom. The concept of class, here, is used for convenience in order to distinguish them from tribal society.

Tribal elites and tribal masses which composed the majority of Saudi society were strongly connected vertically by the loyalty of masses towards elites in each tribal group. Such strong connection by tribe-consciousness is called 'asabiyyah (tribal solidarity).

Literally, the term refers to the male relations in the male line of the family or tribe, and designates the sense of solidarity which binds them to each other and promotes mutual cooperation against external forces.(3)

The traditional tribal society was made up of interactions of tribal groups which were strongly connected by 'asabiyyah. Besides groups of 'asabiyyah, there were other groups composed of families and religious schools. These many different groups overlapped in some part of their aggregates and interacted reciprocally, thus keeping the tension of the group structure. At the same time, inside the framework of each group, the power position of the

tribal masses moved up and down according to their personal relationship with the tribal elites. The power of traditional society was "derived from nepotism, favoritism, maneuver, and influence wielding." (4) Thus, the traditional Saudi society was a resilient society composed of both interactions among groups and power relations of members within each group. (5)

Another particularity of the traditional Saudi society was created by the unification work of Ibn Sa'ūd. That is to say that Āl al-Sa'ūd, one of many tribal groups, slipped out of the situation of intragroup interactions and all the members of Āl al-Sa'ūd became a super tribal elite who stood above other tribal groups which were composed of both tribal elites and masses. They had much stronger power than any other tribal elite in every aspect of social life and possessed mutual consciousness that they themselves were rulers. In that sense, they were the suitable aggregate to be called 'the ruling class.' (6)

The phenomenon of Āl al-Sa'ūd's becoming the ruling class influenced interactions with its subordinate groups. The balance of the politico-social structure, which had been kept by both horizontal interactions among groups and vertical power relations of members inside each group, changed as follows. The direction of those interactions among groups, though



they kept a very small amount of their horizontal characteristics, changed to a vertical one with the appearance of the dignity of the king and loyalty towards Āl al-Sa'ūd including the king. All the king had to do was to consolidate this loyalty by holding majlis (council meetings) between the king and tribal shaykhs periodically.

## **B. The Impact of the Modernization on the Politico-Social Structure**

### **1. Changes in the Political Establishment and their Consequences**

For people in Saudi society, the biggest change caused by the modernization under the leadership of King Faisal was the change in the political establishment. In the pre-modernized era, the self-willed absolute rule by the king made the relationship between the ruler and the ruled a simple structure composed of the dignity of the king and loyalty toward the king. Since then, the political establishment has been moving toward a rational monarchy including non-Sa'ūd people as a result of the modernization under the leadership of King Faisal which had such characteristics as bureaucratic government, the integration of religious groups into the administration, planned economy and the institutionalization of the royal

succession.

What should be noticed here is that following the change of the political establishment a new non-Sa'ūd upper class started being created composed of the tribal nobility, military elite, economic elite, native landlords, foreign capitalists, and the landless rentier elite.(7) They started entering into such power as had been held by the super tribal elite, Āl al-Sa'ūd. Diversification of needs and complication of interdependence inside and outside the state following the modernization narrowed the jurisdiction of Āl al-Sa'ūd. Faisal tried to organize the ruling system well so that he could diversify and strengthen his indirect social influence by "maintaining, and even increasing , [his] grip on sensitive sectors of the country's political system." (8) As a result, a non-Sa'ūd upper class started being created. Though they still took personal relationship with the king as the opportunity to rise to the class, they started feeling the consciousness that they belonged to the same stratum and had familiarity with each other. In this sense, the Saudi upper stratum is creating a diversified upper class.

It is not only the upper class that was influenced by the modernization. Among the rest of the

tribal elites and masses, a feeling of being connected by horizontal stratum-consciousness rather than by vertical superior-subordinate relations appeared. As a result of "the movement of people engaged in traditional jobs to other economic activities in the industrial and service sectors, especially construction, trade and some manufacturing," the consciousness of equality and the sharing of value started being formed in each stratum.(9) This phenomenon was caused by the diversification of the upper class. Inside each group which was tied by 'asabiyyah, the central powers used maneuver to rule others and vertical superior-subordinate relations were too strong for group members to form horizontal stratum-consciousness.

However, the diversification of the upper class caused the creation of several subordinate groups under each diversified upper class, such as managers under executives of big companies, administrators under high-class bureaucrats and officers under high military bureaucrats. These new vertical relations were different from those of the tribal elites and masses. Consequently, the creation of the new vertical relations alongside the stronger vertical relations of tribal societies relatively weakened the tribal relations. The weaker tribal vertical relations became,

the more horizontal stratum-consciousness appeared among the people. At present, it is hard to divide those several strata clearly into middle and lower strata because Saudi modernization started only two decades ago and is still only at the half way stage. We will have to wait for further progress of the modernization to see several strata shake off the tribal vertical relations and generate the independence of classes.

## 2. The Emergence of the New Middle Class

Among several strata being formed as a result of the modernization, a stratum which is based on different sources of power from the others is being created.

[T]hey are distinguished from the rest of the middle class by their reliance on secular, non-traditional knowledge to attain their positions. They are the first group of people in their society who are not automatically members of a class because of family ties; they are in the New Middle Class primarily because of their personal qualifications. The needs of the economy have opened up opportunities for their upward mobility on the basis of education and training.(10)

In 1957, Riyadh University, the first modern university of Saudi Arabia, was established as a source

of supply of manpower for the Development Plan which was due to start from 1970. In 1964, King 'Abd al-'Azīz University was also established. The number of students sent abroad has increased drastically since the late 1960s.(11) After coming back to Saudi Arabia, they select such jobs as "managers, administrators, technicians, clerks, teachers of modern subjects . . . , lawyers, scientists, army officers and others in government and business."(12) Many of them "relate themselves to others through performance and service rather than material wealth or personal connections."(13) As table 5 shows, this stratum, which is connected by such new stratum-consciousness as the equality of opportunity and professional sense, has increased rapidly with the progress of modernization. We can say that the stratum is forming a new class because of its strong stratum-consciousness and energy. The new class occupies a middle level in socio-economic power like the middle class which already existed. Thus I will call the new class 'the New Middle Class.'

**TABLE 5**  
**INCREASE OF THE NEW MIDDLE CLASS**  
 (in thousands)

Year	65	70	75	80	85
Mid-grade civil service (% increase)	3.6 (67)	6.0 (202)	18.1 (125)	40.7 (125)	56.8 (40)
Military officers (% increase)	5.6 (7)	6.0 (17)	7.0 (6)	7.4 (50)	11.1 (50)
Teachers (% increase)	5.7 (79)	10.2 (118)	22.2 (71)	38.0 (19)	45.3 (19)
Total (% increase)	14.9 (49)	22.2 (113)	47.3 (82)	86.2 (31)	113.2 (31)

Source: Heller, p. 10.

**TABLE 6**  
**THE NEW MIDDLE CLASS AS A PERCENTAGE**  
**OF SAUDI LABOR FORCE**  
 (in thousands)

Year	65	75	80	85
Labor force	712.8	1,026.4	1,190.0	1,379.5
New Middle Class	14.9	47.3	86.2	113.2
New Middle Class as % of Labor force	2.1	4.6	7.2	8.1

Source: Heller, p. 11.

## Notes

1 James A. Bill, "Class Analysis and the Dialectics of Modernization in the Middle East," International Journal of Middle East Studies, No.3, 1972, p.420.

2 Bill, p. 424. Bill's definition of power refers to the ability to influence and control the behavior of others.

3 Michael C. Hudson, Arab Politics: The Search for Legitimacy, (New Haven and London: Yale Univ. Press, 1977), pp. 35-36.

4 Bill, p. 433.

5 Bill describes the resiliency of the Islamic Middle Eastern class structure as follows:

The Islamic Middle Eastern class structure has been knit together in contrast movement and has traditionally possessed an extraordinary elasticity. This resiliency has been intimately related to intraclass group patterns as well as to interclass relationships and mobility processes.

See, Bill, p. 429.

6 Mills criticizes the use of the word 'the ruling class' as follows:

'Ruling class' is a badly loaded phrase. 'Class' is an economic term: 'rule' a political one. The phrase, 'ruling class,' thus contains the theory that an economic class rules politically. That short-cut theory may or may not at times be true.

See, C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite, (London, Oxford, New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1956), p. 277.

7 This classification of the upper class was used in Bill, p. 428.

8 Dawisha, "Saudi Arabia's Search for Security," p. 14.

9 Mohammed Ahmed Rasheed, "Education as an Instrument of Progress in the Arab Gulf States," in The Impact of Oil Revenues on Arab Gulf Development, ed.,

M. S. El Azhary, Centre for Arab Gulf Studies, Univ. of Exeter, (London and Sydney: Croom Helm; Boulder and Colorado: Westview Press), 1984, p. 172.

