

# REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN THE GULF

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THE BACKGROUND  
TO THE FORMATION OF  
THE GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL

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## Acknowledgements

The bulk of this study was written during 1984 while I was a graduate student of the International University of Japan. My principal objective is to analyze comprehensively the political circumstances in the Gulf Among the variety of political phenomena in the Gulf, I particularly focused my subject on the formation of the Gulf Cooperation Council because I believe that there exist a lot of socio-political ingredients behind its establishment.

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Hiroyuki Abe  
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## Preface

The present volume is No. 9 in the Working Papers Series of the Institute of Middle Eastern Studies(IMES) International University of Japan(IUJ). the Author of this volume attempts to clarify the essential characteristics of the Gulf Cooperation Council(GCC) which was established by the Gulf countries in 1981. By making use of original materials in Arabic, the author makes an excellent analysis of the GCC from the viewpoint of the international politics of the Middle East. Readers of this volume may be able to obtain concise, but sufficient information about the GCC which is both very useful and helpful for an understanding of the present situation of the Gulf countries, and also helpful for our estimate of their future. Since the trends of the Gulf countries are an acute




reflection of the politico-economic state of the region as well as of the world, careful observation is always required. Therefore, the problems facing the Gulf countries and the GCC are important and merit continued study hereafter.

Mr. H. Abe, the author of this volume, is a research fellow of IMES at present, and is engaged in the study of Middle Eastern Affairs. He is a promising researcher with a fresh and keen perception in this field.

Akiro Matsumoto  
General Editor

MAP 1. Arabian Peninsula and the Gulf



Sources: Robert Litwak. Sources of Inter-State Conflict, Security in The Persian Gulf Vol. 2. London, Allandheld, Osmun, 1981. p.xii.

# Introduction

Among the various forms of regional integration in the world, the European Community ( EC ) has been most successful, having been able to achieve the unification of various economic policies and a substantial degree of economic integration. The success of the EC is more apparent than other attempts at unification because as history records, Western Europe was successful in establishing nation states far earlier than any other region in the world and as a result, today, the Western European states are all in an advanced, mature stage. Therefore, each nation became a politically integrated entity in Europe. And this fact enabled Western European nations to strive for cooperation at the regional level as well as the national level.

In the Middle East there have been such cases of regional integration as represented by the formation of

the Arab League in 1945 and the United Arab Republic between Egypt and Syria in 1958. However, such attempts have not succeeded due to the diversity and complexity of policies and the ethnic, religious, tribal and ideological composition of the inhabitants in this region.

Is it valid then to ask the reason for the new trend toward regional integration emerging in the Gulf<sup>1</sup> as exemplified by the formation of the GCC<sup>2</sup>? As the Middle East is located between the Western World and Asia and is close to the Indian Ocean, it is strategically important for both 'the free world' and 'the Communist world'. This classification of the world might be criticized as being oversimplified. Because of the strategic location of the region, the influence of Middle Eastern politics on international politics has inevitably been important for centuries. Though the western powers had influence on the Middle East for a long time, the situation has been reversed over the past few decades. With the emergence of nationalism in this region, the Middle East began to play an increasingly important role in international politics. Therefore, it is important to analyze the background and the significance of the GCC.

The most common approach in analyzing Middle Eastern politics is to view every political incident

occurring in the region as being closely related to the rivalry between the superpowers. With this approach, for example, it could be concluded that the Gulf nations established the GCC in order to eliminate the superpowers' interference, and to establish collective security among the GCC members themselves. There are, however, a number of other ways to evaluate the significance of the GCC. One may focus, for example, only on 'external threats' such as the Iran- Iraq War and assert that such threats are the main factor in the Gulf nations' attempt to achieve regional integration. It is also possible to maintain that the GCC was formed primarily to combat Iran's impact and her official policy of exporting the Islamic revolution. However, neither of these approaches sufficiently explains the real importance of the GCC. Focusing on the Gulf nation's attempt to counterbalance the bipolar system, as the sole reason for forming the GCC is insufficient as it does not take into consideration the domestic factors of each individual country, as well as the regional factors which obviously played a role in the formation of the organization. The terms 'external threats' and 'export of Islamic revolution' are frequently mentioned. However, these concepts do not aid deeper analysis. For the Gulf states, 'external

threats' actually jeopardize domestic security because they can have serious effects on internal destabilizing factors. The 'export of Islamic revolution' can also pose a real threat as the regimes cannot legitimize their 'Islamicity' because of the contradiction between Islām and rapid westernization. My view of this new attempt for regional integration is that the internal destabilizing factors in each country which have been generated by external factors like the Iran-Iraq war, have pushed the Gulf states to found the GCC in order to protect and maintain their current regimes. Therefore, it is important to analyze the GCC comprehensively at various levels and from many different aspects. In this analysis, the domestic problems of the GCC countries will be carefully examined in light of the Saudi Arabian case, because the Kingdom, as the most influential country politically and economically in the region, played a key role in the establishment of the GCC. An attempt will be made to clarify the Saudi role by analyzing each level, global (international), regional and domestic. The principal argument made here is that internal political factors were the primary motivation for the formation of the GCC. First, the polity of Saudi Arabia is examined in order to clarify the Kingdom's unique form of government.

Secondly, Saudi foreign policy including relations with the United States, the Soviet Union and European countries is discussed. Attention will be focused on those political conditions relevant to the formation of the GCC. The third topic to be discussed is the external threats perceived by the Gulf countries such as the Iran-Iraq war following the Iranian Revolution the latter of which has had both a direct and indirect influence on domestic destabilizing factors and was the strongest inducement for the creation of the GCC. Fourthly, the historical background and objectives of the GCC will be treated in order to illuminate the present GCC's function and basic problems. Finally, a comprehensive analysis is made of all the above arguments in order to demonstrate the limits of its functions, and also to show the inherent contradictions of the GCC on the international, regional, and domestic levels.

## REFERENCES

1. Both 'The Persian Gulf' and 'The Arabian Gulf' are frequently used in theses and dissertations on the Middle East. However, there exists a certain amount of confusion and disagreement over the use of these terms. The choice of terms in most cases represents the personal bias of the author i.e., a pro-Arab or pro-Iran stance. Hence, the term 'the Gulf' is adopted in this thesis to sidestep this problem.
2. The official name of the GCC in Arabic is 'Majlis Al-Ta'āwun li-Duwal Al-Khalīj Al-Arabīya' which is translated into English as 'The Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf'. The name demonstrates the GCC countries' intention to avoid the political expression 'Al-Khalīji Al-Arabī (The Arabian Gulf)' which might irritate Iranian feeling. In documents published by the Information Center at the GCC headquarters in Riyadh, the abbreviated expression 'Majlis Al-Ta'āwun Al-Khalīji (The Gulf Cooperation Council' is used and 'the GCC' is employed in this thesis).



## I

## The Polity of Saudi Arabia

There are several monarchies in the Middle East. Saudi Arabia is characteristic of these, a Kingdom which claims legitimacy primarily from Sunnī Islām. The King of Al-Saud is not only a symbol but also a real potentate who controls the reins of government. In this regard, Saudi Arabia is relatively different from the other monarchies of the Middle East. All sovereign power in Saudi Arabia is concentrated around the person of the king, the absolute monarch. At the same time, the king's power is theoretically limited by the Qur'ān (A sacred scripture of Islām) and the Sharī'ah (Islamic law). This is because the political legitimacy primarily from Sunnī Islām and has observed the Sharī'ah as the customary law, which encompasses all aspects of life. Professing to be the guardian of the holy cities of Islām, Mecca and Medina, Saudi Arabia

has been trying to maintain her religious legitimacy. In this chapter, the uniqueness of the Saudi polity will be illustrated.

### I-1. The Royal Family of the Kingdom

In the polity of the Kingdom, it is observable that the Royal Family, namely, the House of Saud plays a vital role. In fact, the ruling power of the House of Saud is quite extensive because its members occupy important positions in the government. The Royal Family, numbering around 5,000, originated from Muhammad Ibn Saud (who reigned 1744-1765) and founded the First Wahhabī Kingdom by an alliance with Imam Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703-1787), the founder of Wahhabism(Wahhābīyah: in Arabic). Puritanical Wahhabism accepted only the Qur'ān and Sunna and rejected any theological and mystical interpretations of Islam presented by Sufism, Islamic Mysticism (Tasawwuf: in Arabic). Muslims who opposed Wahhabism were regarded as sinners(Fāsiq:in Arabic). By the time Wahhabism had become the principle doctrine of the Kingdom in the 1920s, the House of Saud had already become corrupted, taking the position of moderate Wahhabism, much concerned about the rapid influx of western technology

such as the automobile, radio, television and telephone. Such imports of technology have caused resistance and complaints from rigorous Wahhabism-minded people. It is apparent that this is a dilemma for Saudi Arabia which has to maintain both Wahhabism and modernization, the latter of which inevitably introduces western values into the Kingdom.

Another contradictory factor for the Kingdom's legitimacy is the present local administrative system based on complex tribalism. Ibn Saud had utilized the Ikhwān (the Brethren in English), a religiously-oriented and politico-military force formed in order to create order in the Arabian peninsula. Ibn Saud succeeded in transforming the traditional tribal loyalty in to loyalty toward himself and unified such loyalty firmly, in order to strengthen the power of Ikhwān forces. Nevertheless, the Ikhwān because of its puntanical nature, strongly objected to Ibn Saud's policies, especially the decision not to confront the British, and as a result the Ikhwān confronted the House of Saud. The defeat of the Ikhwān by Ibn Saud became another built-in element for the destabilization of the Saudi political base because the imbalance of power and tension among the tribes has remained deep-rooted ever since. Consequently, since the establishment of the

Kingdom the House of Saud has had to continuously keep harmony and balance among the tribal powers.

The present Saud family seem to be relatively well-united, nonetheless, there are several examples of 'dissonance' among them. The first confrontation inside the Royal Family was the emergence of the 'Free Princes' around 1960. The representative of the 'Free Princes'<sup>1</sup>, Prince Talal Ibn Abd al-Aziz was born in 1931 a quite progressive and reformist thinker he was appointed as the Minister of Finance and National Economy and worked for an enactment of the constitution which turned out to be abortive. This internal disharmony had two important aspects for the future destiny of the Kingdom. Firstly, it was the first criticism of the regime from within, which called for the establishment of a constitutional monarchy.<sup>2</sup> As the second aspect, there existed a political confrontation or a battle for power between the King Saud and Crown Prince Faisal. It is evident that King Saud cooperated with Talal and other liberal princes attempting to take the political initiative away from Faisal, who was nominated as the Prime Minister by the Council of Royal Families and had substantial power. After the relations between King Saud and Talal deteriorated in 1962, the 'Free Princes' denounced the Saud regime. It

was, eventually, a political battle over supremacy in the Kingdom, not simply ideological incompatibility between members of the Royal Family. This contention has still not yet been solved and may flare up again as long as there are strong requests for popular participation in politics or the realization of a constitution. The assassination of King Faisal Ibn Abd al-Aziz (1964-1975) by Faisal Ibn Musaid, a nephew whose father was the fifteenth son of Ibn Saud <sup>3</sup> suggests another serious conflict in the Royal Family. The incident itself seemed to be solved by the beheading of Faisal bin Musaid whose motivation for the murder was seen as a personal grudge born from the death of his brother Khaled Ibn Musaid, shot by a policeman when he attacked a television station in 1969. Khaled Ibn Musaid had been opposed to the introduction of television which was perceived by religious and puritanical conservatives such as himself as contaminating the Islamic value of Wahhabism. The same kind of objection was raised in the case of the introduction of radio when public broadcasting was started in 1949. All these things indicate that western values which were introduced with modernization were and still are seen as cultural threats to Saudi Arabia because such western values are interpreted to be

against Islamic values. That is, it is vital for the government to promote modernization without conflict with the religious sector, however, this objective seems to be contradictory.

Discordance between 'modernizers' and 'conservatives' in the Royal Family,<sup>4</sup> particularly, since the end of the 1970s, is also perceptible. This kind of classification of the ruling elites may be oversimplified and ineffective in analyzing the power-struggle in Saudi Arabia, nevertheless, it should be noticed that in the decision-making line the concentration of power exists in the Sudairi brothers. Known as 'Sudairi Seven',<sup>5</sup> the King Fahd is the head of the 'modernizers'. The 'modernizers' are regarded as more progressive and positive the modernization. The other six brothers are, Sultan (Minister of Defence and First Vice Prime Minister), Na'if (Minister of Interior), Turki (Former Deputy Minister of Defence), Salman (Governor of Riyadh), Ahmad (Deputy Minister of the Interior) and Abd al-Rahman (Councillor of the Royal Family Affairs). Crown Prince Abdallah, the tenth son of Ibn Saud with his mother from the Shammar tribe, represent the traditional faction, which wishes to decelerate modernization. Abdallah is also the Commander of the National Guard (The White Army), a

loyal and faithful Bedouin force which defends the monarch. Whereas, the regular armed forces are controlled by the 'modernizers' faction. To keep the balance of power, therefore, both factions have a different military support.<sup>6</sup> It is ridiculous for both powers to struggle over the control of forces as such a military collision may be detrimental to the durability of the present regime. So far, the succession to the throne has not incurred any serious confrontation between members of the royal family, because each faction has realized that such a clear split in the family would be a direct threat to their power base as well as to the House of Saud itself. Consequently, the most crucial concern for the ruling elite is to evade any destabilizing elements that may injure the regime. Although there are various frictions and conflicts within the family, ideological contention, political confrontation and tribal antipathy are firmly recognized by them all as the most dangerous factors and threats to the Saudi dynasty. The problem is for how long can such a common recognition in the Royal Family continue? If confrontation comes to the surface in the future, there is no guarantee that the Royal Family will maintain its unified stance.

