

**THE DEVELOPMENT OF MYANMAR NAING-
NGAN-TAW WARDA(s): POLITICAL
SOCIALIZATION, THE STRUCTURE OF CIVIL-
MILITARY RELATIONS, AND THE ROLE OF
TATMADAW SINCE THE SECOND WORLD
WAR**

By

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ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS

The Development of Myanmar Naing-ngan-taw Warda(s): Political Socialization, the Structure of Civil-Military Relations, and the Role of the Tatmadaw since the Second World War

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The dissertation examines the development of Myanmar Naing-ngan-taw Warda, its political socialization, the relations to the structure of civil-military, and the role of the Tatmadaw. Naing-ngan-taw Warda means an all-embracing political ideology, doctrine, or political belief system that is used to legitimize a state or a political system by encompassing the political, socioeconomic, and security environment to build a nation-state. The central argument is that Myanmar has had four dominant stages in the development of Naing-ngan-taw Warda, while the fifth is ongoing. The first stage, “Freedom at All Costs,” occurred during colonialism. After Independence, the second phase was characterized by the belief in a politico-economic system based on the principles of justice, liberty, and equality, the essence of which is captured in the term “Democratic Socialism.” Declared in 1962, “the Burmese Way to Socialism” was the third stage. The fourth, “Our Three National Causes,” developed during the State Law

and Order Restoration Council. These developmental stages of Naing-ngan-taw Warda(s) also shaped and constructed the structures of Myanmar civil-military relations. Following these developmental stages, Myanmar experienced only the subjective types of civilian control, and the Tatmadaw promulgated “collective democratic control” in the 2008 constitution, guaranteed the Tatmadaw’s leading role in national politics to establish a disciplined democracy. The fifth stage, “Federalism based on Our Three National Causes and Democratic Principles,” is an ongoing process of national reconciliation or peace led by State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi’s government, an effort that started in 2011 under President Thein Sein’s government. In this process, the fourth stage of Naing-ngan-taw Warda, “Our Three National Causes,” is still vital to upholding the principles for a future Democratic Federal Union and the structure of civil-military relations. In each of these developmental contexts, the Tatmadaw has been central in the formulation (in some stages), implementation, and socialization process of these ideologies and the structure of civil-military relations. The dissertation contributes a new concept, Naing-ngan-taw Warda, to Political Science, International Relations, and Sociology. It also provides a new model of civil-military relations that is suitable for a transitional or hybrid-regime to Military Sociology, by following the analysis on Myanmar’s case, and a new research, findings, and perceptive of Myanmar modern history and politics related to the scope of my study.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

- | | |
|-------|--|
| ADNG | Academy for Development of National Groups |
| AFO | Anti-Fascist Organization |
| AFPFL | Anti-Fascist Freedom League |
| BA | Burma Army |

BCP	Burma Communist Party
BDA	Burma Defence Army
BFB	Burma Freedom Bloc
BIA	Burma Independence Army
BNA	Burma National Army
BSPP	Burma Socialist Programme Party
BSWP	Burma Workers Party
BWPP	Burma Workers and Peasants Party
BWS	Burmese Way to Socialism
CGSC	Command and General Staff College
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CICS	Central Institute of Civil Services
C-in-C	Commander-in-Chief
CIPS	Central Institute of Political Science
COs	Commanding Officers
CPB	Communist Party of Burma
CROAT	Combat-Related Organisational Activities Training Centers
DASSK	Daw Aung San Suu Kyi
DBA	DoBama Asiaiyone
DFU	Democratic Federal Union
DS	Defence Services
DSAS	Defence Services Administration School
DSCFS	Defence Services (Army) Combat Forces School

EAOs	Ethnic Armed Organizations
FAC	Freedom at All Costs
GAD	General Administration Department
GCBA	General Council of Burma Association
KIA	Kachin Independence Army
KMT	Chinese Kuomintang
KNDO	Karen National Defense Organization
MEC	Myanmar Economic Corporation
MMA	Myanmar Medical Association
MMCWA	Myanmar Maternal and Child Welfare Association
MWVO	Myanmar War Veterans Organization
NBS	Nga-Bwint Saing
NCA	Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement
NCO	Non-commission officers
NDC	National Defence College
NDSC	National Defence and Security Council
NLD	National League for Democracy
NSO	National Solidarity Organization
NUF	National Unity Front
OTNC	Our Three National Causes
PBF	Patriotic Burmese Forces
PCC	Party Central Committee
PCOC	Party Central Organising Committee

PDC	Party Discipline Committee
PLA	People's Liberation Army
PRP	People's Revolutionary Party
PVO	People's Volunteer Organization
RC	Revolutionary Council
SEPC	Socialist Economy Planning Committee
SLORC	State Law and Order Restoration Council's
SPDC	State Peace and Development Council
SW	Sinyetha Wunthanu Party
TET	Tatmadaw Education Team
TPC	Tatmadaw Party Committee
UDNR	National Races of the Union
UMEHL	Union of Myanmar Economic Holdings Limited
UN	United Nations
USDA	Union Solidarity and Development Association
USDP	Union Solidarity and Development Party
YMBA	Young Men's Buddhist Association

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background

The degree of military influence in politics is different between particular countries in different circumstances. This is mainly reflected by a variety of references, such as the security environment, the level of external and internal threats¹, and the level of the political culture of a society.² Myanmar is a country that has a long history of military rule, and from 1962, it had been ruled by a one-party state. When the state transferred power to the constitutional government in 2011 (according to the plan set by the 2008 constitution), the international community, including the United States, welcomed this transition.³ In 2015, the landslide victory of the National League for Democracy (NLD) led by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi (DASSK) was evidence that a real transition was underway. According to Andrew Selth, the transition created “a hybrid civilian-military government.”⁴ Maung Aung Myoe called it a form of “Partnership in Politics,”⁵ while the current unhealthy civil-military relations (CMR) are manifest.

In this context, one interesting point came after the government and eight Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) signed the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) on October 15, 2015.⁶ In the NCA, the establishment of the future Democratic

¹ Michael C. Desch, *Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment* (JHU Press, 2008).

² Samuel E. Finer, *The Man on Horseback: Military Intervention into Politics* (Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin, 1975).

³ Whitehouse, “Remarks by President Obama at the University of Yangon,” whitehouse.gov, November 19, 2012, <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2012/11/19/remarks-president-obama-university-yangon>.

⁴ Andrew Selth, “Democracy in Myanmar: Who Can Take Credit? | The Myanmar Times,” March 31, 2016, <https://www.mmmtimes.com/opinion/19744-democracy-in-myanmar-who-can-take-credit.html>.

⁵ Maung Aung Myoe et al., “Partnership in Politics: The Tatmadaw and the NLD in Myanmar since 2016,” in *Presentation to the 2017 Myanmar Update Conference, Australian National University*, vol. 17, 2017.

⁶ Since 1962, the first official public usage of federalism or federal system can be seen in President U Thein Sein’s message sent on the occasion of the 67th Anniversary Shan State Day. See The New Light of Myanmar, “Taking Lessons of Past Experiences, All People Are to Make Efforts for Ending Conflicts and Peaceful Coexistence of All National Races,” February 7, 2014.

Federal Union (DFU) and the structure of civil-military relations⁷ is based on an ideological foundation of federalism, Our Three National Causes, and democratic principles. The idea of “democracy” was not new in Myanmar’s political history. But the concept and voice of federalism prescribed officially and publicly to establish future Myanmar disappeared from Myanmar politics after the 1962 military coup. It is important to address various questions such as; the history of how Myanmar was built and on what kind of ideological foundations since the anti-colonial period, why Myanmar deserves to define these as of Naing-ngan-taw Warda(s), state-centric national ideologies, how many significant stages there were, what kinds of CMR structures were established based on the development of Naing-ngan-taw Warda(s), which influential group[s] or institution[s] politically socialized these ideologies and how, and where the current Naing-ngan-taw Warda, “Federalism based on Our Three National Causes and Democratic Principles” came from. Though everybody agrees that the *Tatmadaw* (Myanmar Armed Forces) has played a critical role in Myanmar politics until now, its role in the developmental context of Myanmar Naing-ngan-taw Warda also remains unclear. The author approaches the research from this perspective.

This dissertation examines the development of Myanmar Naing-ngan-taw Warda(s), its social orientation agenda, the relations to the structure of civil-military relations, and the *Tatmadaw*. In the anti-colonial struggle period, by adopting the ideology of “Freedom at All Costs” (FAC), *Tatmadaw* was formed for national Independence. From that point, the origin of the CMR structure had started in the Anti-Fascist Freedom League (AFPFL). After regaining Independence on January 4, 1948, *Tatmadaw* was in a subordinate position to the civilian government for over a decade. The *Tatmadaw* staged a military coup in the name of the Revolutionary Council (RC) on March 2, 1962, and subsequently declared “Burmese Way to Socialism” (BWS). And then, RC founded the Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP) in July 1962.

⁷ Although the NCA does not mention explicitly the term, the “structure of civil-military relations,” it agreed to “discuss matters concerning Pyidaungsu [Union] *Tatmadaw* [Armed Forces] made up of all ethnic nationalities during political dialogue.” Hence, the term “matters” already includes all of the affairs of armed forces, such as formation, armaments, positions, policy, and civil-military relations, and so on.

Since January 1947, Tatmadaw was subordinate again to the leadership BSPP by the CMR structure of the 1974 constitution.

Tatmadaw retook state power after the nationwide upheaval in 1988. In the era of State Law and Order Restoration Council's (SLORC) and State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), Tatmadaw gradually adopted "Our Three National Causes" (OTNC)— "Non-disintegration of the Union, Non-disintegration of national solidarity, Perpetuation of national sovereignty"—as the state's ideology. They also carefully crafted CMR structure by following the OTNC. The 2008 constitution legitimized the state ideology and the current structure of CMR. Bound by this structure, now Myanmar is governed by a democratically elected constitutional government, led by a de-facto leader, State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi.

1.2 Problems and Objectives

In Myanmar, the central problem is a lack of theoretical and historical understanding of the development of Naing-ngan-taw Warda(s), its political socialization, and the structure of civil-military relations, while there is a controversial issue related to the current structure of CMR. The most widespread understanding in Myanmar about civilian control over the military is that it is done through so-called subjective means: maximizing civilian power and 'civilianizing' the military.⁸ The ongoing peace and

⁸ Though there are some reasonable view of Tatmdaw's commitment of political neutrality (the military to be simply apolitical), in Myanmar, the perspective of subjective civilian control influences on political debates, civil society, press and media. The classical civil-military relations theorist, Samuel Huntington, stated two types of civilian control: subjective civilian control and objective civilian control. Subjective control means maximizing civilian power and 'civilianizing' the military by enhancing the power of civilian institutions, particular social classes, and binding the military through particular constitutional structures. In this subjective type, civilian control becomes an instrumental slogan or specific interest utilized by one particular civilian group or groups which lack power over military forces. The main challenging question on it is that which civilian is to do the controlling because of involving the vast extent and conflicting interests of civilian groups. Consequently, it leads to being more difficult to minimize the military power and to get the respect of the military. "The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations," *Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press* 163 (1957): 80–85. For example, a politician in a middle-level government position, Yangon Chief Minister Phyo Min Thein, said that "there are no civil-military relations in a democratic era" on July 9, 2017, at "Civil Society and Media Project, Former Political Prisoners Fellowship 2017 Introduction and Orientation Workshop". He wanted to say in a very subjective sense that it does not need 'relations', but only 'control' in the communication between civil and military institutions. Notably, Phyo Min Thein was promoted in 2016 to the NLD's Central Executive Committee (CEC). Hence, it would appear that this interpretation of civil-military relations is prevalent among the NLD's upper leadership. See Nyan Hlaing Lynn, "Phyo Min Thein

reform process are also in stagnation⁹ for establishing a future democratic federal Union. In the existing structure, Tatmadaw takes 25 percent of parliamentary seats and hold three most robust ministries: Ministry of Defense, Home Affairs and Border Affairs. Six out of eleven members of the National Defence and Security Council (NDSC) come from a military background. Therefore, conventional wisdom is that the 2008 constitution has no civilian control and is designed for permanent military interference in future Myanmar politics.¹⁰ The NLD government did not call the NDSC meeting despite facing high national security issues, internal armed conflicts in the northern, eastern, and western part of Myanmar, as well as the terrorist attacks in western Rakhine state.¹¹ By this structure, there is no way of establishing a healthy CMR. This assessment somehow lacks theoretical and historical analysis.

None of these are easily solved without a better understanding of the ideological base of Myanmar CMR and its structural context. Neglecting the causes is

Apologises to Military Chief,” Frontier Myanmar, July 17, 2017, <https://frontiermyanmar.net/en/phyomin-thein-apologises-to-military-chief>.

⁹ Justine Chambers et al., *Myanmar Transformed?: People, Places and Politics* (ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, 2018); DVB, “စီးပွားရေးစီမံခန့်ခွဲမှုတွင် လက်ရှိအစိုးရ ယခင်အစိုးရထက် မကောင်းဟု

စစ်တမ်းဆို [The Report Shows the Management of Economy of the Incumbent Government Is Not Good than Previous Government],” DVB, March 17, 2018, <http://burmese.dvb.no/archives/259227>.

¹⁰ Zoltan Barany, “Burma: Suu Kyi’s Missteps,” *Journal of Democracy*, January 2018, <https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/burma-suu-kyis-missteps/>; Marco Bünte, “Burma’s Transition to ‘Disciplined Democracy’: Abdication or Institutionalization of Military Rule?,” 2011; Nick Cheesman, Nicholas Farrelly, and Trevor Wilson, *Debating Democratization in Myanmar*, vol. 233 (Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2014); Aurel Croissant and Jil Kamerling, “Why Do Military Regimes Institutionalize? Constitution-Making and Elections as Political Survival Strategy in Myanmar,” *Asian Journal of Political Science* 21, no. 2 (2013): 105–125; William C. Dickey and Nay Yan Oo, “Myanmar’s Military Holds Key to Further Reform,” *Nikkei Asian Review*, August 18, 2017, <https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Myanmar-s-military-holds-key-to-further-reform2>; Renaud Egretau, *Caretaking Democratization: The Military and Political Change in Myanmar* (Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2017, 2016),

<https://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190620967.001.0001/acprof-9780190620967>; Renaud Egretau, “Myanmar’s Military: Who ‘Guards the Guardians’?,” *Nikkei Asian Review*, December 22, 2016, <https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Myanmar-s-military-Who-guards-the-guardians>; News-Eleven, “NLD အစိုးရ၏ သက်တမ်းဝက် အခြေအနေနှင့် မြန်မာ့နိုင်ငံရေး

အလားအလာ [The circumstance of the NLD government’s half-term and political potential],” Eleven Media Group Co., Ltd, October 8, 2018, <https://news-eleven.com/headline/86446>; Htet Naing Zaw, “Ethnic Parties, NLD at Odds over Pace of Military’s Exit from Politics,” *The Irrawaddy*, July 17, 2019, <https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/ethnic-parties-nld-odds-pace-militarys-exit-politics.html>.

¹¹ “Myanmar: New Evidence Reveals Rohingya Armed Group Massacred Scores in Rakhine State,” May 22, 2018, <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2018/05/myanmar-new-evidence-reveals-rohingya-armed-group-massacred-scores-in-rakhine-state/>.

dangerous in the case of interpretation of the effects and problem-solving. Therefore, the main objective of this research is to conduct an analysis of the development of Naing-ngan-taw Warda, its political socialization, and the structure CMR to gain a better understanding of these issues. The second is to fulfill some of the literature gaps in the existing study of the state, national, and military ideologies and civil-military relations to be useful in the current Myanmar liberalization and national reconciliation process. Moreover, it also tends to contribute a new concept, Naing-ngan-taw Warda, to Political Science, International Relations, and Sociology and to contribute a new model of civil-military relations that is suitable for a transitional or hybrid-regime to Military Sociology. Third, it is also relevant to use in establishing healthy CMR for national security and future Union. Fourth, it would help to provide a better understanding of the country's past, present, and future politics, regarding the scope of the study. Finally, the dissertation will also partially explain why and how the Tatmadaw has played a leading role in Myanmar politics, and help distinguish between national politics and party politics since the parliamentary democracy era until now.

1.3 Literature Review

The literature related to Myanmar armed forces and politics can essentially be divided into three categories: institutional aspect, political aspect, and general aspect. Institutional aspect strongly emphasizes the military matter,¹² Tatmadaw's formation, armament, procurement, combat capabilities, modernization, military doctrine and strategy, organization and force structure, training, and education. A political aspect concerns the literature of military role in politics, civil-military relations, and the performance of the military regime.¹³ In the general aspect, it can be added to a wide

¹² Maung Aung Myoe, *Building the Tatmadaw: Myanmar Armed Forces since 1948*, vol. 352 (Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009); Andrew Selth, *Burma's Armed Forces: Power without Glory* (Signature Books, 2002); Andrew Selth, *Transforming the Tatmadaw: The Burmese Armed Forces since 1988*, 113 (Australian National University, Research School of Social Sciences, 1996).

¹³ Yoshihiro Nakanishi, *Strong Soldiers, Failed Revolution: The State and Military in Burma, 1962–88* (NUS Press Pte Ltd, 2013); Claude Emerson Welch and Arthur K. Smith, *Military Role and Rule: Perspectives on Civil-Military Relations* (Duxbury Press North Scituate, Mass., 1974); Josef Silverstein, *Burma: Military Rule and the Politics of Stagnation* (Cornell University Press, 1977); Dorothy Guyot, "The Burma Independence Army: A Political Movement in Military Garb," *Southeast Asia in World War II: Four Essays*, 1966, 51–65; Robert H. Taylor, "The Evolving Military Role in Burma," *Current History* 89, no. 545 (1990): 105; Mary Patricia Callahan, *Making Enemies: War and State Building in Burma* (Cornell University Press, 2005); Andrew Selth, "The Future of the Burmese

variety of literature in which Tatmadaw related to democracy, insurgency, political economy, ethnicity, intelligence, military secret, national security, biography, ideology, and so on.¹⁴ Whereas there were some book chapters and articles that emphasized the study of Myanmar CMR, such as analysis on Burmese Praetorianism,¹⁵ Tatmadaw's new professionalism,¹⁶ Tatmadaw's perception of the ongoing liberalization process,¹⁷ and Tatmadaw's calculated move to a "disciplined democracy"¹⁸ are prominent.

While studies partially reveal the Tatmadaw's or state's political ideology to some extent, especially for the RC and BSPP era, a more comprehensive view of the relations between the Tatmadaw, the development of Naing-ngan-taw Warda, and political socialization are insufficiently explored. There is valuable literature from the ideological aspect related to Myanmar society, such as Robert Taylor's "Marxism and Resistance in Burma," Mikael Gravers's "Nationalism as Political Paranoia in Burma," and Gustaaf Houtman's "Mental Culture in Burmese Crisis Politics," the study from

Armed Forces," *Burma/Myanmar: Strong Regime Weak State*, 2000, 52–90; Robert Taylor, "Myanmar: Military Politics and the Prospects for Democratisation," *Asian Affairs* 29, no. 1 (1998): 3–12; Mary P. Callahan, "Cracks in the Edifice? Military-Society Relations in Burma since 1988," *Burma Myanmar: Strong Regime, Weak State*, 2000, 22–51.

¹⁴ Robert Taylor, "Government Responses to Armed Communist and Separatist Movements: Burma," *Governments and Rebellions in Southeast Asia*, 1985, 103–125; David I. Steinberg, *Burma: The State of Myanmar* (Georgetown University Press, 2001); Taylor, "The Evolving Military Role in Burma"; Robert H. Taylor, "General Ne Win: A Political Biography," *Asian Education and Development Studies*, 2016; Steinberg, *Burma*, 2001; Michael Fredholm, *Burma: Ethnicity and Insurgency* (Praeger Publishers, 1993); Michael Aung-Thwin, *Burma: Political Economy Under Military Rule* (JSTOR, 2001); Bertil Lintner, *Burma in Revolt: Opium and Insurgency since 1948* (Routledge, 2019); Desmond Ball, *Burma's Military Secrets: Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) from the Second World War to Civil War and Cyber Warfare* (White Lotus Press, 1998); Tin Maung Maung Than, "Burma's National Security and Defence Posture," *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 11, no. 1 (1989): 40; Tin Maung Maung Than, "Myanmar: Myanmar-Ness and Realism in Historical Perspective," *Strategic Cultures in the Asia-Pacific Region (Houndmills: Macmillan, 1999)*, 1999, 165–81; Tin Maung Maung Than, "Myanmar: Preoccupation with Regime Survival, National Unity, and Stability," *Asian Security Practice: Material and Ideational Influences*, 1998, 390–416; Aung Myoe, "The Counterinsurgency in Myanmar: The Government's Response to the Burma Communist Party," 1999; Selth, "The Future of the Burmese Armed Forces."