10 William Rugh, "Emergence of a New Middle Class in Saudi Arabia," The Middle East Journal, Vol. 27, No. 15, Winter 1973, p. 7.

11 According to Statistical Year Book (Ministry of Finance and National Economy), the number of students sent for the first time increased from 193 (1967) to 2,122 (1975). In 1967, European universities received 46.6% of those students, other Arab countries 37.8%, the United States only 9.9%. In 1975, the number of students received by the United States increased to 40.1%, Arab countries 48.0%, Europe decreased to only 9.4%. Now the United States receives about 80% of students from Saudi Arabia.

12 Rugh, p. 7.

13 Bill, p. 433.



## Chapter IV.

### The New Middle Class in the Making

At the end of chapter III, the emergence of the New Middle Class as a result of modernization was discussed. This chapter examines the kind of modernization which is ideal for the New Middle Class as a product and promoter of modernization. The attitude of the New Middle Class in Saudi politics is also analyzed. Such analysis of the New Middle Class is very significant when considering which direction the present government is promoting for its nation building, this direction being strongly related to the stability of the kingdom. For example, the regime of the Shah of Iran, which rapidly promoted its nation building through westernization, was overthrown by Islamic revolutionists with Ayattollah Khomeini as their leader.

The New Middle Class, as mentioned in chapter III, has strengthened class-consciousness, relating themselves to others through performance and service rather than by means of material wealth or personal connections. The source of its power is personal qualifications based on higher education. In this manner, it can be said that the development of education has greatly contributed to the formation of the New Middle Class in Saudi Arabia. In the first section of this chapter, I analyze the characteristics of the New Middle Class by researching the change in Saudi educational goals.

## A. The Educational System and the New Middle Class

### 1. The First Educational System

Saudi education was previously overwhelmingly of the religious type, controlled by conservative Wahhābī 'ulamā'. The first Saudi institution of higher education was the Sharī'ah Islamic Law College of Mecca which was established in 1949. Soon after that, a Sharī'ah College (1953) and an Arabic Language College (1954) were established. They were "designed to prepare teachers for Saudi high schools . . . [or] to prepare lawyers and judges for the Saudi legal system."<sup>(1)</sup> Concerning secular subjects, few high schools

developed. Secular subjects began to be taught in "private schools sponsored by Hijazi merchants." (2)

Some graduates of these schools were able to go to foreign universities, and the first four Saudi university graduates returned from Egypt in 1945. (3)

It was in 1957 that "[a] secular university modeled on Egyptian ones, was opened in Riyadh." (4)

## 2. The Second Educational System

As the modernization proceeded, the goals of education changed in line with the demands of a society in transition. At first, the educational system "place[d] the emphasis on preparing students for general administrative jobs" to cope with the rapid development of the Saudi administration. (5) Second, the government tried to transfer to Saudi people technological jobs which had been occupied by immigrant workers. Thus, the goal changed to developing scientific capability and technical skills which formed the basis for meeting the demands of development.

The second educational system, designed to cope with the demands of industrial development, had not existed in Saudi Arabia before the modernization started. Inevitably, the modern western educational

system had to be introduced and it became dominant in higher education. About half the posts of teachers were occupied by non-Saudi people, mostly from other Arab countries such as Egypt and Jordan, because of the shortage of Saudi teachers.(6)

**TABLE 7**  
**TEACHERS BY NATIONALITY IN SAUDI ARABIA,**  
**1975/76 AND 1980/81**

Year	National		Non-national		Total No.
	No.	%	No.	%	
1975/76	25,101	49.0	26,075	51.0	51,176
1980/81	44,768	52.0	41,309	48.0	86,077

Source: J. S. Birks and J. A. Rimmer, p. 15.

However, negative effects of overdependence on the modern western educational system have been recently discussed as follows:

We have . . . imported from Western sociology, scientific assumptions and hypotheses and sociological analyses of life and conflicting formulations which are directly contradictory to our traditional religious assumptions. As a result, 'hypocrisy' has become a public style and anxiety is increasing.(7)

Modern Western education places an exaggerated emphasis upon reason and rationality and underestimates the value of the spirit. It encourages scientific enquiry

at the expense of faith; it promotes individualism; it breeds scepticism; it refuses to accept that which is not demonstrative; it is anthropocentric rather than theocentric. . . . When such an individual philosophy catches the mind of a powerful group it is turned into dogma. Marxism is one such philosophy. For the sake of security in a rootless society some people have accepted this new dogma and with religious fervour they have turned their society into a dogma-controlled community.(8)

As a result, students are "creating doubts in the minds . . . about the fundamental tenets and assumptions of Islām instead of reinforcing faith in God and purifying the sensibility by removing confusion and contradiction."(9)

### 3. Necessity of a Third Educational System

The Saudi government was concerned about the increase of political ideas and social values contrary to traditional values. Thus, the government "reduce[d] the proportion of Saudi university students who must go overseas for the continuation of their education,"(10) because "Saudi students abroad [were] widely believed to be violating many of the tenets of Islām" and causing social confusion.(11)

However, such a remedy was not effective for students who were studying in Saudi Arabia. What was worse, it caused students who came back from abroad to

lose their reputation, which badly influenced their will to work.

In order to cope with the whole range of educational problems, the Saudi government felt the necessity of educational reform. "This is not the reform of basic concepts of sociology, economics, political science, psychology, and history but a rewriting of text-books on the basis of Islamic concepts." (12)

Muslim intellectuals are expected now to justify their methods and at the same time restate their traditional ideas in the context of the new, and formulate new concepts for recent branches of knowledge by reasserting the spiritual realization of Truth as enshrined in revelations from God. (13)

In the book entitled Crisis in Muslim Education, Husain and Ashraf call the traditional educational system 'the first educational system' and the system borrowed from the West 'the second educational system.' (14) They advocate the necessity of "the creation of a third system embracing an integrated system of education." (15)

Such reform would aim to save society both from political tension between the two different factions, the traditionalists and

the modernists, and also from secularization and the creation of tension and lack of purpose in society which the West is suffering from.(16)

Though it is not certain whether the third educational system has already been put into effect or not, Saudi education will be much better when it starts. At any rate, the existence of such advocacy itself reflects a great deal of progress.

#### 4. Characteristics of the New Middle Class from the Educational Point of View

The characteristics of intellectuals trained by the third educational system must be 'modern man with Islamic character.' Husain and Ashraf analyze their characteristics in detail.

[They] are acquainted with their own traditions but are willing to acquire any wisdom that modern civilization can offer. Only then will it be possible for a modern Muslim to integrate the principles of moral and spiritual behavior with current intellectual knowledge. . . . It is only this third group that can preserve the organic character of our society and save it from the malaise of modern Western civilization; that of dehumanization and of cohesion through the loss of those common situations and images which form a society and bind its members together. . . . They will have to work out a comprehensive political, social and economic framework suitable for modern man but essentially Islamic in character. Only by doing this will they be able to save modern

Muslims from the tension and insecurity in which they are living today.(17)

As for students coming back from abroad, it is proved that attitude change occurs while they stay in foreign countries. Abdullah Al-Banyan researched Saudi students in the United States and found that "changes in the students' attitudes [were] associated with length of their exposure to the American environment."(18)

Length of stay in the United States had some effect on Saudi Arabian students' attitude toward their traditional cultural values as indicated by a shifting away from traditional attitudes concerning the position of woman and her participation in community affairs, and in the area of occupational values, a trend toward more reliance on personal ability and willingness to take risks.(19)

However, according to Shirley Kay, Saudi students return home "reassuring security of the strongly moral society" in the end.(20)

Young men with American doctorates may hope eventually to introduce some of the advantages of Western life, but they have been shocked too much by what they have seen in the West. They are appalled by the violence and crime which they consider to be the result of our 'soft' attitude to punishment.(21)



Thus, the New Middle Class, composed of both intellectuals trained by the third educational system and abroad, must be conscious of its society's problems and possibilities and be capable of participating in the country's development.

#### **B. The Ideal of the New Middle Class for Economic Modernization**

Modernization is essential for developing countries. It is necessary for them to strengthen national power by promoting modernization in order to get real independence from the suppression of imperialism. The same can be said concerning Middle Eastern countries. Since the end of World War II, modernization aiming at such fair society as gives profit to the whole nation has been necessary for them in order to recover from the distress under colonialism.