## I-2. The 'Ulamā'

The role of the 'Ulamā' (the Islamic religious scholars) in Saudi Arabia is significant in comparison with other politics in the Middle East. As mentioned, political power is concentrated with the King, nevertheless, the power of the King cannot transcend, in some points, the decision of the Grand Council of 'Ulamā's (Majlis Haiyat Kibār Al-'Ulamā: in Arabic), this point is quite different in the case of other monarchs in the Middle East. Thus, it can be regarded that the polity of the Kingdom is based on an equilibrium between the Royal Family, the tribal powers and the religious authorities, 'Ulamā. There exists some controversy whether the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is an 'Islamic state' governed by the holy Qur'ān. Be that as it may, it is also a fact that the judicial system is strictly based on Sharī'ah.<sup>7</sup> The 'Ulamā' have influence on the following fields.<sup>8</sup>

1. The judicial system of Saudi Arabia
2. The implementation of the rules of the Islamic Shari'ah
3. Religious Guidance Group with affiliated offices all over the Kingdom



4. Religious education, that is, Islamic legal education and theology at all levels in Saudi Arabia
5. Religious jurisprudence
6. Preaching and guidance throughout the nation
7. Supervision of girls' education
8. Religious supervision of all mosques in the Kingdom
9. Preaching of Islam abroad
10. Continuous scientific and Islamic research
11. Notaries public
12. The handling of legal cases in courts according to Islamic law

In the political foundation, the 'Ulamā', in particular, the members of the Āl al-Shaykh which is the family of the Wahhabi movement's founder, Muhammad Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhāb, have influence on the affairs concerning the decision-making of the Ministry of Justice, Higher Education, and Pilgrimage and Endowment. Furthermore, the 'Ulamā' can issue the fatwā (the religious opinion) which legitimates the political decisions of the Al-Saud because of their historical connection with the elite of the regime. Therefore, the Saudis can use the fatwā to legitimize their politico-religious authority by cooperating with the 'Ulamā'. However, there exists strict limits in the

role of the 'Ulamā', because they cannot abuse Islamic law arbitrary. With this strict reservation, it may be observed that 'Ulamā' reinforce the Al-Saud's interests. Although a lot of fatwās have been enacted before, there are some examples which explain the connection between the 'Ulamā' and the Sauds. The fatwā of March 29, 1964 which legitimated the transfer of power from King Saud to Crown Prince Faisal is one such example.<sup>9</sup> The second illustration is that there was a fatwā issued on November 20 and 24, 1979. The 'Ulamā' cooperated with the King to supply the legitimization for using force to suppress the dissidents who occupied the holy Ka'ba Mosque.<sup>10</sup>

Accordingly, the rulers of the Al-Saud have been undoubtedly pragmatic in employing the 'Ulamā' to make the Islamic value congruous with their political undertakings. This role of 'Ulamā' is naturally far from that of the past Wahhābī states and Hanbālī doctrine. It is apparent that the bureaucratization and centralization of government activities in the executive, legislative and judicial fields, and the prevailing westernization or secularization over Saudi Arabia are all undermining the influence of the 'Ulamā' and creating dissonance between the requirements of the traditional role of 'Ulamā' and their

present condition. As long as the regime continues to apply Islamic interpretations to its political decisions, doubts about the legitimacy of the Saudi dynasty will continue to persist, and this is most dangerous for the regime. At the same time, it is most important for the polity of the Kingdom whether religious legitimacy will continue to be compatible with political legitimacy.

#### REFERENCES

1. For details about Talal, see: David Holden and Richard Johns. The House Of Saud. London: Pan Book Ltd., 1981. pp.212-3.
2. Contestation over the establishment of the constitution and democratization has occurred several times in the past. In 1926, so-called 'Hijaz Constitution' was enforced, however, it was an incomplete one only aiming to make Hijazis content politically, not to realize popular participation in the democracy. In 1960, Radio Mecca announced that the constitution was made, nevertheless, it was aborted. Crown Prince Faisal tried to implement the 'Ten Point Statement' including the reformation of the legislative organization and the consultative council (Majlis al-Shūrā) in 1962. Both in 1975 and 1980, King Khalid and Crown Prince Fahd also articulated the political reformation. All these attempts were in vain. On December 2, 1984, it

was reported in The Sunday Times, London that the constitution would be enacted within three or four months. It demonstrates Fahd's efforts to democratize the politics to take a counterbalance among the modernizers and the conservatives.

3. For details about the backgrounds of the assassination of King Faisal, see: David Holden. op. cit., pp.381-3.
4. For detailed generalogical Tables of The Descendants of Al-Sa'ud, see: Brian Lees. A Handbook of The Al-Sa'ud Ruling Family of Saudi Arabia. London: Royal Genealogies, 1980.
5. For details about the Sudairi Tribe, see: Chuto Kyoryoku Center. Saudi Arabia no Tochikiko. Tokyo: March, 1982, pp.62-78.
6. For detailed about the Military Institutions in Saudi Arabia, see: Fouad Al-Farsy. op. cit., pp.69-72.
7. About the position of the 'Ulama' in the judicial system of Saudi Arabia, see: Metin Heper and Raphael Israeli, eds., Islam and Politics in the Modern Middle East, London: Croom Helm, 1984. pp.33-34.
8. See: Fouad Al-Farsy. op. cit., p.67.
9. For details concerning the fatwā at the time of transfer of power from King Saud to Crown Prince Faisal, refer to: "Documents: Transfer of Powers from HM King Sa'ud to HRM Amir Faysal ('64/3/30)", The Middle East Journal, Summer, 1964.
10. For more information about the fatwā to the Mecca Mosque Incident, refer to: Abd Al-Ansārī, Jarima Al-'Asr-Qissat Al-Ihtilal Al-Masjid Al-Haram (Today's Crime: Story of Occupation of Al-Haram Mosque), Cairo, 1980.

## II

### The Saudi Position in International Politics

When the Saudi position in international politics is examined, it is noteworthy that Saudi Arabia is a country which has an exceptional identity in the Middle East on which none of the other states can easily exert their power. The common belief among the states in the Middle East is that the present frontiers were drawn artificially by the imperialistic and colonialistic western powers. There is also a strong belief that the wealth of petroleum has been unfairly exploited by the western countries since it was discovered. Saudi Arabia also shares, more or less, some kind of blame i.e., discredit for the power diplomacy of the western countries.

Since the first oil shock in 1973, the oil-consuming, western allies have tried to diversify their oil-suppliers from the Middle East to other regions,

develop alternative energy resources and conserve oil however, western countries are still dependent on Middle Eastern oil. In particular, the superpowers have been approaching the Gulf in order to eliminate the threatened predominance by the opponent over the region. Nevertheless, such outside powers sometimes may upset the political stability of the region and place the Gulf states in a predicament or an impasse by adopting power diplomacy with the arms race and other irreconcilable policies. In this chapter, the first and second part will treat Saudi relations with the superpowers. The third part deals with the Saudi relations with European countries.

## II-1. Saudi-U.S. Relations

No one denies that there lie common interests between Saudi Arabia and the United States. Apparently, only Saudi Arabia can control its petroleum output capacity as a so-called 'swing producer' and have influence on the determination of oil prices. This is because Saudi Arabia produces about thirty percent of the total Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries' (OPEC)<sup>1</sup> oil production and supplies approximately ten percent of U.S. domestic

consumption.

It might be quite natural that there exists some arguments that the United States can hardly neglect the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia due to its responsibility for stabilizing the crude oil price, and subsequent economic security for 'the western countries'. On the other hand, some might argue that Saudi Arabia relies on the United States in order to stabilize its political basis, premising that the U.S. has been supporting the Kingdom since it lost the Shah in Iran.

In the framework of the U.S.-Saudi relations, how can we analyze the background to the founding of the GCC? Apparently, the GCC has consistently been advocating the elimination of superpowers' intervention and influence in the Gulf since it was established. At the same time, the GCC has never officially announced that there exist 'common interests' with the United States. However, it is a fact that Saudi Arabia started to increase its purchase of armaments from the U.S. dramatically in 1977. As a result, eighteen percent of the U.S. arms' supply was exported to Saudi Arabia. On the other hand, the United States reached a 'turning-point' in its Middle Eastern diplomacy with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1978 and the Iranian Revolution in 1979. One of the results of the

fall of the Shah in Iran was a change in the balance of power between the Soviet Union and the United States. Eventually, the United States started to diversify its foreign policy dramatically so as to encounter Revolutionary Iran and Soviet influence<sup>2</sup>, and to moderate the attitudes of some Arab countries against Israel so that this U.S. ally could reinforce its position. The first characteristic of recent U.S. diplomacy in the 1980s is the reinforced military presence in the region such as the establishment of the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) and the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) on October 1, 1981.<sup>3</sup> The purpose of the RDF is to prepare a trip-wire in the event of other military options' exercises with 200,000 combat troops with an additional 100,000 reservists who would have to be called up to support them.<sup>4</sup> The total military expenditures by 1986 is likely to be substantially more than 10 billion U.S. dollars.

As well as the augmented military presence in the Middle East, the United States has been maintaining a high-rate of economic aid which mainly consists of military aid towards moderate countries such as Egypt, Jordan, Pakistan, Turkey, Sudan and Saudi Arabia. In fact, 2,473 million U.S. dollars which is more than 70 percent of the total U.S. military assistance to



foreign nations was distributed to the Middle East, however, this includes 1,400 million U.S. dollars assistance toward Israel - 43.1 percent of the total<sup>5</sup>, which intensifies the military threat toward the neighboring Arab states, including Saudi Arabia, and increases obstacles to solving the Palestinian issue. The U.S. arms sales to Saudi Arabia was 18.3 percent of the total U.S. foreign military sales in 1981.<sup>6</sup> The supplies of F-15s and AWACS (Airborne Warning and Command System), inter alia, contribute to the defense ability of the Saudi regime.<sup>7</sup>

Not only military aid but also a large amount of U.S. technology is also understood as indispensable for strengthening the political and economic basis of the nation. At the same time, Saudi Arabia has guaranteed the oil flow, and has made a vast amount of direct investments in the West, mostly in the U.S. monetary market. Therefore, Saudi funds may be a leverage vis-a-vis the United States who anticipates more investments of Saudi surplus oil revenues. Judging from these facts, Saudi Arabia and the United States are interdependent economically and politically, though not on equal ground.

Analyzing these facts, it becomes clear that the objective of the GCC is not to seek new relationships

apart from the United States. Nonetheless, it is also not appropriate to judge that Saudi Arabia only depends on U.S. support. As the United States still heavily follows a pro-Israel diplomacy in terms both of military assistance and economic aid, Saudi Arabia whose fundamental ideology is Islām cannot excessively rely on the U.S. because the nation's *raison d'être* could be threatened. There is no doubt that the general sentiment among the Saudi people, realizing the direct threat from Israel, is far from 'pro-U.S.' Therefore, it is noteworthy that in terms of the Saudi-U.S. relations, the Saudi dependence on the U.S. will continue to be fundamentally unchangeable.

## II-2. Saudi-Soviet Relations

Soviet diplomacy toward the Middle Eastern is sometimes oversimplified in the expression 'toward the south' diplomacy. That is to say, it is said that the Soviet Union has many special interests in the Middle East, which include obtaining a powerful position in the Indian Ocean and the Middle East to increase her influence on the region's petroleum supplies, and to intensify her military expansion in the area to break anti-Soviet containment. It is, however, quite doubtful

whether the Soviet threat towards the Middle East based on her 'expansionism' can be really effective for analyzing Middle Eastern politics. In fact, the U.S.S.R. has apparently some influence on the peoples of the Democratic Republic of Yemen, Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Libya and Syria. Nevertheless, the Soviets have not succeeded in expanding their diplomatic leverage over the Gulf states. All these analyses and assumptions are based on western maneuvering of opinion, which attempts to attribute to Soviet intrigue any political changes in the Middle East which threatens the 'western world'. At the same time, it is hardly possible to mention that Saudi Arabia has a special relationship with the Soviet Union in its diplomacy. Historically, the Soviet Union was the first country in the world to recognize Ibn Saud officially as the new king of the Hijaz-Nejd in 1927. The Soviets as well as supporting the independence of the Arabs from European domination, were partly cognizant of their own large population of Muslims living in central Asia and the Caucasus.<sup>8</sup> In 1932 King Abd al-Aziz dispatched his son Faisal to Moscow. Even today both countries have still not exchanged ambassadors, nevertheless, they have been exchanging congratulatory addresses on various occasions such as

national independence day. Taking these facts into consideration, we can not decipher Saudi Arabia's motives in founding the GCC, to foster regional integration so as to weaken her excessive dependence on the U.S. and establish her own diplomacy.

Therefore, Saudi-Soviet relations can be interpreted as a diplomatic option which has increased Saudi autonomy, in particular, when Saudi-U.S. relations became prominent. It can be observed that one of the main aims of the GCC, 'the elimination of the super-powers' intervention in the Gulf' has an objective to strengthen of the independence of the regime, not to maintain the political balance between the U.S. and the Soviet Union.

### II-3. Saudi-EC Relations

European countries have long-standing historical relationships with the Middle East. At the same time, Europe is dependent on Middle Eastern oil at a much higher level than in the case of the United States. And the Middle East has been regarded as a large market for the military and other industrial goods from Europe. Therefore, it is natural that EC countries incline to make their own policies towards the Middle East

different from those of the U.S. In particular, on the Palestinian issue, there is a large gap between Europe and the United States. The November 1983 EEC declaration on the Middle East accentuated the fact that 'in the establishment of a just and lasting peace, account must be taken of the legitimate rights of the Palestinians'. Moreover, the June 1977 declaration stressed 'the need for a homeland for the Palestinian people'.<sup>9</sup> Since the Camp-David Agreements of September 1978, the Carter Administration made the Palestinian Problem more complex. When President Giscard d'Estaing visited the Gulf countries in March 1980, 'self-determination' as a right for the Palestinians was recognized diplomatically by France. Foreign Minister Genscher of the Federal Republic of Germany also showed his understanding of the need for a solution to the Palestinian problem.

When Washington broke off relations with Iran after the revolution and terminated her trade in April 1980, the European countries did not immediately follow the U.S. They felt the inconsistent policy of economic retaliation might disrupt and jeopardize Euro-Arab relations. Under such conditions, the interests of Europe and the Gulf states coincided. They started to strengthen new partnerships apart from the U.S. or

Soviet Union.