¹⁵ James F. Guyot, *Burmese Praetorianism*, 1993.

¹⁶ Tin Maung Maung Than, "Burma: The 'New Professionalism' of the Tatmadaw," *Military Professionalism in Asia: Conceptual and Empirical Perspectives*, Edited by Muthiah Alagappa (Honolulu, HI: East-West Center, 2001), 2001, 163–78.

¹⁷ Maung Aung Myoe, "The Soldier and the State: The Tatmadaw and Political Liberalization in Myanmar since 2011," *South East Asia Research* 22, no. 2 (2014): 233–249; Myoe et al., "Partnership in Politics."

¹⁸ Andrew Selth, "All Going According to Plan? The Armed Forces and Government in Myanmar1," *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 40, no. 1 (2018): 1–26.

the state-centric national ideological aspect is understudied in the field.¹⁹ Although there are many studies related to Myanmar military politics, the research related to the structures of Myanmar CMR looking from the development of Naing-ngan-taw Warda and the political socialization aspect remains limited. While there is literature that partly focuses on state ideology and Myanmar CMR to some extent in a limited time framework, a more comprehensive theoretical view of the relations between the development of Naing-ngan-taw Warda, its socialization, CMR structural dynamic, and Tatmadaw is insufficiently explored. This dissertation addresses this gap that has been lacking in Myanmar literature.

1.4 Research Questions and Arguments

This study raises the following questions. First, what are the significant Naing-ngan-taw Warda developments in Myanmar? How many stages it has? How and who did socialize them? Second, why and how had structures of Myanmar civil-military relations been constructed and shaped by following the developmental stages of Naing-ngan-taw Warda, and how did they link with these stages and its political socialization? Third, specifically, what are the theoretical understanding of the development of Naing-ngan-taw Warda(s) and Myanmar CMR, and what types of civilian control had been experienced since the Second World War?

By following these questions, the dissertation argues that Myanmar has had four dominant stages in the development of Naing-ngan-taw Warda, while the fifth is ongoing. The first stage, “Freedom at All Costs,” occurred during colonialism. After Independence, the second phase was characterized by the belief in a politico-economic system based on the principles of justice, liberty, and equality, the essence of which is captured in the term “Democratic Socialism.” Declared in 1962, “the Burmese Way to Socialism” was the third stage. The fourth, “Our Three National Causes,” developed during the State Law and Order Restoration Council. These developmental stages of

¹⁹ Robert H. Taylor, *Marxism and Resistance in Burma: 1942-1945* (Ohio University Press, 1984); Mikael Graver, “Nationalism as Political Paranoia in Burma,” *Copenhagen: Nordic Institute of Asian Studies*, 1993; Gustaaf Houtman, *Mental Culture in Burmese Crisis Politics: Aung San Suu Kyi and the National League for Democracy*, vol. 33 (The Institute for the study of Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa, 1999).

Naing-ngan-taw Warda(s) also shaped and constructed the structures of Myanmar civil-military relations.

Table 1.1 The Development of Naing-ngan-taw Warda and the Structure of Myanmar Civil-Military Relations

<i>Timeline</i>	<i>Naing-ngan-taw Warda</i>	<i>The structure of Myanmar civil-military relations</i>
1) Resistance movement for Independence	“Freedom at All Costs” (The collective ideology of Buddhism, Nationalism, Marxism/Leninism influenced by Pragmatism)	Collective subjective control under the leadership of AFPFL
2) Parliamentary Democracy Era (1948-1962)	“Democratic socialism”	Subjective civilian control by the 1947 constitution
3) Revolutionary Council to Burma Socialist Programme Party (1962-1988)	“Burmese Way to Socialism” (Democratic centralism)	Military rule to Subjective civilian control by the 1974 constitution
4) State Law and Order Restoration Council to State Peace and Development Council (1988-2011)	“Our Three National Causes” (Paternalistic ideology of national security)	Military rule
5) Multiparty Democracy (2011-2020) (Reforming to be a Democratic Federal Union)	Federalism based on Our Three National Causes and Democratic Principles	Collective democratic control by the 2008 constitution

Following these developmental stages, Myanmar experienced only the subjective types of civilian control, and the Tatmadaw promulgated “collective democratic control” in the 2008 constitution, guaranteed the Tatmadaw’s leading role in national politics to establish a disciplined democracy. The fifth stage, “Federalism based on Our Three National Causes and Democratic Principles,” is an ongoing process of national reconciliation or peace led by State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi’s government, an effort that started in 2011 under President Thein Sein’s government.

In this process, the fourth stage of Naing-ngan-taw Warda, “Our Three National Causes,” is still vital to upholding the principles for a future Democratic Federal Union and the structure of civil-military relations. In each of these developmental contexts, the Tatmadaw has been central in the formulation and prescription (in some stages), implementation, and socialization process of these ideologies and the structure of civil-military relations. The relations between the contexts of the development of Naing-ngan-taw Warda(s) and CMR structures can be categorized as in table 1.1.

It needs some pre-explanation related to the first and second stages. In the first stage, although there had other dominated ideologies in this period, such as Buddhism, nationalism, Marxism, or socialism, the dissertation argues “Freedom at All Costs” as a Naing-ngan-taw Warda or state-centric national ideology. The reason is that FAC played as a leading ideology above or overcome the others. Without FAC, Myanmar could not regain Independence by following the ideologies of Buddhism, nationalism, Marxism, or socialism per se. In the case of the second stage— “Democratic Socialism,” by the perspective of military ideology and its literature, Tatmadaw defines the period from 1948 to 1955 as a “Period of Ideological Gestation.”²⁰ But Naing-ngan-taw Warda already existed and written in Myanmar three main documents: our Declaration of Independence, the first Address to the Parliament of the first President of the Union, and the Constitution of the Union of Burma (1947). Tatmadaw just studied and discussed it starting from 1956 and defined officially as a “national ideology” on October 21, 1958. It was also the official starting point of the usage of “Naing-ngan-taw Warda.” Therefore, the dissertation argues that “Democratic Socialism” started from the year 1948, not from 1958.

1.5 The Conceptual Framework

This conceptual framework represents the author’s own constructed ideas by following the existing theories and concepts used to explain the variables in the scope of the dissertation and how to connect with each other. It is also an adaptation of existing theories that the author adopts to suit the research purpose.

²⁰ Ministry of Defence, *Naing-Ngan-Taw Warda Hnint Tatmadaw Loat-Ngan-Sin [The National Ideology and the Role of the Defence Services]*, Third Edition (Yangon: Sar Pay Bate Mhan Press, 1960).

First of all, it is necessary to explain how ideology and the structure of CMR are related. By Samuel Huntington, military institutions of any society are shaped by functional imperative and societal imperative. The former stems from the threats to society's security and the latter arise from the social forces, ideologies, and institutions dominant within the society.²¹ Balancing these two imperatives is the nub of the problem of CMR. In fact, these imperatives are prerequisites not only for the military institutions but also for shaping the structure of CMR. In Myanmar's case, the high level of national security threat (functional imperative) sets in constant because of two main reasons. The first one is the geopolitical location. Myanmar is a juncture of South Asia, Southeast Asia, and East Asia, India's "Look East" policy and China's "Go West," United States' Indo-Pacific strategy, "an ironclad and enduring commitment" and China's "One Belt One Road Initiative."

The second reason is the prolonged intrastate armed conflicts. Myanmar has protracted armed conflicts between state and ethnic armed groups and among ethnic groups themselves since before Independence. Now it is in the stage of trying to get a common political agreement between government, Tatmadaw, and Ethnic Armed Organizations through NCA or national reconciliation process. Therefore, in Myanmar, as Huntington defined, CMR is not only the principal institutional component of military security per se,²² but it is overwhelming the national security as a whole. When the high level of national security threats (functional imperative) remains constant, shaping the CMR and its structures by the ideology development of dominant institutions and political socialization within the society are more significant (societal imperative). In Myanmar, this kind of ideology is called Naing-ngan-taw Warda. While authoritarianism is a core value of Myanmar political culture,²³ there are Naing-ngan-taw Warda(s) that influenced and shaped the structures of CMR.

²¹ Huntington, "The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations," 2–3.

²² By Huntington, national security policy consists of three types of sub-policies: military security policy that focus on the activities to minimize or neutralize efforts to weaken or destroy the external security threats, internal security policy deals with the internal security threats against the state, and situational security policy is concerned with the threat of erosion of social, economic, demographic, political conditions, and so on. Huntington, 1.

²³ Maung Maung Gyi, *Burmese Political Values: The Socio-Political Roots of Authoritarianism* (Praeger Publishers, 1983).

Conceptualization Naing-ngan-taw Warda and Political Socialization.

Naing-ngan-taw Ward is one kind of ideology. But the author notices that while there are numerous western concepts related to ‘ideology,’ there is a lack of sufficient and explicit concepts to explain Myanmar *Naing-ngan-taw Warda*. The challenge is to explain Naing-ngan-taw Warda in the sense of outside world’s understanding for those who neither understand Burmese language and Myanmar history.²⁴ In Myanmar, *national ideology* is an official and a direct translation from the Burmese “နိုင်ငံတော်ဝါဒ” [*Naing-ngan-taw-Warda*] that is formulated and projected by the state

Figure 1.1 The Evidence of Official Translation Naing-ngan-taw Warda as National Ideology



or dominant institution, as shown in figure 1.1. It is an agent-specific and sometime case-specific ideology that is tried to internalize as a “national ideology.” But, by the western concepts, “national ideology” is an insufficient translation of Naing-ngan-taw

²⁴ By the discussion and comment of Professor Motohide Saji (Ph.D. in Political Science, University of Chicago), one of the advisors of my dissertation, he mentioned that he also had in mind a similar case in the study of modern Japan of at least up until the end of WWII. The ideology of “koku-tai” (national-body-polity-structure-organization-identity-essence) was crucial in modern Japan in its nation-state building. But it would be extremely difficult for those who neither understand Japanese language nor know Japanese history to understand the full meaning of the term because it is impossible to convey all its connotations in translation.

Warda, because “nation” and “state” have different concepts and understanding in Political Science, International Relations, Sociology, and so on.

Myanmar is a multi-ethnic country. But there is no different concept or understanding in Myanmar between “nation,” a socio-cultural-historical-psychological-emotional, imagined unity, and “state,” a political organization with the territory, population, government, and sovereignty. It has only one concept of “*Naing-ngan-taw*” or “*Naing-ngan*” over a thousand of years ago that was used to denote “the periphery of the kingdom of Bagan.”²⁵ In *Naing-ngan-taw*, different ethnic people are living together. In the official term in Burmese, Myanmar was called “မြန်မာနိုင်ငံတော်” [*Myanmar Naing-ngan-taw*].²⁶ The suffix *taw* (တော်) connotes the notion of dignity and royalty. Therefore, the context of *Naing-ngan-taw* conceptually comprised of both the essence of “nation” and “state” or “nation-state.” *Warda* (ဝါဒ) connotes the concept of ideology, doctrine, policy, and discipline, while the concept of ideology is more significant. Therefore, in this regard of translation of *Naing-ngan-taw Warda*, though use the term “ideology” is appropriate, the term “national” insufficiently connotes. Thus, the author decided to use the term directly in Burmese, *Naing-ngan-taw Warda*, and tries to conceptualize in the way of the outside world to be understandable.

That is also the main reason why my dissertation explicitly does not approach the conceptual framework from the military’s political ideology or state ideology point of view. For example, the very first development of *Naing-ngan-taw Warda*, “Freedom at All Costs,” and the second, “Democratic Socialism,” and fifth, “Federalism based on Our Three National Causes and Democratic Principles” were not originated from the military. “Freedom at all Costs” derived from the young western-educated nationalists to mobilize the whole nation to establish Myanmar’s own state instead of

²⁵ Robert H. Taylor, *The State in Myanmar* (NUS Press, 2009), 1–3; Michael Aung-Thwin and Maitrii Aung-Thwin, *A History of Myanmar since Ancient Times: Traditions and Transformations* (Reaktion Books, 2013), 7–8.

²⁶ The conflicts and power rivalries between Myanmar indigenous people also do not originate and concern on the concept of “nation” and “state.” They have different reason of conflicts that based on politics, specific rights, resources, and governmental system or structure, and so on.

the British colonial state. It includes the concepts of both “state” and “nation.” Hence, Myanmar regained its Independence as a nation-state with its own state.²⁷ In this regard, FAC cannot be defined as a state ideology per se. Even though the national elites led to the development of FAC, involving non-ruling actors is significant in the formation and functions of Naing-ngan-taw Warda.

Furthermore, the military just codified “Democratic Socialism” behalf of the state, the concept that was already included in Myanmar’s three main fundamental documents at that time. It is not an ideology that is originated or derived from the military. “Federalism based on Our Three National Causes and Democratic Principles” also developed at the time of President Thein Sein’s regime, so-called transitional government. Though it was the state-led development, the ideology also reflects the desire of non-ruling actors. The Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement included the ideological formulation is a good example. It was not a military’s original ideological formulation. In other words, if the dissertation looks at Naing-ngan-taw Warda from the point of and directly using the terminology of military ideology or state ideology, the consistency of my thesis will be distorted.

The military formulated and dominated the third, “Burmese Way to Socialism,” and the fourth stage of Naing-ngan-taw Warda, “Our Three National Causes.” It also influences the current fifth stage is another matter. In these stages, even though some challenges come from the side of the political or state system, different ways of functioning Naing-ngan-taw Warda(s), there were no significant conceptual challenges of non-ruling actors from the Naing-ngan-taw Warda or ideological point of view. For example, notwithstanding significant challenges against a one-party state system and military rule, there were no significant ideological conceptual challenges to BWS and OTNC. Though Naing-ngan-taw Warda(s) have different levels of accomplishment and different challenges, non-ruling actors also involve in the formation and functions of Naing-ngan-taw Warda(s).

²⁷ From the Myanmar’s side, the colonial period had no state formation. It was just a time of humiliation as an appendage of British India. Colloquially, Myanmar people regarded themselves as *kyun-tha-bouk* (slave of slave: Myanmar likes a slave of India that is a slave of British).

By the western concepts and understanding, in Political Science and Sociology, the word *ideology* was coined by French philosopher Antoine Destutt de Tracy (1754–1836) as a new “science of ideas” in the late eighteenth century.²⁸ As Andrew Heywood remarked, “an ideology is a more or less coherent set of ideas that provides the basis for organized political action, whether this is intended to preserve, modify or overthrow the existing system of power.”²⁹ In the political context, the faces of ideology can be seen as a political sophistication, a set of political beliefs, deliberation and discourse, and hegemony and history.³⁰ Ideology also overlaps with the “belief system” that displays low degrees of logical constraint as “a configuration of ideas and attitudes in which the elements are bound together by some form of constraint or functional interdependence.”³¹

Not all ideology can be clearly defined as an “-ism.” For example, the paternalistic ideology of “national security” inspired in the United States in 1823.³² The U.S. “Monroe Doctrine” developed over fears of Spanish absolutism and Russian claims on the Pacific Coast. After World War II, when communism became a threat to the United States, President Truman translated the Monroe Doctrine into a universal “capitalist versus communist” principle that started a plan, firstly, to provide thousands of U.S. dollars to the Balkans to stop the spread of communism. In Myanmar, “Freedom at All Costs” and “Our Three National Causes” are this type of ideology. The former has a significant political intention or doctrine, while the latter has a paternalistic concept based on national security. Hence, in sociology, the ideology highly correlated with philosophy, concept, attitude, strategy, and doctrine. Nevertheless, ideology influences the structure of political understanding and thus sets

²⁸ Andrew Heywood, *Political Ideologies: An Introduction* (Macmillan International Higher Education, 2017), 5.

²⁹ Heywood, 10.

³⁰ Betty Dobratz, Linda Waldner, and Timothy Buzzell, *Power, Politics, and Society: An Introduction to Political Sociology* (Routledge, 2015), 92–97.

³¹ Philip E. Converse, “The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics (1964),” *Critical Review* 18, no. 1–3 (2006): 1–74; Michael Freedman, *Ideologies and Political Theory: A Conceptual Approach* (Oxford University Press on Demand, 1996), 36.

³² Theo Westow, “The Ideology of National Security,” *New Blackfriars*, 1980, 52–61.

goals, inspires activism, shapes the nature of political systems, and acts as a form of social cement.³³

In International Relations, ideologies are predictive and prescriptive. They are a source of conflict that shows great intensity between parties, unwillingness to compromise, and marked tendency to become total. One of the post-war regional conflicts, Arab-Israeli conflict, is a good example that had ideological dimensions, usually nationalism.³⁴ In one respect, the Cold War was an ideological struggle between liberal democracy and communism. They have motivational power that is conducive to active interventionist foreign policies. Explanations of foreign policies have often been sought in terms of ideologies, for example, US's isolationism and interventionism/internationalism, Wilsonian idealism. They are a source of capability within the state sometimes that can 'spill over' into the external environment as a reflection of their internal beliefs and values. In realist tradition, ideologies and separating power may be a source of putative power that tended to obscure the possibility.

They can influence policy-making because they become a kind of lens through which policymakers look at interstate and intrastate relations and politics. These ideological influences are also a product of socialization, such as manifest socialization and indoctrination that occurs in all social systems and begins in the family, influence as much as intellectual fashion. They are also ways of looking at the subject by the aspect of intellectual preferences. Recently Burton's World Society³⁵ perspective and cobweb idea was more isomorphic with an increasingly complex world politics. Indeed this perspective is a collapsing a way of looking at politics by distinction between domestically and externally. Ideologies perhaps are interchangeable with perspective or intellectual tradition and more concerned with the subject as studied on the campus rather than the subject as conducted in practice.

³³ Heywood, *Political Ideologies*, 2–3.

³⁴ Richard N. Rosecrance, "Action And Reaction In World Politics International Systems In Perspective," 1963.

³⁵ John W. Burton and John W. Burton, *World Society* (Cambridge University Press, 1972).

By the morphological analysis, ideologies emerge at all levels of social articulation.³⁶ Therefore, when a state or other dominant, influential institution or group that controls a state believes in and formulates a concept (or an “-ism”), this becomes a state-centric ideology that reaches the national level. In this context, ideology has a sense of subjectivity and political mobilization that influences the mind and action of the people; it is an indispensable and crucial idea in building a nation-state. Therefore, in this dissertation, Naing-ngan-taw Warda is defined as an all-embracing political ideology, doctrine, or political belief system that is used to legitimize a state or a political system by encompassing the political, socioeconomic, and security environment to build a nation-state. It is also an ideology to guard the state in making Myanmar as a modern nation-state. It will also seek to stipulate what foreign policy analysts would call long-term goal for the future.

A Naing-ngan-taw Warda also requires specific political socialization that is defined as “the deliberate inculcation of political information, values, and practices by instructional agents who have been formally charged with this responsibility.”³⁷ In other words, it is also a deliberate inculcation or mass mobilization of ideological concepts and facts by the regime to build a nation-state. But it does not mean “propaganda,” “black magic,” or “pseudo-populism,” so-called by Charles Derber, that is in line with the story of civilization under threat, the alien establishment, permanent war, or the election trap.³⁸ In Myanmar, the conceptualization, contextualization, and political socialization of the Naing-ngan-taw Warda, in some stages, were practically monopolized by a particular group or institution, through narrative and discourse to shape what they believed Myanmar should be. Tatmadaw is this kind of particular institution in some stages. The political socialization also has the establishment of attached institutions that functioned at the cost of Naing-ngan-taw Warda socialization.

³⁶ Michael Freeden, Lyman Tower Sargent, and Marc Stears, *The Oxford Handbook of Political Ideologies* (OUP Oxford, 2013), 115–37.

³⁷ Fred I. Greenstein, *Children and Politics* (Yale University Press: New Haven, 1969), 5.

³⁸ Charles Derber, *Hidden Power: What You Need to Know to Save Our Democracy* (Berrett-Koehler Publishers, 2005), 121–49.

Conceptualization “Collective Democratic Control of Armed Forces.” By following the development of Naing-ngan-taw Warda, this study attempts to analyze the structures of Myanmar CMR by providing Huntington’s theory and democratic control theories. In the field of civil-military relations, there are minimal CMR models that are suitable for transitional society and hybrid-regime. Meanwhile, the dissertation tries to build a new model of CMR to analyze the current structure of Myanmar CMR by adapting the existing democratic control theories.