Modernization, in this case, is regarded as the process from the old and inferior to the modern and superior. The ultimate goal of modernization, which may be happiness, should be completed by filling conditions in several aspects: the improvement of the standard of living, the establishment of a peaceful and democratic society where freedom and equality are guaranteed, and

so on. These goals can be achieved by promoting the modernization of various aspects of human life. In this sense, modernization should be the balanced integration of political, economic and social modernization. The transformation of Saudi traditional society was discussed in chapter III. Next, I will discuss political and economic modernization. As for political modernization, western countries practiced colonialism historically; therefore, for those countries trying to recover from the distress under colonialism, modernization must not be westernization in the political sense. As for economic modernization, the Middle Eastern oil producing countries have rapidly proceeded with several development plans with the help of huge oil income. They have to accomplish the basis of their nation building before the oil dries up. A huge amount of western technology has been introduced.

However, these countries have recently been suspicious about their way of pursuing economic modernization. Saudi Arabia is no exception to these countries. Although technology transfer from western countries to Saudi Arabia where no advanced technology was well developed was considered convenient and progressive, the evil influences of technology transfer have been shown as development plans have advanced. First, technology transfer is not used properly to

enrich Saudi Arabia; it is made use of by western countries in order to recycle petrodollars.

Geared substantially towards the importation of sophisticated highly technologically advanced processes which are not necessarily appropriate to the local situation, the main priority of the Plan appears to be the 'recycling' of as many petrodollars as possible.(22)

Such economic modernization as proceeds with the help of highly sophisticated technology for which Saudi Arabia does not have intermediate technology cannot be useful for Saudi Arabia, with the result that Saudi Arabia invests huge amounts of money wastefully. Second, technology transfer is very often operated by small numbers of limited indigenous agents because "[i]t is illegal for western firms to operate in the country without an indigenous agent."(23) The positions of agents are occupied by the political and economic ruling class and "the tacitly acknowledged 'commission' system of agencies . . . has allowed a number of fortunes to be made with surprising speed."(24) Thus, technology transfer increases the gap between the rich and the poor. Third, highly advanced technology gives western countries themselves various troubles, such as neglect of human beings, mental disorder, social

tension and environmental pollution. It becomes impossible to say that westernization leads developing countries to prosperity as was believed from the late nineteenth century to the early twentieth century.

The New Middle Class, who are sufficiently educated to be aware of these evil influences, strengthen the suspicious feeling toward pursuing economic modernization through pure westernization. Economic modernization should be carried out not by highly sophisticated technology which does not meet the needs of present Saudi Arabia but by what the Saudi people really need and in such a way that they can share in the benefit. Discarding westernization which does not lead to Saudi progress, the New Middle Class is starting to think better of traditional values, which are based on Islām and are not western in nature. The troubles of western countries and Iran's failure with westernization give the New Middle Class enough confidence to keep aloof from westernization.(25) The New Middle Class realizes the necessity of proceeding with Islamic modernization maintaining the religious and moral values of Islām.

Next, the discussion proceeds to Islamic modernization. What kind of modernization is Islamic modernization? Are advanced science and technology contradictions to Islamic modernization? Western

scholars are apt to regard Islām as a medieval religion and an anachronism which cannot receive advanced science and technology without ideological confusion of traditional values.

Within twenty years or less people have moved from desert tents with bushes as lavatories to villas with gold plated bath taps. The ideological confusion which arises from this contradiction is enormous. Western producers and local importers encourage the development of materialism and even King Faisal, the religious ascetic, favoured material modernization.(26)

Actually when an automobile was introduced in Saudi Arabia about a half century ago, it was a real surprise for bedouin people who knew nothing but the camel as a vehicle. However, the surprise came not because Islām prohibited such innovations but because it was their first opportunity to see an automobile. There is a concept of bid'ah which literally means innovation. The interpretation of bid'ah is that Islām regards what is not in the Qur'ān as heresy. Western scholars tend to misunderstand the interpretation of bid'ah in the following way: because advanced science and technology are not in the Qur'ān, they will cause ideological confusion when they are introduced. However, the concept of bid'ah concerns a spiritually innovative

attitude against the teachings of God.(27) As long as advanced science and technology contribute to the building of a sound Saudi society where justice and righteousness are carried out, these innovations are recommended.

The application of modern science and technology is an inevitable objective. It forces itself on us through the riches that it offers. Our main problem is to find the right balance between its enriching attraction and the beauty of our spiritual values.(28)

The New Middle Class understands that science and technology are instruments for economic modernization. Science and technology should be used to promote balanced modernization; they should not be used to recycle petrodollars nor be used to increase the gap between the rich and the poor. The New Middle Class, because of abundant knowledge coming from higher education, can make proper judgements about the pace, quality and quantity of technology transfer so as not to cause social confusion.

[T]hey apparently understand the inherent conservative and religious nature of the society as a whole and believe that too-rapid social change would be a mistake.(29)

For the New Middle Class, the ultimate goal of modernization is to build a fair Islamic society which is profitable for all Muslims including the New Middle Class itself. The goal came from the concept of social welfare which should be carried out in 'ummah Islāmiyat (the Islamic community). Even when the New Middle Class uses science and technology, it places the spiritual value of modernization on Islām. In this sense, the New Middle Class is not a secular existence which puts traditional values into confusion but the aggregate of serious and realistic Muslims.(30)

### C. The Attitude of the New Middle Class in Saudi Politics

The Saudi government is negative in promoting political and social modernization. Though King Faisal promoted the consolidation and the systematization of the ruling system, it was not for the liberation of the Saudi people but for strengthening the rule of the Saudi monarchy. For example, the majlis, which should provide ordinary citizens with a chance to bring their problems directly to the attention of the rulers, does not achieve its original purpose.

The access which citizens had to the King in his daily majlis has caused some observers to describe the majlis system as a form of

democratic representation. This is incorrect, for the ability to express views to the decision-maker is not equivalent to having a share in determining what decisions are made.(31)

Āl al-Sa'ūd is still powerful. In this section, the attitude of the New Middle Class toward political and social modernization is discussed.

According to John A. Shaw, "Saudi students abroad . . . have been introduced to a broader spectrum of political ideas. . . . Nevertheless, . . . Saudi students abroad as well as at home remain apolitical."(32) Asaf Hussain states that "[they] do not act in the interests of their own class. . . . and are considered to lack not only economic power but also political ideology."(33) Peter Hobday shows that "some Saudis, in fact, use government service as an obvious stepping stone to better deals in the private sector."(34) Even though they stay in government, "[m]ost conscientious bureaucrats are too busy to consider venting their frustrations actively in the political arena."(35) There are other discussions which view the New Middle Class as tainted with individualism and egoism.

If the business world stops being the world where fortunes are to be made, and if government work is too much of a routine business save for the very few at the top with real power -- then, perhaps, the



country's most precious asset, its highly trained manpower, will not return from these universities. . . . Perhaps they will stay and work abroad.(36)

Stephen Duguid gives the example of 'Abd Allāh Tariki who was the first technocrat in Saudi Arabia.

[H]e was willing to work within the 'system' in Saudi Arabia to achieve his own goals and those of his fellow nationalists. . . . [T]he most important key to Tariki's willingness to work within the system, . . . , was the fact he had been put in a position of real power and responsibility.(37)

Thus, there are many discussions about the apoliticality of the New Middle Class that support Michael C. Hudson's statement that "the sudden growth of technocratic government in Saudi Arabia . . . [has] taken place so far without jeopardizing the legitimacy of the ruling family."(38)

However, there are many areas in which the political crisis of the Saudi regime is developing. R. Hrair Dekmejian indicates six dimensions of crisis: identity crisis, legitimacy crisis, misrule/coercion, economic crisis, military impotence and cultural crisis.(39) I will examine the problems involved in each of these dimensions in Saudi Arabia.

First, as for identity crisis, rapid economic

modernization causes the collapse of tribal society and urbanization. In the process of the transformation of tribal society, from a vertically structured society composed of tribal groups to a horizontally structured society formed by stratum-consciousness, people cannot easily change their identity from tribal groups to the kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Nepotism and maneuver based on personal relationship in the tribal society still work as a source of power. Moreover, the Saudi monarchy does not promote positive policies so that people could change their identity.

Second, on legitimacy crisis, as political modernization the Saudi monarchy has been trying to establish a rational ruling system including non-Sa'ūd people. However, with this attempt Āl al-Sa'ūd is merely taking unavoidable measures to cope with the diversified society; it is never so democratic that it promotes the political participation of non-Sa'ūd people. The Saudi monarchy is negative as regards allowing the non-Sa'ūd's political participation and the significant posts of the ruling system are still occupied by Āl al-Sa'ūd. On the other hand, religious groups with Āl al-Shaykh as the leader are losing their power. They are not strong enough to put pressure on Āl al-Sa'ūd as an anti-Establishment force.

Third, on misrule/coercion, the extravagance and

corruption of the royal family can cause a problem. Moreover, the maldistribution of wealth as a result of the unfair distribution of oil income will be criticized severely. As for foreign policy, the Saudi people will pay rigid attention to the relationship between the United States which supports Israel and the correspondence to the Iran-Iraq War and the Palestinian problem.