For instance, Saudi Arabia has diversified her sources of arms supply from the United States to European countries. France became a large supplier of armour and air defence, supplying 350 AMX-30B tanks, 200 AMX-10P Infantry Combat Vehicles, 96 Shahine air-defence missiles in 1982.<sup>10</sup> In addition, France is training the Saudi Navy. The Federal Republic of Germany received orders from Saudi Arabia for 240 Leopard II tanks and 100 Tornado fighters in 1981. These figures do not imply a full shift for Riyadh from the United States to Europe. Washington will continue to be an major guarantor. Nevertheless, Saudi-Europe relations will develop economically and militarily as long as Saudi Arabia continues her efforts to block Israeli expansionism, and as long as she has a sort of discontent with the U.S. concerning its reluctant political commitment towards a solution of the Palestinian Question<sup>11</sup>.

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### III

## The External Threat to Saudi Arabia

The overthrow of the Pahlevi regime in early 1979 and the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the September 1980 outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war had a traumatic impact on the Gulf states. The Islamic Revolution in Iran was perceived as an 'external threat' by the Gulf countries. This is because most of the conservative monarchies which rely for their religious legitimacy on Sunnī Islām regard the high percentage of Shī'ī population in their countries as channels through which the Islamic revolution could be exported. The Gulf regimes were terrified that such Shī'īs might rise up and provoke disturbances inspired by the success of the Islamic revolution in Iran. This same belief was shared by the Iraqi Ba'ath regime, which decided to open a war against Iran in 1980. The Gulf war or the Iran-Iraq war is still at dead-lock,



greatly tempting the weaponry-exporting countries in the world which expect a stable and continued demand for their arms.<sup>1</sup> The Gulf countries including small shaikhdoms, eventually, started to consider their own security problems and formed the Gulf Cooperation Council. In this chapter, the apprehensiveness of the Gulf countries towards 'external threats' will be examined. The first part will deal with the Iranian Revolution principally from the GCC stance. Secondly, the Iran-Iraq war will be treated as it is, a direct menace to the Gulf regimes.

### III-1. The Iranian Revolution

Even before the Iranian Revolution, there was social discontentment helping revolutionary or anti-regime movements in the Gulf. For example, unequal treatment of Shi'i peoples in the oil fields of the Eastern Provinces in Saudi Arabia had existed since the 1930s. It has already been argued in chapter one that tribal discordance was another example. The moral deprivation of the Royal Family started to be taken as another example in the Kingdom after the first oil-shock and resultant large accumulation of wealth. With this domestic background, some disturbances were

provoked in Saudi Arabia in November, 1979 in Ras Tannura and Abu Qaiq located in the Eastern Provinces where approximately 400,000 Shī'īs live. Another demonstration broke out in Qatif on February 1, 1980 this was on a large scale, celebrating the anniversary of Khomeini's return from exile. The common belief is that these series of uprisings were the simple results of Saudi Shī'īs response to Iranian propaganda denouncing the corruption of the House of Saud, inspired by Khomeini. For example, a group called the organization of the Islamic Revolution in the Arabian Peninsula stated 'the Islamic revolution in the Peninsula would continue to intensify until the tribal Al Sa'ūd regime was defeated and the Islamic republic established on the ruins of that oppressive regime.'<sup>2</sup> Teheran radio also severely criticized the Saud dynasty's delinquency in not sticking to Islam. Nevertheless, the principal factor is the continuance of social oppression on the Shī'īs who have been forced to live at the bottom of society and have been discontent with the Sunnīs domination for a long time.<sup>3</sup> Actually, most of the Shī'īs in the Eastern Provinces where there are many large oil fields, are working in the oil terminals or refinery plants and their socio-economic status is not as high if compared with that of non-Shī'ī inhabitants. It is

natural that Shī'īs felt discriminated against socially and were antagonistic towards the Sa'ūd regime which feared any sensitivity about discrimination in society.

At the same time, the Grand Mosque Occupation in Mecca broke out in November, 1979.<sup>3</sup> This was a protest against the moral depravation of the ruling dynasty and the erosion of Islamic values in Saudi Arabia. Led by Juhaïman Ibn Saïf al-Otaïbi, the armed intruders required the recognition of Muhammad Ibn Abdallah al-Qahtani as the Mahdī (The Righteous Guide). They were not Shī'īs, but Sunnī 'fundamentalists', the Salafīya. This incident was not directly influenced by the Iranian Revolution. Nevertheless, the most important fact was that the indigenous Sunnī revivalists and reformists confronted a regime which had been claiming religious legitimacy since its establishment. Another important fact was the coincidence of two domestic riots which indicated different sources of social discontentment with different social backgrounds, inspired by the success of the Iranian Revolution.

Saudi Arabia, which was regarded as the most strict Islamic country with its religious backbone of Wahhabism, had to confront factions who denounced the corruption of Al-Sa'ūd and called for the overthrow of

the regime just after the Iranian Revolution. Furthermore, the Iranian pilgrims engaged in political demonstrations, denouncing the United States and Israel and urging Saudi Arabia to join Iran against the United States. This quickly enlarged tension between Riyadh and Teheran. Therefore, the success of the Islamic Iranian Revolution which claimed a return to Islām, brought these domestic destabilizing elements emerge to the surface of Saud, political life.

Bahrain, with a more than 60 percent Shī'ī population, encountered more serious demonstrations in 1979 and 1980, which criticized the policies of the Al-Khalīfa Sunnī dynasty. The Iranian-backed Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain denounced the regime. With the revival of Iran's territorial claims to Bahrain, the consciousness of regional security intensified. In Kuwait, where the population of Shī'ī is around 30-40 per cent of the total population, there were also small demonstrations which called for the construction of an Islamic Republic led by Shī'ī and Iranians. The problem of domestic political instability in Kuwait is more serious than the other littoral states in the Gulf above all because of its small proportion of indigenous population. At the same time, the existence of a large population of Palestinians in

Kuwait is a specially sensitive internally issue.

Whether large or small, the Gulf regimes were forced to recognize their vulnerability with regard to domestic instability because of the influence of Iran. The Iranian Revolution had a great influence over the Gulf as a whole, but it mainly influenced the Shī'ī minorities. However, the influence will continue to be widespread even amongst the indigenous Sunnī populations. With this in mind, it is apparent that revolution can be exported through ideology as shown in the Iranian case. For example, the reorientation of radicalism and the revival of religious activism, expounded by 'Alī Sharīatī (1933-1977), an Iranian thinker, may provide the ideological foundations for revolution in the Gulf. It is this aspect that the Gulf regimes are mostly afraid of.

The Salafīya, one of the main streams of Islamic 'fundamentalism', insist on following the period of salaf (first generation of Islām), in short, according to their claims the salafīya is a movement for the purification of Islām. It originated from the same revivalistic ideas of the Hanbalī school, in particular, those of Ibn Taymīya (d. 728), the great Hanbalī jurist. The movement of Salafīya has often appeared in history and Wahhabism descends from this movement.

However, since King Abd al-Azīz compromised with the western powers and confronted the Ikwān revolt, Wahhabism split, into the original, fundamental and religious spirit, and the official Wahhabism which gave the Saud dynasty its political legitimacy. Consequently, the Salafīya and Wahhabism have become completely incompatible, because the Salafīya regards the Wahhabism of Al-Sa'ūd as having deviated from original principles.

### III-2. The Iran-Iraq War

Undoubtedly, the Iranian Revolutions impact upon Iraq was more serious than that of other Gulf states. Riots in Najaf, Basra, Karbala' and even in Baghdad have frequently broke out since the end of the 1970s. In Najaf, 3,000 Shī'ī were arrested and the Iraqi consulate was occupied in Khoramshahar. As more than 55 percent of the total population consists of Shī'ī, the Iraqi Ba'ath regime was confronted with a direct threat from the Shī'ī ruled Islamic state of Iran. If we attribute the Iran-Iraq war only to Saddam Hussein's personal anxiety about domestic instability amplified by Khomeini's challenge, it would be impossible to deduce why the war is perceived as an implicit menace,

particularly by the conservative Gulf regimes. Some hypotheses as to the background and causes of the Iran-Iraq war will be examined briefly in order to understand the effect of the war on the Gulf countries, in particular, Saudi Arabia.

The first hypothesis is that the the Iraq's attack was indirectly inspired by the United States. This hypothesis concludes that the United States aimed at solving the American Embassy hostage problem at the same time as enhancing her leverage in Iraq, whose relations with the Soviet Union had been deteriorating since 1978. The U.S. attempted to supplement the fall of the Shah with her own strategic approach to Iraq with the development of a new U.S.-led security policy in the Middle East. In fact, Washington had been selling her weaponry to Iraq despite the fact that she finally succeeded in reestablishing diplomatic relations with Iraq only in December 1984 after seventeen years' absence. However, when Iraq entered the war with Iran, it is quite doubtful that the United States really hoped to push Iraq to open a war against Iran because both the United States and Iraq did not have good diplomatic relations at that time. Washington might have been reluctant to have relations with the U.S.S.R. further deteriorate by interfering in Iraqi

policies by supplying a large number of weapons. Nevertheless, Soviet-Iraq relations have deteriorated in importance since 1979 when Iraq adopted her non-aligned policy seen in the 'National Covenant' proposed by Iraq in February 1980.<sup>4</sup> Since then, Iraq started to diversify her arms-supplies, the Iraqi Communist Party was suppressed, and Iraq began to make approaches to moderate countries like Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Morocco in order to strengthen her supremacy in the Middle East. Iraq's policy decisions from the end of the 1970s to 1980 were made with a complexity of motives in mind. Thus it is hardly possible to explain the outbreak of the war solely in the context of super-power confrontation or rivalry. On the contrary, it seems that Iraq opened the war against Iran with her own special political aims outside the influences of the superpowers.

The Second hypothesis sees the cause of the war from a nationalistic point of view for example as an Arab-Persian confrontation. Iraq vindicated her aggression in the name of pan-Arabism against Iran. Before Saddam Hussein decided to start an all-out war, it seemed that he anticipated that some uprisings would break out by Arabs in Khuzestan located in the southern part of Iran, in cooperation with Iraqi troops. Never-



theless, no riots were provoked in these regions after the Iraqi invasion. This may have been because most of the Arabs in Iran are Shī'ī and not the kind of Arab nationalist whom Saddam Hussein anticipated uprising against the Iranian regime.<sup>5</sup> Moreover, fury against the war started by Iraq, which made their lands battlefields and deprived them of their properties, occupied the minds of the Arabs in Iran. Another piece of counter evidence to the second hypothesis is related to the political split among the Arab states. Iraq had been a hard-liner, in alignment with Libya, she had opposed any U.S.-led Middle Eastern peace plan since the 1958 revolution, and demanded huge military assistance from the Soviet Union. However, the present situation has changed dramatically. Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Morocco are supporting Iraq with other Gulf sheikhdoms in the name of the 'Arab Cause'. Syria, Libya and Algeria have criticized Iraqi policies aggressively. This serious and paradoxical split among Arab states caused by the Iran-Iraq war seems an unlikely argument to positively support the second hypothesis.

Thirdly, the Shī'ī-Sunnī hostility between the two nations can be used for analyzing the war. However, there exist some contradictions in Iraq. That is, it is

estimated that more than 55 per cent of the Iraqi population consists of Shī'ī suppressed by a government which has opposed Shī'ī religious sentiments since 1921. Notwithstanding both nation's strong appeal as oppressed peoples historically ruled by opposite countries, it is noted that Shī'ī Arabs in Iran did not follow the Iraqi invasion and the Ba'ath regime still enjoys its national integration despite the stalemated war with Iran. Taking into consideration Iran denunciation of Saddam Hussein's tyranny and claims for the emancipation of the deprived people in Iraq in the name of Islām, the traits of religious war are noteworthy for analyzing the background of the war. Nonetheless, the religious and ideological confrontation between the two nations is much more complex and cannot only be explained in terms of the differences between the religious sects of Shī'ī and Sunnī.

There are also some hypotheses which attempt to elucidate the backdrop of the war, for instance, some accept the animosity between Saddam Hussein and Khomeini as the most principal cause of the war and the others make much of Saddam Hussein's personal ambition attempting to enhance his leadership role in the Arab world. These assumptions are not negligible, however, they are insufficient to offer a full explanation.

Furthermore, there exist several arguments which oversimplify the background of the Iran-Iraq war. For instance, some argue that the Iran-Iraq war reflects multitudinous ideological antagonism between Iran and Iraq, such as the radical, fundamental and revolutionary Islām of Iran versus the traditional, secularized and revised Islām conformed into the synthesized Sosialism and Nationalism of Iraq; the theocratic and clerical, political system versus the laicism and religious-separated political system; modernization compatible with indigenous culture versus western-oriented modernization. Furthermore, in a newly-borne state people have much more to hope for than to complain about, the pursuit of social equality and fairness is contrasted with a regime whose first priority is survival after 17 years in power since the 1968 coup. These categories are frequently adopted among people who believe that they can clarify the ideological divergences between the two countries.

The Iran-Iraq war should be analyzed comprehensively in the web of interacting ideological and social conflicts that exist between the two nations. Analyzing ideologically, Iran can be regarded as the Islamic Republic. On the other hand, Iraqi's ideology is based on Arab socialism. This ideological difference of the

two nations is the most important ingredient to understand the background of the war. To be more specific, the political progressiveness of Iran, supported by Syria and Libya, seriously threatened Iraq. Looking deeply into Iraqi policy, Iraq has been advocating Arab socialism and trying to establish its own polity with the strong leadership of Saadam Hussein and the Ba'ath party. Consequently, Iraq had been against Islām. As already mentioned before, more than 55 per cent of the Iraqi population consists of Shī'ī. This fact has become the most serious threat to the regime. Related to the Iranian revolution, the decisive incident was the execution of Ba'qir-as-Sadr who had been respected like Ayatollah Khomeini. Since then, schemes to execute Saddam Hussein have become frequent. Eventually, the political stability of Iran relatively strengthened the social status of Iraqi Shī'ī. It is assumed that the Iraqi attack on Iran was aimed at preventing a sudden increase of Shī'ī's influence on Iraqi society. Saadam Hussein must have assumed that the revolutionary regime in Iran would collapse because of its instability if Iraqi troops attacked the southern part of Iran where, it was said, the anti-governmental movement was severe. His move was most likely supported by the advice of the anti-Khomeini faction and the U.S. As a result, the war

between the two countries has continued unabated. Eventually, the real impact of the war will be for either country a decisive leverage on the ideology of the Gulf countries, in particular, if the war should end in victory for Iran. Saudi Arabia is a state which directly recognizes this threat.