Huntington explained two different control systems: subjective and objective civilian control.³⁹ Subjective control means maximizing the civilian power and civilianizing the military while objective control means maximizing military professionalism and militarizing the military. Subjective civilian control always leads to the interests of one or more civilian groups because of the large amount and variety of conflicts concerned with the own interests of civilian groups, which made it more difficult to minimize the military power and difficult to get the respect of the military. It can be seen as the three different forms to maximize power by governmental institutions, social class, and constitutional forms.

Whereas objective civilian control is based on the distribution of power between the military and civilian groups, it tends to be the notion of professionalization of the military. Huntington’s words for the objective way are “making them the tool of the state” and for a subjective way, “making them mirror of the state.” The objective type is more conscious and nuanced. Therefore, it is difficult to set up easily and quickly. It can be seen very rarely even in Western societies in which liberalism and democratic norms are dominant. It allows and respects the military’s security and sphere of influence. This thesis will take the Huntington’s concept to explain what type of civilian control in Myanmar CMR structures since the anti-colonial period until 2010, but it is inadequate in analyzing the transitional society or hybrid-regime that transformed long-term military rule to a more liberalized constitutional government. Therefore, the dissertation requires building a new CMR model based on existing theories to examine the current structure of Myanmar CMR.

³⁹ Huntington, “The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations,” 83–85.

Civilian control cannot always be regarded as being democratic. Dictatorial and monarchical regimes can also establish civilian control in subjective ways. Therefore, democratic civilian control is about democratic governance rather than the government itself. Moreover, democratic control theories have broad and effective explanatory power for CMR, which are in the early stage of democratic transition from the dictatorial military state. There is no definite or ultimate model of democratic control. It is formulated based on the respective society's politics, history, values, culture, and the level of internal and external security threats. This article examines the current structure of Myanmar CMR by adopting the concepts of democratic control theories.

Rudolf Joo outlined general societal, institutional, and procedural requirements for a democratic model of civilian control of the armed forces.⁴⁰ This control requires the existence of a clear legal and constitutional framework that provides a vital prerequisite for the functioning of the rule of law. The significant role of parliament in legislating on defense and security matters, including budget approval and controlling spending – ‘the power of the purse’ over ‘the power of the sword’ – is essential. The military must have hierarchical responsibility to the government through a civilian organ of public administration and the presence of a well-trained and experienced professional military corps. The division of authority with accountability between the civilian and uniformed defense authorities is a prerequisite. A developed civil society must exist as a part of society's political culture and a national consensus present on the role and mission of the military. Also required is the presence of reliable non-governmental components within the defense community, that is, academics and media experts who support democratic control. He further argued that the everyday practice of policymaking differs from country by country. The development of CMR is a dynamic process in which problems are managed but not solved.

⁴⁰ Rudolf Joo, *The Democratic Control of Armed Forces: The Experience of Hungary* (Institute for Security Studies, Western European Union, 1996), 3–5.

Andrew Cottey, Timothy Edmunds, and Anthony Forster stated that the concept of ‘democratic control’ is broader than ‘civilian control.’⁴¹ It is beyond the simple concept of ‘maximization’ of civilian power over the military and ‘minimization’ of the military role in politics. While they agree that the role of the democratically elected executive is central to democracy, it involves a balance of power between different bodies of the state to constrain the power of the executive authority. It also includes the concept of democratic legitimacy, democratic governance of the defense and security sectors, and democratic control of defense policy and foreign policy. Armed forces do not mean military only; they also include other significant militarised formations such as police and other paramilitary forces. These different groups are sometimes more politically influential than the military. Although the normative ideal of democratic control is that the military should be apolitical, it always has reference points or reasons for military intervention in domestic politics, such as in the case of national security and preventing communism.⁴²

Hans Born conceptualized the democratic control of armed forces ‘roadmap’ in three methods and their instruments: vertical control, horizontal control, and self-control.⁴³ Vertical control means the parliamentary and governmental control of the armed forces. In the way of vertical control, political leaders have six instruments: budget, legislation, micromanagement, appoints of generals, parliamentary oversight of armed forces, and the use of countervailing powers within the military. The horizontal control is the job of societal institutions, including media, religious organizations, research institutions, and NGOs. These institutions can serve as a bridge between the armed forces and civil society to integrate the armed forces into society. Horizontal control is vital for countries that have no conscription law, the natural bridge between the military and society. The last interesting one is self-control. It

⁴¹ Andrew Cottey, Timothy Edmunds, and Anthony Forster, “The Second Generation Problematic: Rethinking Democracy and Civil-Military Relations,” *Armed Forces & Society* 29, no. 1 (2002): 31–56.

⁴² Andrew Cottey, Tim Edmunds, and Anthony Forster, “Democratic Control of Armed Forces in Central and Eastern Europe: A Framework for Understanding Civil-Military Relations in Post-Communist Europe” (One-Europe Programme, 1999), 5.

⁴³ Hans Born, “Democratic Control of Armed Forces: Relevance, Issues, and Research Agenda,” in *Handbook of the Sociology of the Military* Edited by Giuseppe Caforio, Handbooks of Sociology and Social Research 6 (233 Spring Street, New York, New York 10013: Kluwer Academic/ Plenum Publishers, 2003), 151–165, <http://www.wkap.nl/>.

means that the armed forces have a social responsibility, respect for the democratically elected civil authority, democratic norms, human rights, and political neutrality. These responsibilities are the result of military education and training. Therefore, Born concludes that civilian control does not equal democratic control. It is a necessary but not sufficient condition for democratic control.

Almost all democratic control theories stress the concept of control mechanisms, while this dissertation tries to adapt and adopt existing concepts to suit Myanmar's case. In other words, it conceptualizes and builds the model of "collective democratic control"⁴⁴ of Myanmar's existing CMR structure. In Myanmar's case, the Tatmadaw's professionalism is appropriate with Alfred Stepan's "new professionalism," which emphasizes internal security and politized military.⁴⁵ It opposes Huntington's "old professionalism," which emphasizes external security and political neutrality.⁴⁶ Aurel Croissant also argued that the militaries in Southeast Asia primarily focus on safeguarding internal and regime security and contribute to nation-building compared to Western counterparts defeating threats from foreign adversaries.⁴⁷ Theoretically, nowadays, while Tatmadaw's professionalism suits the "new professionalism" concept, it cannot be looked at through the lens of Huntington, suggesting "objective civilian control" that is mainly based on "old professionalism."⁴⁸ Currently, Myanmar's "vertical control" is constructed based on the concept of "equilibrium" rather than "dichotomy," "un-ascendency" rather than "ascendency,"

⁴⁴ In the conceptualization of this terminology "collective democratic control," the term 'civilian' is omitted. Because of the fact that "collective democratic control" strongly emphasizes on the "governance" [system] and "collectiveness" rather than subject and object [civilian/military or person, group or institution]. Logically, the author thought that labeling the name of one side (civilian or military or any others) to control or influence others (civilian or military or any others) always provokes the opposing reaction of another side. It leads not only to be a strategical flaw in establishing a collectiveness in healthy civil-military relations but also to the subjectivity of studying CMR discipline that is much more than studying control of one side to another side.

⁴⁵ Alfred Stepan, "The New Professionalism of Internal Warfare and Military Role Expansion," *Authoritarian Brazil: Origins, Policies, and Future*, Edited by Alfred Stepan, New Heaven: Yale University Press, 1973, 47–65.

⁴⁶ Than, "Burma."

⁴⁷ Aurel Croissant, *Civil–Military Relations in Southeast Asia* (Cambridge University Press, 2018), 45–60.

⁴⁸ Even though, by the theory, one can explain that Myanmar CMR suits with 'new professionalism', the word 'professionalism' is commonly interpreted into Burmese as *Kyesar*, a derogatory connotation and an image with no social responsibility that one works or serves only for money. Hence, the Tatmadaw strongly opposed the use of the 'professional army', which has the connotation of 'mercenary army' [*Kyesar-Tat*]. See Myoe, "The Soldier and the State," 9–10.

“collectiveness” rather than “confrontation.” These concepts do not define the terms of organizational characteristics and occupational structures of the military. Instead, they refer to the structure in which the type of CMR or control is constructed.

Armed forces do not mean military only. It also includes the police forces and intelligence agencies that sometimes have a political influence other than the military, as discussed above by democratic civilian control theories. The armed forces have their professional realm: subjects, academics, ethics, and ideology, which differ from the state, civilian institutions, or sometimes from society. The difference between civilian and military institutional culture and characteristics is their nature. Hence, stressing on “dichotomy” leads to “power rivalry”: who can control, prevail, or influence whom. This result will depend on the times, circumstances, and security environment, while equilibrium is the result of adapting and balancing process between them at any time and circumstance. Even by the father of dichotomous CMR theorists, Huntington argued that “Any system of civil-military relations thus involves a complex equilibrium between authority, influence, and ideology of the military, on the one hand, and the authority, influence, and ideology of non-military groups, on the other.”⁴⁹ He also stated that the “distribution of power between military and civilian groups which is most conducive to the emergence of professional attitudes and behavior among members of the officer corps.”⁵⁰ In Myanmar, the current CMR has a structure of shared responsibility to the military.

Related to this point, Herspring argued that “Too often, observers have focused on which side prevailed in the decision-making process: the military or the civilians.”⁵¹ This view overlooks the interactive nature of the process. Douglas Bland also stated that “civilian control of the military is managed and maintained through the sharing of responsibility for control between civilian leaders and military officers. . . . The relationship and arrangement of responsibilities are conditioned by a national evolved regime of principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which

⁴⁹ Huntington, “The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations,” 456–66.

⁵⁰ Huntington, 83.

⁵¹ Dale R. Herspring, *Civil-Military Relations and Shared Responsibility: A Four-Nation Study* (JHU Press, 2013), 3.

actor expectations converge in the matters of civil-military relations.”⁵² Schiff’s concordance theory also suggests the military, the political elites, and the citizens should aim for a cooperative relationship.⁵³ Concordance theory does agree to the extent that the civil-military conflicts or tensions are inevitable in any structure. Myanmar CMR structure has the concept of ‘collectiveness’ rather than ‘confrontation.’ Note that it has a primary concept that the military subordinates to a legitimated constitutional state or government that is constitutionally elected from a legitimate democratic election.

Conceptualization “self-control.” Moreover, in the case of conceptualization “self-control” in Myanmar, it is active not by teaching Huntington’s “professionalism” concept and by having social responsibility, respect for the democratically elected civil authority, democratic norms, human rights, and political neutrality, provided by Hans Born as mentioned above. Tatmadaw has a particular form of ‘self-control’ that intends to adapt and synchronize the current and future liberalization process other than that is defined by western concepts. Yagil Levy also introduced the concept of ‘control from within’ that is the intentional action taken by soldiers against the military-political directives.⁵⁴ It has two variables: the level of presence of potentially subversive soldiers in the same social groups and the group’s social status within and outside the military. These variables exert a powerful effect on ‘control from within,’ but a volunteer system reduces the influence of it. This concept will not be significant in Myanmar, a country that has been conducting a volunteer system since the anti-colonial period. Michael R. Kenwick also introduced the concept of “self-reinforcing civilian control” that is based on the level of development of a shared norm of civilian control within the military and learning among military elites that fosters a belief that civilian rule is robust to military challenges.⁵⁵ It needs sufficient time for civilianized institutions to be well adopted. Without questioning this logic, Myanmar has its own

⁵² Douglas L. Bland, “A Unified Theory of Civil-Military Relations,” *Armed Forces & Society* 26, no. 1 (1999): 9–10.

⁵³

⁵⁴ Yagil Levy, “Control from within: How Soldiers Control the Military,” *European Journal of International Relations* 23, no. 1 (2017): 192–216.

⁵⁵ Michael R. Kenwick, “Self-Reinforcing Civilian Control: A Measurement-Based Analysis of Civil-Military Relations,” *International Studies Quarterly* (2020) 00,1-14 (2017).


mechanisms to achieve “self-control” that is different from the western logic. In Myanmar, “self-control” is active in other forms by offering laws, people-centric ideology (no social boundary exists between civilian and military), and military ethics or Codes of Conduct, and by bounding up with by-laws and historical and political legacy factors. “Self-control” paves the way for “collective democratic control” to be feasible in its own way.

Tatmadaw’s conceptualization of the vital difference between ‘national politics’ and ‘party politics’ is another form of “self-control.” This differentiation prevents the military not to fight primarily because of an explicit political ideology or indoctrination of ‘-ism[s],’ because Tatmadaw had a bitter experience of communism penetration into the armed forces at the time of the anti-colonial period. And then, the armed forces ideologically and ethnically disunified into pieces. The result was civil-war after regaining Independence and the “Rangoon Government” called by international media that could not control even the suburbs of Rangoon. Hence, Tatmadaw is naturally active to undermine ‘ism[s]’ itself and prefers to “national politics,” do not attach or participate to political parties at the time of active in-service and overtly displaying partisan neutrality. Hence, Morris Janowitz said that even the professional soldiers do not assume that they could or should be unpolitical.⁵⁶

Conceptualization “common ideological base.” Myanmar has a common ideological base that supports active collective democratic control of armed forces. In other words, more than vertical control, horizontal control, and self-control, it supports the civil-military collective work that is derived from the historical experience, the development of Naing-ngan-taw Warda, and subjective types of civilian control. This ideological base also could contribute to the other control mechanisms to be more workable. It is a paternalistic and national security-centric ideology, “Our Three Main Causes”: Non-disintegration of the Union, Non-disintegration of the national solidarity, Perpetuation of the national sovereignty. OTNC gradually developed from the Tatmadaw’s primary duties to Naing-ngan-taw Warda at the time of State Law and

⁵⁶ Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait* (1230 Avenue of the Americas, New York, NY 10020: Free Press, An imprint of Simon & Schuster, Inc., 2017), 233–36.

Figure 1.2 Conceptual Framework



Order Restoration Council. Nowadays, even in the era of the NLD government, the most vigorous opposition party or group against the military rule, is conducting the national reconciliation process in line with OTNC to establish a future Democratic Federal Union. Therefore, OTNC is actively playing a vital role in the collective concept of Myanmar's CMR structure. The conceptual framework of the dissertation is, as shown in figure 1.1.

1.6 Research Methodology, Limitations, and Organizational Structure

This dissertation is a case study that uses qualitative process-tracing method designs to explore the little-known area.⁵⁷ It adopts an analytical overview, a holistic and in-depth theoretical understanding of the research area, development of Naing-ngan-taw Warda, political socialization, and interactional dynamics of Myanmar CMR structure. There is no limitation of sources. The author attempts to gain information from all available sources, open-ended data collection methods. Also, to collect unpublished documents, eyewitness accounts, and speeches concerned with the ideological context, the military archive is the primary source. The government or semi-government publications, earlier research, and mass media are also the secondary sources of my research. It is a specific case study, and rigorous examination mainly focused on the contexts of Naing-ngan-taw Warda(s), their socialization process, and the structures of Myanmar CMR.

This dissertation does not contribute to studying interstate or intrastate challenges of Naing-ngan-taw Warda(s) from various sectors that have different ideologies, political beliefs, concepts, or interests in detail. But some extent of the discussion is included in the conclusion. Giving ‘equal weight’ on these challenges could distort the consistency and scope of the study. While the academic desire for attaining ‘balance’ on these challenges is a moral and political concern, this dissertation is an empirical and theoretical one. The organizational structure is arranged based on the stages of Naing-ngan-taw Warda development. The dissertation examines the first stage “Freedom at All Costs,” in Chapter II, second stage “Democratic Socialism” in Chapter III, third stage “Burmese Way to Socialism” in

⁵⁷ By Beach and Pedersen, the process-tracing method is a method that enables us to open up the black box of causality using in-depth case study research designs to make strong within-case inferences about causal mechanisms. There are three types of process-tracing methods: theory-testing, theory-building, and explaining-outcome process-tracing method. In this analysis, I use the method by mixing the features of theory-building and explaining-outcome process-tracing methods to build a generalizable theoretical explanation from empirical evidence, inferring that a more general causal mechanism exists from the facts of a particular case, and to craft a minimally sufficient explanation of a puzzling outcome in a specific historical case. See detail in Derek Beach and Rasmus Brun Pedersen, *Process-Tracing Methods: Foundations and Guidelines* (University of Michigan Press, 2019).

Chapter IV, and the fourth stage “Our Three National Causes” in Chapter V, accompanied with their political socialization, the structures of civil-military relations based on the development of Naing-ngan-taw Warda, and the role of the Tatmadaw respectively. Chapter VI discusses the current ongoing fifth stage of Naing-ngan-taw Warda development “Federalism based on Our Three National Causes and Democratic Principles” as a conclusion chapter.

CHAPTER II

FREEDOM AT ALL COSTS, POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION, THE STRUCTURE OF CIVIL- MILITARY RELATIONS, AND THE TATMADAW

2.1 Background

From the Bagan Dynasty (c.849-1287) to the fall of the last *Konbaung* King Thibaw in 1885, warfare and *mandalas*⁵⁸ have been a feature of monarchical state-building through the Buddhist religion, education, and ideology to create a homogeneous population. In which, *Sangha* or monkhood with less obviously exploitative and coercive posture provided Myanmar society to establish a cultural unity in the institutional form of the Buddhist faith. In precolonial Myanmar, dynasties did not clearly define the structure of CMR. In theory, the King has the authority or the right to the service of all his subjects for serving in the Army if there is no exception related to physical and mental features. Myanmar can be regarded more or less as a nation of soldiers.⁵⁹ This relied on the King's charismatic power, decentralized, and personal character. The level of authority derived from the King's capital city was determined by the regions' geographical distance from the center and the level of subordinates' loyalty.

British annexed Myanmar by the First Anglo-Burmese War (1824-1826). Myanmar lost the provinces of Tenasserim, Arakan, and Assam, and an indemnity of a million pounds sterling. The first two are the main coastal areas that were controlled by the British. While the causes of the First War were the different world views, cultural misunderstanding, including a matter of power, the causes of the Second War

⁵⁸ Mandalas mean the 'circles of kings' identified with divine and universal authority. In which, one king claimed personal hegemony over the other rulers in his mandala who in theory were his obedient allies and vassals. O.W. Wolters, *History, Culture, and Region in Southeast Asian Perspectives* (Heng Mui Keng Terrace, Pasir Panjang: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1982), 16–33.

⁵⁹ Than Tun, *A Modern History of Myanmar (1752-1948)* (Yangon: Loka Ahlinn Publishing House, 2010), 112–23.

(1852-53) was more to do with personalities and power projections.⁶⁰ British entered to the Dry Zone and the ‘heartland’ and occupied ‘Lower Burma,’ the window to the outside world. The Third War in 1885 was nearly everything related to the economic and political concerns of the British. At that time, the British had an intense rivalry with the French and fear of America’s power expansion in China. Nevertheless, Myanmar lost its capital, Mandalay, its records were burned, and treasures looted, and King Thibaw and his Queens were taken into exile in India. Since that time, the British never entirely achieved the pacification in Myanmar.

The British annexation and the abolishment of Myanmar monarchy was just as the replacement of “order without meaning.”⁶¹ They had no intention in building nationhood, but the colonial state and order. By the comment of Major Snodgrass, a military secretary to the commander of the expedition, and assistant political agent in Ava, “... a more serious and protracted nature than any in which our Eastern empire had been engaged for a long series of years.... the conquest of the capital of Alompra [Alaungpaya]... would have had a good effect upon the whole Eastern world...”⁶² At that time, the colonial state used the British-Indian Army as a tool of the state to nurture and maintain the profits of European firms, such as the East India Company, Bombay-Burma Trading Corporation, and other powerful commercial interests. While Myanmar, like a buffer-zone between French Indochina and British India, was not a priority in British imperial policy, it just intended to build a slim state that paid for itself by letting commerce flourish.⁶³ The stage-by-stage annexation by three Anglo-Burmese wars was the result of that kind of British intention to pacify the Burmese population.

⁶⁰ Oliver B. Pollak, *Empires in Collision: Anglo-Burmese Relations in the Mid-Nineteenth Century*, 1 (Greenwood Pub Group, 1979); Dorothy Woodman, *The Making of Burma* (Cresset Press, 1962); Aung-Thwin and Aung-Thwin, *A History of Myanmar since Ancient Times*, 174–93.

⁶¹ Michael Aung-Thwin, “The British ‘Pacification’ of Burma: Order without Meaning,” *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 16, no. 2 (1985): 245–261.