Fourth, on economic crisis, as table 8 shows, the Saudi Arabian balance of payments has a deficit in the 1980s. The government is now reviewing subsidies on various items such as housing and essential foods, which have been playing a role in suppressing the dissatisfaction of the people. The government cannot help reducing or abolishing them, which will be a trigger of crisis.(40) A further problem comes from this deficit. Immigrant workers who have occupied the majority of the Saudi labor force are being sent home by the Saudi government and the distribution of the employment positions of immigrant workers to Saudi people will be a serious problem.

Fifth, on military impotence, in the event that the menace of Israel or Iran becomes a real attack, the impotence of the Saudi military will be exposed.(41) As for domestic security, it is known that the National Guard took a long time to solve the Mecca incident in

TABLE 8  
SAUDI ARABIAN BALANCE OF PAYMENTS,  
1974-83 (\$ billion)

Balance of \	Year	74	75	76	77	78
Trade		29.1	21.3	25.2	25.7	17.0
Exports		32.7	27.3	35.6	40.4	37.0
(Oil)		(32.6)	(27.2)	(35.5)	(40.2)	(36.8)
Imports		3.6	6.0	10.4	14.7	20.0
Invisible trade		-6.0	-6.9	-10.9	-3.8	-19.2
Current account		23.1	14.4	14.4	12.0	-2.2
Capital account		-12.7	-5.3	-10.6	-9.3	-4.5
Total		10.4	9.1	3.7	2.7	-6.7
Overseas assets		20.1	39.2	52.3	61.4	61.7

Balance of \	Year	79	80	81	82	83
Trade		34.6	72.5	77.2	38.7	11.9
Exports		58.1	100.7	111.1	73.1	45.4
(Oil)		(57.9)	(100.6)	(110.9)	(72.9)	(44.9)
Imports		23.5	28.2	34.0	34.5	33.5
Invisible trade		-23.4	-31.1	-38.8	-39.8	-30.4
Current account		11.2	41.4	38.4	-1.1	-18.4
Capital account		-10.9	-37.5	-28.8	-1.2	-16.9
Total		0.2	3.9	9.6	-2.3	-1.5
Overseas assets		64.8	94.4	141.8	157.0	148.5

Source: Korekara no Chūtōjōsei to Sekiyu, (The Japanese Institute of Middle Eastern Economics, 1985), p. 83.

1979 and to suppress the ensuing Shī'ah riots in Hasa.(42)

Finally, on cultural crisis, as the oil industry develops in Saudi Arabia, Saudi people have many opportunities to touch foreign cultures. For example, marriage customs are beginning to see change.

Many upper middle class Saudis who have been educated abroad depart from the age old custom of marrying within the tribe, and marry non-Saudi girls because they want better educated wives than they can find among Saudis. . . . This, in turn, has encouraged some Saudi girls to seek an education, and helps account for the recent boom in education for girls in the kingdom.(43)

Students sent abroad realize the position of women and their participation in the business world. Moreover, the inflow of advanced science and technology is too rapid for traditional values to adjust to it, which causes social confusion. The traditional powers grieve that Saudi people sometimes behave abroad in a way that conflicts with God's religion and with moral behavior, for example, entering cabarets, night-clubs and bars, and gambling. It was said that one reason for the Mecca incident in 1979 was a growing disaffection among younger puritanical Saudis with such immorality.

The young Muslim militants who seized the Grand Mosque at Mecca on November 20, 1979, declared as one of their objectives the "cleansing" of Saudi society of all such immoralities but specifically the "moral hypocrisy" of the ruling elite.(44)

If such social confusion and immorality continues, the cultural crisis will be serious.

Mark Heller and Nadav Safran indicate three peculiar factors which have prevented these potential problem areas in Saudi Arabia from developing into revolution: the country's immense wealth; the size and role of the royal family; and the vastness of its territory and lack of structural integration.(45) However, they conclude by saying as follows:

[T]he general new middle class model applies to Saudi Arabia despite the existence of several seemingly countervailing factors peculiar to that country. . . . The chances that one of these crises will erupt and produce upheaval [involving the new middle class] within the next ten years are considerably greater than even.(46)

As for the general New Middle Class model, they believe that "[i]f the inadequacy of the modernization effort is exposed, . . . important elements of the new middle class [will] defect to revolutionary forces and . . . help bring about the destruction of the old order."(47) Is the New Middle Class of Saudi Arabia really a

potential leader of revolution? I will consider the attitude of the New Middle Class toward the six dimensions of crisis. As a product and promoter of modernization, the New Middle Class is seriously concerned in the identity crisis, legitimacy crisis and cultural crisis. As for the other crises, there is no difference of position between the New Middle Class and other Saudi people.

The New Middle Class, as its identity, ranks new factors such as performance and service gained from higher education higher than traditional factors such as tribe, blood line and school of religion.(48) Its identity agrees with the promotion of economic and technical modernization. The government is trying to promote economic modernization "maintain[ing] the religious and moral values of Islām," therefore it should adopt the ideal of Islamic modernization favored by the New Middle Class, in which the balance of traditional values and science and technology should be maintained.(49) In this sense, there is not such a serious cultural crisis in the promotion of economic modernization. However, concerning the legitimacy crisis, the New Middle Class, in the same way as other people, is dissatisfied with the absolute power of Āl al-Sa'ūd. The New Middle Class is regarded as promoting

the demand for democracy. However, the New Middle Class has been formed too recently to have grown strong enough to make the Saudi monarchy concede to the demand.

As mentioned above, although it is impossible to say that the New Middle Class is a perfect anti-Establishment force, it is certainly the bud of an anti-Establishment force. The Saudi monarchy will need to avert the spearhead of the people's dissatisfaction with the situation in which there is no policy for political democratization by promoting the Islamic modernization which the New Middle Class regards as ideal.



## Notes

1 Rugh, "A New Middle Class," p. 11.

2 Rugh, "A New Middle Class," p. 11.

3 Rugh, "A New Middle Class," p. 11.

4 Rugh, "A New Middle Class," p. 12.

5 Rasheed, p. 176.

6 Reliance upon non-national teachers rises with educational level. See, J. S. Birks and J. A. Rimmer, Develping Educational System in the Oil States of Arabia: Conflicts of Purpose and Focus, Occasional Paper Series, No.21, Manpower and Migration Series, No. 3, (Durham: Univ. of Durham, Centre for Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies, 1984),p. 16.

7 Syed Sajjad Husain and Syed Ali Ashraf, Crisis in Muslim Education, King Abdulaziz Univ., (Jeddah: Hodder and Stoughton, 1979), p. 13.

8 Husain, p. 2.

9 Husain, p. 3.

10 McLaurin, p. 205. According to Statistical Year Book, the number of students sent for the first time had its peak in 1977 (2,269 students), but the number decreased to 1,220 in 1981.

11 McLaurin, p. 204.

12 Husain, p. 4.

13 Husain, p. 4.

14 Husain, p. 16.

15 Husain, p. 17.

16 Husain, p. 17.

17 Husain, pp. 15-16.

18 Abdullah Al-Banyan, Saudi Students in the

United States: A Study of Cross Cultural Education and Attitude Change, (London: Ithaca Press, 1980), p. 68.

19 Al-Banyan, p. 70.

20 Shirley Kay, "Social Change in Modern Saudi Arabia." in Tim Niblock, ed., State, Society and Economy in Saudi Arabia, The Centre for Arab Gulf Studies, Univ. of Exeter, (London: Croom Helm, 1982), p. 82.

21 Kay, p. 82.

22 Lackner, p. 151.

23 Lackner, p. 203.

24 Lackner, p. 214.

25 The Iranian revolution occurred as a response to westernization. The New Middle Class of Saudi Arabia realizes the necessity of nation building based on traditional values by reading the text of the Iranian revolution.

The fact of the past is applied to the future. . . . the essence of the revolution can be conceived as an intertextual process. By intertextuality, it is meant that the revolution is an action of reading the texts of the preceding revolutions. . . . The men of the revolution reinterpret their own activities with reference to the preceding texts.

See, Atsuo Yoshida, The Texts of the Revolution: Murtaza Mutahhari and Hannah Arendt, IMES-I.U.J. Working Papers, No. 3, (Niigata: The Institute of Middle Eastern Studies, International Univ. of Japan, 1985), pp. 16-17.