The Iranian threat seems to spread over the Gulf, inter alia, over Saudi Arabia. The legitimacy of the Saudi reign was briefly discussed in chapter I, nonetheless, this part will deal with the religious legitimacy of the Kingdom, which is at present challenged by various ideologies internally and externally. Saudi Arabia was established with Wahhabism, founded by Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703-1792), an eighteenth century revivalist, who called for the return to the pure Islām. Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab emphasized the interpretation of tawhīd, the oneness of God, namely, the transcendence of God. He also underscored the responsibility of the individual believer, therefore, blind obedience to the traditional schools of law and thought and taqlīd (imitation of authorities in canonical matters) were eliminated in the course of studying two important sources of Islamic law and thought, the Qur'ān and the Sunnah. At the same time, he accepted 'ijtihād (independent legal judgement

or effort or ability to deduce rules from fundamental sources). Although these descriptions of the revivalistic movement are associated with politics ruled by religious fever, they contain the idea that admits realism and political flexibility. Ibn Taymīya (1263-1328), who gave basic inspiration to Abd al-Wahhab explained this as follows:

It is obvious that the [affairs of the] people can not be in a sound state except with rulers, and even if somebody from among unjust kings becomes ruler, this would be better than there being none. As it is said: 'Sixty years with an unjust ruler are better than one night without a ruler'. And it is related of [the fourth Caliph] 'Ali, May God Be Satisfied With Him, to have said that: 'The people have no option but to have a rulership [imarah], whether pious or sinful'. People asked him: We understand the pious, but why bother for the sinful?' He said: '[Because,] thanks to it, highways are kept secure, canonical penalties are applied, holy war is fought against the enemy, and spoils are collected' <sup>6</sup>

Actually, the political flexibility of Wahhabism has helped Saudi Arabia to consolidate its state power using rapid modernization and westernization, which as a result has accelerated social transformation in Saudi Arabia,<sup>7</sup> victimizing a large number of the poor, deprived and disaffected.

In this sense, there emerges a viewpoint among the fundamentalists that official Wahhabism as a means of legitimizing the Saud dynasty, has deviated from the

original and puritanical belief of the eighteenth century. In particular, a faction of the Salafīya, who provoked the Grand Mosque (Masjid al-Haram) occupation in Mecca in 1979, accused the present Saud regime on not being orthodox successors. The ideological strife held in the form of the Iran-Iraq war is not directly applicable to the Saudi case, nevertheless, the war has placed Saudi Arabia in an ideological predicament different from the case of Iraq.

Firstly, Iran proved that masses of deprived people could achieve revolution against regime by themselves in the name of Islām. The possibility of similar upheavals in Saudi Arabia was clearly shown by the action of religiously-inspired dissidents in the Grand Mosque Incident. Moreover, the Saud dynasty perceived the Iranian Revolution as a Shī'ī revolution and the Iran-Iraq war as a Shī'ī jihād (just war), both of which invigorated a large number of the Shī'ī population in the Eastern Provinces of the Kingdom. Ayatollah Khomeini exhorted the Shī'ī to abandon their age-old reluctance to say their prayers behind Sunnī leaders, known as taqīyah (expedient dissimulation), by a fatwā (legal opinion, responsum) issued in October 1979,<sup>8</sup> which infused the Shī'īs in Saudi Arabia with an ideological transformation. Consequently, Khomeini-type

'Neo-Islām' which was behind the success of the Iranian Revolution may be a strong inducement to revolutionary and reformative powers not only in Saudi Arabia but also in other Gulf states.

Secondly, the ideological challenge is relevant to the Islamic radicalism of 'Alī Shari'atī (1933-1977), a French-educated Iranian sociologist whose books are widely read. His thoughts are very popular among the raushanfikir, the modernist liberal intellectuals who oppose and fight traditional society with radicalism and religious activism with all its revolutionary implications. In Saudi Arabia, western-educated intellectuals and technocrats have rapidly increased, as in the case of Iran before the revolution. The equivalent thoughts of 'Ali Shari'ati, in the Sunnī context, would attract and offer a suitable ideology for the educated young, and the junior technocrats in the Kingdom, who are not satisfied with the present regime because of the lack of satisfying employment due to the reliance on an oil based, mono-cultural economy, and also because there are no opportunities for them to participate in the politics of the Kingdom. Stressing the world view of tawhīd (in his word, jahan-bini) and the abolishment of the status quo, 'Alī Shari'atī inspired the Iranian masses to join the revolution,



using a word, intizār (originally anticipation of the reappearance of twelfth Imam who was declared occulted) which is applied to a more radical connotation, 'revolution'. He said that 'Belief in intizar is belief in God's promise to the Muslims, in the final realization of the wretched masses' ideal and hope; in the final triumphant emergence of the classless society, a society freed from tyranny, injustice and deceit....'<sup>9</sup>

It is obvious that the thoughts of 'Alī Shariati were welcomed enthusiastically by Iranian intellectuals during and even after the revolutions grave political implications in Saudi Arabia and other sheikhdoms in the Gulf. Because the western-educated technocrats and intellectuals no longer follow traditional Islām as their fathers did, they are ready to accept the reinterpretation of Islām which Shari'ati produced in Iran. Modernization, which is proceeding at present in the Gulf countries, requires a number of such educated youths, thus, there exists a serious dilemma as explained above. The ideological challenges caused by the Iranian Revolution, contribute to expand the perception of authentic threats which aggravate and will continue to the domestic stability and continuity of the present Gulf regimes.

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## IV

### Establishment of the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (GCC)

There have been numerous attempts to realize regional integration including political federation and more functional cooperation in the Middle East, nevertheless, most of these attempts have been abortive due to ethnic diversity in the region, the Arab-Israeli conflict and other confrontations. Since the beginning of the 1980s, the regional dynamics in the Middle East have been transformed by the shift to 'radical' and 'moderate' alignments. The first of these regional alignments commenced with Libya's merger with Syria in September, and with Chad in November, 1980. The alliance of Libya, South Yemen, and Ethiopia is also considered as the first radical coalition, which confronts the second alignment. The second alignment embodies the regional integration of the 'moderate' countries in the Gulf and is called the Gulf

Cooperation Council (GCC).

This chapter will treat the GCC as a second regional alignment in order to examine the background of the GCC's creation. The first part will be devoted to the historical background of inter-Arab cooperation before the GCC's foundation. The second part will examine the organization and achievements of the GCC up to date. Thirdly, the structure of the GCC will be examined. In the final part, the internal problems which force the GCC will be discussed.

#### IV-1. Historical Background and Establishment of the GCC

##### 1) Historical Background

Since the middle of the 1960s, cooperation among the Gulf countries has taken various forms and has been at different levels such as political, economic, cultural, educational, technical, commercial, and military. The nature of the cooperation has differed depending on the interests of countries involved. The following is a list of examples of regional cooperation among the Gulf countries, including a series of joint ventures.

- 1945 League of Arab States
- 1950 Arab Joint Defence and Economic Cooperation Pact
- 1951 General Union of Chambers of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture for Arab Countries
- 1953 Arab Economic Council
- \* 1960 Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
- \* 1961 Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development
- \* 1962 General Petroleum and Mineral Organization (PETROMIN)
- 1964 Arab Economic Unity Council
- 1965 Arab Common Market
- 1967 Arab Organization for Standardization and Metrology
- 1968 Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries
- 1969 Industrial Development Center for Arab State
- 1970 Inter-Arab Investment Guarantee Corporation (its operation started in 1974)
- \* 1971 Abu Dhabi Fund for Arab Economic Development
- 1973 Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development
- 1973 Arab Maritime Petroleum Transport Company
- 1974 Arab Shipbuilding and Repair Yard Company
- 1974 Arab Federation for Chemical Fertilizers
- 1974 Islamic Development Fund
- 1974 Arab Investment Company
- \* 1974 Saudi Development Fund
- \* 1974 Iraqi Fund for External Development

- \* 1974 Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development
- \* 1975 Arab Petroleum Investments Corporations
- \* 1975 Arab Company for Agriculture and Food Production
- \* 1975 Islamic Development Bank
- \* 1975 Gulf International Bank
- 1976 Arab Monetary Fund
- 1976 Arab Petroleum Services Company
- 1976 Arab Satellite Communication Organization
- \* 1976 Arabian Gulf Organization for Industrial Consultation
- \* 1976 Gulf Organization for the Development of Egypt
- \* 1976 Saudi Basic Industries Corporation (SABIC)
- 1977 Arab Organization for Mineral Resources
- \* 1977 Gulf Arab News Agency
- \* 1980 Gulf Arab University
- 1980 Arab Economic and Social Council

This array of regional economic cooperation projects include a number of Arab joint ventures and public consultative organizations, however, they exemplify Arab efforts to develop economic integration from mere trade liberalization to joint investment.<sup>1</sup> Within the framework of the Arab League to create a future strategy for Arab economic integration, some basic concepts were approved by the first Arab

economic summit meeting held in Amman, Jordan, in November 1980. They were as follows:<sup>2</sup>

- a) The maximisation of the flow of capital surpluses for national and regional investments, with a view to developing an integrated and self-sustaining productive base which would strengthen the economic structure of the countries concerned, and achieve a balanced growth in both geographic and economic terms.
- b) The development of manpower resources to meet regional requirements in the long-run, through joint vocational and training programmes.
- c) The creation of an indigenous technological base, through pooling and co-ordinating national programmes for developmental research.
- d) The creation of an efficient common infrastructure.

In the above chart, the asterisk mark indicates Gulf-oriented cooperation. As is clear from this chart, since 1973 the amount of Gulf orientated cooperation has increased, particularly in comparison with the development of cooperation at the Arab League level. Several factors caused the increase of Gulf-oriented economic integration. Firstly, new inter-Arab stratification was one of the results of the enormous accumulation of wealth in the Gulf countries after the first oil-shock. Secondly, the Arab League was split between 'moderates' and 'radicals' because of the Camp David Agreement and the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty at

the end of 1970s. The influence of the Arab League was split politically and economically between the Gulf countries and the other countries in the Middle East. In such circumstances, it was observed by the Gulf states that the Arab League did not function efficiently to form a barrier against the threat from the Iranian Revolution. The way in which the Gulf states perceived the Iranian Revolution has already been discussed in chapter III.

The series of past cooperation projects initiated by the Gulf states have attained only partial economic integration, they have incurred various setbacks, illustrated by the case of ASRY.<sup>3</sup> The establishment of the GCC in 1981 can be observed as a new type of regional cooperation among the Gulf states each of which have different aims and expectations.

## 2) Establishment of the GCC

Since the beginning of the 1970s, both bilateral and collective economic agreements among member states have been concluded. They are:

- 1) June 30, 1973 The Economic Cooperation Agreement between Kuwait and U.A.E.
- 2) March 23, 1975 The Economic Cooperation Agreement between Kuwait and Saudi Arabia



3) April 12, 1975 The Economic Agreement between  
Saudi Arabia and Bahrain

Not only have these above agreements been signed but also a number of corporations and organizations have been set up which aim to promote collective cooperation. Under such conditions, more integrated and efficient forms of cooperation in the Gulf have been anticipated for the future. A preparatory meeting was held during the third Islamic Summit Conference in Taif from January 17 to 22, 1981 among leaders of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, U.A.E., Qatar, Bahrain, and Oman. A meeting of the foreign ministers of these six countries was held in February 1981. The Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (GCC) formally came into existence on May 26, 1981 when a meeting of its Supreme Council was held in Abu Dhabi.

#### IV-2. Objectives of the GCC and its Nature

According to the Charter of the GCC, the basic objectives of the GCC are specified in Article 4 as follows:<sup>4</sup>

1. To effect coordination, integration and inter-connection between member states in all fields in order to achieve unity between them.

2. To deepen and strengthen relations, links and the scope of cooperation now prevailing between their peoples in various fields.
3. Formulate similar regulations in various fields including the following:
  - a. Economic and financial affairs
  - b. Commerce, customs and communications
  - c. Education and culture
  - d. Social and health affairs
  - e. Information and tourism
  - f. Legislation and administrative affairs
4. Stimulate scientific and technological progress in the fields of industry, mineralogy, agriculture, water and animal resources; the establishment of scientific research centers, implementation of common projects, and encourage cooperation by the private sector for the good of their peoples.

Viewed from the above official objectives, the Gulf states underscored their hope of further cooperation in various fields except defense affairs. As long as the GCC pursues its independent form of integration, interest in stability and security matters is inevitable. The lack of mention of defence matters in the Charter though, suggests the sensitivity of this issue. The GCC has frequently mentioned its concerns about the security matters. The real weight of concern of the Gulf regimes can be observed in the final declaration of the second Supreme Council, it was expressed that:<sup>5</sup>

- 1) The GCC discussed "all attempts by other powers to create positions for themselves in the Gulf area to threaten its security and sovereignty." and rejected "these attempts which are dangerous to the area and its people."
- 2) The GCC expressed "its opposition to the attempts of the great powers to interfere in the affairs of the area which will involve it in a conflict not in accord with the interests of its States and the will of its people."

In this declaration, the GCC demonstrates its neutral position from the bipolar system and strong awareness of the need for Gulf security. Apparently, the defence and security of the Gulf region comprise one of the main motive forces behind the establishment of the GCC.

The first joint military exercise among the six members of the GCC was held in Abu Dhabi in October 1983. At the same time, the GCC was trying to create a joint committee to coordinate defence policies and set up an indigenous arms industry. The GCC's Secretary General, 'Abdulla Bishara proposed his view in a press interview in July 1981, as follows:<sup>6</sup>

- 1) Gulf states do not believe that Western security assistance would be the best way to ensure the outflow of oil from the Gulf. On the contrary, they believe that the U.S. Rapid Deployment Force would directly or indirectly invite the Soviet Union to intervene in the area.
- 2) The GCC is in favor of "Gulfanization" of Gulf security; that is, this security should be left

to the people of the Gulf alone. A threat to the stability and internal security of any GCC member is therefore considered a threat to the stability and internal security of all members.

This statement clearly indicates that the Gulf states realize the real threat, their security, namely, the threat of Iran, not of the superpowers. There have also been attempts to further cooperation in internal security matters. In particular, following a coup attempt in Bahrain in December 1981, the member states signed bilateral pacts to ensure internal security. The Interior Ministers of the GCC held their first meeting in January 1982 and decided to establish a Standing Committee to coordinate matters relating to internal security, including the question of unification of passport, nationality and identity card systems, they also discussed the issue of extradition of criminals and exchange of security information. Saudi Arabia is playing a main role in integrating security arrangements with the other Gulf states. As a further development, in November 1982, a joint Gulf defence plan was finally approved.