⁶² John James Snodgrass, *Narrative of the Burmese War: Detailing the Operations of Major-General Sir Archibald Campbell’s Army, from Its Landing at Rangoon in May 1824, to the Conclusion of a Treaty of Peace at Yandaboo, in February 1826* (London: J. Murray, 1827), 283–84.

⁶³ Callahan, *Making Enemies*, 21.

The British used harsh tactics in the repressive measures against Burmese resistance and rebellion.⁶⁴ By Colonel Sir Reginald Hennell writing: “In practically all engagements with the enemy we had to fight an invisible foe.....Not only difficult to locate the enemy in their hidden lairs, but our men labored under the vast disadvantage of having to force their way through the close undergrowth of an unknown forest, whilst the enemy knew all the ins and outs of their tangled labyrinths and was able to keep concealed....Our only means of punishment was to burn these villages.”⁶⁵ These kinds of measures backfired on British administration and imperialism. The resistance movements of villagers had become more robust than previous ones.⁶⁶

There is no doubt that the British introduced Myanmar with ‘modern state’ like European bureaucracies. Chief Commissioner Charles Crosthwaite’s implantation of the Village Act was the very first introduction of a modern bureaucracy to Burma by breaking the traditional non-territorial and local-level Burmese administration, which was also a destruction of the social and cultural fabric of late 19th century Burma.⁶⁷ The British never entirely achieved the pacification, while the British-Indian Army was just as a coercion-intensive tool of the colonial state, which is completely apart from the Burmese society. Throughout the British colonial period until the Japanese invasion, there have been no significant external security threats against the colonial state but instead an internal security threat. After lifting martial law and far-reaching modern bureaucracy had been established throughout the first half of the twentieth

⁶⁴ Ni Ni Myint, *Burma’s Struggle against British Imperialism* (Rangoon: Universities Press Rangoon, 1983).

⁶⁵ Reginald Hennell, *A Famous Indian Regiment, the Kali Panchwin, 2/5th, Formerly the 105th, Mahratta Light Infantry, 1768-1923* (J. Murray, 1927), 134.

⁶⁶ British tried to maintain administrative order by reinforcing 16,000 forces in mid-1886, by using about 40,500 British and Indian troops in 1887, and 30,000 troops and Indian police forces for Upper Burma and 5,300 troops for Lower Burma in 1890. British estimate annexation expense in the pacification campaign in Burma rose from 300,000 £ to 635,000 £ in 1885-6 and then to more than twice that amount in both 1887 and 1888. See John F. Cady, *History of Modern Burma, Ithaca* (N. York: Cornell University Press, 1960), 135–37; DSMHRI, *Tatmadaw History (1824-1945)*, vol. I (Defence Services Museum and Historical Research Institute, 1998), 44.

⁶⁷ John Sydenham Furnivall, *Colonial Policy and Practice: A Comparative Study of Burma and Netherlands India, New York* (New York Univ. Press, 1956), 73–77; Daw Mya Sein, *The Administration of Burma* (Oxford University Press, 1973).

century, Burma was still in the extent of a garrison state because of the emergence of nationalism and nationalists' uprising.

2.2 The Structures of Colonial States' Civil-Military Relations

On January 2, 1923, the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms, 'Dyarchy' administration (1923-37), or the first parliamentary system was inaugurated in Burma as a Governor's Province with a Legislative Council of 103 seats. Among them 80 were filled by election, 21 by the nomination of officials and non-official, and the remaining two by the Members of the Governor's Executive Council. By the Dyarchy, Burma was firstly introduced with Elections held on November 21, 1922.⁶⁸ Despite the reforms of the executive government into two parts: reserved subjects and transferred subjects, policing, justice, prisons, and revenue included in the reserved subjects were administered by the Governor and Members of the Council under the direct control of the Government of India and the Secretary of State. By the Dyarchy, the general devolution of power to the province of the Indian Empire, General Council of Burma Association (GCBA) split into two factions: *dy-men* 'Twenty-one Party' and '*Hlaging-Pu-Kyaw*.'

Englishmen accepted the view that the Burman would never be a soldier according to their experience of war in Burma's heyday. The British used six battalions of armed police naturally recruited Indians to patrol the northern frontier areas. In the interior, about 4,000 troops were recruited the Karen minority for a quarter, and the rest were also all Indian.⁶⁹ Apart from that, there was one field company, 1887-1927 Burma Sappers and Miners, that organized with all Burmans with a few Karens as Burmans were natural sappers and had good skills in carpentry. They also served bravely in Mesopotamia 1916-18; Harvey stated that though Burmese discipline was only fair in the peace-time, it was excellent on active service. The four battalions of Burma Rifles (1916-27) became Karen, Chin, and Kachin predominantly because of

⁶⁸ Though GCBA boycotted the Elections, the reform was accomplished. But only 11 percent out of 1,767,227 voters went to the polls. See Maung Maung, *Burma's Constitution* (Springer Science & Business Media, 2012), 18.

⁶⁹ Godfrey Eric Harvey, *British Rule in Burma, 1824-1942* (24 Russell Square, London: Faber & Faber, 1946), 40-42.

the reason that the tribesmen were poor and glad of the pay while Burmans were dissatisfied with the pay despite giving better results, and their absenteeism gave more trouble to the British. Therefore, Burman was excluded from the regular units of Burma Rifles from 1927 to 1937, but the military police battalions recruited to some extent.⁷⁰

Mary Callahan stated that “in 1938, there were 10,365 army troops in Burma. Of these, 4,713 were British... roughly 3,000 were Indians, and nearly 3,000 were indigenous Karens, Chins, and Kachins.”⁷¹ In 1941, there were one sapper company, ten rifles, and four territorial battalions. Among them, the numbers of Burman were still limited both in officers (one in twelve) and non-officer groups (one in five).⁷² As long as Burma had no imminent external threat but prominent insurgencies, the British were never able to define the responsibility between police forces and military, British Burma Army was an instrument to suppress the insurrections and restore colonial law and order. Hence, the practice of ‘garrison state’ or military-dominated structure in politics and administration in Myanmar conceived even at the time of establishing modern British bureaucracy. In this respect, a modern bureaucracy that was not completely devoid of human warmth⁷³ but in favor of military campaigns and a large number of Indians and Chinese immigration, who were the men a part of the bureaucracy and business houses that remained aloof from the common people, which was a traumatic experience for Burma in both political and social aspects.

Myanmar was a princely state as a province of the British Empire of India from 1824 to 1937 until Burma was separated from India in accordance with the “Government of Burma Act, 1935.” Burma had a complete cabinet, an upper (senate), and lower (representatives). But the governor alone was responsible for defense, foreign affairs, currency, and the excluded areas. By this Act, the British firstly introduced the constitutional structure of civil-military relations. But it was clearly defined that His Majesty has absolute control of any forces in Burma via the Governor.

⁷⁰ Harvey, 42.

⁷¹ Callahan, *Making Enemies*, 26.

⁷² Harvey, *British Rule in Burma, 1824-1942*, 42.

⁷³ Maung, *Burma's Constitution*, 5.

By article 3(1), “The Governor of Burma is appointed by His Majesty.... has all such powers and duties as are conferred or imposed on him by or under this Act, and such other powers of His Majesty as His Majesty may be pleased to assign to him,” any authority of the Governor is at His Majesty disposal. And by article 4 (1) and (2)(a)(b)(c), the rights and authority of the establishment of all naval, military and air forces, enlistment or enrolment, and commissions of any force are also the absolute subjects of His Majesty. In part IX, the services of the Crown in Burma, the control of His Majesty on the Defence Services on the appointments and commissions of Defence Services had been prescribed in detail, by article 91(1) (2) and 92. For day to day managing level, “without prejudice to the generality of the powers conferred on him by this Act, the Secretary of State, acting with the concurrence of his advisers, may from time to time specify what rules, regulations and orders affecting the conditions of service of all or any of His Majesty’s forces in Burma shall be made only with his previous approval,” by article 93.

Throughout the uprisings and struggle for Independence, thirty comrades from Burma got military training that was contributed by the Japanese as part of an agenda in the Japanese concept of “The Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.” From early 1942 to early 1945, Myanmar was under Japanese rule. At the time of Japanese occupation, Burma gained so-called Independence in accordance with “The Constitution of Burma, under Japanese Occupation” promulgated on August 1, 1943. It was the Independence without sovereignty, but Burma was the first western colony that achieved Independence in Southeast Asia during the Pacific War. In which the structure of CMR also clearly defined in the section “Armed Forces.” By this structure, the Head of the State is a Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Burmese Armed Forces, including all granting commission by the recommendation of the War Minister. The war minister was directly responsible to the Head of the State in the organization, administration, and training of the Armed Forces. There was also a War Cabinet which included the War Minister, the Chiefs of General Staff concerned, the Vice-Minister for War, the Chief of General Headquarters, Deputy Chiefs of the General Staff, the Director of Military Training and such other members of the Armed Forces. The Prime Minister or any Minister, President, or the Vice-President of the

Privy Council also have the right to speak and take part in the proceedings of the Council, while they have no right to vote. In the Army, there was a check and balance system between the Chief of the General Staff and War Minister. While the Chief of the General Staff is responsible for the Executive Military Command of the Armed Forces, the War Minister has the power to inspect the General Staff or Staffs and the troops and other forces under their command. There was a definite article the armed forces must be outside politics to ensure the stability of the state. Also, the military accounts are controlled by a Special Auditing Board directly under the Head of the State.

The structure of Burmese state was promulgated in this autocratic style constitution, and the Japanese controlled both the Burmese government and the armed forces by three major agreements signed on Independence Day. These were: a Treaty of Alliance between Japan and Burma, a Japan-Burma Secret Military Agreement, and a Detailed Agreement describing the Japan-Burma Secret Agreement.⁷⁴ The former, Treaty of Alliance, signed by Dr. Ba Maw and Sawada Renzo, Japanese Ambassador to Burma, focused on the cooperation with each other in military, political, and economic matters. In contrast, the two latter, secret military agreement and detailed agreement signed by Dr. Ba Maw and Lieutenant-General Kawabe, the Commanding General of the Burma Area Army, were the main mechanisms to control Burma, to get every necessary assistance requested by Japanese, to supply labor forces and strategic materials, to exempt taxes, to provide land and to build freely on it, to give authority over the communication and transportation systems, censorship of the press, the police, the Burmese district, and its officials and frontier regions.⁷⁵ The control was made through the Japanese ‘advisory body’ in all principal offices in the Burmese Government offices and regiments of the armed forces. In reality, it was not an advisory body but control and authority.

⁷⁴ Won Z. Yoon, “Military Expediency: A Determining Factor in the Japanese Policy Regarding Burmese Independence,” *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 9, no. 2 (1978): 262; Thakin Lwin, *Japankhit Bamarpyi (Burma in the Japanese Era)* (Yangon: Saikku Cho Cho Sarpay, 2012), 176–79.

⁷⁵ For the full text of these Treaty, see Document no.38,39,40, Frank N. Trager, *Burma: Japanese Military Administration, Selected Documents, 1941-1945* (University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971), 152–55.

Therefore, the British and Japanese control was not much different from the Burmese King's absolute power on the Defence Services, but the former became a systematic modern and well-organized one rather than the latter. The structures of CMR under the British and Japanese rules were controlled by colonial states. The British and Japanese indirectly established their command structure through colonial states and mechanisms. Therefore, from the Myanmar side, it has no sufficient reason or significant context that is worth to figure out this time by using the term of civil-military relations. It was just colonial state-army relations. A national revolutionary army different from imperialists' armed forces was the hidden agenda of underground movement for Independence.

2.3 Freedom at All Costs and Political Socialization

In the case of ideology development in the resistance movement, before the development of Naing-ngan-taw Warda, "Freedom at All Costs," the idea of religious and social freedom was developed to protect the rights of "Bamar" and "Buddhism" under the British colonial rule at the beginning of 1900. Western-educated nationalists⁷⁶ founded the Young Men's Buddhist Association (YMBA) in March 1906. Signs of political awakening and successful campaigns included the "No-Footwear" campaign, and the appeal to Edward Montague to separate Burma from India and to grant a representative form of government. At the 8th YMBA conference in 1920, the association changed its name to the General Council of Burma Association and dedicated its intentions to political goals. YMBA/GCBA played a leading role in developing Burmese social rights, mainly by arousing Myanmar's nationalistic and patriotic ideals in the Sangha and in civil society. Establishing national schools and

⁷⁶ The three active members were Maung Ba Pe, Maung Gyi, and Maung Ba Yin, but the association was more or less led by Maung Ba Pe as the secretary. Later, Maung Gyi went to Calcutta to study for an M.A. degree and Maung Ba Yin for medicine. Only Maung Ba Pe, who was not wealthy enough to study abroad, kept up the association. See Maung Maung, "Nationalist Movements in Burma, 1920-1940: Changing Patterns of Leadership: From Sangha to Laity" (Master Thesis, Department of Asian Civilizations, Australian National University, 1976), 4.

colleges⁷⁷ nurtured the young generation, who would become essential players in socialization and in the implementation of the “Freedom at All Costs.”

GCBA had disunited into pieces in the 1920s. The younger generation, in addition to the difficulties during the Great Depression, also experienced armed revolts, riots, social unrest, and boycotts. The ideology of freedom derived from the ideology of “*DoBamar*” [We Burmans (ဒို့ဗမာ)] in the middle of the Coringhi-Burma riots on May 26, 1930. The riots between the Chinese and the Burmese also took place in Yangon. And then *Thakin*⁷⁸ Ba Thaug tried to disseminate this idea. He was also a western-educated intellect, a translation tutor at Rangoon University, and a founder of *DoBama Asiayone* (DBA), the We Burmese Association (ဒို့ဗမာအစည်းအရုံး). The first attempt at socialization that uplifted Burmese patriotic and nationalist sentiment was a famous pamphlet named *Naingganpyu Sarzu Ahmat Tit*, Reform Series No. I (နိုင်ငံပြုစာစု အမှတ် ၁).⁷⁹ Though I could not find the ideology of absolute freedom in the first series directly, it was in indirect expressions such as “Burma for Burmans” (ဗမာနိုင်ငံသည် ဗမာ့ဘို့) and phrases such as, “if Burmans could totally manage [the country] in the future” (နောင်အခါ ငါတို့ဗမာများ စိတ်တိုင်းကျ

⁷⁷ Myo Oo, “The Covert Objective of YMBA (1906-1920) and Its Activities,” *역사와경계* 81 (2011): 105–128.

⁷⁸ In Burma, Ba Thaug and colleagues initiated the idea that suggested adding the term *Thakin* (master) in front of the name of the members of *DoBamar Asiayone* instead of common Burmese prefixes such as “Maung,” “Ko,” and “U.” The idea was to show and provoke the people that Burmans are the real masters of Burma. The *Thakin* prefix had been familiar to the Burmese since the Bagan period. Englishmen used it in the colonial period in dealing with natives. Later, *Thakin* Ba Sein clarified that the idea was not the brainchild of Ba Thaug and his colleagues. It was the combination of Myanmar’s traditional pride and the concept of master-morality and slave-morality of the German philosopher, Frederick Nietzsche. See Zaw Soe Min, “Emergence of the *DoBamar Asiayone* and the *Thakins* in the Myanmar Nationalist Movement,” *Graduate School of Humanities and Social Sciences, Okayama University* 27, no. 1 (March 26, 2009): 103–21.

⁷⁹ *DoBamar Asiayone, Reform Series No. I* (Yangon: Pyigy Mandai, 1930). In the first paper, they wrote very classic and memorable “shout-proclamations” such as Burma is Our Country, The Burmese literature is our literature, The Burmese language is our language, Love our country, Cherish our Literature, Respect our Language (ဗမာပြည်သည် တို့ပြည်။ ဗမာစာသည် တို့စာ။ ဗမာစကားသည် တို့စကား။ ဗမာပြည်ကိုချစ်ပါ။ ဗမာစာကို ချီးမြှင့်ပါ။ ဗမာစကားကို လေးစားပါ။)။ In mid-August 1930, they also published Reform Series No. II, which contained eight articles.

စီမံနိုင်သော အခြေအနေသို့ ရောက်လျှင်). However, the 2nd series approached the idea of freedom by stating, “when will our nation. . . gain total freedom? The answer is easy . . . it will get [freedom] when we have the wisdom.”⁸⁰ Though there was no explicit agenda of Freedom at All Costs, these reform series stimulated virulent anti-alien ideas and anti-colonialism. Unheard of previously in Burmese society, these reform series also had a socialization agenda for young educated nationalists.

Thakin Ba Thaug clarifies the underlining confrontational sentiment for freedom of Burma against the imperial British in *DoBamar Thichin*, We Burmese Song (ဒို့ဗမာသီချင်း), a national anthem of the anti-colonial period. He states, “Burma is not for British, but for Burmans. So, we must regain it in one day.... get out British from Burma...it is not showing the fist clandestinely, but an overt calling challenge to British when they are in the highest superiority and power.”⁸¹ This is clear evidence of an anti-British ideological message given to the people. “We Burmese Song” was a handy tool for the socialization of patriotic and nationalist sentiments, more effective than a reform series. When the song was popular, the DoBama Asiayone got more public attention as well as monitoring by the British administration.

The leaders of the Mawlamyine conference in November 1938 were convinced that Myanmar was not efficient only with a mode of operation with mass participation. The conference leaders concluded that arms and revolutionary armed forces were needed, as well as an assembly of troops from different units. DoBama Asiayone initiated its group of executives, including Thakin Hla Baw, Thakin Mya, Thakin Aung San, Thakin Nu, and Thakin Than Thun, to form the Burma Freedom League [later known as the Burma Freedom Bloc (BFB)] (ဗမာ့ထွက်ရပ်ဂိုဏ်း)⁸² on October 1, 1939.

At that time, DoBama Asiayone had already split itself into two groups: the group of

⁸⁰ Dobamar Asiayone Thamine Pyuesuyae Apwae [The Committee of Compilation History of We Burmese Association], *DoBamar Asiayone Thamine (Baung-choke) [The History of DoBamar Asiayone (Collection)]* (Yangon: Seikku Cho Cho Sar Pay, 2018), 30.

⁸¹ Dobamar Asiayone Thamine Pyuesuyae Apwae [The Committee of Compilation History of We Burmese Association], 39–42.

⁸² First known as Burma Freedom League (မြန်မာပြည်လွတ်လပ်ရေးဂိုဏ်း).

Thakin Thiketin Kotawgyi that included Thakin Aung San, Thakin Mya, Thakin Soe, and Thakin Than Htun, and the group of Thakin Htun Oak and Thakin Ba Hein. Furthermore, even the Thakin Aung San group had three different ideas on how to acquire freedom: some wanted to take no sides (neither the imperialists' nor the fascists'), some wanted to side with the imperialists to fight the fascists, and some wanted to fight the first enemy, the imperialist British, by taking help from anywhere.⁸³

After forming the Burma Freedom Bloc, its leaders conducted a show of the Bloc's force with over 15,000 people on February 25, 1940, by Thakin Aung San's declaration of the demand for Burma's freedom and opposed on the wars between European countries. The attitude was that "the war in Europe was plainly a war between two sets of imperialists and could have no appeal of any kind."⁸⁴ On June 9, 1940, the Bloc held a city-wide meeting in Jubilee Hall, Rangoon. Thakin Nu and Dr. Ba Maw clarified the future agenda to the public. They intended to fight for freedom through armed revolution and to enlist cooperation from people who no longer wanted to live in a British colony. The real agenda of the Burma Freedom Bloc was to use the means of armed revolution if necessary. But it did not relinquish mass actions and legal means and prepared for the defense of Burma after Independence. This objective included the aim to defend Burma from WWII's ramifications.⁸⁵ These actions incorporated the ideology of socialization of freedom to gain public support.

Not surprisingly, international politics impacts on this development of Myanmar "Naing-ngan-taw Warda(s)." "Freedom at All Costs" was a reflection of anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism is obvious. Though in the western hemisphere and much of Asia, mercantilist or dynastic imperialism was active roughly from 1492-1763, Myanmar faced the direct impact of the expansion of 'new' imperialism started roughly from the late 19th century, which witnessed the subjugation by Europe of most of Africa and part of the Far East. Imperialism can be distinguished from colonialism

⁸³ Thakin Tin Mya, *Bonbawakopyint Myawtyaingway*, vol. I, Collection (Yangon: Seikku Cho Cho Sar Pay, 2014), 131–38, 151–58.

⁸⁴ Robert H. Taylor, "The Burmese Communist Movement and Its Indian Connection: Formation and Factionalism," *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 14, no. 1 (1983): 95–108.