26 Lackner, p. 216.

27 Concerning bid'ah, the Qur'ān says as follows:  
And that this is My path, straight; so do you follow it, and follow not divers paths lest they scatter you from His path.  
That then He was charged you with; haply you will be godfearing.(6:153)

28 Abd-el Wahab Abd-el Wassie, Education in Saudi Arabia, (London: Macmillan, 1970), p. 65.

29 Shaw, p. 82.

30 The New Middle Class is seriously and realistically Muslim because it tries to make the most use of Islam in modernization. Michael C. Hudson gives a good example of the New Middle Class's feeling toward traditional values: "[I]t is 'completely fallacious' to assume that rational development could not go hand in hand with traditional values." See, Hudson, p. 180.

31 Niblock, p. 89.

32 Shaw, p. 83.

33 Asaf Hussain, Political Perspectives on the Muslim World, (London and Basingstoke: The Macmillan Press, 1984), p. 18.

34 Peter Hobday, Saudi Arabia Today: An Introduction to the Richest Oil Power, (London and Basingstoke: The Macmillan Press, 1978), p. 81.

35 Shaw, p. 76.

36 Hobday, p. 89.

37 Stephen Duguid, "A Biographical Approach to the Study of Social Change in the Middle East: Abdullah Tariqi as a New Man," International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol.1, July 1970, p. 202.

38 Hudson, p. 179.

39 See, R. Hrair Dekmejian, "Fundamentalist Islam: Theories, Typologies, and Trends," Middle East Review, Vol. XVII, No. 4, Summer 1985, p. 29.

40 See, Ragaei, p. 180.

41 Adeed I. Dawisha describes the impotence of Saudi military power:

Since 1973, Saudi leaders have injected much of this surplus capital into the defense sector in order to improve the country's military capability. This has resulted in a breathtakingly rapid modernization of the armed forces. . . . All this effort and military hardware, however, has not changed Saudi Arabia's status as a second-rate military power. The standing army is very small, the quality of the rank and file

remains inferior. . . . Perhaps the greatest handicap is the lack of a modern military tradition in the desert kingdom.

See, Dawisha, "Internal Values," pp. 137-138.

42 James P. Piscatori gives the details of those incidents. As for the Mecca incident, "an odd group of well-armed zealots . . . [seized the Grand Mosque and] threw the country into almost two weeks of turmoil." (Piscatori, p. 66.) As for the Shī'ah riots in Hasa:

At the same time as the siege of the Great Mosque was going on, there were riots among the 20,000 to 30,000 Shī'ah of the Eastern Province. . . . Although the Shī'ah constitute 35 per cent of the Arabian American Oil Company's work-force, they have never felt that they were benefiting as much as the Sunni majority from the oil wealth they helped to create.

See, Piscatori, p. 67.

43 Rugh, "A New Middle Class," p. 17.

44 Saad E. Ibrahim, The New Arab Social Order, (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press; London: Croomhelm, 1982), p. 111.

45 Heller, p. 16.

46 Heller, p. 27.

47 Heller, p. 6.

48 Though Heller states that "they are not heirs to any traditional corporate identity or loyalty," (Heller, p. 3) it is impossible for them to forget all traditional identity. It requires a further period of time for them to give up their traditional identity completely because the New Middle Class in Saudi Arabia has been formed very recently.

49 The goals of the Third Development Plan (1980-5) are given in John Townsend, "Philosophy of State Development Planning," in The Impact of Oil Revenues on Arab Gulf Development, ed., M. S. El Azhary, Centre for Arab Gulf Studies, Univ. of Exeter, (London and Sydney: Croom Helm; Boulder and Colorado: Westview Press, 1984), p. 48:

(1) to maintain the religious values of Islām by applying , propagating and fostering God's

Shari'ah;

(2) to assure the defence of the religion and the country and maintain the internal security and social stability of the Kingdom;

(3) to continue balanced economic growth by developing the country's resources, by increasing the income from oil over the long term and by conserving depletable resources, thereby improving the social well-being of all citizens and providing the economic strength to attain all the other fundamental goals of development;

(4) to reduce dependence on the production of crude oil as the primary source of national income;

(5) to develop human resources through education, training and the raising of health standards; and

(6) to complete the basic infrastructure required for the attainment of these goals.

## Conclusion

Saudi Arabia steadily proceeded with its nation building from the 1920s to the middle of the 1970s through the unification work of Ibn Sa'ūd and the political economic modernization of King Faisal. Since the death of Faisal, toward which direction has Saudi Arabia been moving? Ibn Sa'ūd became the leader of Islām by conquering Hijaz which contained the two holy cities, Mecca and Medina. He had a high regard for the rational administration of Hijaz; he did not try to rule Hijaz by the tribal direct way as he had ruled other places. Prince Faisal, who was named the Viceroy of Hijaz, succeeded in political development by extending the rational administration of Hijaz to the whole kingdom. Simultaneously, he established the basis of the Islamic kingdom by integrating religious groups into the administration and advocating Pan-Islamism.

Thus, they gained the legitimacy of Saudi people who were Muslim.

Economic modernization, which was started under the leadership of King Faisal in the form of the Five Year Development Plan, invited such predictions by western scholars that rapid economic modernization would destroy the traditional values of Saudi Arabia and that the New Middle Class, who were supposed to be the propeller of revolution, would gather strength. In fact, the regime of the Shah of Iran, which had pursued pure westernization, was overthrown by traditional powers. However, the economic modernization of Saudi Arabia is different from the Shah's westernization. As a first principle of the Third Development Plan (1980-5), the government advocates "the dedication of the government to upholding Islām and maintaining its associated cultural values." (1) Moreover, the New Middle Class, who are the product and promoter of economic modernization, realize the necessity of Islamic modernization. They try to proceed with economic modernization by making the most use of traditional values pragmatically. In this sense, it is impossible to say that the New Middle Class disagrees with the government in its promotion of economic modernization and causes social confusion.

However, as for political modernization, is the

present Saudi monarchy prepared for real modernization? Although the Saudi monarchy has rationalized its ruling system by expanding the Hijaz way to the whole kingdom and through the consolidation and systematization of the ruling system, the rationalization does not give people the opportunity of political participation. The Saudi monarchy has rationalized its ruling system because it has had to cope with a diversified society as a result of economic modernization. Āl al-Sa'ūd still occupies the position of the privileged class. The rationalization is not democratization which gives people freedom. The New Middle Class has started to doubt this rationalization which is not accompanied by democratization. Although the New Middle Class is not strong enough to become an anti-Establishment force, it is certain that the New Middle Class is the bud of an anti-Establishment force.

How does the Saudi monarchy cope with the doubt? The monarchy simply tries to maintain the status quo by promising a written constitution and a revival of the Consultative Council (Majlis al-Shūrā) which existed in Hijaz.(2) This kind of lip service could so far have prevented the discontent of the people from developing into revolution, even though there have been some chances such as the Mecca incident. However, the



instability of Saudi Arabia could be caused by many other factors in the Middle East, for example, by the change of diplomatic conditions. The expansion of the Iran-Iraq War and the process of Arab-Israeli conflict might put the Saudi monarchy under circumstances where its diplomatic attitude would be severely noticed by the Saudi people. Under such circumstances, the following causes for discontent might be strengthened: the impotence of Saudi military power; the protection by the United States which supports Israel; and the lack of a policy for political modernization. The New Middle Class could be the nucleus of the movement caused by these grievances. It is possible that other people will also be involved in the movement. Therefore, the development and the transformation of the New Middle Class in connection with the domestic and foreign setting are worth noticing.

## Notes

1 Townsend, p. 48.

2 As for a written constitution, Sankari states as follows:

The most serious effort to write a constitution was made after the attack on the Grand Mosque of Mecca in Nov. 1979. Crown Prince Fahd announced that a "basic system of rule" was forthcoming. Thereafter, an eight-man committee under the chairmanship of Prince Nayyif, minister of interior, was formed in March 1980 to draw up a 200-article "basic system of rule" based entirely on Islamic principles.

See, Sankari, p. 182. As for a Consultative Council, William B. Quandt states as follows:

In the end the Mecca affair was a shock to the Saudi establishment. . . . Following Mecca, there was a bit of soul-searching, some talk of cracking down on corruption, and a revival of the oft-mentioned plan to form a Consultative Council (Majlis al-Shūrā). . . . Greater deference was paid to conservative social structures, and the new Five-Year Plan was designed to emphasize social investments rather than new massive construction projects. But more than a year after Mecca little of consequence had changed. There was no Consultative Council. Power remained in the same hands.

See, William B. Quandt, Saudi Arabia in the 1980s: Foreign Policy, Security and Oil, (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1981), pp. 95-96.

## APPENDIX 1

## Constitution of the Kingdom of the Hijaz

August 29, 1926

## PART I

THE KINGDOM, CONSTITUTION, CAPITAL  
AND OFFICIAL LANGUAGE

Art. 1. The Kingdom of the Hijaz, with its known boundaries, cannot be divided or separated by any means.