Notwithstanding its efforts, the GCC does not seem able to build, train or equip a defence force capable of repelling aggression, not least because of the lack of manpower. After all, they have to depend heavily on

sophisticated western weaponry such as land-based anti-aircraft and marine missile defence networks. Moreover, it is also a conspicuous fact that the GCC relies on U.S. military support, seen in Saudi Arabia's cooperative relations with the U.S. Army Corp of Engineers. As it is contradictory for the GCC to rely on the U.S. too heavily, some controversy has emerged among its members.

#### IV-3. Structure of the GCC

##### a. Supreme Council

As shown in chart 2, Structural Organization, the Supreme Council is the highest decision-making body of the GCC. By 1984, five Supreme Council meetings had already been held. Its members are the rulers of six GCC countries. Regular sessions are held once a year and emergency meetings can be called at the request of a member state seconded by another state. The Commission for the Settlement of Disputes is attached to the Supreme Council in order to settle disputes between member states.

##### b. Ministerial Council

The Ministerial Council is composed of the Foreign

Ministers of the member states or other delegated ministers. Regular meetings are held every three months and extraordinary sessions can be called at the request of any two member states as in the case of the Supreme Council. The Ministerial Council formulates policies, recommendations and legal drafts for promoting cooperation among the member states.

#### c. Secretariat General

The Secretariat General is conducted by a Secretary General whom the Supreme Council nominates from among the nationals of the member states.

#### d. Ministerial Committees

At the first GCC summit meeting held in May 1981, specialized committees at the ministerial level were founded. In fact, committees at every ministerial levels have frequently been held in order to promote better coordination and policy-making among the members.

Under the Secretariat-General, there are five Directorates of: 1) Financial and Administrative Affairs; 2) Legal Affairs; 3) Environment and Human Resources; 4) Economic Affairs; and 5) Political Affairs

as well as the independent Information Center. There are also twenty one departments controlled by these Directorates.

#### IV-4. Problems of the GCC

In March 1983, the first stage of the GCC Economic Agreement went into effect and various modes of economic cooperation were positively promoted. Not only in the economic field, military cooperation such as the formation of an integral Gulf defence force was also advanced. However, behind these vigorous efforts among the members, some problems pertaining to the GCC's policies have been highlighted by various scholars.

##### 1) Membership of the GCC

The GCC was set up by only six of the Gulf states without Iraqi and Yemeni participation. The charter of the GCC lacks an article which accepts the participation of new members. Dr. Adil al-Tabatabā'i, a professor of common law in the faculty of law and Shari'a at Kuwait University, proposed that Iraq should be included in all ministerial committees.<sup>7</sup> Dr. Abdul Muhsin Taqiy Muzaffar, Secretary General of the Arab

Institute of Planning, noted that "the absence of Iraq and the two Yemens from the new council might widen the gap between the rich and the poor in the Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula, which might in future obstruct the lower levels of cooperation and integration within the Arabian Peninsula alone."<sup>8</sup> A North-Yemeni magazine 'Al-Hurriya (The Freedom)' denounced the exclusive tendency among the six coalition states, stating that their action could threaten Arab mutuality. At the same time, the magazine stressed that regional security for the Arabian Peninsula could not be achieved without the participation of all countries in the region, pointing out Yemen's affluence in human resources and her geopolitical importance.<sup>9</sup> Iraqi Foreign Minister, Sa'dūn Hamādī was interviewed in London in March 1981 and commented that the Cooperation Council was an attempt to disregard and emasculate the Arab League.<sup>10</sup> Apparently, this statement reflects the idea that the GCC was formed because of the malfunction of the Arab League. However, Iraq has received a huge amount of economic assistance from the Gulf states, assistance which has been necessary for Iraq to continue the war with Iran. The GCC states of course are pleased to continue to aid Iraq, afraid of the Iranian ideological threat of revolution. Here then, there is ground to



harmonize their policies with Iraq which has claims pan-Arabism, aiming to become the potential Arab leader and the GCC countries who inevitably wish to form a regional block against Iran.

## 2) Absence of Political Aspects

Dr. Omar Ibrahim al-Khatīb presented his analysis of the GCC in 'Al-Khalīj' newspaper on September 1, 1981.<sup>11</sup> Firstly, he criticized the GCC's lack of concern to build common objectives or to have a permanent written constitution which is indispensable for modern, independent and sovereign states. At the same time, he stressed the importance of democratization based on parliamentary organizations through free and direct elections. According to Dr. Omar's opinion, Dr. Al-Nafisi added that popular participation in government is the most crucial factor for domestic security. If the government eliminates opposition sects or opinions and only adopts formal and incomplete forms of democracy systems, the discontentment among the people could be wide-spread and may cause political instability.

There are also several issues which are incompatible with the GCC's formal position, such as:

- a) Dissonance in oil policies among the members despite unified oil policies agreed in the Unified Economic Agreement of the GCC.
- b) Disharmony in security policies in spite of official neutral policies, some states offer military facilities to outside powers. Moreover, there are no official statements condemning the U.S. military presence, nevertheless, the GCC denounced the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

In addition to these self-contradictory factors, Saudi economic power and the strength of her political influence could also be said to hamper the establishment of equal partnership among all the member states. Consequently, the future success of the GCC is dependent on how it will be able to overcome these political difficulties.

## REFERENCES

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2. *ibid.* p.79.
3. Though ASRY (Arab Shipbuilding and Repair Yard Company) was established in Bahrain, Dubai constructed her own dock in Dubai. For details, see: Emile a. Nakhleh, The Persian Gulf and American Policy, New York: Praeger, 1982. p.45.
4. See Appendix 2, CCharter of the GCC.
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8. *ibid.*, p.67.
9. Abdallah al-Nafisi, Majlis al-Ta'āwun li-Duwal al-Khalīji al-Arabī, London: Ta-Ha Publishers, 1982. p.15.
10. *ibid.*, p.15
11. *ibid.*, p.16.

## V

## Analysis of the GCC's Establishment

Numerous factors concerning the Gulf countries have already been examined. In analyzing these factors, my position has been clear, external threats like the Iran-Iraq war stimulated and aggravated domestic destabilising factors in each Gulf country. As a result the Gulf countries were prompted to found the GCC in order to protect their regimes and to maintain political continuity.

This chapter will examine the political environment contributory to the establishment of the GCC, on three levels, namely; 1) the international 2) the regional, and 3) the domestic level. A systematic and comprehensive analysis will be attempted. At the same time, the positive political initiative of Saudi Arabia in the creation of the GCC will be carefully studied.

## V-1. Analysis at the International Level

There were several factors which induced the Gulf countries to establish the GCC at the international level. They can be classified into two major factors; 1)superpower rivalry, 2)new dependency on the West.

### 1) Superpower Rivalry

Since the GCC was established it has frequently emphasized its neutral diplomacy. It is obvious that the GCC regards the rivalry between the superpowers, with their aim of establishing worldwide hegemony, as one factor inducing political tension in the Gulf. The GCC believes it has a duty to eliminate interference by such foreign powers.

The détente seen in East-West relations in the 1970s has deteriorated rapidly since the Iranian Revolution in 1979, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the birth of the Reagan Administration. Partly because of United States, emphasis on the Soviet threat to the free world, and partly because of her advocacy of the reinforcement of the western alliance, and increased military power in order to protect her interests in the Middle East, the Gulf has become a

focus for the superpowers' strategic rivalry. And especially, military tension in the Gulf has been intensified by the stalemate of the Iran-Iraq war. A glance at recent diplomatic maneuverings by the superpowers reveals that their intervention in the Gulf does not solve even fundamental problems. It merely increases armaments expenditures, as seen in the case of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and exacerbates the political impasse.

U.S. diplomatic failure was prominent in her abandonment of the Shah, which raised serious doubts about U.S. credibility. It is a natural that the Gulf countries have become aware that the capability of the United States for risk management in the Middle East has deteriorated, in particular, since the failure of the U.S. Embassy hostage rescue operation.<sup>1</sup> Consequently, in such an international context, it is perceived that the GCC aims to cope with their collective security problem by strengthening regional integration, though they still have to depend on the United States as a major weapon supplier. The disharmony over the shape of Middle Eastern diplomacy between Western Europe and Washington also helped the foundation of the GCC by giving it maneuvering power to take different political options, to create distance

from the bipolar system and to approach Western Europeans, who are better qualified than Americans to apprehend the web of religious, cultural, economic and social factors relevant to any phenomena in the Middle East.<sup>2</sup>

## 2) New Economic Primacy of the West

Saudi Arabia increased exports to other GCC member states, mostly crude oil, from 152 million U.S. dollars in 1971 to 3,020 million dollars in 1981, a twentyfold expansion in only ten years. Imports, mostly food and industrial commodities, from other GCC member states expanded from 39 million U.S. dollars in 1971 to 480 million U.S. dollars in 1981, an approximately twelvefold increase. Since petroleum is one principal product that can be exported among the member states, these figures illustrate that interdependence in the Gulf has heightened dramatically.

At the beginning of the 1970s, the Bretton-Woods system, which had been led by U.S. economic power, collapsed following the first oil-shock, and the world economy entered into a prolonged period of stagnation which has lasted up to the present day. In the face of emerging trade protectionism, the free trade system has

been facing many difficulties and economic security has become an imperative factor for the world. OPEC's influence rose from 1974 to 1979 and the Gulf countries were able to promote modernization and development plans using their immense oil revenues. Subsequently, because of the slowdown in the world economy and the decreasing dependence on oil among the oil-consuming countries, OPEC lost its monopolistic power over the market. As a result, the GCC countries, were forced to discount crude oil prices in March 1983<sup>3</sup> and scale down their development plans. They now aim to recover their political and economic influence by strengthening regional integration and cooperation. The United Economic Agreement in 1981 and the creation of the Custom Union and the Gulf Investment Organization demonstrate this intention.

From the economic aspect, the oil-producing countries exploited by the major western international oil companies from the time oil was discovered in the Middle East until OPEC was established in 1960. Even though OPEC dramatically recovered its negotiating power in relation to the oil-consuming countries and the so-called 'Majors', namely, the multinational petroleum corporations, in the 1970s, conditions for the primacy of the West gradually formed in the societies



of oil-producing countries. In fact, the enormous oil revenues made rapid modernization possible. However, this process concomitantly accelerated the disintegration of the farmer stratum. Because of the asymmetric distribution of oil wealth there exist in the oil rich Gulf countries, relatively poor classes, like the Bedouin. Such expanded social inequality is attributable to the fact that the Gulf countries have been incorporated into the modern economic system led by the West. In this sense, the wealth made by the increased oil price did not improve the Gulf states' stand towards the economic primacy of the West. On the contrary, new conditions, were created, by which the Gulf states depend on the West far more than the West does on them. Therefore, the GCC serves as a counterbalancing power to the longstanding dependency on the western world by strengthening Gulf inter-state cooperation in various fields.

## **V-2. Analysis at the Regional Level**

Analysis at the regional level is indispensable for illuminating various political phenomena in any part of the globe. In some of previous works on the Middle East, however, there is a tendency for each

phenomenon to be exaggerated and over-anthropomorphized through sole investigation of the process by which foreign policies are made. Moreover, the interpretation of each phenomena is often distorted and misleading.

If the creation of the GCC is to be analyzed at the regional level, several factors have to be looked at in order to understand the total picture. They are;

- 1)The Iranian Threat
- 2)Polarization of the Arab system
- 3)Territorial disputes
- 4)Saudi political ambitions.

#### 1). The Iranian Threat

The complex background of the Iran-Iraq war has already been discussed in chapter 3. At the regional level, the GCC is perceived as a political option for the Gulf states to help prevent 'external threats' destabilizing their regimes. In this approach, 'external threats' seem to include the so-called 'export of Islamic revolution' from Iran. Regional confrontations or conflicts are chiefly focused on and considered as main causes for phenomena in the inter-state relations at the regional level. In the case of the GCC, observers tend to conclude that the Gulf countries achieved their regional integration to prevent the spread of Iranian influence, which they

feared may prompt revolutionary sentiment among peoples of their own countries. However, as argued in chapter 3, encouragement from the outside only works when there are inherent social conditions for revolutionary or anti-regime movement?

Therefore, it is also possible to argue that the 'external threats' actually exist within the Gulf regimes. For the internal conflict between religious legitimacy and the maintenance of power is one which itself causes instability and destabilization. If we regard Shī'ī disturbances provoked in the Gulf states concomitant to the Islamic revolution in Iran as simple responses to 'Khomeini's propaganda', this coincides with the regimes' perceptions, but such an analysis cannot reveal the true significance of the disturbances. The Shī'ī riots in the Gulf countries must be seen through the fact that there exists long-standing social oppression of the Shī'īs in Sunnī-ruled countries. Thus, it should be noticed that feelings of resentment among Saudi Shī'īs, (who although traditionally living in the oil fields have always been deprived of any wealth), came to a peak and finally exploded, inspired by the rising "Islamization" of Iran. In this respect the GCC was founded to lay a common framework for collective endeavors in order to confront 'external

threats', for each member state regards the threats to each one to be common in their nature.

## 2). Polarization in Arab System

The second aspect of our analysis looks at the creation of the GCC in terms of the political intention of the Gulf states, in particular Saudi Arabia, to create a 'moderate block' in the Arab world. Behind the creation of this 'moderate block' exist severe contentions among the Arab states, to do with the balance of power within the Middle East. The Cairo-Riyadh-Teheran Axis became redundant after the Iranian Revolution and Al-Sadat's unilateralism changed the Arab balance of power, and contributed to the formation of an Iraqi-Saudi-Jordanian Axis in 1980.<sup>4</sup> Iraq's changed position in the Arab system from a 'hard-liner' to a 'moderate' country pushed Syria to form a counter-vailing alignment with Libya. This aimed to offset the power and influence of the Iraqi-Saudi-Jordanian alliance. However, the Iran-Iraq war turned the latter in to a sort of alignment for war against Iran than a political route for the reconstruction of the Arab system. Although the Iranian diplomacy is neither pro-West nor pro-East, Syria and Libya, the most radical and pro-Soviet hardliners in the Arab system are

support Iran. This is the point, of which Saudi Arabia is most afraid of a clear split in the Arab system. Recognizing this split in the 1980s, Saudi Arabia took the option of strengthening her relations with other Gulf countries by forming the GCC in order to consolidate a 'moderate' faction, even though the GCC is criticized as a bloc against the Arab League.