⁸⁵ Dobamar Asiayone Thamine Pyuesuyae Apwae [The Committee of Compilation History of We Burmese Association], *DoBamar Asiayone Thamine (Baung-choke) [The History of DoBamar Asiayone (Collection)]*, 436.

by definition, but the two concepts often overlap in practice. Especially from the side of colonies, full economic and political integration of its subjects in the form of a supranational entity is not much different from the political and legal domination by an alien minority, economic exploitation and dependency, complete assimilation, and racial and cultural inequality.

At the time of 'new' colonialism, the European states had been preoccupied with the sense of domestic issues such as balance of power, free trade, liberalism, nationalism, and the industrial revolution. These kinds of ideas and the European governmental system, to some extent, flowed into colonial Burma through the British bureaucracy and modern education. No doubt that Myanmar, amidst foreign exploitation, social and economic inequality, British, Indian, and Chinese, took everything on top, peasant rebellion, and the world economic crisis, also was followed in the mainstream of world and regional politics.

The global anti-colonial struggle, socialist revolution, and the ideological contradiction between the West and Russia were prominent since the Bolshevik revolution of November 1917. President Wilson's doctrine of self-determination elevated the hope and dream of people under colonial states. World War I ended with revolutionary sentiments spreading in the West. The countries fought the war under the banner of democracy and freedom by the people for the people. But after the Great War, the dream left as a dream in general, the colonies in Asia continued to be colonies. The world politics gradually changed along with the vast upheavals in Russia, Germany, Italy, and Turkey, and most of the West. Pan-Asianism, also to some extent, developed in East, South, and Southeast Asia. It motivated the resistance movement to Western imperialism and colonialism. The leaders in the rest of the world, especially under the colonial states, also thought out a revolution of some kind with radical ideas kept coming in, by not distinguishing whether the ideas were black or white or red and whether they were from Europe or Russia or China or Japan.

At the same time, Marxism/Leninism also rooted in Myanmar, parallel with anti-imperialist, anti-colonialist, and anti-capitalist sentiments through the Left Book Club (dominated by Fabianism and British socialist literature) and *Nagani* or Red Dragon Book Shop. The original books were brought by the men who returned from studying abroad. The leading members of DoBamar Asiayone and All Burma Student

Union encouraged and supported young students and people by contributing the Marxist/Leninist-derived books, cheap paper-back editions in Burmese, and discussions. By showing clear ideological preference, Dr. Ba Maw founded *Sinyetha* (Proletarian) Party in 1936, and young leaders, including Aung San, founded the Burma Communist Party in 1939. DoBamar Asiayone also became dominated by Marxist-oriented leaders. And then Burma Freedom Bloc had established as a united national front by early 1940. Churchill also excluded British colonies to give the rights or ‘self-determination’ of the Atlantic Charter. Myanmar searched its own way to form armed forces and fight for freedom. Later the leaders get a connection with the Japanese “Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere.”

The peak of ideology development arrived at the national level only during the anti-Japanese resistance movement when the British reoccupied Burma during WWII. The Tatmadaw’s leader, General Aung San, could mobilize the masses, the People’s Volunteer Organization (PVO), some politicians from the era of the YMBA/GCBA, and ethnic and social organizations to AFPFL more readily than before.⁸⁶ Almost after WWII, AFPFL became the most popular and active political organization striving for Myanmar independence. The mass participation in the Nay Thu Rain Meeting was relatively high on August 19, 1945. On November 18, 1945, the People’s Conference held at the hill of Shwedagon was regarded as the most crowded one in the resistance movement, a testament to the political force of AFPFL.⁸⁷ These events were evidence of its political success against the British’s “White Paper” for Burma and mass mobilization for “Freedom at All Costs.”

Before the Nay Thu Rain Meeting, the Tatmadaw’s commanding officers’ (COs’) conference on August 12, 1945, declared by the final decision of conference that encouraged unity between national leaders and the people to reestablish the

⁸⁶ Aung San, *Burma’s Challenge* (Tataetta Sarpay, 1946), 43–44; Thakin Thin Mya, *Phasit Tawhlanya Htarnachot Hnint Taing Sal Taing (Anti-Fascist Headquarter and Ten Commands)* (Yangon: Thihayadanar Sarpay, 2010), 23; Ba Swe (Former Prime Minister), *Tawhlanya Ei Myukekwat Shokekwat Myar (The Secrets and Complexities of Revolution)* (Yangon: Nayyiyi Sarpay, 2013), 69–76.

⁸⁷ Swe (Former Prime Minister), *Tawhlanya Ei Myukekwat Shokekwat Myar (The Secrets and Complexities of Revolution)*, 127.

nation.⁸⁸ The Tatmadaw COs' conference was followed by the 4th conference of national leaders organized by AFPFL. The leaders' conference, comprised representatives from the Tatmadaw, political parties, ethnic and race organizations, and famous or influential persons,⁸⁹ was followed by the Nay Thu Rain meeting. Thus, these political unity successes were the result of the encouragement of the political unification by the Tatmadaw COs' conference. The role of General Aung San, as both a Tatmadaw and an AFPFL leader, upgraded the Tatmadaw's institutional influence on others. Hence, the Tatmadaw played an influential role in shaping and implementing the development of "Freedom at All Costs."

Exactly why "Freedom at All Costs," rather than nationalism, Marxism, socialism, or Buddhism, is considered here as a Naing-ngan-taw Warda needs clarification. At that time, while almost all young, university-educated, intellectual nationalists worked to regain national independence, no doubt in line with some other ideologies,⁹⁰ "Freedom at All Costs" could overcome dogmatic beliefs in these other ideologies. The persistence of Marxist-Leninist ideology is questionable in the resistance movement. Furthermore, "Freedom at All Costs" referred to practical circumstances and goals that stood firmly as a Naing-ngan-taw Warda. The evidence shows that the Communist Party, a central pillar of AFPFL, changed its doctrine at the time of the resistance movement following interstate Marxists' ideological influence, twice, under the leadership of Thakin Soe, a master of Marxist dialectics. Although nationalists who believed in leftist ideology worked together in line with the Burma Freedom Bloc's demands against British rule, the communists changed their doctrine "to fight Fascists by cooperation with Allied Forces and peaceful development," influenced by American communist leader Earl Browder's idea⁹¹ advanced by the

⁸⁸ DSMHRI, "The Declaration of Tatmadaw's leaders and the Conference's decision," n.d., DR-4664, Defence Services Museum and Historical Research Institute.

⁸⁹ Swe (Former Prime Minister), *Tawhlanya Ei Myukekwat Shokekwat Myar (The Secrets and Complexities of Revolution)*, 93; DSMHRI, *Tatmadaw History (1945-1948)*, vol. III (Defence Services Museum and Historical Research Institute, 1999), 20–29.

⁹⁰ Taylor, *Marxism and Resistance in Burma*, 2–7.

⁹¹ Thein Pe Myint, *Myanma Naingngayae Kantlatphat Myinkwin (The View crossed Myanmar Politics)* (Yangon: Tagaung Publishing House, 2011), 385–90.

Comintern.⁹² Thakin Soe abandoned that line after World War II and again took up the doctrine, “to fight British imperialists with arms,” influenced by the Zhdanov Doctrine⁹³ advanced by Cominform.⁹⁴ The result of this ideology development was regaining Burma’s independence on January 4, 1948. It could not have materialized through only nationalism and Buddhism, as well as Marxism.

2.4 The Origin of the Structure of Myanmar Civil-Military Relations

By following “Freedom at All Costs,” the origin of Myanmar CMR had started in the underground resistance movement after the formation of the Burma Independence Army (BIA). The two branches of the DoBama Asiayone underground movement, which had been trying to develop a military organization and acquire foreign assistance, later connected with the Japanese *Minami-Ki-Kan*.⁹⁵ The Tatmadaw had by then developed in a step by step fashion from national heroes “Thirty Comrades,” changed in the name of Burma Independence Army (BIA), Burma Defence Army (BDA), Burma National Army (BNA), People Liberation Army (PLA), Patriotic Burmese Forces (PBF), Burma Army (BA), and Peoples’ Army, and Myanmar Armed Forces (Tatmadaw), till now.

To examine the very first structure of Myanmar CMR that was separate from the colonial state formation and control was originated since the formation of the Anti-Fascist Organization (AFO). AFPFL was called or formerly known as Anti-Fascist

⁹² Mya, *Bonbawakopyint Myawtyaingway*, I:185–89; Taylor, “The Burmese Communist Movement and Its Indian Connection,” 103. [The Communist International (Comintern) was founded by Vladimir Lenin on March 2, 1919, also known as the "Third International", was an international organization that advocated world communism to overthrow the international bourgeoisie and the creation of the international Soviet republic. Comintern was followed by the Information Bureau of the Communist and Workers' Parties (commonly known as Cominform) that was created by the delegates from the Communists Parties of the Soviet Union, Poland, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Italy, and France, on September 22, 1947.]

⁹³ “The Zhdanov Doctrine and the Cominform - The Cold War (1945–1989),” accessed October 7, 2019, <https://www.cvce.eu/en/education/unit-content/-/unit/55c09dcc-a9f2-45e9-b240-caef64452cae/7cdb6d5c-4347-4afe-bb5f-1853b8eeae71>.

⁹⁴ DSMHRI, *Tatmadaw History (1948-1962)*, vol. IV (Defence Services Museum and Historical Research Institute, 1996), 4–5.

⁹⁵ Minami Kikan was a clandestine organization designed to promote Japanese war aims in Burma, established on February 1, 1941, by the Imperial General Headquarters of the Japanese Army. It was led by Colonel Suzuki Keiji and covered under the name “Minami Masuyo,” the “Southeast Asia Industrial Investigation Association”. The headquarters were located in Bangkok, and branches were at Kachanaburi, Ranong, Chiang Mai, and Raheng.

Organization (AFO).⁹⁶ At the time of Japanese occupation, AFO conducted as underground forces that comprised Burma National Army (BNA),⁹⁷ Communist Party of Burma (CPB), and People's Revolutionary Party (PRP) as a core political alliance. Japan gave the so-called Independence on August 1, 1943. After Aung San came back from the Tokyo welcome party, he explained broadly and implicitly that Independence would be a nominal one. And then, Aung San met with Thakin Soe and Thakin Than Htun from August 4 to 6 in 1944 at Standard Regiment in Pegu (now Bago), and they discussed for the future plan and program to form a collective anti-Japanese movement: supply, transportation, communications, assistance, people mobilization, a retaliatory measure to Japanese counter-movement to innocent people, and so on. Bogyoke Aung San revealed the very first statement of the AFO, and the others agreed. The statement awakened the people by the facts of fighting Japanese, unity, freedom, establishing people's government, and peace. At this time, there is no clear formation of Central Committee, but Bogyoke Aung San was designated as a President, and Thakin Than Htun served as a General Secretary, and Thakin Soe was a member.⁹⁸

⁹⁶ In the beginning, AFPFL had several names. U Thein Phay Myint who has arrived in India as the external liaison officer to contact with Allied Forces called Burma Patriotic Front (ဗမာ့မျိုးချစ်တပ်ဦး), British called Anti-Fascist Organization (အေအက်ဖ်အို), American called Anti-Fascist League (အေအက်ဖ်အယ်လ်). In Burmese acronym, it called "Pha Ta Pa La" (ဖက်ဆစ်တိုက်ဖျက်ရေး ပြည်သူ့လွတ်လပ်ရေးအဖွဲ့ချုပ်) in anti-Japanese resistance and it changed the name in Burmese acronym to "Pha Sa Pa La" (ဖက်ဆစ်ဆန့်ကျင်ရေး ပြည်သူ့လွတ်လပ်ရေးအဖွဲ့ချုပ်) in December 1945 after World War II. While "Ta" means "attack or destroy", "Sa" means "oppose or be against" that is softer in sense than "Ta".

⁹⁷ Though the meeting that was made at Maj. General Aung San's house from March 1 to 3 in 1945 decided that Tatmadaw will conduct resistance against Japanese in the name of "People's Independence Army" (ပြည်သူ့လွတ်လပ်ရေးတပ်မတော်), the Allied Forces called "Burma National Army" (ဗမာ့အမျိုးသားတပ်မတော်).

⁹⁸ There is a contradiction an exact date of the formation of the AFO. Some sources stated the meeting of Aung San, Thankin Soe, and Thakin Than Htun at Pegu Standard Regiment as a formation of AFO, while the other sources stated AFO was established on 23 August 1944 at the Aung San's house. Some other sources stated just general date that it was during August 1944. See *Burma's Challenge*, 43–44; Mya, *Phasit Tawhlanyae Htarnachot Hnint Taing Sal Taing (Anti-Fascist Headquarter and Ten Commands)*, 23; DSMHRI, *Tatmadaw History (1945)*, vol. II (Defence Services Museum and Historical Research Institute, 1999), 5–8; *Tatmadaw History (1945-1948)*, III:1–2; Mya, *Bonbawakopyint Myawtyaingway*, I:581–83; Swe (Former Prime Minister), *Tawhlanyae Ei Myukekwat Shokekwat Myar (The Secrets and Complexities of Revolution)*, 69–76; U Thu Wai, *Pha Sa Pa La U Kyaw Nyein* (Yangon: Tagaung Publishing House, 2012), 165–67; The Groups of Compiling General Aung San's Biography, *Amyoethar Gaungsaunggyi Bogyoke Aung San (1915-*

Notably, the members of Tatmadaw and PRP were not included in this meeting because of the fact of a very secretive situation under-watch of Japanese. But Bogyoke Aung San added PRP on behalf of it in AFO.⁹⁹ It was Bogyoke Aung San's first attempt to get an agreement with communists.

Therefore, on August 8, 1944, at the Foreign Minister U Nu's house, Bogyoke Aung San reconfirmed the formation of AFO with CPB and PRP members, such as Thakin Nu, Thakin Mya, U Kyaw Nyein, Thakin Chit, U Ba Swe, Thakin Soe, Thakin Than Tun, U Hla Maung.¹⁰⁰ In this meeting, they changed the name of AFO to AFPFL [ဖက်ဆစ်တိုက်ဖျက်ရေးနှင့်ပြည်သူ့လွတ်လပ်ရေး အဖွဲ့ချုပ်(ဖတပလ)] and made an agreement on the design of AFPFL. After that, on 23 August, by including three main pillars, Tatmadaw, PRP, and CPB reconfirmed the formation AFPFL again. In this meeting, most of the attendances were from Tatmadaw, such as Maj. General Aung San, Colonel Ne Win, Colonel Latyar, Colonel Zaya, Major Kyaw Zaw, Major Yan Aung, Major Aung, Major Ba Htoo, Bo Aung Gyi, Bo Maung Maung, Bo Khin Maung Galay, Bo Saw Kyar Doe, Bo Phoe Kon, the members of PRP were Thakin Chit, U Kyaw Nyein. The members of CPB were Thakin Soe and Thakin Than Htun. Therefore, the literature from Tatmadaw's perspective regarded 23 August 1944 defined as AFO's formation day.¹⁰¹ After that, Bogyoke Aung San started a plan to designate the political officers in Tatmadaw. At the meeting with political officers, he said that "the Japanese resistance will not accomplish if the communist party or Tatmadaw fights alone, participating all public will be needed. So, we formed AFPFL...it does not intend to hate Japanese, but fascism.... the political ideology must be adjusted with the practice...and then conclude the answer...it is about

1947) (*The National Leader General Aung San 1915-1947*) (Yangon: Pan Wai Wai Sarpay, 2013), 341-42.

⁹⁹ Mya, *Phasit Tawhlanya Htarnachot Hnint Taing Sal Taing (Anti-Fascist Headquarter and Ten Commands)*, 13.

¹⁰⁰ Amyoethar Gaungsaunggyi *Bogyoke Aung San (1915-1947) (The National Leader General Aung San 1915-1947)*, 341-42.

¹⁰¹ *Tatmadaw History (1945)*, II:5-6.

wisdom...”¹⁰² And then, communists’ political indoctrination started in the Tatmadaw.¹⁰³

The date of the Japanese revolution was nearer. On 1-3 March 1945, at the Bogyoke Aung San’s house, the leaders discussed international politics, the comparison of the circumstances of Allied Forces and Japanese, the amount and power of Burmese forces, to reply the letter from the British Military Command, and the advancement of the formation of AFO’s Central Committee by taking equal numbers from three main groups. In this meeting, Tatmadaw: Maj. General Aung San, Colonel Ne Win, Colonel Letyar, Colonel Zaya, Colonel Saw Kyar Doe, Major Kyaw Zaw, Major Ba Htoo, Major Yan Aung, Major Ye Htun, Major Phoe Kon, Major Aung Gyi, and Major Maung Maung, Bo Sein Mhan, Bo Khin Maung Galay, PRP: U Ba Swe, U Kyaw Nyein, and Thakin Chit, CPB: Thakin Soe, Thakin Than Htun, and Thakin Mya were attendances.¹⁰⁴ The Central Committee was clearly organized by Tatmadaw: Maj. General Aung San, Bo Lat Yar, and Bo Ne Win, PRP: U Kyaw Nyein, U Ba Swe, and Thakin Chit, CBP: Thakin Soe, Thakin Than Htun, and Thakin Tin Mya.¹⁰⁵ Maj. General Aung San’s and Thakin Than Thun’s positions as the President and the General Secretary were not changed. Moreover, the Military Committee was also formed by seven-member, Maj. General Aung San as a military leader, Thakin Soe as a political leader, and Thakin Than Htun as a leader of foreign affairs (to contact with Thakin Thein Phay and Allied Forces); Bo Letyar, Bo Ne Win, U Kyaw Nyein, and Thakin Chit were the members.¹⁰⁶ The formation shows the concept of collective leadership of Myanmar’s very first CMR structure under Tatmadaw’s leadership Maj.

¹⁰² Mya, *Bonbawakopyint Myawtyaingway*, I:597–99.

¹⁰³ The very first political officers from CPB that was designated in Tatmadaw were Bo Thein Tan, Bo San Ngwe (U Chit Maung), Bo Hla Maw, Bo Soe Maung, Ko San Nyunt, Ko Thet Tin, Ko Htay Aung, Ko Htun, Ko Soe Tint, and Ko Sein Hlaing. Mya, *Phasit Tawhlanya Htarnachot Hnint Taing Sal Taing (Anti-Fascist Headquarter and Ten Commands)*, 23.

¹⁰⁴ *Tatmadaw History (1945)*, II:14.

¹⁰⁵ Literature of Thakin Tin Mya stated that he was a member of Central Committee, while literature from PRP’s perspective stated Thakin Ba Hein was in this place. See Wai, *Pha Sa Pa La U Kyaw Nyein*, 166; Mya, *Bonbawakopyint Myawtyaingway*, I:669–73; Mya, *Phasit Tawhlanya Htarnachot Hnint Taing Sal Taing (Anti-Fascist Headquarter and Ten Commands)*, 60.

¹⁰⁶ U San Nyein and Dr. Daw Myint Kyi, *Myanma Naingngan Yae 1958-1962 (Myanmar Politics 1958-1962)*, vol. I (Yangon: Universities Publishing House, 1991), 11.

General Aung San. And then, the Executive Council of AFPFL gradually advanced 9 to 16 and 36 members.¹⁰⁷

Table 2.1 The AFPFL's Collective Leadership of Armed Forces in Japanese Resistance Movement¹⁰⁸

Military Command	Areas	Leaders ¹⁰⁹	
		Military Commander	Political Officer
1. <i>Minhlasithu</i>	Pyay, Thayarwaddy, Insein, and East-Hinthada	Maj. General Aung San (later Bo Maung Maung)	U Ba Hein
2. <i>Kyawgaungbala</i>	Pyapon, Kungyangon, Twantay (Hanthawaddy)	Colonel Ne Win (Later Bo Aung Gyi)	Thakin Soe
3. <i>Yekyawthuya</i>	Maubin, Pathein, Myaungmya, West-Hinthada	Colonel Saw Kyaw Doe (Later Bo Aung Gyi)	-
4. <i>Letyarkyawhtin</i>	Bago, Shwegyin	Colonel Kyaw Zaw	Thakin Chit
5. <i>Zayakyawthu</i>	Mawlamyine, Dawei, Myeik	Captain Tin Htun	Thakin Ba Thein Tin
6. <i>Bayakyawhtin</i>	Meiktila, Pyinmana, Taungoo, and Southern Shan State	Major Ye Htut	U Kyaw Nyein (Later Thakin Tin Oo)
7. <i>Thirikyawhtin</i>	Thayet, Magway, and Minbu	Major Aung	Thakin Tin Mya
8. -	Upper Burma	Major Ba Htoo	U San Nyunt
9.-	Rakhine	U Nyo Htun	U Nyo Htun
10.-	Yangon	Major Khin Nyo	U Kyaw Nyein (RET)/ U Ba Swe

¹⁰⁷ *Tatmadaw History (1945-1948)*, III:92.