Art. 2. The Arabian kingdom of the Hijaz is a royal, legislative, Muslim and independent country in all its internal and foreign affairs, both at home and abroad.

Art. 3. Mecca is the capital of the Hijaz Kingdom.

Art. 4. The Arabic language is the official language of the kingdom.

## PART II

THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE KINGDOM,  
SENTENCES, AGENT-GENERAL AND  
RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE ADMINISTRATION

Art. 5. The entire administration of the Kingdom of the Hijaz shall be in the hands of His Majesty King 'Abd al-'Azīz I, Ibn 'Abd al-Rahman Āl Faisal Āl Sa'ūd. His Majesty is bound by the Sharī'ah laws.

Art. 6. Sentences in the Kingdom of the Hijaz shall be given according to the Qur'an and the Sunnah of the Prophet.

Art. 7. His Majesty on his part shall employ an Agent-General and as many directors and chiefs as he deems necessary to take charge of the Administration of the Hijaz.

Art. 8. As the Agent-General is the final resort for all the departments of the kingdom and its different sections, every head of a department shall be held responsible before him for the proper administration of everything in connection with his office. The Agent-General is in turn responsible to His Majesty the King.

### PART III

#### THE DEPARTMENTS OF THE KINGDOM OF THE HIJAZ

Art. 9. The departments of the Kingdom of the Hijaz shall be divided into six fundamental departments, thus:--

- (1) Sharī'ah Affairs.
- (2) Internal Affairs.
- (3) Foreign Affairs.
- (4) Financial Affairs.
- (5) Public Education.
- (6) Military Affairs.

#### (1) SHARĪ'AH AFFAIRS

Art. 10. Sharī'ah Affairs include everything in connection with the Sharī'ah court, the two holy sanctuaries, waqfs, mosques and all religious establishments.

#### (2) INTERNAL AFFAIRS

Art. 11. Internal Affairs include everything in connection with public security, telegraphs, posts, public health, municipalities, public works, commerce and industry, agriculture and public establishments. These organizations shall be directly managed by the Agent-General's office.

Art. 12. As the Agent-General is in charge of the different sections of internal affairs, all heads of public security, telegraphs, posts and public health should carry out their duties within the limits of the rules and regulations issued to them by the Agent-General.

Art. 13. Directors of municipalities shall comply with the orders and rules which will be promulgated in

connection with the municipalities and their organizations. The municipality of the capital shall be attached to the Department of Internal Affairs. The other municipalities will be managed by the senior administrative official in the township concerned.

Art. 14. The Pilgrimage Committee shall comprise all the chiefs of departments dealing with the pilgrimage and a number of qualified notables who will be nominated by His Majesty the King, under the direction of the Agent-General.

Art. 15. The Pilgrimage Committee is fully authorized to examine everything in connection with the pilgrimage and to carry on every form of investigation which they deem necessary in connection with the pilgrimage.

Art. 16. All regulations made by the Pilgrimage Committee should be enforced by the Agent-General after they have been sanctioned by His Majesty the King.

### (3) FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Art. 17. The Department of Foreign Affairs is a department which shall deal with the foreign policy of the country and carry it out within the limits of its powers. It shall be divided into four sections: political, administrative, legal and consular.

Art. 18. The Directorship of Foreign Affairs shall be assigned by His Majesty the King to a very competent and highly qualified person.

Art. 19. The Department of Foreign Affairs shall be directly connected with the royal court, and shall carry out the orders of the Agent-General in connection with administrative and consular sections only.

### (4) FINANCIAL AFFAIRS

Art. 20. The Department of Financial Affairs is the organization dealing with the various revenues of the Kingdom and its general expenditure. Its subdivisions shall be as follows:--

- (a) Financial section.
- (b) Financial offices in the dependencies.
- (c) Accountancy offices in those official departments which deal with the revenues.
- (d) Customs Department.

Art. 21. The Financial Department with its different branches mentioned above shall be attached to the office of the Agent-General.

Art. 22. All financial officials are responsible, according to their grade, for the proper control of financial affairs.

#### (5) PUBLIC EDUCATION

Art. 23. Public education comprises the diffusion of science, education and the arts, and the opening of libraries, schools and religious institutes, great care and attention being taken to act in accordance with the foundations of religion in all the Kingdom of the Hijaz.

Art. 24. The Directorate of Public Education should be attached to the office of the Agent-General.

Art. 25. A law for public education shall be decreed and shall be brought into force gradually. Elementary education shall be free of cost throughout the Kingdom of the Hijaz.

#### (6) MILITARY AFFAIRS

Art. 26. Military Affairs comprise everything which demonstrates the strength and the influence of the Government at home and abroad.

Art. 27. His Majesty the King will deal with everything concerning military affairs.

### PART IV

ASSEMBLIES: THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY,  
THE COUNCIL OF MEDINA, THE COUNCIL OF JIDDAH,  
DISTRICT COUNCILS, TRIBAL AND VILLAGE COUNCILS

#### LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY

Art. 28. A council shall be organized in the capital under the name of the "Legislative Assembly." This should consist of the Agent-General, his advisers and 6 notables. The latter must be able and competent persons, and shall be nominated by His Majesty the

King.

Art. 29. The Legislative Assembly shall meet once every week, or more often if need be, under the presidency of the Agent-General or one of his advisers, in order to examine everything submitted to them by the Agent-General and to discuss and go into each question carefully. Decisions will be taken according to the majority of votes given.

Art. 30. Heads of departments may attend the meetings of the Legislative Assembly when called upon by the Agent-General to do so, and whenever anything concerning their departments is being discussed, if their presence is considered necessary.

Art. 31. All decisions made by the Legislative Assembly should be put into effect after they have been passed to His Majesty the King through the Agent-General and after their sanction by His Majesty.

#### COUNCIL OF JIDDAH AND MEDINA

Art. 32. A committee shall be elected in Jiddah and Medina respectively, and shall be called the "Administrative Council." This council shall consist of the qaimaqam, his assistant, the chief officials and 4 notables, the latter of whom will be chosen and nominated by His Majesty the King.

Art. 33. Each of these two councils shall meet once a week, or more often if necessary, under the presidency of the qaimaqam or his assistant, to examine affairs and matters concerning each council respectively, and to reach decisions thereon according to the majority of votes given.

Art. 34. In accordance with article 31 of these regulations, all decisions made by the two councils above mentioned shall be passed to the Agent-General, who will in turn pass them to His Majesty the King for sanction. Once they are sanctioned by His Majesty the King they must be put into effect.

Art. 35. All decisions and laws after being sanctioned by His Majesty the King and registered in His Majesty's high offices shall be passed to the Agent-General, who will in turn put them into effect and undertake their circulation and publication throughout all districts and the different departments.

Art. 36. As regards the notables chosen to sit in the Legislative Assembly according to article 28, and those chosen for the Councils of Jiddah and Medina, according to article 32, their tenure of office will expire after 1 year's service, after which other members will be elected.

Art. 37. Previous members are eligible for re-election.

#### DISTRICT COUNCILS

Art. 38. A council shall be elected in every district under the presidency of the local chief. These councils will be composed of the assistant to the chief, the chief officials and certain notables, and will meet once a week or more frequently.

Art. 39. The function of the councils mentioned in the preceding article is to investigate and discuss any notes and official matters transmitted to the said council by sheikhs of the districts, and to reach decisions regarding the same.

Art. 40. Decisions made by district councils shall be transmitted to the qaimaqam of the province, who in turn will pass them to the Agent-General. The latter, after making his remarks upon them, will submit them to the King for sanction. Once they are sanctioned by the King they will be put into effect.

#### TRIBAL AND VILLAGE COUNCILS

Art. 41. In every village and each important tribe there shall be a council under the presidency of the sheikh, consisting of his legal adviser and two of the notables, to look into the state of the affairs and the conditions of each village or tribe in accordance with the new regulations for the organization of province, districts, villages and tribes.

Art. 42. Village and tribal councils shall be held responsible before the higher authorities for everything within their respective jurisdictions, in accordance with the preceding article.

#### PART V

#### DEPARTMENT OF ACCOUNTS



Art. 43. The Department of Accounts shall be located in the capital and shall consist of a president and 3 members who will be nominated by His Majesty the King. They will be chosen from among competent persons who are expert in accounts and financial matters, and will be attached to the office of the Agent-General.

Art. 44. The primary function of the Department of Accounts is to inspect all the financial resources of the Kingdom and to control the general expenditure, according to the general budget regulations.

Art. 45. No sum whatsoever shall be paid from the State Treasury before it has been approved by the Department of Accounts, as will be stated in the rules of its organization, with the exception of sums the payment of which may be ordered by His Majesty the King.