### 3) Territorial Disputes

Territorial disputes can also be categorized into two, i.e., inter-Gulf disputes and disputes with the non-Gulf states.<sup>5</sup> Although these territorial disputes have been regarded as a serious impediment for cooperation among the Gulf countries, the GCC was formed. This is because there exist other incentives stronger than the problem of territorial disputes. At the same time, the Gulf countries have tried to create a common forum for solving such disputes. This is demonstrated by two significant examples, the solutions to the disputes between Bahrain and Qatar, and Saudi Arabia-Kuwait.

The Gulf-non-Gulf disputes can be observed as those between small Sheikdoms and the two big neighboring states, Iran and Iraq. In this sense, the GCC contributes to solve threats towards the Sheikdoms by

consolidating their power and coping with these disputes collectively. Threats towards small Gulf countries exist, and can be seen by the fact that Iran never abandoned her claims to the three small islands in the Gulf even after the Revolution. Furthermore, in addition to Iranian ideological claims over the Gulf states, Iranian expansionism is unlikely to decline. While, Iraq reconciled with Saudi Arabia on their territorial problem in 1979, this was as a result of Saudi Arabias decision to give financial assistance to Iraq, which was and is necessary to maintain the war with Iran.

### 3)-a. Inter-Gulf Territorial Disputes

#### Bahrain-Qatar

One of friction between these two countries comes from the question of the Hawar islands, situated about 2.4 kilometers off the west coast of Qatar, at present administered by Bahrain. Another question is Bahrain's claim to Zubarah, on the a north-western coast of Qatar. (See Map 2) In March, 1982 the GCC ministerial council persuaded both countries to maintain the status quo.

### Qatar-Abu Dhabi-Saudi Arabia

There exists a triangular dispute over the Khaur al-'Udaid inlet to the south-east of Qatar. (See Map 2) Saudi Arabia asserted her own territorial claims to the Liwa Oasis in Abu Dhabi in 1970.

### Saudi Arabia-U.A.E.


A long-standing dispute over sovereignty of the Buraimi Oasis (See Map 2) was settled by an agreement in August, 1974. Saudi Arabia made a renunciation of her claim to the Buraimi Oasis and obtained the Zarrara field and the Khaur al-'Udaid from Abu Dhabi as a quid pro quo.

### Oman-U.A.E.

Ras Musandam, located in the northern part of Ras al-Khaimah (See Map 2), has been a source of dispute between Oman and U.A.E. The Abu Dhabi government announced the settlement of this problem on April 7, 1981.


### Saudi Arabia-Kuwait

The 'Uqair Treaty of December 2, 1982 established the Kuwaiti-Saudi neutral coastal zone to the south of Kuwait. (See Map 4) In the 1960s, both countries agreed






MAP 3. Bahrain - Qatar - U.A.E. - Iran



Sources: Alan. J. Day. Border and Territorial Disputes.  
Gale Research Company, 1982. p.212.



and completed the allocation of territories. However, there still remain Saudi claims to the islands of Qaru and Umm al-Maradin (See also Map 4), located respectively 37 kilometer and 26 kilometers off the coast of the northern part of Saudi Arabia.

There have been also intra-U.A.E. border disputes among seven emirates. The claims over the continental shelf boundary have remained unresolved among the Gulf states for a long time because of the considerable offshore oil resources in these areas.

### 3)-b. Gulf-Non-Gulf States Territorial Disputes

#### Iraq-Kuwait

Just after Kuwait gained independence on June 19, 1961, Iraqi Prime Minister Abdal Karim Qasim raised the claim of Iraqi sovereignty over Kuwait, regarding Kuwait as an "integral part of Iraq". In 1963, the tension between the two countries eased concomitant with the Iraqi revolution of February 8, 1963. Iraqi concern was to obtain access to the Gulf through the islands of Warbah and Bubiyan. (See Map 4) In March, 1973, Iraqi forces occupied Kuwaiti posts at al-Samtah, however, they soon withdrew because of the strong

disapproval of other Arab countries. Iraq claimed that Kuwait could have a 99 years lease of half-Bubiyan if she ceded of Kuwait sovereignty over Warba in May, 1975 in return. The same Iraqi claim was revived by Saddam Hussein in July 1981. However, Kuwait has been against the Iraqi proposal up to date.

#### Iraq-Saudi Arabia

Territorial rivalry originated from the period of independence of both countries following the collapse of Ottoman Empire. In 1922, Iraq and Saudi Arabia concluded an agreement, which created a neutral zone. On December 26, 1981, both states agreed to fix the border between the two countries. (See Map 4)

#### Iran-Bahrain

Long-standing Iranian revanchism over Bahrain was settled in 1970 when the Iranian government of the Shah endorsed a United Nations Security Council resolution affirming the full independent sovereignty of Bahrain. Nevertheless, after the revolution Ayatollah Sadeq Ruhani reaffirmed Iran's claim to Bahrain. On December 13, 1981, an attempted coup was prevented and it was announced that the dissidents involved, members of an Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain, had some

connection with Iran.

### Iran-U.A.E.

A dispute over the islands of Abu Musa, Greater Tunb (Tunb al-Kubrā: in Arabic) and Lesser Tunb (Tunb al-Sughrā: in Arabic), which are strategically located at entrance of the Gulf has existed since the early 1970s. On November 30, 1971, Iranian troops suddenly occupied the three islands, this action was condemned by the Arab League. However, Iran still continues to occupy these islands. The U.A.E. reaffirmed her full sovereignty over these islands in 1980.

All Gulf states often emphasize their common ethnic affinity and identity as Arabs, referring to their common heritage such as language, religion and culture. The GCC contributed to the solving of some of these problems as in the case of the Bahrain-Qatar dispute in 1982 and of Saudi Arabia-Kuwait dispute also in 1982. Thus, it can be stated that the GCC may work efficiently to pacify confrontation over territorial demarcation. However, in the Gulf, an exclusive alignment is liable to create new tensions with Iran which has never abandoned her tough policy towards territorial problems. And, there is no guarantee that

Iraq will not revive her irredentist claims, when the Iran-Iraq war is over. Thus, it should be interesting to see whether the GCC will be able to take collective action if Iraq revives her irredentist claims at the end of the war with Iran.

#### 4) Saudi Political Ambitions

Saudi Arabia has aimed to dominate the entire Arabian Peninsula since the eighteenth century. She has never lost this ambitious idea. Such Saudi ambition was apparent when King Faisal gave political asylum to the opposition party against Sultan Said bin Taymur (1932-1970) King Faisal also refused to accept Taymur's son, Sultan Qabus as new sultan. This situation lasted for a year and a half from 1970 to 1971.

Another example was Saudi refusal to recognize the U.A.E. until late 1973 because of her contestation over the Braimi Oais issue. It was obvious that the Kingdom was eager to obtain an outlet to the Gulf through Abu Dhabi in the Khawar al-'Udaid area. However, the formation of the GCC indicates that Saudi Arabia changed her territorial ambition to policies to develop her geo-political predominance over the Gulf area.<sup>6</sup>

Acknowledging such a Saudi intention, the other Gulf countries have had to rely on Saudi political protection in order to encounter threats from Iran. In particular, the common concepts against external threats, stemming from the Iranian Revolution, accelerated Saudi Arabia aim to tighten solidarity with the other Gulf states. It can be observed that the GCC was established as a compromise for the small Gulf states' who have accepted Saudi influence in order to protect their regimes.

Certainly, there have been a number of disputes due to ethnic and tribal antagonisms in the Gulf at the regional level. The rivalries among rulers often aggravate such disputes and make problems more complex. But compromise with Saudi policies, and GCC influence contribute to diminish disputes and confrontations among the Gulf countries.

### V-3. Analysis at Domestic Level

Finally, the analysis of the GCC's foundation will be treated at the domestic level. The third approach explains that the Gulf countries, which have numerous domestic threats to their current regimes, have established the GCC as a cooperative body to prevent

any attempts to overthrow or disturb their governments. One of the GCC's main objectives is to tighten the military bond between the Gulf countries and to enhance crisis management capability. This part will examine each one of the domestic factors which undermine the stability of the Gulf countries. These factors are; 1)the influx of foreign labor 2)the presence of Palestinian and Shī'ī peoples 3)the destruction of the traditional society; 4)the emergence of new social strata. Two other factors, namely, the absence of popular political participation and the presence of revolutionary fundamentalism have already been mentioned in chapters 3 and 4. Thus, first four factors will be treated in this part.

#### 1) Influx of Foreign Labor

There are several reasons which explain the Gulf countries' dependence on foreign labor:<sup>7</sup>

- a. The rapid growth of oil revenue and ambitious development plans have created a new demand for labor. (Table 5-1) In particular, from 1973 to 1974, most oil-producing countries experienced an astronomical increase in oil revenue resulting from



Table 5-1. Evolution of Oil Revenues for Major Arab Producers (1965-1979)

Evolution of Oil Revenues for Major Arab Producers 1965-1979, in \$ Millions

Major Producers	Years									
	1965	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1979
Saudi Arabia	655	1214	1885	2745	4340	22574	25676	37809	36900	
Kuwait	761	899	1407	1634	1980	8645	7706	8063	6800	
Iraq	375	521	840	575	1843	5700	8500	8800	8800	
United Arab Emirates	33	233	431	551	900	5536	6000	7000	8000	
Qatar	69	122	200	255	464	1802	1700	2090	2100	
Libya	371	1351	1674	1563	2223	5999	5101	7500	8600	
Algeria	102	272	321	613	988	3299	3262	3699	3984	
TOTAL	2276	4612	6758	7936	12738	53555	56975	74663	775184	

Sources: Saad Eddin Ibrahim. The New Arab Social Order. Colorado: Westview Press, 1982. p.31.

Table 5-2. Migrant Workers In The Arab Region By Country of Employment, 1975 and 1980.

Country of Employment	1975		1980		Annual growth rate, 1975-1980 (per cent)
	Number	Per Cent	Number	Per Cent	
Saudi Arabia	773,400	42.5	1,023,250	36.3	5.7
Libya	332,350	18.3	545,500	19.3	10.4
United Arab Emirates	251,500	13.8	411,000	14.6	10.3
Kuwait	208,001	11.4	378,700	13.4	12.7
Qatar	53,716	3.0	80,250	2.8	8.3
Bahrain	29,285	1.6	67,720	2.4	18.2
Jordan (East Bank)	32,900	1.8	76,000	2.7	18.2
Oman	70,700	3.9	96,800	3.4	6.5
Yemen	2,450	0.1	17,000	0.6	47.3
Iraq	65,700	3.6	125,500	4.4	13.7
TOTAL	1,820,002	100.0	2,821,720	100.0	9.1

Sources: J.S.Birk and C.A. Sinclair, "The socio-economic determinants of intra-regional migration," in International Migration in the Arab World, UNECWA, 1981.

Table 5-3. Oil Revenue of Selected Countries.

Country	Millions US\$			Decline from Peak
	1980	1981	1982	
Iraq	26,136	10,387	9,695	62.9%
Kuwait	17,613	13,661	8,615	51.1%
Libya	22,574	15,658	13,944	38.2%
Oman	3,294	4,416	4,087	7.5%
Qatar	5,672	5,691	4,282	24.8%
Saudi Arabia	102,113	112,152	75,671	32.5%
UAE	20,747	20,215	16,943	18.3%

Sources: Najem A. Sherbiny. "Expatriate Labor Flows To The Arab Oil Countries In The 1980s" in The Middle East Journal, Autumn, 1984. Vol.38. No.4. p.645.

their oil-embargo and concomitant quadrupling of oil prices.

- b. The low participation of indigenous women in the labor force.
- c. The presence of the nomadic population is estimated to create around 10 percent potential loss of the indigenous work force.<sup>8</sup>
- d. The refusal to do manual work by the indigenous work force because of its lack of prestige.
- e. The high illiteracy rate among the indigenous labor force.

All these factors contributed to the rapid influx of foreign labor in the oil-producing countries (Table 5-2). The large population of migrant workers apparently enabled the Gulf states to promote the construction of a basic infrastructure and social service institutions. However, this heavy dependence on migrant labor has helped create other serious problems.

Firstly, new ideologies alien from those of each of the Gulf countries have been introduced as a result of migrant labour. These ideas challenge the traditional set of beliefs in each country. For example, most of school teachers in the Gulf countries are Egyptian or Palestinian and they have introduced

radical and liberal ideologies through education since the 1960s. The second problem is discrimination between local and migrant workers. Policies in the Gulf countries are operated by oligarchic national elites. This political situation has caused grievances among all immigrant workers. Such feelings have been made worse by a series of unfair restrictive policies. In practice, every Gulf country has been paying attention to its foreign population total, and has been trying to control immigration by repatriation or by reducing the number of new entry permits. Moreover, the Gulf states control migration by laws of naturalization. For instance, the Kuwait government requires fifteen years of continuous residence and permits only fifty naturalizations a year. Wage discrimination, which gives the locals higher salaries than any of the immigrants, aggravates the feelings of bitterness among the expatriates. These feelings are bound to breed hostility. High ranking jobs and political decision-making positions are also dominated by a few locals. This developing hostility is actually threatening the present regimes in the Gulf. The Gulf governments have recently tended to diversify their labor supplies from Arab to Asian countries like South Korea. This diversification creates new hostility between Asian workers

and Arab workers who lose their jobs.

Recognizing these problems, the Gulf countries are steadily cooperating in terms of domestic security. For example, cooperation for exchanging information about crime and criminals is reinforced among the Gulf states. Legislation which gives each state rights to search for criminals fifteen kilometers across each of their borders is being studied. However, Kuwait has disapproved of this threatened intrusion by foreign powers on her territory and also of the prospective interference of foreign laws. Among the member states of the GCC, Kuwait is the only country with which Saudi Arabia has not concluded a domestic security agreement. Recently, the economic condition of the Gulf countries has dramatically changed because of the world-wide oil glut, resulting in a sharp decrease in their oil revenues. (Table 5-3) Subsequently, since the beginning of 1982, the demand for expatriate labor has declined. The GCC countries are searching for a new social order which does not rely on excessive foreign labor -- one of the largest destabilizing factors. Nonetheless, it will be difficult to attempt to create an indigenous, high-quality human resource in the short term, notwithstanding the support of the GCC since the establishment of the Gulf University in 1980, which is both technical

and practical.