¹⁰⁸ The commands also designated political officers by their plan. Mya, *Bonbawakopyint Myawtyaingway*, I:673-74; *Tatmadaw History (1945)*, II:14-15; Mya, *Phasit Tawhlanya Htarnachot Hnint Taing Sal Taing (Anti-Fascist Headquarter and Ten Commands)*, 62-63; Swe (Former Prime Minister), *Tawhlanya Ei Myukekwat Shokekwat Myar (The Secrets and Complexities of Revolution)*, 25-36.

¹⁰⁹ After Colonel Saw Kyaw Doe was kept by Japanese early and Colonel Ne Win went to Yangon and served as a Chief of Frontier Commands, Bo Aung Gyi served as a Commander of No.2 and No.3. Colonel Letyar served to contact between No.2 and No.3 Commands.

Notably, by the encouragement of Bogyoke Aung San, the leaders of PRP and CPB tried to organize as one-party to get the leftist unity. The young leaders of PRP from Tatmadaw Bo Maung Maung, Bo Aung Gyi, Bo Khin Maung Galay, and U Ba Swe, Thakin Chit, and Yangon Ba Swe went to the Dedaye where Thakin Soe was hiding and met with him in August 1944.¹¹⁰ By taking about one month for discussion, they could sign “Revolutionary Front’s Agreement” ‘*Tawhlanyaе Tаtоо Thаbawthunyichat*’ (တော်လှန်ရေးတပ်ဦးသဘောတူညီချက်) on October 3, 1944. By this agreement, PRP and CPB (included members of Tatmadaw from both) were formed as a one-party and to conduct the resistance movement together. The important point is that PRP received a promise from CPB that communists will also fight the British after resistance against the Japanese if they do not give Independence to Burma, PRP also gave the chance of Communists’ ideology indoctrination of PRP members and PBF-men, vice versa.¹¹¹

And then, Maj. General Aung San instructed to train political officers and designated them in Tatmadaw. Thakin Tin Mya, a political officer of No.7 Command, noted Maj. General Aung San’s idea that was explained to the leaders at No.7 Command in Pyaloe Village was that-

“..... every member of Tatmadaw must mainly serve to resist the Japanese in military mean in the resistance movement. So political officers must serve to teach political knowledge at the time of rest from war. Political officers are the bridge of good relations between the Tatmadaw and the public. Meanwhile, it is necessary to teach them to understand in a political sense why we resist. Tatmadaw must be an institution that has political awareness [နိုင်ငံရေးအသိရှိသော တပ်မတော်ဖြစ်ရမည်]. Political officers must serve not only the duty of political education but also

¹¹⁰ In February 1945, Bo Nay Win and U Kyaw Nyein again met with Thakin Soe in Dedaye to discuss the advancement of AFO and leftist unity. Mya, *Bonbawakopyint Myawtyaingway*, I:591–92; Wai, *Pha Sa Pa La U Kyaw Nyein*, 163–65.

¹¹¹ On Decemb1945, Thakin Soe unilaterally rejected this agreement. Wai, *Pha Sa Pa La U Kyaw Nyein*, 161–65; Mya, *Bonbawakopyint Myawtyaingway*, I:603-7,639-40; Yangon Ba Swe, *Pyithu Ayaetawbon Party (People Revolutionary Pary)* (Yangon: Ngar Dot Sarpay (NDSP Publishing House), 2015), 11–15, 127–48.

fighting in operation with the military commander, in order to be a unity between the military commander and political officer, and will get the respect from ranks and files...”¹¹²

Unfortunately, the ramification from this policy would be a cause of Tatmadaw’s disintegration into pieces after regaining Independence. Therefore, the formation of military commands to fight the Japanese included political officers from PRP and CPB, as shown in table 2.1.

AFPFL was also the very first strong and united civil-military relations mechanism in Myanmar politics. It led the Myanmar Independence movement and the agenda of socialization for “Freedom at All Costs,” too. Among the three main pillars of AFPFL, Tatmadaw led by Maj. General Aung San was a main and strong political and military force because of two times the failure of establishing leftist unity between CPB and PRP.¹¹³ Before the Nay Thu Rain Meeting, Tatmadaw’s COs’ conference on August 12, 1945, led by Maj. General Aung San declared a strong encouragement for the unity of national leaders and the people to participate in reestablishing the nation. This declaration stated that

“The World War became nearly finish, but our intention has not accomplished yet. To complete the objective [Freedom at all Costs] that had been conducted adventurously by the Tatmadaw and all the people, it needs to carry on and conduct by uniting the leaders of the nation, the people from all ethnicity and religion. The Tatmadaw intended the freedom of all people, not for one group and personal. So...we strongly encourage all the leaders and all the people to cooperate and conduct together in the AFPFL, for Independence, rebuilding the country...”¹¹⁴

Though the British negotiated Aung San with the rank of Brigadier General for Deputy Inspector-General position in the new Burma Army, Aung San left the military career. He resigned from the Tatmadaw, his basic of political power, after the


¹¹² Mya, *Bonbawakopyint Myawtyaingway*, I:698–99.

¹¹³ Mya, I:603–7, 638–40, 775–78.

¹¹⁴ Aung San, *Bogyoke Aung San Maintkhon Baungchot (The Collection of General Aung San’s Speeches)* (Yangon: The Key Collection Press, Thinn Publishing House, 2013), 124–25.

amalgamation of BA and PBF by the Kandy Agreement.¹¹⁵ Aung San wrote to Mountbatten that “..I regret very much that I shall not be able to serve further in the Army, but this has been the democratic decision of my colleagues, and I will have to submit to them. Personally, a military profession is one which I would have preferred to choose of all others if only it is a personal question of selecting a permanent calling

Figure 2.1 The Subjective Collective Leadership of the Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League



for myself....”¹¹⁶ And then, Tatmadaw also resigned from the AFPFL, and it was the end of Myanmar's first CMR structure in AFPFL’s collective leadership, but the Aung San’s leadership was still active in Tatmadaw. Notably, the life of Aung San is also

¹¹⁵ *Tatmadaw History (1945-1948)*, III:118; Swe (Former Prime Minister), *Tawhlanya Ei Myukekwat Shokekwat Myar (The Secrets and Complexities of Revolution)*, 97; Callahan, *Making Enemies*, 103; *Amyoethar Gaungsaunggyi Bogyoke Aung San (1915-1947) (The National Leader General Aung San 1915-1947)*, 432–33; U. Maung Maung, *Aung San of Burma* (Hague: Published for Yale University, Southeast Asia Studies by M. Nijhoff, 1962), 89.

¹¹⁶ Maj. General Aung San wrote two letters to Louis Mountbatten, Supreme Allied Commander of South East Asia Command. The first one is about expression of thanks for smooth delegation and hospitality for their stay at Kandy. The second one is concerned about the Maj. General Aung San’s decision for his future career. *Amyoethar Gaungsaunggyi Bogyoke Aung San (1915-1947) (The National Leader General Aung San 1915-1947)*, 677–79.

the very first evidence of Tatmadaw's leader transferred his military career to a political leader in Myanmar. Nonetheless, his leadership and Tatmadaw played an influential role in shaping and implementation of "Freedom at All Costs" and the very first subjective collective leadership of AFPFL, as shown in figure 2.1. Finally, Myanmar regained Independence on January 4, 1948, in accordance with the 1947 constitution.

2.5 Conclusion

This Chapter introduced the British and Japanese colonial state and their structures of civil-military relations. And then, it examined the development of Myanmar Naing-ngan-taw Warda— "Freedom at All Costs," the origin of Myanmar CMR structure in the resistance movement for Independence. The structure of civil-military relations under British and Japanese colonial states has subjective types of colonial state control.

In the late 19th century and beginning of the 20th century, educated Myanmar young men began organized Buddhist Associations, such as Buddha *Sasana Noggaha* Association, *Asoka* Society, Young Men's Buddhist Association. The latter gradually entered politics. The leaders of thought started debated public affairs both at the College Debating Society and in the press. The role of Burma Research Society, founded in 1910, was also prominent in such kinds of scholarly debates of Burmans and Europeans with a common interest of Myanmar. Consequently, the young and educated nationalists were to become heroes of the *wunthanu* nationalist movement and planted the seeds in National High schools, future political leaders of "Freedom at All Costs." Nevertheless, the British introduced Myanmar with to some extent of liberalism and democracy with subjective civilian control of armed forces by the Government of Burma Act, a Dominion pattern, from April 1, 1937, till the Japanese occupation in 1942. Tatmadaw was born as a result of Naing-ngan-taw Warda development "Freedom at All Costs" influenced by pragmatism, and the origin of Myanmar CMR had started in a collective leadership of AFPFL between political elites and armed forces in Soviet-style army.

But, at that time, Burmese ideology development can be categorized into two forms under the ultimate Naing-ngan-taw Warda "Freedom at All Costs." Marxism/

Leninism had been developed at the inner layer of people's hearts, while democracy, freedom, liberty, and justice became developed at the outer layer along with the bitterness of war and militarism. Generally speaking, the young freshmen, but all were not politicians, for “Freedom at All Costs” were left-leaning and in some ways rather close to Communist/Leninist thinking. But national leader, Bogyoke Aung Sun, could overcome any kind of dogmatic belief and blindly following “ism.” Myanmar’s switched anti-British to anti-Japanese movement by following international politics during World War II. But it also depended on the contradiction of Japanese’s promise and practice on Myanmar.

And then it switched to anti-British again after World War II till regaining its Independence in 1948 that was written based on democratic socialist principles. The political means against the British reoccupation of Burman became a priority for Independence after WWII rather than the armed revolution. The United States-led international politics and liberalism also favored democracy and liberty of not only Burma but also the other nations under colonial rule. Myanmar's real intention was to fight against imperialism and colonialism, whoever applied to Myanmar. Nevertheless, the anti-colonial period was also the time of ideological foundation to shape the state in post-colonial Myanmar. The idea of party control also was rooted in this period. The structure of civil-military relations also became active in the sense of subjective civilian control, which will be discussed in detail in the next Chapter.

CHAPTER III

DEMOCRATIC SOCIALISM, POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION, THE STRUCTURE OF CIVIL- MILITARY RELATIONS, AND THE TATMADAW

3.1 Background

On the eve of Independence, the Patriotic Burmese Forces (PBF) emerged from the resistance movement and Burma Army (BA) of the British mixed together as a postwar regular army by the “Kandy Agreement.” It was a form of combining ‘professional soldiers’ and ‘revolutionary soldiers’ and not a happy mixture but “two-wing solution,” ethnic-Burman soldiers (most of them are PBF-men) and non-Burmans (most of them are BA-men). PBF-men saw the men from BA as ‘mercenaries,’ and the BA-men saw the former as ‘upstarts.’ Even before the Independence, armed and political conflicts among the forces derived from the resistance movement since AFPFL dismissed Thakin Soe’s red flag communists. On July 19, 1947, General Aung San and six members of the Executive Council were assassinated. This event was an immeasurable juncture loss of qualified political leaders for future Myanmar politics.

Regaining Independence on January 4, 1948, led to more utter collapse. Thakin Than Tun’s communist party also went underground. Some members of the People Volunteer Organization (PVO) (PBF personnel who were unacceptable to reenlist in the postwar army) and Karen National Defense Organization (KNDO) also started an insurrection and armed separatist campaign. Bo Zeya, Bo Ye Htut, and their followers were sympathetic to communist ideology and party members, deserted to go underground. And then, the other ethnic insurrection, such as Pa’O, Mon, and Mujahid separatist movement, emerged in their specific regions. The 75 percent of Myanmar had been under the control of communists and ethnic insurgencies.¹¹⁷ U Nu’s regime, surrounded by nation-wide rebellion, was referred to as “Rangoon Government” by foreign observers. The “two-wing solution” had collapsed, and Tatmadaw reformed

¹¹⁷ Sithu Aung and Maung Hmat, *Shwepyitaw Myawe-maway-pyi-moet[No Longer A Distance to the Golden Land]* (Myawaddy, 2017), 120.

again at the beginning throughout the nation-wide rebellion. Finally, ‘Revolutionary soldiers’ became entirely dominated by the Tatmadaw.

The structure CMR in the post-colonial period was highly influenced by the practice of the colonial state or the British administration. That was framed by the British-trained barristers, especially U Chan Htun, in accordance with the 1947 constitution, while General Aung San was at the helm of political guidance. In Myanmar, the theoretical specification does not match with ideological and practical verification. By that structure, civilian control was guaranteed and workable. But it is not because of the idea of “professionalism” or “objective civilian control” that is promoted by Samuel Huntington.¹¹⁸ After Independence, even though the structure of CMR was not a Marxist/ Leninist style party control system, the ideology of both civilians and the military did not meet the point of professional military ethic.

Therefore, though the structure of CMR had no party-state control mechanism, it was just a subjective type of CMR. There were two main reasons for that point. First, the structure of CMR by the 1947 constitution was strongly subjective. Second, Tatmadaw’s experience of the disintegration of armed forces into pieces after regaining independence. It was mainly a result of the political indoctrination of communism and its infiltration into the armed forces in wartime. This bitter experience of Tatmadaw’s disintegration influenced the perception of Tatmadaw’s leadership. In that way of the fact that Tatmadaw convinced the military must stay away from politics. Contrary to this stance, in practice, in the midst of civil war, internecine strife of political parties, foreign Kumington invasion, and counterinsurgency operations paralleling the construction and reconstruction of the postcolonial nation-state, Tatmadaw gradually adopted its own version of political ideology, projection self-image as the guardian of the state, and finally took a leading role and changed the

¹¹⁸ The basic ideology of objective civilian control in a democratic system bases on mutual respect between civilian and military institutions, while military subordinates the government that comes from and is legitimized by democratic election. It firmly based on maximizing professional military ethics. But in a one-party state system, the party controls all state mechanisms and maximizes party-state power in the armed forces.

structure of Myanmar CMR itself. There had been many subjective factors that influenced this ideological adaptation.

3.2 The Second Stage of Naing-ngan-taw Warda Development and Political Socialization

The second stage of ideological development took place during the parliamentary democracy period. Interestingly, Tatmadaw led the development, even though it was under the leadership of a parliamentary democratic civilian regime. This development also became a strong supporting cause for changing CMR structure. Amid civil war and political conflicts that I discussed above, Tatmadaw had the difficulty of having no definite ideology what it should believe in, and a lack of synchronization with the civilian government in counterinsurgency operations, mainly in psychological warfare against communism. For instance, Colonel Sein Mya discussed the difficulty of establishing law and order as long as the civilian administration set free people the Tatmadaw captured in counterinsurgency operations, releasing them from punishment. He discussed the issues related to the lack of cooperation in civil-military relations for effectively performing counterinsurgency operations.¹¹⁹ Colonel Ba Than also discussed that “.....we (Tatmadaw) had no definite ideology from 1948 to 1955. The disadvantage is that communists are not the ordinary insurgent groups revolt just with arms, they have concrete ideology and proclamation, but we are just fighting with arms per se, and it is our deprivation. It is not able to fight with arms per se requires fighting by ideological mean...”¹²⁰ Therefore, starting with the 1954 Defence Services conference,¹²¹ Tatmadaw studied and discussed the importance of Naing-ngan-taw Warda and what it should believe.¹²² In fact, the second Naing-ngan-taw

¹¹⁹ See DSMHRI, “The Minutes from the tap records of the 1958 Tatmadaw Conference held in Meiktila,” n.d., CD(B)00057, Defence Services Museum and Historical Research Institute.

¹²⁰ See DSMHRI, “The presentation and discussion of Tatmadaw officers (Army/Navy/Airforce) from Yangon, Mingalardon, Mawbi, Inntakaw, and Inndai at the Tatmadaw’s Theatre, on 29 September and 2 October 1959,” n.d., CD(B)00075, Defence Services Museum and Historical Research Institute.

¹²¹ In 1954 COs’ Conference, General Ne Win said that “At this conference, the first section is for analyzing the previous year’s experiences, and the second is the discussion of new ideology what is suitable with Tatmadaw.....”. See *Tatmadaw History (1945-1948)*, III:141–42.

¹²² In this case, the term “development” refers to the process of discussion and analysis of Tatmadaw’s Defence Services conferences. The trace-back analysis of the essence of three main documents of Myanmar is the author’s own contribution.

Warda consolidates the essence of three fundamental documents of the Union of Burma: The constitution of the Union of Burma promulgated on September 24, 1947, the Declaration of Independence, and the first Address to the Parliament of the first President of the Union on January 4, 1948.¹²³

Here it is important to notice that though these three documents originated with the leadership of AFPFL, there is no significant evidence of political socialization regarding “Democratic Socialism” as a Naing-ngan-taw Warda. The Tatmadaw consolidated the essence of democratic socialism scattered in these documents and reasserted it as a Naing-ngan-taw Warda by publishing an official document, “The National Ideology and the Role of the Defence Services.”¹²⁴ And then, it tried to ideologically socialize both the Tatmadaw and the public at large.

In the preamble of the 1947 constitution, the idea of democracy was “.... To maintain social order on the basis of eternal principles of justice, liberty and equality and to guarantee and secure to all citizens justice, social, economic and political; liberty of thought, expression, belief, faith, worship, vocation, association and action; equality of status, of opportunity and before the law...”¹²⁵ The ideology of democracy in the Declaration of Independence is that “....under the desire of the people to elect a President who will be dedicatedly able to serve for the people is a normal and clear human being idea, we have possessed the Union of Burma which is administered in accordance with discipline and law, equal moral principles, equal rights, equal class to be steadfast till the world continues to exist.”¹²⁶ The first speech in the parliament of the first president of the Union of Burma, President Sao Shwe Thaik, defined his government’s goal. His statement was directly concerned with socialism: “.... Our primary objective that is always looking forward to relinquishing imperialism and to establish a socialist state that has a guarantee for all citizens to possess the nation’s

¹²³ Ministry of Defence, *Naing-Ngan-Taw Warda Hnint Tatmadaw Loat-Ngan-Sin [The National Ideology and the Role of the Defence Services]*, 5–6.

¹²⁴ Ibid.

¹²⁵ DSMHRI, “The Fundamental Documents of the Union of Burma,” n.d., CD(B)00038, Defence Services Museum and Historical Research Institute.

¹²⁶ Ibid.

production of goods and services.....all citizens of the Union of Burma shall have the same rights under the constitution of the Union of Burma.”¹²⁷

By taking the essence of these three fundamental documents of Myanmar, the 1958 DS conference held in Meiktila on 21st October adopted “The National Ideology and Our Pledge,” and then give it to themselves to follow.¹²⁸ It was “a politico-economic system based on the eternal principles of justice, liberty and equality.” The essence is democratic socialism. Tatmadaw’s a slim published paper that tends to make ideology orientation, “The Naing-ngan-taw Warda and its Defence” (နိုင်ငံတော်ဝါဒနှင့် နိုင်ငံတော်ဝါဒကာကွယ်ရေး),¹²⁹ also stated that “...democratic social system and sufficient and equal economic system are the basic two foundations of the Union of Burma. The combination of these two foundations is a basic principle of Naing-ngan-taw Warda ...”

Notably, during the second stage of nurturing democracy in 1959 (and in 1958), Tatmadaw not only clarified the Naing-ngan-taw Warda but precisely defined its own ideology in the “Role and Attitude of Defence Services.” These priorities were: peace and the rule of law- *first*, democracy to bloom-*second*, establishing a socialist economy-*third*.¹³⁰ Some literature allows for ambiguous interpretations of the difference between Naing-ngan-taw Warda and Tatmadaw’s role and attitude.¹³¹

¹²⁷ Ibid.

¹²⁸ By the definite prescription, the national ideology was that “Man’s endeavor to build a society set free at last from anxieties over food, clothing and shelter, and able to enjoy life’s spiritual satisfaction as well, fully convinced of the sanctity, dignity and essential goodness of life, must proceed from the premise of a faith only in a politico-economic system based on the eternal principles of justice, liberty and equality. This is our belief. We would rather give up this belief. In order to achieve the establishment of such a society, we have resolved to uphold this belief forever in this our Sovereign Independent Republic of the Union of Burma.” See Ministry of Defence, *Naing-Ngan-Taw Warda Hnint Tatmadaw Loat-Ngan-Sin [The National Ideology and the Role of the Defence Services]*, 5.