## PART VI

### INSPECTORATE-GENERAL

Art. 46. The Inspectorate-General is responsible for the inspection, supervision and control of all Government departments and all official transactions, in order to ensure the proper conduct of affairs and their being kept in good order.

Art. 47. The Inspectorate-General shall be entrusted by His Majesty the King to a person of experience and with the proper qualifications to take charge of its duties.

Art. 48. The Inspectorate-General shall be attached to His Majesty the King. He may make an inspection of the districts when necessary, and may employ an inspector for each district if and when necessary.

Art. 49. The Inspectorate-General or District Inspectors have the right to inspect all Government departments, to investigate and to control the state of affairs in each at any time, to stop any transaction which may be contrary to the rules and regulations, and to suspend temporarily any official guilty of any such

transaction or of having caused it to take place, to ask for the trial of such an official before the courts, and to complete the enquiries in connection therewith.

Art. 50. The Inspectorate-General has the right to ask for the replacement or the dismissal of any official who is proved to be incompetent and unfit for carrying out the functions entrusted to him. He may do so by approaching the authorities who are concerned with the engagement and dismissal of officials.

Art. 51. The Inspectorate-General shall submit his inspection reports to His Majesty the King.

Art. 52. District Inspectors shall submit their inspection reports to the Inspectorate-General, who in turn will submit the same to His Majesty the King.

Art. 53. The District Inspectors shall submit a monthly report on the state of affairs in their respective districts to the Inspectorate-General, who, after making his observations on each, will submit it to His Majesty the King.

Art. 54. All heads of departments shall give every assistance and all facilities to the Inspectorate-General or the District-Inspectors, and shall also comply with the orders and instructions given by the Inspectors within their jurisdiction, in accordance with the provisions of the rules and regulations.

Art. 55. Any official not complying with the preceding article, whose failure to comply with it is proved, will be severely punished, without regard to his position or grade.

## PART VII

### EMPLOYEES

Art. 56. All members of councils and all Government employees should possess the following qualifications:--

- (1) They should be subjects of his Majesty the King.

- (2) They should be properly qualified and competent.
- (3) They should be of good character and address.
- (4) They should not have forfeited their legal Shari'ah rights.

Art. 57. Persons who are not His Majesty's subjects, and whose employment is considered necessary, may be engaged on contract for limited periods and under special conditions.

Art. 58. Any civil servants among those mentioned in article 56 have their rights and honour guaranteed by the Government.

Art. 59. A civil servant who shows efficiency and application in his work shall not be transferred to another department without his consent.

Art. 60. Any civil servant whose innocence of any charge against him is proved before a court shall not be dismissed from his employment.

Art. 61. Rules and regulations shall be drawn up regarding Government employees, setting forth the terms of their employment, promotion, salaries, rights, functions, grades, dismissal, pensions, trials and everything in connection with the same.

## PART VIII

### GENERAL MUNICIPAL COUNCILS

Art. 62. A council shall be elected in each of the municipalities of Mecca, Medina, and Jiddah, and shall be called the "General Municipal Council."

Art. 63. Its members shall be landlords, members of special crafts and professions, which will be mentioned in the municipal regulations, and the notables who will be elected by His Majesty the King or his Agent-General after their names have been submitted for membership of the General Municipal Council.

Art. 64. The membership of persons elected for a General Municipal Council will not be considered valid until after approval by His Majesty the King.

Art. 65. The members of a General Municipal Council shall not exceed 12 in number in the capital, and 8 in Medina and Jiddah.

Art. 66. Any member elected to a Municipal Council should be a subject of His Majesty the King, not less than 30 years of age, and should be a capable and competent person, able to read and write Arabic well. He must be in possession of his legal and Sharī'ah rights and known to be of good conduct.

Art. 67. The General Municipal Councils must meet once every month, or more frequently if necessary, under the presidency of one of the members, who will be elected at each setting.

Art. 68. The General Municipal Councils have full right to examine everything in connection with the municipalities and to pass resolutions to ensure their good administration and order.

Art. 69. Every resolution passed by the General Municipal Councils in the capital should be transmitted to the Agent-General's office or, in the case of Jiddah and Medina, to the office of the qaimaqam, who after investigating it should submit it to the Legislative Assembly, who after investigation and endorsement will pass it to His Majesty the King through the Agent-General.

Art. 70. The directors of the municipalities should act in accordance with the resolutions passed by the General Municipal Councils and approved by His Majesty the King, and should carefully comply with them.

Art. 71. The General Municipal Councils have the right to draw up, modify or increase, when necessary, the municipal budgets. They can do so after the approval of His Majesty the King, as laid down in article 69.

Art. 72. As the directors of the municipalities are held responsible to the General Municipal Councils, they should be prepared to answer in detail any enquiry or question put forward by the members in accordance with the law which will be drawn up regarding the organization of the municipalities.

Art. 73. The municipal members have no right to

go beyond the limits of such of the foregoing articles as may be valid and may be laid down in the organization of the municipalities.

Art. 74. The period of validity of membership of the General Municipal Council is 3 years, after which new elections must take place in accordance with article 63.

Art. 75. Former members are eligible for re-election.

Art. 76. Membership of the General Municipal Councils is an honorary position.

## PART IX

### MUNICIPAL ADMINISTRATION COMMITTEES

Art. 77. In every municipality there shall be a committee composed of the director of the municipality and other heads of its different sections.

Art. 78. The function of these committees is to investigate ways and means for executing the resolutions passed by the General Municipal Councils, by carefully examining everything which is passed to them and by reaching decisions regarding the same.

Art. 79. Administrative committees should meet twice every week, or more often if necessary.

Source: Davis, pp. 374-383.

## APPENDIX 2

### The New Statute of the Council of Ministers

Royal Decree No. 380,  
dated 22 Shawwal 1377 (May 11, 1958)

After putting our trust in God: We, Sa'ūd ibn 'Abd al-'Azīz Āl Sa'ūd, King of the Saudi Arabian Kingdom:

Considering what the interests of the country necessitate in the matter of the revision of the Statute of the Council of Ministers in accordance with the provisions of our Decree No. 37 dated 2 Ramdhan 1377 (March 22, 1958);

And desiring to fix responsibilities and to delimit authorities, and having regard to the progress and development of the country:

And in accordance with the decision of the Council of Ministers No. 120, issued on 15 Shawwal 1377 (May 4, 1958):

Have ordered as follows:

#### GENERAL RULES

1. This Statute shall be called the Statute of the Council of Ministers.

2. The headquarters of the Council of Ministers is Riyadh, while it is permissible for its meetings to be held in another part of the Kingdom.

3. Nobody but a Sa'ūd (national) shall be a member of the Council of Ministers; nor shall anyone be a member who is of ill repute, or has been convicted of crime or trespass harmful to religion and honor.

4. After the issue of this Statute the members of the Council shall not proceed with their work except after taking the following oath:

"I swear by God Almighty that I will be loyal to my religion and my sovereign and my country, and that I will not reveal any of the secrets of the Government, and that I will protect its interests and its laws, and that I will perform my functions with integrity and honesty and loyalty."

5. It is not permissible to combine membership of the Council with any other Government office, except if

the President of the Council should consider that to be necessary.

6. It is not permissible for a member of the Council of Ministers, during the the currency of his membership, to purchase or rent any property of the Government whatsoever, either directly or through an intermediary or by public auction.

Likewise it is not permissible for him to sell or lease any of his own property to the Government; and he may not engage in any commercial or financial operation, or accept membership of the Board of Directors of any Company.

7. The Council of Ministers is a statutory body, and shall hold its meetings under the presidency of the President of the (Council of) Ministers or his deputy; and it shall conduct its work and its functions in accordance with this Statute and its internal Statute.

8. Every Minister is responsible for the work of his Ministry to the Chief Minister; and the Chief Minister is responsible for his work and the work of the Council to His Majesty the King; and the Chief Minister may request His Majesty the King to relieve any member of the council of Ministers of his work; and the resignation of the Chief Minister shall involve the resignation of all the members of the Council.

9. A Minister shall be regarded as the immediate chief and final resort in the affairs of his Ministry; and he shall perform his functions in accordance with the rules of this Statute, and the internal Statute of his Ministry.

10. Only another Minister shall deputize for a Minister: and that in accordance with a royal command issued on the recommendation of the Chief Minister.

#### CONSTITUTION OF THE COUNCIL

11. The Council of Ministers shall consist of:  
 (a) the President of the Council of Ministers; (b) a Vice-President of the Council of Ministers, who shall be appointed by royal command on the recommendation of the President of the Council of Ministers; (c) the Departmental Ministers, who shall be appointed by royal command on the recommendation of the President of the Council of Ministers; (d) Ministers of State who shall

be appointed members of the Council of Ministers by royal command on the recommendation of the President of the Council Ministers; and (e) Advisers of His Majesty the King who shall be appointed members of the Council of Ministers by royal command on the recommendation of the President of the Council of Ministers.