## 2) Presence of Palestinians and Shi'i

The large influx of Palestinians into the Gulf countries started in 1948. The largest Palestinian population exists in Kuwait, standing at approximately 280,000 which is about 20 percent of the total population. Most of them occupy high-ranking positions such as local government officials, consultants of the Royal Family and entrepreneurs, thus, their political influence is not negligible. However, the most serious problem for the Kuwait government relates relevant to the Palestinian cause. For example, Kuwait committed herself to recognize the PLO for fear of the PLO's reaction if she did not, this is indigenous menace to the stability of Kuwait. It will be a crucial problem how the GCC, which relies on U.S. military assistance, will take the initiative in dealing with the Palestinian problem.

The Iranian Revolution galvanized the Shi'i in Bahrain to demonstrate against the Al-Khalifa Sunni dynasty in 1979, protesting against the regime's secular activities and pro-U.S. policies. In 1980, another demonstration was provoked denouncing the relationship between the Bahraini regime and Iraq. The

Bahraini government fears she may lose confidence as a financial center in the Gulf which could undermine the basis of the Al-Khalifa families rule from the domestic security viewpoint.

The problems of Shi'i minorities in the Gulf countries are closely related to their economic conditions. In Saudi Arabia, most of the Shi'i live in Al-Hasa in the Eastern Provinces annexed in 1913 by King Abd Al-Aziz. They are estimated approximately 350,000, which is about five percent of the total population, and are mainly working in the oil terminals. Underprivileged for a long time, Shi'i minorities have been enduring low-quality, unskilled jobs since the discovery the petroleum. Many high-level and skilled jobs are taken by expatriates, and Shi'i have been prevented from advancing to knowledge intensive or technical jobs, though most of them live in the oil fields which generate almost 90 percent of Saudi's revenue.<sup>9</sup> The Shi'i position is bad not only because the oil industry is highly capital-intensive and does not require a large labor force, but also because there has been existing deep-rooted, social apartheid towards them. The social unfairness and uneven distribution of oil wealth has created a volatile situation in Saudi Arabia, seen in the large-



scale demonstrations which took place in November 1979 and February 1980 in Qatif, inspired by the Islamic Revolution of Iran. Such upheavals in the Eastern Provinces have led to serious threats to Al-Sa'ūd's reign, because the oil industry is concentrated in this region. In a sense, a large proportion of the Palestinian and Shī'ī minorities perform the function of undermining the bases of the Gulf regimes.

### 3) Destruction of Traditional Society

Before the discovery of petroleum, the economics of all Gulf countries relied on primitive economic structures based on mainly on fishery, pearl fishery and nomadism. In fact, peoples who lived on pearl fishery were numbered about 25 percent in the Gulf at the beginning of 20th century.<sup>10</sup> However, the Gulf countries have enjoyed increasing oil revenues since 1940s. Saudi oil revenue increased from 0.6 billion U.S. dollars in 1965 to 1.2 billion U.S. dollars in 1970 and 4.3 billion U.S. dollars in 1973. Moreover, it jumped to 22.5 billion U.S. dollars in 1974 as a resulted of the price quadrupling after the October War. In 1977, Saudi oil revenue continued to expand and reached to the level of 37 billion U.S. dollars and in

the aftermath of Iranian Revolution it came to 70 billion U.S. dollars in 1979.<sup>11</sup>

With these enormous revenues, the Saudi Five-Year Plans turned ambitious. The Third Five-Year Plan (1980-85) had a budget two times as Second Five Year Plan (1975-80) -- 145 billion U.S. dollars. The construction of infrastructure has been advancing in Saudi Arabia. This is borne out by the fact that of the 38,000 km of paved road in 1983, only 7,000 km existed in 1975. Grain production in 1983 was 1.32 million tons compared to 0.8 million tons in 1975. Annual desalination capacity jumped from 2.7 million gallons in 1975 to 363 million gallons in 1983. However, such oil wealth has never been fairly distributed in the societies of the Gulf countries.

The soaring land prices caused by the construction boom and the demand for housing due to large influxes of population into the urban areas from the suburbs, make life for the poor relatively difficult. On the opposite side, instant millionaires are enjoying their fortunes and the gap between 'rich' and 'poor' has widened very rapidly in the Gulf societies. The uneven growth of the economy and the sudden influx of money, goods and foreign labor has also resulted in conflicts among the various provinces in Saudi Arabia. Poorer,

more deprived areas are feeling the effects of the economic imbalance which favors the central (Nejd), eastern (Dammam, Dahrhan), and western areas (Jeddah, Mecca, Medina).

Modernization has had serious effects influence on traditional nomadism and agriculture and disrupted the ecological order in Saudi Arabia. The first problem is the collapse of nomadism.<sup>12</sup> The nomads have been suddenly thrown into a non-traditional way of life. They do not have to look for a source of water now because of the introduction of water-tank vehicles and deep-dug wells has enabled them to settle down in a place. However, the permanent settlement and resulting over-pasturage of livestock incur desertification. Secondly, there is a problem of the decline of small nomads. Small-scaled nomadism has declined and richer nomads have expanded their business adopting large-scale, pasture systems with a number of water-tankers. As a result, the gap between rich nomads and poor nomads has enlarged. Thirdly, the collapse of traditional agriculture has cast the same serious problem as a case of nomadism. Mechanized methods of agriculture such as motor-driven pumps have disrupted the ecological system and many underground water supplies have dried up. The poor farmers who cannot invest in such

mechnization fall into poverty and farm land is concentrated into hands of capitalistic, large farmers. These policies of modernization in agriculture have been promoted by the government. The long-range effects on traditional agriculture and nomadism which have been past of traditional society for a long time in Saudi Arabia seem to be neglected completely.

#### 4)Emergence of New Social Strata

The new Saudi bourgeoisie exemplifies the transformation of Saudi social order. Most of them are from merchants' families in Hejaz and have connections with the government. These new Saudi bourgeoisie are relatively different from those of western societies. They are only mediate traders between foreign manufacturers and the local consumers, however, they can earn billions in profits in a short period because of their close ties with the government which had led Saudi economic development during the past 10 to 15 years. They actually contribute to western materialistic culture, nevertheless, no one has pointed out that such materialism is eroding the traditional culture and society. Educated Saudi entrepreneurs try to stimulate the domestic demand for the commodities or services

with which they are dealing in order to achieve more profits, inspired by the foreign partners who also aim to monopolize the markets in the Gulf. With such economic conditions, the gaps between the entrepreneur and the 'have nots' have been enlarged resultant discontent amongst the latter.

Another force in the new social order in the Gulf are the technocrats. The most famous technocrat is Ahamd Zaki Yamani, former Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Resources. Among other technocrats are Hisham Nazir, Minister of Planning; Ghazi al-Qusaibi, Minister of Industry and Power; Muhammad Abd al-Khayl, Minister of Finance and National Economy; Abd al-Aziz al-Qurayshi, former head of the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency; Muhammad Abduh Yamani, former Minister of Information; Sulaiman Abd al-Aziz al-Sualim, Minister of Commerce, and Faisal al-Bahshir, Deputy Minister of Planning. It is natural that they anticipate a broader sharing of power, however, they sometimes feel difficulties in proceeding in their decision making because few senior members of the Royal Family still occupy the core process of Saudi decision making. In the future, they favor social and political reforms in education, health, bureaucratic efficiency, they aim for less corruption, and more sharing of power. Some

are opposed to the indiscriminate, rapid pace of development symbolized by the Second Saudi Five-Year Plan (1975-80). Some have also urged that more effort should be made to develop Saudi manpower to replace of the skilled foreign workers in the country.

The educated young technocrats have another complaint about the current political system. Under the present polity of Saudi Arabia, there are few opportunities for both the young technocrats or the commoners to participate in political decision-making. It is urgent for the Gulf countries to broaden the opportunities available for the young technocrats to join in politics more freely.

Apparently, these factors mentioned above are partially supported by the formation of the GCC. As to the first element, the influx of foreign labor and the second one, the presence of Palestinian and Shī'ī in the Gulf states, the ability of the GCC to help solve such problems, by means of concluding mutual domestic security agreements and exchanging the information about criminals, etc. is quite obvious. Concerning the third factor, it is perceived by the Gulf rulers that the GCC will be able to pacify the disaffection of the people who are anxious about the destruction of traditional society, by offering them capital-intensive

type of the social welfare. As the fourth factor, the new social strata like the bourgeoisie and western-educated young technocrats, they are apparently waiting in anticipation for the construction of a new social order. In a sense, the GCC is expected to realize new opportunities for them to participate in diversifying the economy and industry of the Gulf. Consequently, these factors are clearly contributory to the creation of the GCC.

As seen above, the background to the GCC's establishment has been analyzed at the international regional and domestic level, at the same time, the obstacles, and the supporting factors for the GCC have been illuminated. Subsequently, it was shown how the establishment of the GCC enhances the stability of the Gulf states.

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## Conclusion

The Gulf countries have been prominent as economic and political powers since the beginning of the 1970s. Thanks to the accumulated oil wealth, the Gulf countries obtained the opportunity to take the kind of political initiative which was taken by the Arab League until the Arab world was split into two factions, that is, 'moderates' and 'radicals' resulting from the Camp David agreement and following the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty. Under such political circumstances at the end of the 1970s, the Iranian Revolution broke out as a popular revolution with mass mobilization. Because the Revolution claims all monarchies in the Middle East are un-Islamic, the Gulf regimes perceive it as the real threat. The Iran-Iraq war, provoked in 1980 exacerbated such anxiety of the Gulf states concerning the stability and continuity of their own regimes.

The GCC was established among the six Gulf countries in May 1981, officially advocating regional cooperation in various fields. However, the most important objective of the GCC is the maintenance of the status quo and the elimination of any threat which may destabilize the basis of the regimes, namely, the threat stemming from the Iranian Revolution. Although Saudi Arabia, which took the initiative to form the GCC with the other Gulf states, is supporting Iraq, Saudi objectives are not necessarily the same as those of Iraq. The first priority of Iraq is the survival of the present Ba'ath regime, which was established in the 1968 coup. At the same time, Iraq aims to be the leader of pan-Arabism. While, the social background of the Gulf countries is different from that of Iraq and there have existed numerous factors which undermine their domestic stability. Though the decision-making structure is concentrated in the Royal Family of Saudi Arabia, there exist two factions the 'modernizers' and 'conservatives'. Despite of the existence of the conservative faction, it is observed that the 'modernizers' faction had already taken the political initiative by the beginning of the 1980s. This is apparent from the fact that Crown Prince Fahd in proposed the Fahd Plan in 1981. On the occasion of the

succession of the throne from the late King Khalid to Crown Prince Fahd, there was no contestation with the opposite faction in the Royal Family and this shows the increased political influence of 'modernizers'. From these facts, it is noticable that Crown Prince Fahd attempted to consolidate the Royal Family in order to strive against the ideological threats rising from the Iranian Revolution by organising regional cooperation, namely, the GCC.

Officially, the GCC advocates neutral diplomacy which is equi-distant from both of the superpowers. Nevertheless, it is apparent that Saudi Arabia regards the United States as her principal supplier of weaponry, which is necessary for her domestic security, as illustrated by the facts that Riyadh continues to purchase various strategic arms from the United States.

Under these conditions, Saudi Arabia is confronting various domestic problems such as the destruction of traditional society, the deprivation of the morality, social disaffection among the deprived Shi'is, and the presence of fundamentalists who claim to be the believers of the true and original Islām faith. As each of them may have serious repercussions for the survival of the Gulf regimes, it is extremely critical for the future development of the GCC whether

it will be able to function effectively to solve these domestic factors and protect its members' regimes from 'external threats'.

## APPENDIX 1.

NATIONAL COVENANT PROPOSED BY IRAQ, BAGHDAD, FEBRUARY 8,  
1980

In light of current international situation and the possibilities of its future development and in light of the dangerous possibilities that might ensure form this development, threatening pan-Arab sovereignty and security on the one hand, and world peace and security on the other; in response to the dictates of pan-Arab responsibility toward the Arab nation and its people, land, culture, civilization and heritage; and in accordance with the principles of the nonaligned movement, Iraq find itself called upon to initiate the issuance of this declaration so that it can serve first as a charter to regulate relations among the Arab countries and second, as a pledge by the nation to neighboring countries which proclaim their respect for and commitment to this charter.

The declaration is based on the following principles:

1. The rejection of the presence or the facilitation of the presence of any foreign armies, bases or armed forces in the Arab homeland in any form, under any pretext and guise or for any reason: the isolation of any Arab regime which does not adhere to this principle, boycotting such an Arab regime politically and economically and resisting its policies by all available means.

2. Banning any Arab state from resorting to armed force against any other Arab state and resolving any dispute that might arise among the Arab countries by peaceful means and within the context of the principles of joint pan-Arab action and the supreme Arab interests.

3. The application of the principle cited in clause two above to the relations between the Arab nation and its countries and nations and states neighboring the Arab homeland.

Of course, you know that the Zionist entity is not included because it is not considered a state. It is a freak entity occupying Arab land and is not included in these principles.

It is not permissible to resort to the armed forces in disputes with these states, except in the case of self-defense and the defense of sovereignty against the threats which undermine the security and basic interests of the Arab countries.

4. The solidarity of all the Arab countries against any aggression, violation or states of actual war which any foreign side might undertake against the territorial integrity of any Arab country. These countries will jointly repulse this aggression or violation and will thwart it by using all ways and means, including military action, collective political and economic boycott and any other methods dictated by necessity and pan-Arab interests.

5. The affirmation of the Arab countries' commitment to international laws and norms pertaining to the use of waters, airspace and zones by any state which is not in a state of war with any Arab country.