¹²⁹ DSMHRI, “The Paper of Naing-ngan-taw Warda and its Defence,” n.d., CD(F)00011, Defence Services Museum and Historical Research Institute.

¹³⁰ In the statement of “The National Ideology and the Role of the Defence Services”, a trick or ambiguity was inserted concerning the defining of Tatmadaw’s ‘role and attitude’ and ‘national ideology’. In page four, the Tatmadaw’s ideological development phases are described as if the formulation of its role and attitude as a second phase of ideological development itself. In fact, at that time, its role and attitude was not a ‘national ideology’ yet. The process of the Tatmadaw’s ideology development apart from ideology can be seen in Myoe, *Building the Tatmadaw*, 352:60–62.

¹³¹ Nakanishi, *Strong Soldiers, Failed Revolution*, 74.

These three duties do not constitute Naing-ngan-taw Warda yet, rather they are presented as the role and attitude of Tatmadaw: "...pursuing the aims of national politics, as distinct from party politics, the Defence Services pledge themselves to this adopted role and attitude. Peace and the rule of law—first..."¹³² On the other hand, these three attitudes are the ideology of Tatmadaw. It was also the very first evidence of Tatmadaw trying to differentiate between the roles and ideas of party politics and national politics.

Although civilian control was needed in the area of defining Naing-ngan-taw Warda and designating the Tatmadaw's responsibility and duty, the civilian regime had not given the matter serious attention or control.¹³³ Probably party and personal conflicts muddled the civilian government at that time.¹³⁴ In 1958, Commanding Officers' conference on October 20, the final stage of defining Tatmadaw's role and attitude, Prime Minister U Nu's speech, over 16 pages long, mentioned nothing concerned with Naing-ngan-taw Warda. Still, the important duties at the time of power transferring to the Caretaker Government.¹³⁵ Prime Minister U Nu's, as a translator of Dale Carnegie's "How to Win Friends and Influence People" into Burmese "*Lubaw Luzaw Loatnee*," understood the aspect of ideology well. Still, he underestimated the long-term consequences of the military, taking a leading role in Naing-ngan-taw Warda consolidation and planning its role and attitude itself. Later it becomes the third

¹³² Ministry of Defence, *Naing-Ngan-Taw Warda Hnint Tatmadaw Loat-Ngan-Sin [The National Ideology and the Role of the Defence Services]*, 40–41.

¹³³ Civilian leaders also knew and agreed upon the Tatmadaw's codification of the national ideology. They had no serious objection to it, as it just took the essence of the three fundamental documents, although U Nu had less confidence in the socialist economy. See Colonel Maung Maung's discussion, "The presentation and discussion of Tatmadaw officers (Army/Navy/Airforce) from Yangon, Mingalardon, Mawbi, Inntakaw, and Inndai at the Tatmadaw's Theatre, on 29 September and 2 October 1959."

¹³⁴ After Independence, Myanmar had faced not only with colorful insurgencies but civilian politics full with ideology, party, and personal conflicts. See Silverstein, *Burma*, 27; Frank N. Trager, "The Political Split in Burma," *Far Eastern Survey* 27, no. 10 (1958): 147–49; Frank N. Trager, "Political Divorce in Burma," *Foreign Affairs* 37 (1958): 317; Sein Win, "The Split Story," *Rangoon: The Guardian Ltd*, 1959; U. Nu, *U Nu, Saturday's Son: Transl. by U Law Yone-Ed. by U Kyaw Win* (Yale University Press, 1975), 157, 321; Callahan, *Making Enemies*, 96–99; *Tatmadaw History (1948-1962)*, IV:224–30; Nyein and Kyi, *Myanma Naingngan Yae 1958-1962 (Myanmar Politics 1958-1962)*, 1991, I:125–76; Kyaw Win, *Myanma Naing-Ngan Yae Laelar Sansit Chat-1948-1988 (The Scrutinization of Myanmar Politics -1948-1988)* (Yangon: Gant Gaw Myain Sarpay, 2012), 29–36.

¹³⁵ DSMHRI, "The Speech of Prime Minister U Nu at CO's Conference held in Meiktila," n.d., CD(B)00057, Defence Services Museum and Historical Research Institute.

stage of Naing-ngan-taw Warda. Hence, Tatmadaw's role and attitude was not just a Tatmadaw's political ideology formulation. But it supposes a signal or the line of the next process, the 1962 military coup, and the establishment of "Burmese Way to Socialism," if the government will conduct against the Naing-ngan-taw Warda and the role and attitude of the Tatmadaw formulated. Even this matter is not the only reason for the important role of the future Tatmadaw along Myanmar's political journey. It is hard to deny that it was a very remarkable influential first step.

The second stage of ideology development was derived primarily from the program of ideological (psychological) warfare, the explicit political tactics of ideological socialization to counter communism and the communist insurgency. After the official promulgation in 1958, the national ideological orientation agenda was obvious both inside the Tatmadaw and among the public. For instance, after approving the Naing-ngan-taw Warda, Tatmadaw had established the courses for ideological education under the title of national defense and distributed *Khityae Journal* (ခေတ်ရေး) (The Epoch), especially to teach Naing-ngan-taw Warda, by emphasizing both high-ranking officers and non-commissioned officers (NCO).¹³⁶ For simplicity at the micro-level, the psywar department distributed and organized discussions on a short paper — "The Most Important Work for the Union of Burma and Our Duty" (ပြည်ထောင်စုမြန်မာနိုင်ငံတော်အတွက် အဓိကအရေးအကြီးဆုံးသောလုပ်ငန်းနှင့် ငါတို့တပ်မတော်သား များ၏တာဝန်).

To effectively socialize and implement the ideology in the public sphere, Tatmadaw had established [National Solidarity Organization (NSO)] (နိုင်ငံတော်ကြံ့ခိုင်ရေးအသင်း)¹³⁷ and opened "The Course for Village Headman"

¹³⁶See the discussion of Brigadier General Than Phay and Colonel Ba Than in "The presentation and discussion of Tatmadaw officers (Army/Navy/Airforce) from Yangon, Mingalardon, Mawbi, Inntakaw, and Inndai at the Tatmadaw's Theatre, on 29 September and 2 October 1959."

¹³⁷ Richard Butwell, "The New Political Outlook in Burma," *Far Eastern Survey* 29, no. 2 (1960): 21–27.

(သူကြီးသင်တန်း). NSO was intended to become an institutionalized non-partisan civil organization even though any government will take the state power in the future. But it was mostly led by military officers, including non-commission officers and some civilian and bureaucratic elites. At the time of the Caretaker government, the role of NSO played not only in the socialization of Naing-ngan-taw Warda, but in performing varied functions such as building the rule of law, fighting the black market, and educating the civic rights and duties to the people.¹³⁸ These functions caused the Tatmadaw's encroachment to the very basic public administration.

At the macro level, by the discussions of the CO's conference and the talks with junior officers related to the second stage of Naing-ngan-taw Warda development that followed, of concern was the militarization in the future and the lack of civilian leadership in the development of Naing-ngan-taw Warda. At the micro-level, there were three critical concerns regarding the role and attitude of the Tatmadaw. The first was how the Tatmadaw would establish a socialist economy (what was the exact or detailed procedure and to what extent). Second, because of the usage of the term "socialist economy," there would be public suspicion that the Tatmadaw was taking the side of the socialist party. Third, if a future government did not agree or if there was a conflict related to Naing-ngan-taw Warda formulated by the Tatmadaw, what would occur in the future. There were no definite answers to these concerns except to give a general explanation that the civilian leaders agreed on the developments so far and that this would be the same in the future, too.

In practice, the answers related to these questions appeared in the third stage of Naing-ngan-taw Warda development after the 1962 military coup. Nonetheless, during the second stage, there was no strategic conflict in civil-military relations

¹³⁸ For a detailed discussion about the National Solidarity Organization in DSMHRI, see "The Future of National Solidarity Association, The Minutes of the Third Section of the presentation and discussion of Tatmadaw officers (Army/Navy/Airforce) from Yangon, Mingalardon, Mawbi, Inntakaw, and Inndai at the Tatmadaw's Theatre, on 2 October 1959," n.d., CD(B)00075, Defence Services Museum and Historical Research Institute.

concerning the agenda of building a democratic socialist state and Naing-ngan-taw Warda against the autocratic one-party rule of communism.

3.3 The Structure of Civil-Military Relations in Parliamentary Democracy System

No special section for Defence Services was promulgated in the 1947 constitution. Tatmadaw was integrated and placed under a civilian Defence Minister. The framers of the constitution decided the Defence Services should have the same status as other ministries. But first, they set the clauses in the draft, that also known as ‘pink book,’ such as “ (1) The supreme command of the Armed Forces shall be vested in the President, but the President shall not exercise the supreme command except through a Defence Council appointed by him on the recommendation of the Prime Minister. (2) Subject to these provisions, the exercise of the supreme command of the Armed Forces shall be regulated by law.”¹³⁹ These clauses were not promulgated by the final discussion of the drafting committee. The drafters of the constitution assumed that the Defence Council was also a detailed plan of administrative matters that should not take into account by special provisions. General Aung San himself considered that, in essence, the military dictatorship could not be prevented by prescription. Instead, the mindsets (ideology) and education of its commanders and personnel are important.

But it led to a strong subjective control of the Prime Minister. Though the president “shall take precedence over all other persons throughout the Union and who shall exercise and perform the powers and functions conferred on the President by this Constitution and by law” by article 45, the president has no direct authority over the government. The president must appoint a prime minister who will be the head of the government by the nomination of the Chamber of Deputies; the government will be appointed by the nomination of the prime minister; the resignation or termination of any member of the Union government cannot be conducted by the president, without the prime minister’s advice, by article 56 (1) (2) (3). Every Bill passed or deemed to have been passed or enacted by both Chambers, and the president requires to sign and

¹³⁹ Maung, *Burma’s Constitution*, 146–47.


promulgate without questioning, by article 58 (1) (2). Therefore, in this system, the president was just a figurehead only both in the administrative and legislative bodies. He has the eligible authority on the case of pardon only. It is clear that the prime minister and the parliament have special authority over the government ministries, including the Defence Ministry and Defence Services under it.

The parliament had an exclusive right to restrict and abrogate the fundamental rights of Defence Services' personnel, such as the rights of citizenship, rights of equality, rights of freedom, rights relating to religion, cultural and educational rights, economic rights, rights relating to criminal. Article 28 stated that "The Parliament may by law determine to what extent any of the rights guaranteed by this Chapter [II] shall be restricted or abrogated for the members of the Defence Forces or of the Forces charged with the maintenance of public order so as to ensure fulfillment of their duties and the maintenance of discipline." The formation and organizing of armed forces were controlled by the Parliament by Article 97 (1) (2), "the right to raise and maintain the military, naval and air forces is vested exclusively in the Parliament" and "No military, naval or air forces, or any military or semi-military organization of any kind (not being a police force maintained under the authority of any unit solely for duties connected with the maintenance of public order) other than the forces raised and maintained by the Union with the consent of the Parliament shall be raised or maintained for any purpose whatsoever."

Moreover, by Article 90 and 92, the parliament has the right to make laws related to armed forces, the defense of the Union including all preparations and such acts in times of war, and demobilization after its termination, by the Union's legislative list, especially for raising, training, maintenance, and control of all forces and their employment and execution, their duties and works, defense industries, forming cantonment areas, authorities, and delimitation, arms, firearms, ammunition and explosives, atomic energy, mineral resources essential to its production, and even the conduct of war. By Article 94, if the president declared "Proclamation of Emergency" by the security of Union, war or internal disturbance, and a grave economic emergency, the Parliament has the power of law-making for any part of the Union. The

stationing and not-raising of armed forces in the Union, the declaration, and participation of war were controlled by the executive authority and the Parliament by Article 122 and 123. Therefore, by the structure of CMR in the 1947 constitution, the strong subjective civilian control of armed forces by the government and parliament was manifest. Legally, it has no room for armed forces in the decision-making or policy-making process, contrary to the country's emergency stage of security and political instability.

Figure 3.1 The Subjective Civilian Control in the Parliamentary Democracy System



3.4 The Motives of Changing of Naing-ngan-taw Warda and Structure of Civil-Military Relations¹⁴⁰

Before one week of materializing the final stage of Tatmadaw's ideology development, the structure of CMR had changed constitutionally. Prime Minister U Nu transferred the state power to Tatmadaw leadership, General Ne Win, by Article 57, on October 28, 1958, with the agreement of Parliament. General Ne Win formed a Caretaker Government after ten years of regaining Independence. In fact, this event was the result of the occurrence of three occasions: political chaos, declining of Prime Minister U Nu's leadership, some regional leadership of Tatmadaw's trying to take a coup,¹⁴¹ but it still sought in the constitutional boundary. Myanmar had faced bitter crises among political parties, and it affected the military security and unity. The one reason I already discussed Tatmadaw's codifying of the state ideology and developing its role and attitude even under the robust subjective civilian control because of the need for ideological warfare in counterinsurgency operations. There were other factors and motives that influenced Tatmadaw's ideology development, such as the factions of political parties, factionalism, and mutinies of armed forces, and external threat. The development of Naing-ngan-taw Warda and changing the structure of CMR stemmed from these kinds of chaos and dislocations in society.

Factionalism was a political culture of Myanmar society since the time of the British colony. General Council of Burmese Association, the first NGO in Myanmar society, split into two based on the question of whether it should accept the diarchy or not.¹⁴² The 21 colleagues of U Ba Phay agreed with the diarchy to participate in politics, but U Chit Hlaing and his group took action this system. A powerful association in Myanmar politics, *Dobama Asiayone* (Our Burmese Association), also

¹⁴⁰ This kind of facts from the perspective of the opportunities for the first military intervention in 1958 and the opportunities and disposition for the second military intervention in 1962 can be seen in the author's unpublished Master thesis. Ye Phone Kyaw, "Political Ideology Development in Tatmadaw: Comparative Study Between Myanmar, Indonesia, and Thailand" (Master Thesis, Minamiuonuma, International University of Japan, 2016), 36–58.

¹⁴¹ U San Nyein and Dr. Daw Myint Kyi, *Myanma Naingngan Yae 1958-1962 (Myanmar Politics 1958-1962)*, vol. II (Yangon: Universities Publishing House, 1991), 1–153.

¹⁴² Silverstein, *Burma*, 15.

split into two groups based on their personal and ideological conflicts. The Thakin Kotaw Mie group and Thakin Ba Sein group.¹⁴³ The faction of the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League (AFPFL) also directly impacted Myanmar politics and the Tatmadaw. This league was organized by three main pillars: the Communist Party of Burma (CPB), People Revolutionary Party (PRP), and Patriotic Burmese Forces (PBF), as I discussed in Chapter I. Firstly, the faction had happened in CPB in 1946. One group led by Thein Pay Myint and Than Tun as Communist Party of Burma (CPB), known as 'white flag,' and another group led by Thakin Soe as [Communist Party (Burma)], known as 'red flag' in public.¹⁴⁴

Thakin Soe's 'red flag' group had been expelled from AFPFL in July 1946. PRP was expelled, on December 8, 1950, as Burma Workers and Peasants Party (BWPP) led by Thakin Chit Maung and Thakin Hla Kywe, because of critical opinions of Government foreign policy toward the Korea War¹⁴⁵, later renamed as Burma Workers Party (BWP), also known as '*Social Ni*.'¹⁴⁶ According to the Kandy Agreement, PBF became "Burma Rifle" with 12,000 men, at least 5,000 soldiers, and 200 officers from PBF.¹⁴⁷ Therefore, General Aung San organized the rest of the comrades of PBF as People's Volunteer Organization (PVO) for political strength. So, PVO became a member group of the AFPFL instead of PBF. PVO split as '*Tat Ni*' (Red Forces) followers of Thakin Soe CPB. At the beginning of the independence, because of the ideological conflict upon Prime Minister U Nu, 'Nu Policy,' PVO split into the 'White Band' and 'Yellow Band.'¹⁴⁸ It is a short story of the faction of the main political parties in Myanmar politics.

Although the previous faction AFPFL had happened based on the ideology, in late 1950, it changed to personal and factional rivalries. The most apparent friction

¹⁴³ Win, *Myanma Naing-Ngan Yae Laelar Sansit Chat-1948-1988 (The Scrutinization of Myanmar Politics -1948-1988)*, 29–31.

¹⁴⁴ Nyein and Kyi, *Myanma Naingngan Yae 1958-1962 (Myanmar Politics 1958-1962)*, 1991, I:53–58.

¹⁴⁵ Silverstein, *Burma*, 27.

¹⁴⁶ Win, *Myanma Naing-Ngan Yae Laelar Sansit Chat-1948-1988 (The Scrutinization of Myanmar Politics -1948-1988)*, 32–36.

¹⁴⁷ Callahan, *Making Enemies*, 96–99.

¹⁴⁸ Nyein and Kyi, *Myanma Naingngan Yae 1958-1962 (Myanmar Politics 1958-1962)*, 1991, I:80–81.

between U Nu and U Kyaw Nyein led to the AFPFL to be divided into two.¹⁴⁹ AFPFL's power and persuasion also dramatically fell down because of its pocket groups, *Pyusawhtis* (village guards), and bias of the ministers who came from the AFPFL gave subsidies 'pork-barrel' and other opportunities to their party followers, whereas the formidable opposition, the National Unity Front (NUF), emerged as a powerful cement in the Parliament. However, the power rivalry between Clean and Stable AFPFL could not be stopped, and the Government transferred state power to General Ne Win to restore the stability and held a free and fair general election. This event was very first constitutionally changing the structure of CMR, and the military played a leading role in daily-politics. This time of factional disputes, political payoffs, nepotism, and corruption in Myanmar politics was not only a black spot of a democratic system and a bad legacy for Myanmar's future but also one of the facts and motives that influenced the changing structure of CMR and development of Naing-ngan-taw Warda.

¹⁴⁹This spark of fire started from the case of selling rice from the Rice Cabinet Sub-committee. Therefore, AFPFL polled 1,743,816 votes and NUF polled 1,139,286 votes and won 45 out of 250 seats in the election, held in 1956. U Nu assumed that this situation was caused by corruption in the AFPFL of wrongly using power. Particularly, there was concern over the exploitive role of party members and to the populace, by which he stepped down from office for nine months and purged the party by 'cleaning it up'. Whereas U Kyaw Nyein assumed that NUF got a lot of votes because communist rebellions assisted and threatened by gun to get the votes and he thought that U Nu's party cleaning was to press his socialist group. This difference led to an increase in tensions. The tempo of rivalry between Nu-Tin colleagues and Swe-Nyein colleagues became high and U Nu even prohibited carrying guns into the AFPFL building. The final straw was broken in early 1957. U Nu visited Ceylon (Sir Lanka), to attend the Jayanti Celebration for the 2500th day of Buddhism. At the time, in Myanmar, the meeting concerned with the case of Brigadier General Kyaw Zaw contacted with Communists rebellions called at Prime Minister and Defense Minister U Ba Swe's residence. Those who came to this call included U Kyaw Nyein, General Ne Win, Takhin Kyaw Tun, and Ambassador U Hla Maung. Colonel Maung Maung, Colonel Aung Gyi, Colonel Kyi Win and Lieutenant Colonel Chit Kyine were also there. At this meeting, Ambassador Hla Maung proposed to this group that it should keep U Nu as a National figure as the president of AFPFL, like Mao in China, and should advise him to resign from the cabinet. When U Nu arrived back, he heard this news and was very angry. This was the culmination of U Nu's anger and the last hit of a party split. Although General Ne Win and Ambassador U Hla Maung explained the real situations, U Nu thought that the architect of this plan was U Kyaw Nyein and decided to return to the office. Consequently, AFPFL's inner power struggle has been raised and could not be hidden anymore in April 1958. Finally, AFPFL divided into Nu-Tin's group 'Clean AFPFL' and Ba Swe-Nyein's group 'Stable or Real AFPFL' on May 3, 1958, by 7-points of peaceful separation agreement "Fewer the words, lesser the enmity". Trager, "The Political Split in Burma," 145–55; Nu, *U Nu, Saturday's Son*; Win, "The Split Story," 20–25; Nyein and Kyi, *Myanma Naingngan Yae 1958-1962 (Myanmar Politics 1958-1962)*, 1991, I:140–48; Former Brigadier General Maung Maung, *Einsaunt Asoeya: Shudaunt Ashot Mha Democracy Ko Santhetchin (Some Aspects of the "Care-Taker Government": An Experiment in Democratic Process) translated by Sithu Kyaw* (Yangon: Roads of Yangon Publishing House, 2018), 14–121.