12. Presence at meetings of the Council of Ministers is the personal right of its members only, and the Secretary General of the Council of Ministers; but it shall be permissible, on the demand of the President or any of the members after approval by the Council of Ministers, to allow any of the officials or experts to attend the sittings of the Council, to communicate any information or explanations they may have: provided that the right of voting is exclusive to the members only.

13. A meeting of the Council shall not be regarded as effective except in the presence of two-thirds of its members, while its decisions shall not be valid unless they are passed by a majority of those present; and in the event of equal voting, the vote of the President shall be regarded as preferred.

14. The Council shall not make a decision in any matter affecting one of the Ministries, except in the presence of its Minister or whoever deputizes for him: unless circumstances make it necessary.

15. The activities of the Council are secret; but its decisions and action thereon shall be public, except such of them as are regarded as secret by decision of the Council.

16. Members of the Council of Ministers shall be prosecuted for offenses committed by them in connection with their official functions in accordance with a special Statute, which shall comprise a statement of offenses, and lay down the procedure for the prosecution and trial, and the manner of the composition of the court.

17. It is permissible for the Council of Ministers to form committees of its members or others to investigate a matter entered on its agenda, in order to present a special report thereon. And the Internal Statute of the Council shall contain a list of the number of the committees with the procedure for their activities.



## FUNCTIONS OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS

18. The Council of Ministers shall draw up the policy of the State, internal and external, financial and economic, educational and defense, and in all public affairs; and shall supervise its execution; and shall have legislative authority, and executive authority and administrative authority. And it shall be the arbiter in all financial affairs and in all the affairs committed to the other Ministries of the State and other Departments. And it shall be the factor deciding what actions it may be necessary to take therein. And international treaties and agreements shall not be regarded as effective, except after its approval. And the decisions of the Council of the Ministers shall be final, except such of them as require the issue of a royal command or decree, in accordance with the rules of this Statute.

## LEGISLATIVE MATTERS

19. No laws or agreements or international treaties or concessions shall be issued, except in accordance with royal decrees, drafted after the approval of the Council of Ministers.

20. It is not permissible to alter laws or agreements or international treaties or concessions, except in accordance with a Statute issued in conformity with clause 19 of this Statute.

21. The Council shall debate the projects of laws submitted to it, clause by clause; and then it shall be voted on as a whole: and that in conformity with the procedure prescribed in the internal Statute of the Council of Ministers.

22. Every Minister has the right to present to the Council a project of law within the scope of the functions of his Ministry, with a view to its approval; and the Council may agree thereto or reject it; and, if the Council rejects a proposal, it is not permissible for it to be raised again before it except if circumstances demand it. Similarly, every one of the members of the Council of Ministers has the right to propose any matter which he may consider expedient for discussion in the Council.

23. If His Majesty the King does not approve of any decree or order put forward to him for his signature, it will be returned to the Council, with a statement of the reasons leading thereto, for discussion thereof. And, if the decree or order is not returned by the secretariat of his Majesty the King to the Council of Ministers within thirty days of the date of its receipt, the President of the Council shall take such action as he may think appropriate: informing the Council thereof.

24. All decrees must be published in the Official Gazette, and they become effective as from the date of their publication, unless a term is specified therein.

#### EXECUTIVE MATTERS

25. The Council, in its capacity as the direct executive authority, has full supremacy over executive matters, and it possesses the real power to take any action which it considers in the interests of the country: and the following matters are within the scope of its powers: (a) supervision of the execution of the decisions and laws; (b) establishment and organization of the public departments and official posts, and the appointment, dismissal and promotion of departmental directors and officials occupying the third grade and upwards, and their retirement on pension; and (c) the Council of Ministers shall decide the creation of committees of investigation to undertake the inspection of the progress of work in the Ministries and Departments in general, or of a particular case; and the committees of investigation shall report the results of their inspection to the Council within the period prescribed for them; and the Council shall debate the result of the investigation according to the Statute.

#### ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS

26. The Council of Ministers is the direct authority for the administration of the country, and it has full supremacy over all administrative matters, while the different areas in the whole extent of the Kingdom shall be administered in accordance with Statutes enacted for them.

27. Municipal affairs shall be administered in accordance with a special Statute, to be called the "Statute of Municipalities," which will fix the grades of municipalities and their obligations, and the creation of municipal councils, and so on to matters affecting the functions of the municipalities.

#### FINANCIAL MATTERS

28. The Council of Ministers is the authority for the financial affairs of the State.

29. It is not permissible to impose taxes or duties except in accordance with a Statute.

30. The payment of duties and taxes shall be according to the rules of the Statutes; and it shall not be permissible to exempt therefrom, except in accordance with the Statute.

31. The sale of State property, or the lease thereof, or the enjoyment thereof, shall only be in accordance with the Statute.

32. It is not permissible to grant a monopoly or concession or the exploitation of any resources of the country, except in accordance with a special Statute, and with due consideration of the public interest.

33. It is not permissible for the Government to incur any debt except after the approval of the Council of Ministers, and the issue of a royal decree conferring on it permission therefrom.

34. Every contract entered into by the Government, and involving the payment of funds from the public treasury shall be only in accordance with the rules of the budget approved in conformity with the principles; and if the clauses of the budget do not make room for it, it must be in accordance with a special Statute permitting it.

35. All receipts of the State must be handed over to the unified public treasury, and their entry and disbursement must be in accordance with the principles laid down by Statute.

36. It is not permissible to allocate a salary,

or grant compensation, or spend any sum out of State funds, except in accordance with the Statute and by decisions of the Council of Ministers.

37. The Council of Ministers shall annually approve a Statute of the State budget, comprising estimates of the receipts and disbursements for that year, and it shall be submitted to his Majesty the King for his approval; and the approval of the budget shall take place at least one month before the financial year. But, if the financial year has begun, and urgent reasons have prevented the approval of the budget, the budget of the preceding year must be acted on in the proportion of one-twelfth (per mensem) until the issue of the new budget.

38. Every extra whose inclusion in the budget may be desired shall only be in accordance with the Statute and by decision of the Council of Ministers.

39. The proceedings for the approval of the budget shall be in accordance with the principals prescribed for the issue of Statutes, and it shall be voted on section by section.

40. The financial Statute shall remain effective immediately and operative until issue of regulations for its modification.

41. The audit of State accounts shall be by the examination of all the accounts of the Government, and the verification of the correctness of the entries concerning its receipts and disbursements in accordance with the rules of the Statute of this department.

42. The Ministry of Finance shall present to the Council of Ministers the final account of the financial administration for the past year with a view to its confirmation, within the first three months of the new financial year.

43. The budgets of departments independent of any of the Ministries, and their final accounts shall be dealt with under the same rules as apply to dealing with the State's budget and its final account.

#### PRESIDENCY OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS

44. It is the Chief Minister who directs the

general policy of the State, and ensures the direction and ordering and cooperation between the various Ministries, and guarantees the uniformity and unity of the operations of the Council of Ministers, and receives the high directions of His Majesty the King, in order to work in conformity therewith; and it is he who signs the decisions of the Council, and orders their communication to the various quarters. And his is the supervision of the Council of Ministers and the Ministries and the Public Departments; and it is he who controls execution of the laws and decisions which are issued by the Council of Ministers.

#### ADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENTS OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS

45. The arrangements of the Council of Ministers comprise the following departments: (1) the office of the President of the Council of Ministers; (2) the secretariat-general of the Council of Ministers; and (3) the branch of the experts. And the internal Statute of the Council of Ministers will contain a statement of the arrangements of these branches and their functions and the methods of their procedure in their operations.

46. Responsibility for the Office of Complaints and the Audit of the Public Accounts lies with the President of the Council of Ministers, in accordance with their special Statutes.

#### FINAL ORDERS

47. The Council of Ministers will approve this Statute, and refer it to His Majesty the King in order to obtain his high approval; and it shall be published, signed by His Majesty and Chief Minister.

48. After the promulgation of this Statute, the Council of Ministers shall begin to frame the following Statutes: (1) the internal Statute of the Council of Ministers; (2) the internal Statute of each of the Ministries; (3) the Statute for the administration of the provinces; (4) the Statute of the Municipalities; (5) the Statute for the trial of Ministers; and (6) the Statute for the sale and lease of State property.

49. This Statute shall come into force with effect from its issue and publication in the Official

Gazette.

50. This Statute cancels the Statute of the Council of Ministers issued on the date of Rajab 12, 1373 (March 14, 1954), and all laws and other decisions which conflict with its provisions and any other provision conflicting with it.

The royal signature: Sa'ūd.

Source: Philby, pp.318-323.

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