6. Keeping the Arab countries away from the circle of international conflicts or wars, and commitment to total neutrality and nonalignment toward any party to the conflict or war as long as these parties to the conflict or war have not violated Arab territorial integrity and the inalienable rights of the Arab countries, which are guaranteed by international laws and norms. The Arab countries will not allow their military forces to participate in part or whole in military conflicts and wars inside and outside the area on behalf of any foreign state or quarter.

7. The commitment of the Arab countries to establish developing and constructive economic relations among themselves in order to provide and strengthen a joint groundwork for a developed Arab economic edifice and Arab unity. The Arab countries will shun any behavior which might harm these relations or impede their continuity and development, irrespective of the diversity of Arab regimes and the peripheral political differences among them, as long as the parties concerned are committed to the principles of this declaration. The Arab countries will adhere to the principles of pan-Arab economic integration. The Arab countries which are economically capable will pledge to offer all kinds of economic assistance to other Arab countries so as to prevent their possible dependence upon foreign forces, which might undermine their independence and pan-Arab will.

8. While drawing up the principles of this declaration, Iraq affirms its readiness to be committed to this declaration before every Arab country and before

any party which is committed to it. Iraq is ready to discuss this declaration with the Arab brothers and to listen to their remarks in order to enhance this declaration's effectiveness and to deepen its context.

Iraq also affirms that this declaration does not constitute a substitute to the Arab League Charter, the joint defense treaty and the economic cooperation among the members of the Arab League. Iraq considers this declaration as a strengthening of the charter and treaty commensurate with the current international circumstances, the dangers which threaten the Arab nation and the pan-Arab responsibilities which result from the current and future circumstances.

Source: Alan R. Taylor, The Arab Balance of Power, Syracuse, 1982, pp.153-155.

## APPENDIX 2.

### CHARTER OF THE COOPERATION COUNCIL FOR THE ARAB STATES OF THE GULF

The States of  
United Arab Emirates  
State of Bahrain  
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia  
Sultanate of Oman  
State of Qatar  
State of Kuwait

Being fully aware of their mutual bonds of special relations, common characteristics and similar systems founded on the Creed of Islam; and Based on their faith

in the common destiny and destination that link their people and

In view of their desire to effect coordination, integration and interconnection between them in all fields; and

Based on their conviction that coordination, cooperation and integration between them serve the higher goals of the Arab Nations; and

In order to strengthen their cooperation and reinforce their common links; and

In an endeavour to complement efforts already begun in all vital scopes that concern their peoples and realise their hopes for a better future on the path to unity of their States; and

In conformity with the Charter of the League of Arab States which calls for the realisation of closer relations and stronger bonds; and

In order to channel their efforts to reinforce and serve Arab and Islamic causes;

Have agreed as follows:

## **ARTICLE ONE**

### **ESTABLISHMENT OF COUNCIL**

A council shall be established hereby to be named The Cooperation Council for the Arab States, of the Gulf hereinafter to as Cooperation Council.

## **ARTICLE TWO**

### **HEADQUARTERS**

The Cooperation Council shall have its headquarters in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.

## **ARTICLE THREE**

### **COOPERATION COUNCIL MEETINGS**

The Council shall hold its meetings in the state where it has its headquarters, and may convene in any member state.

## **ARTICLE FOUR**

### **OBJECTIVES**

The basic objectives of the Cooperation Council are:

1. To effect coordination, integration and interconnection between member states in all fields in order achieve unity between them.



2. Deepen and strengthen relations, links and scopes of cooperation now prevailing between their peoples in various fields.

3. Formulate similar regulations in various fields including the following:

- a. Economic and financial affairs
- b. Commerce, customs and communications
- c. Education and culture
- d. Social and health affairs
- e. Information and tourism
- f. Legislation and administrative affairs.

4. Simulate scientific and technological progress in the fields of industry, mineralogy, agriculture, water and animal resources; the establishment of scientific research centres, implementation of common projects, and encourage cooperation by the private sector for the good of their peoples.

## **ARTICLE FIVE**

### **COUNCIL MEMBERSHIP**

The Cooperation Council shall be formed of the six states that participated in the Foreign Ministers' meeting held at Riyadh on 4 February 1981.

## **ARTICLE SIX**

### **ORGANISATIONS OF THE COOPERATION COUNCIL**

The Cooperation Council shall have the following main organisations:

1. Supreme Council to which shall be attached the Commission for Settlement of Disputes.
2. Ministerial Council.
3. Secretariat-General

Each of these organisations may establish branch organs as necessary.

## **ARTICLE SEVEN**

### **SUPREME COUNCIL**

1. The Supreme Council is the highest authority of the Cooperation Council and shall be formed of heads of member states. Its presidency shall be rotational based on the alphabetical order of the names of the member states.
2. The Supreme Council shall hold one regular session every year. Extraordinary sessions may be convened at the request of any member seconded by another member.

3. The Supreme Council shall hold its session in the territories of member states.
4. A Supreme Council's meeting shall be considered valid if attended by two thirds of the member states.

## ARTICLE EIGHT

### SUPREME COUCL'S FUNCTIONS

The Supreme Council shall endeavour to achieve the objectives of the Cooperation Council, particularly as concerns the following:

1. Review matters of interest to the member states
2. Lay down the higher policy for the Cooperation Council and the basic line it should follow.
3. Review the recommendations, reports, studies and common projects submitted by the Ministerial Council for approval.
4. Review reports and studies which the Secretary-General is charged to prepare.
5. Approve the bases for dealing with other states and international organisations.
6. Approve the rules of procedures of the Commission for Settlement of Disputes and nominate its members.
7. Appoint the Secretary-General.
8. Amend the Charter of the Cooperation Council.
9. Approve the Council's Internal Rules.
10. Approve the budget of the Secretariat-General.

## ARTICLE NINE

### VOTING SUPREME COUNCIL

1. Each member of the Supreme Council shall have one vote.
2. Resolutions of the Supreme Council in substantive matter shall be carried by unanimous approval of the member states participating in the voting, while resolutions on procedural matters shall be carried by majority vote.

## ARTICLE TEN

### COMMISSION FOR SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES

1. The Cooperation Council shall have a commission called "Commission for Settlement of Disputes" and shall be attached to the Supreme Council.
2. The Supreme council shall form the Commission for every case separately based on the nature of the

- dispute.
3. If a dispute arises over interpretation or implementaiton of the Charter and such dispute is not resolved within the Ministerial Council or the Supreme Council, the Supreme Council may refer such dispute to the Commission for Settlement of Disputes.
  4. The Commission shall submit its recommendations or opinion, as applicable, to the Supreme Council for appropriate action.

## ARTICLE ELEVEN

### MINISTERIAL COUNCIL

1. The Ministerial Council shall be formed of the Foreign Ministers of the member states or other delegated Ministers. The Council's presidency shall rotate among members every three months by alphabetical order of the states.
2. The Ministerial Council shall convene every three months and may hold extraordinary sessions at the invitation of any member seconded by another member.
3. The Ministerial Council shall decide the venue of its next session.
4. A Council's meeting shall be deemed valid if attended by two thirds of the member states.

## ARTICLE TWELVE

### FUNCTIONS OF THE MINISTERIAL COUNCIL

The Ministerial Council's functions shall include the following:

1. Propose policies, prepoare recommendations, studies and projects aimed at developing cooperation and coordination between member states in the various fields and adopt required resolutions or recommendations concernign thereof.
2. Endeavour to encourage, develop and coordinate activities existing between member states in all fields. Resolutions adopted in such matters shall be referred to the Ministerial Council for further submission, with recommendations, to the Supreme Council for appropriate action.
3. Submit recommendations to the Ministers concerned to formulate policies whereby the Cooperation Council's resolutions may be put into action.
4. Encourage means of cooperation and coordination between the various private sector activities,

develop existing cooperation between the member states' chambers of commerce and industry, and encourage the flow of working citizens of the member states among them.

5. Refer any of the various facts of cooperation to one or more technical or specialised committees for study and presentation of relevant proposals.
6. Review proposals related to amendments to this Charter and submit appropriate recommendations to the Supreme Council.
7. Approve the Ministerial Council's Rules of Procedures as well as the Rules of Procedures of the Secretariat General.
8. Appoint the Assistant Secretaries-General, as nominated by the Secretary-General, for a renewable period of three years.
9. Approve periodic reports as well as internal rules and regulations related to administrative and financial affairs proposed by the Secretary-General, and submit recommendations to the Supreme Council for approval of the budget of the Secretariat-General.
10. Make arrangements for the Supreme Council's meetings and prepare its agenda.
11. Review matters referred to it by the Supreme Council.

#### ARTICLE THIRTEEN

##### VOTING AT MINISTERIAL COUNCIL

1. Every member of the Ministerial Council shall have one vote.
2. Resolutions of the Ministerial Council in substantive matters shall be carried by unanimous vote of the member states present and participating in the vote, and in procedural matters by majority vote.

#### ARTICLE FOURTEEN

##### SECRETARIAT-GENERAL

1. The Secretariat-General shall be composed of a Secretary-General who shall be assisted by assistants and a number of staff as required.
2. The Supreme Council shall appoint the Secretary-General, who shall be a citizen of one of the Cooperation Council states, for a series of three years which may be renewed for one time only.
3. The Secretary-General shall nominate the Assistant

Secretaries-General.

4. The Secretary-General shall appoint the Secretariat General's staff from among the citizens of member states, and may not make exceptions without the approval of the Ministerial Council.
5. The Secretary-General shall be directly responsible for the work of the work of the Secretariat-General and the smooth flow of work in its various organisation. He shall represent the Cooperation Council with other parties within the powers vested in him.

## ARTICLE FIFTEEN

### FUNCTIONS OF THE SECRETARIAT-GENERAL

The Secretariat General shall undertake the following functions:

1. Prepare studies related to cooperation and coordination, and to integrated plans and programmes for member states' common action.
2. Prepare periodic reports on the Cooperation Council's work.
3. Follow up the execution by the member states of the resolutions and recommendations of the Supreme Council and Ministerial Council.
4. Prepare reports and studies ordered by the Supreme Council or Ministerial Council.
5. Prepare the draft of administrative and financial regulations commensurate with the growth of the Cooperation Council and its expanding responsibilities.
6. Prepare the Cooperation Council's budget and closing accounts.
7. Make preparations for meetings and prepare agenda and draft resolutions for the Ministerial Council.
8. Recommend to the Chairman of the Ministerial Council the convocation of an extraordinary session of the Council whenever necessary.
9. Any other tasks entrusted to it by the Supreme Council or Ministerial Council.

## ARTICLE SIXTEEN

The Secretary-General and the Assistant Secretaries-General and all the Secretariat General's staff shall carry out their duties in complete independence and for the common interest of the member states. They shall refrain from any action or behaviour that is incompatible with their duties and from divulging the

secrets of their jobs either during or after their tenure of office.

## **ARTICLE SEVENTEEN**

### **PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES**

1. The Cooperation Council and its organisations shall enjoy on the territories of all member states such legal competence, privileges and immunities as require to realise their objectives and carry out their functions.
2. Representatives of the member states of the Council, and the Council's employees, shall enjoy such privileges and immunities as are specified in agreements to be concluded for this purpose between the member states. A special agreement shall organise the relation between the Council and the state in which it has its headquarters.
3. Until such time as the two agreements mentioned in item 2 above are prepared and put into effect, the representatives of the member states in the Cooperation Council and its staff shall enjoy the diplomatic privileges and immunities established for similar organisations.

## **ARTICLE EIGHTEEN**

### **BUDGET OF THE SECRETARIAT-GENERAL**

The Secretariat-General shall have a budget to which the member states shall contribute equal amounts.

## **ARTICLE NINETEEN**

### **CHARTER IMPLEMENTATION**

1. This Charter shall go into effect as of the date it is signed by the heads of states of the six member states named in this Charter's preamble.
2. The original copy of this Charter shall be deposited with Saudi Arabia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs which shall act as custodian and shall deliver a true copy thereof to every member state, pending the establishment of the Secretariat-General at which time shall become depository.

## **ARTICLE TWENTY**

### **AMENDMENTS TO CHARTER**

1. Any member state may request an amendment of this

Charter.

2. Requests for Charter amendments shall be submitted to the Secretary-General who shall refer them to the member states at least four months prior to submission to the Ministerial Council.
3. An amendment shall become effective if unanimously approved by the Supreme Council.

#### ARTICLE TWENTY-ONE

##### CLOSING PROVISIONS

No reservations may be voiced in respect of the provisions of this Charter.

#### ARTICLE TWENTY-TWO

The Secretariat General shall arrange to deposit and register copies of this Charter with the League of Arab States and the United Nations, by resolution of the Ministerial Council.


This Charter is signed on one copy in Arabic language at Abu Dhabi City, United Arab Emirates, on 21 Rijab 1401 corresponding to 25 May 1981.

United Arab Emirates  
State of Bahrain  
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia  
Sultanate of Oman  
State of Qatar  
State of Kuwait

Source: Charter of The Cooperation Council For The Arab States of The Gulf, issued by the Information Center of the GCC.

## APPENDIX 3.

## STRUCTURAL ORGANIZATION OF THE GCC



Sources: Structural Organization : issued by the Information Center of the Headquarters of the GCC in Riyadh.



## APPENDIX 4.

## THE ARABIAN PENINSULA AND THE GULF : BASIC FACTS

Country	Area (sq. m.)	Population (est.)			Religion		GNP/Capita (in U.S. dollars)	GNP (est.) (in billions)
		Total (in thousands)	Indigenous (percent)	Alien (percent)	Sunni (percent)	Shi'a (percent)		
Bahrain	260	360	78.0	22.0	44.3	47.9	2,500	1.5
Iran	636,363	38,000	100.0	0	9.8	88.2	2,170	76.0
Iraq	172,000	13,230	98.4	0.6	40.5	52.5	1,550	22.7
Kuwait	7,780	1,340	47.7	52.3	84.6	10.4	15,480	18.0
Oman	82,030	900	90.0	10.0	25.0	50.0*	2,570	2.2
Qatar	4,000	220	19.0	81.0	70.3	24.3	12,740	2.8
Saudi Arabia	873,000	7,870	78.6	21.4	92.1	5.0	10,000	63.0
United Arab Emirates	32,280	800	25.0	75.0	62.5	15.0	14,230	11.0

Sources: Emile A. Nakhleh, The Persian Gulf And American Policy, New York: Praeger, 1982, p.5.

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