The factionalism ramification of forming government in the 1958 August Parliamentary session hit seriously on the Tatmadaw. There was a rumor that the Tatmadaw would stand on one side. But General Ne Win said that the Tatmadaw will never have a bias against one side and never be as a pocket army. It will respect and obey the law and government, which came from elections, and he requested that not to take the Tatmadaw as a political tool for a faction's interests. Moreover, the Tatmadaw will not accept these conditions, and he expressed his opinion to give duties according to the laws and constitution.¹⁵⁰ Two factions did mobilize Tatmadaw by giving incentives for government seats to pursue their own factions. Some commanders of the Tatmadaw also suspected and did not satisfy Nu-Tin's regime for over giving favor to communist rebels and U Nu's infringement of constitutional provisions for making a decision for budget allocations by not calling Parliament session. Nu-Tin regime also suspected that the Tatmadaw had a bias to Swe-Nyein's group because U Ba Swe was the Defense Minister at this time, and they thought that some senior army leaders were more related to Swe-Nyein group than the Nu-Tin faction.¹⁵¹ The concept of political parties to subordinate the Tatmadaw as their mirror to reflect their way was the same as Huntington's 'subjective civilian control' of civil-military relations.

Some individual army leaders supported Swe-Nyein factions at the district level. Although Nu-Tin's regime did not take action against these few leaders in factional wars, they tried to discredit and treat as an enemy.¹⁵² They substituted the important positions in the government by patronage network. The main cause that led to escalating mistrust of the Tatmadaw upon Nu-Tin's regime was that the delegate of *Hanthawaddy* alleged the Tatmadaw as 'public enemy number one' at the Nu-Tin AFPFL convention in the Prime Minister compound. This allegation was strongly effective in civil-military relations, especially at district levels. Politicians looked upon the Tatmadaw either as their potential foe or friend.

¹⁵⁰ Nyein and Kyi, *Myanma Naingngan Yae 1958-1962 (Myanmar Politics 1958-1962)*, 1991, I:214–16.

¹⁵¹ Win, "The Split Story," 69.

¹⁵² Win, 73.

The other cause that supported the Tatmadaw to be an institutionally and ideologically strong force was an external threat. Only early in the 1950s, there had been distinct progress in restoring law and order, and the Tatmadaw was able to control the important cities. But many rural areas were still under the influence of colorful insurgents. At the same time, the invasion of the Chinese Kuomintang (KMT) started in 1949, which also reinforced the threat to the country's sovereignty. The success of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) in neighboring China led to the establishment of KMT deserters, and they fled into Myanmar. They became an external threat to national security, which led to the development of the military doctrine's first phase.¹⁵³ Tatmadaw leaders worried that KMT might provoke China to invade Myanmar, and it also resulted in the overhaul of Tatmadaw. This meant that Tatmadaw faced fighting anti-insurgent operations and also external threats and stepped up the institutionalization of Tatmadaw simultaneously.

Table 3.1 KMT Troops Buildup in Myanmar¹⁵⁴

<i>Date</i>	<i>Total Number of KMT Troops in Myanmar</i>
<i>January 1950</i>	200
<i>March 1950</i>	1,500
<i>July 1950</i>	2,500
<i>April 1951</i>	4,000
<i>January 1952</i>	8,000
<i>February 1952</i>	12,000

The solution of the United Nations related to the KMT aggression backed by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA),¹⁵⁵ to settle the arrangement between the United Nations (UN), Myanmar, Thailand, and Taiwan government,¹⁵⁶ which succeeded in removing over 5,500 KMT, but lots of KMT still remained on Myanmar's soil.¹⁵⁷ Tatmadaw planned operations and fought the foreign aggressors.

¹⁵³ Myoe, *Building the Tatmadaw*, 352:16–19.

¹⁵⁴ Robert H. Taylor, "Foreign and Domestic Consequences of the KMT Intervention in Burma," 1973, 11–13.

¹⁵⁵ Callahan, *Making Enemies*, 154–59.

¹⁵⁶ *Tatmadaw History (1948-1962)*, IV:71–77.

¹⁵⁷ Silverstein, *Burma*, 26.

The last operation was *Mekong* operation (မဲခေါင်စစ်ဆင်ရေး) in 1961 that finished the invasion of KMT aggressors almost 11 years. Along with these operations, the reorganization of the Tatmadaw, decentralized guerrilla-style army to centralized standing one, has also been done by army staff officers, such as Lt. Col. Maung Maung and Lt. Col. Aung Gyi. The Tatmadaw gradually became more self-sustaining and independent of civilian influence.¹⁵⁸

Hence, the reasons for the change of CMR structure and ideology development are the split story of AFPFL, political, ethnic, and personal conflicts continued to deteriorate the national security and the un-synchronizing and tensions in civil-military relations that I have discussed. The civilian government rather could not handle the nation's political situation, while the military's political ideology also developed and tried to stop the ongoing crisis. And then the civilian regime and the military leadership agreed to transfer state power to the Caretaker Government led by General Ne Win by the approval of Union parliament, in accordance with the 1947 constitution's article 56. The main purpose was to hold a free and fair election and restoration of law and order. It took place on October 28, 1958, at the time of a week after the final stage of Naing-ngan-taw Warda, including Tatmadaw's role and attitude development. This occasion was the very first time the Tatmadaw played an additional role above and beyond its primary duty of the military security of the state—it became involved in state administration, civilian politics, and bureaucracy.

3.5 Conclusion

Chapter II discussed the second stage of Naing-ngan-taw Warda development and the structure of CMR after regaining independence, and the motives of these changes. Interestingly, Myanmar chose “Democratic Socialism” and British's parliamentary democracy system instead of a Marxist/Leninist state structure, though the latter ideologically and structurally dominated Myanmar along the time of resistance movement. In the particle sense, there was no way of Myanmar's regaining

¹⁵⁸ Callahan, *Making Enemies*, 159–71.

Independence with Marxist/Leninist one-party state from the British. But the communist view of international relations was still active in Myanmar, ‘capitalism=imperialism=war’—the side effect of monopoly capitalism will inevitably result in the imperialist war. Thus it needs to prepare the way for the establishment of socialism.¹⁵⁹ It was still active, along with the civil war and political crisis. Anti-Fascist Freedom League led Myanmar as a strong political organ, like a one-party state in a so-called parliamentary democracy, until 1962. Therefore, the disintegration of AFPFL led to a falling down of the civilian government.

In the resistance movement, Burmese autocratic, impatient, nationalist, and Marxist proletariat sentiments can be seen in the ways they did and proclaimed. They named the leagues and parties, such as ‘*Dobama Asiayone*,’ ‘*Dobama-Sinyetha Asiayone*,’ ‘*Sinyaethar Party*,’ Dr. Ba Maw called himself ‘*Arnarshin*’ ‘*Adipati*’ (the autocrat), Maj. General Aung San accepted the title of ‘*Bogyoke*’ [the Burmese Supremo], after resignation from PBF to take political carrier, and so on. They had used the means of impatience to regain Independence, admired the “October Revolution,” communists in India and China, and even Hitler and Mussolini, and Japanese too. When the Japanese asked Aung San to prepare a plan for future Myanmar, he had written, “What we want is a strong state administration as exemplified in Germany and Italy. There shall be only one nation, one state, one party, one leader. There shall be no parliamentary opposition, no-nonsense of individualism”.¹⁶⁰

He also explained the ideology and structural foundation of the 1947 constitution for independent Myanmar, by many referencing the Lenin and Stalin words, on May 19, 1947, at Jubilee Hall Conference. He stated that-

“They are not really democratic nations [the western democracy] though they called themselves democratic. In fact, capitalists or bourgeoisie manipulate

¹⁵⁹ Vladimir Il’ich Lenin, *Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism* (Resistance Books, 1999).

¹⁶⁰ It was not only Aung San with the active, practical, and stubborn manner, U Thant, intellectual and artist, a former General Secretary of United Nations, wrote in 1936 that “Democracy is lovelier at a distance. Seen at close quarters, it is nothing to sing hymns about.” Maung, *Burma’s Constitution*, 91–92.

and exploit the countries' economies in this system. In other words, this is a kind of dictatorship governed by capitalists, and democracy is just for show. We need a real democracy to establish the nation by the people's desire. In fact, socialism and communism diverge from this [real] democracy..... must be the one that is not to follow capitalists' democracy that defends their dictator, must also remove feudalism, and must follow authoritarianism that is comprised of all classes called "new democracy" to conduct the right of the people..."¹⁶¹

This speech clearly showed that Bogyoke Aung San's ideology to establish future Myanmar was Mao Zedong's "new democracy."

After regaining Independence, Prime Minister U Nu declared fourteen points of "Nu Mu" (Nu's Policy) on 25 May 1948, which included the facts such as to build a 'leftist unity' or 'Marxist League,' to contact politically and economically with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and Eastern Europe socialist states, to nationalize imperialists' corporations and the economy, to abolish landlord system, and to build the Tatmadaw as a People Democratic Army [Soviet or China-style army].¹⁶² These kinds of ideas were declared even in the Parliamentary democracy system. But it collapsed as Burmese communists did not accept.

Dr. Maung Maung's view is that "The war changed Burmese views towards democracy to a large extent. The resistance against the Japanese militarism was proclaimed in the name of democracy; the freedom of Burma was demanded in the name of democracy and the rule of law in the family of nations. To a certain extent, the change was demanded by circumstances and considerations of tactic. Largely also, it became a matter of faith..."¹⁶³

My conclusion is that it did not become a matter of faith, but it was just taking the British style of parliamentary democracy for a show. It was highly correlated with

¹⁶¹ San, *Bogyoke Aung San Maintkhon Baungchot (The Collection of General Aung San's Speeches)*, 441–62.

¹⁶² *Tatmadaw History (1948-1962)*, IV:8–9; Wai, *Pha Sa Pa La U Kyaw Nyein*, 260–62.

¹⁶³ Maung, *Burma's Constitution*, 92.

international politics. Still, in reality, the political elites desired to promote “new democracy.” The influential subjective factors included: 1) Independence regained from democratic republic Britain instead of Japanese was influenced by fascism and militarism. There was no way Britain would agree to Independence of Myanmar by the one-party state constitution, though they politically gave the right of writing the constitution at Myanmar’s disposal; 2) the expel of extreme communists from the AFPFL was in line with the Western allies’ policy midst the world ideological division between the West (liberalism) and the USSR (communism). CIA-backed KMT foreign invasion also a good example of Cold War ramification; 3) after the Japanese resistance movement, the way of regaining Independence led by Aung San was influenced by the political mean rather than armed resistance, though Burma also prepared for the military mean; 4) the bitter experience and painful memories of WWI and WWII and military administration of British and Japanese influenced the leaders’ and people’s psyche, afraid alien rules and militarism. It does not mean faith or understands the practice of western democracy; 5) the essence or agreement of the Panglong conference between General Aung Sun and Frontier areas’ leaders was to establish a democratic federal Union with equal democratic rights and principles that guaranteed the self-determination of state. Because of these facts, Burma chose, politically and structurally, British-style democracy or Republic. Still, the structure of CMR was still strongly subjective. The ideology, Marxism/Leninism, was still active in the heart of the leaders and the public.

Therefore, in the Parliamentary democracy period, a healthy objective type of civilian control never materialized and practiced between the civilian politicians and military counterparts by promoting military professionalism that was, as Huntington suggested. It was just a subjective type of CMR that bounded the military by the structure enacted in the constitution. At that time, Tatmadaw institutionally was not a professional military and was transforming a guerilla type of armed forces to a conventional one. Tatmadaw was born from revolutionary politicians by the ideology development of “Freedom at All Costs” in line with Maj General Aung San’s idea of Tatmadaw must be an institution that understands politics and has political sense, not

mercenaries. The Tatmadaw was also strongly dominated by revolutionary and political soldiers after the collapse of “two wings solution.”

However, it stayed away from daily-politics and administration until October 1958 because of its bitter experience of disunity, dividing armed forces into small pieces as a result of communists’ and ethnic-forces mutinies, and strongly subjective structure of CMR in 1947 constitution. The Tatmadaw’s staying away from party politics was not because of an objective type of civilian control or equilibrium by the concept of maximizing professionalism. In other words, it was a time of Tatmadaw’s building itself and fighting with insurgencies. However, in the inner layer of psyche, Marxism/Leninism was still active and influential in the Tatmadaw. Its political ideology gradually developed and consolidated itself in the parliamentary democracy system. After saving the Union from total disintegration, the Tatmadaw began to project its self-image as the guardian of the state. The whole idea behind the formulation of Ning-ngan-taw Warda was a reflection of Tatmadaw’s self-image. The result was the development of Naing-ngan-taw Warda and the change of CMR structure in 1958 and 1962. It was a turning point of revolutionary soldiers who controlled the state power and daily Myanmar politics through the constitution.

CHAPTER IV

BURMESE WAY TO SOCIALISM, POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION, STRUCTURE OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS, AND THE TATMADAW

4.1 Background

During the eighteen months of General Ne Win's Caretaker government, it was considerably reasserted stability, restored law and order, brought the insurgency rates and crime rates to the lowest point since the outbreak of rebellions, kept all of the unofficial guns and weapons throughout the country, and managed to conduct the 1960 general election freely and fairly.¹⁶⁴ The Caretaker regime set the military-men in critical positions and restored national security and mismanagements in state-administrations and the economy.¹⁶⁵ On the one hand, this change was the positive result that the military held political power by the constitution like politicians in Myanmar history. They not only even played a part in politics, but they could play a part and manage in administrative affairs to get much more impressive results than the time of the civilian government almost ten years after independence, on the other hand. Some of them were the overt changes in the view of the public.¹⁶⁶ The Caretaker Government could remove the feudal system from Shan and Kayar States and signed the agreement peacefully with neighboring China concerned with defining territory among two countries.¹⁶⁷ The government also brought the cleanliness of Yangon, Capital of Myanmar at this time, and setting up new satellite towns of Thaketa and North and South Okkalapa in the outskirts of Yangon to settle the refugees who lived in shacks downtown areas.¹⁶⁸

¹⁶⁴ Butwell, "The New Political Outlook in Burma," 22.

¹⁶⁵ Maung, *Einsaunt Asoeya: Shudaunt Ahot Mha Democracy Ko Santhetchin (Some Aspects of the "Care-Taker Government": An Experiment in Democratic Process) translated by Sithu Kyaw*, 122–546.

¹⁶⁶ DSMHRI, *Bogyokekyi Asoeya Achainkarla Atwin Yaybuya Thabawhtar Sonsanchat: Ganan Pyint Akyanpyin Sansitchat (Attitude Investigation in the Period of General's [Ne Win] Government: Approximated Quantitative Scrutinization)* (Ministry of Defence, Directorate Office of Education and Psychological Warfare, 1959), 10–21.

¹⁶⁷ *Tatmadaw History (1948-1962)*, IV:255.

¹⁶⁸ Butwell, "The New Political Outlook in Burma," 24.

The Tatmadaw got not only the experiences of government administration but also awareness of the public for its applicability within eighteen months. This experience considerably improved the guardian spirit and disposition of the Tatmadaw to intervene in civilian politics. Tatmadaw became confident itself to control the state power and to manage the administrative affairs like a civilian government. In Callahan's words, war-fighters became state-builders. As promised, on April 4, 1960, the Premier General Ne Win transferred state power to the Clean AFPFL, which won in February elections. Although the time of the Caretaker government had been over, it led to questions in the academic field and the public, concerned with the effectiveness of nation-state building of civilian regime compared with the Ne Win's regime. Related to the point of military's dignified transferring state power to the civilian government which derived from the general election, Johnson commented that "Such a retreat from power and glory seems to conflict with sophisticated ideas about human nature and commonplace theories of politics....it was also one of the greatest surprises of contemporary Southeast Asian politics".¹⁶⁹ Richard Butwell also stated that "There are many, impressed by the accomplishments of the Ne Win government, who regret (and others who question) the necessity for its departure." There were those who questioned the compatibility with the western democracy of Myanmar.

Still, political instability and religious tensions continued. On March 2, 1962, the Tatmadaw took full control of state power again in the name of the Revolutionary Council (RC). It controlled all critical points not only in Yangon but throughout the country and deployed many troops and tanks. Ministers of U Nu's government and attendees of the February 24 Federal Seminar were arrested in the early morning of March 2. In this Federal Seminar, Shan and Kayah state representatives demanded to secede from the Union, according to Chapter 10 of the 1947 Constitution. Moreover, this Seminar tended not only just to discuss the secessionist demands, but also revealed the grievances against the Tatmadaw at the time of the 1950 martial law in the Shan States. Callahan also expressed the report of the British air attaché at this time that the "Army and Shans have been at loggerheads ever since General Ne Win stripped the

¹⁶⁹ John J Johnson and Rand Corporation, *The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1962), 232.

Sawbwas of their feudal powers in 1959.”¹⁷⁰ The Tatmadaw feared the allegation against the Tatmadaw in public again like in 1958 at the Clean AFPFL’s Congress, and U Nu also neglected this case only 50 yards away from him in his compound and neglected the complaints of the Tatmadaw officers. This case exacerbated the misunderstanding and conflicts between the military and civilians at the district level. Supposedly, the Tatmadaw did not want such kind of civil-military tensions, which would lead to potential conflict and harm for the nation.

The amendment of section 21(1) of the 1947 Constitution, adding the Buddhist religion as the state religion, on August 26, 1961, became the big social event in Myanmar politics. There were many unprecedented social, political, and religious tensions because of this event. The discontents of non-Buddhist minorities were escalated throughout the country. Although Tatmadaw top leaders advised to U Nu that this law should prescribe only for the plain regions, in which most Burmans live, he, unfortunately, refused this advice.¹⁷¹ It was a huge problem for the Tatmadaw because the Tatmadaw was formed many diverse ethnics and religious groups. The Tatmadaw leaders did not want the fragmentation of institutions (mutinies) like the experience of after regaining independence. When the government met with critics of other religions, parliament enacted the law to protect other religions again, and the bulk of monks and protesters besieged U Nu’s home. The immediate emergence of the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) had occurred at this moment based on the case of state religion as most of the Kachins follow Christianity. Moreover, even the factions inside governing U Nu’s Union Party emerged again and led to a weak government and made a bad reputation.¹⁷²

The event of the February 24 Federal Seminar was also the motive and paved the way for the military’s eligible reason to defend the ‘national interest.’ Additionally, the Tatmadaw also was oriented with political power within the time of the Caretaker government, and it was already as a bureaucratized institution ready to control the state. The role and attitude of Tatmadaw that has a political-ideological orientation

¹⁷⁰ Callahan, *Making Enemies*, 203.

¹⁷¹ Aung and Hmat, *Shwepyitaw Myawe-maway-pyi-moet*[*No Longer A Distance to the Golden Land*], 145.

¹⁷² Aung and Hmat, 135–41.

were already rooted inside the Tatmadaw. In the case of the 1962 coup, the Tatmadaw faced no serious barriers and challenges. Officially, Brigadier General Aung Gyi declared that the coup had been indispensable because “we had economic, religious and political crises with the issue of federalism as the most important reason for the coup.”¹⁷³

4.2 The Third Stage of Naing-ngan-taw Warda Development and Political Socialization

The second and third stages of ideology development were correlated with each other and not very different ideologically, but institutionally they were different. In fact, it was also the result of Tatmadaw’s declining confidence in the 1947 constitution itself and in the civilian leadership in Myanmar politics.¹⁷⁴ Tatmadaw called the Defence Services Conference on April 30, 1962, at Yadanarbon Navy Command, discussed the Naing-ngan-taw Warda for crafting the future of Myanmar. Finally, it endorsed “Burmese Way to Socialism” (မြန်မာ့ဆိုရှယ်လစ်လမ်းစဉ်) as its nation-building program which had 21 passages of explaining a national belief, basic principles, the socialist economy, the formation of the Union, the process of transformation, the case of ethnicity, social affairs, persuasion, and the duty of the people. In fact, the manifestation of the Tatmadaw’s third ‘Role and Attitude’ was defined in the 1958 DS conference—the establishment of the socialist economy—as a Naing-ngan-taw Warda, in its own way. David Steinberg called it “democratic centralism.”¹⁷⁵

“The System of Correlation between Man and His Environment” (လူနှင့်ပတ်ဝန်းကျင်တို့၏ အညီမညီသဘောတရား) was a central ideological

¹⁷³ Silverstein, *Burma*, 30.

¹⁷⁴ Tatmadaw discussed not only the dangers of some people who shouted about they convinced democracy, while they were conducting practically against democratic principles and constitution, but also the weaknesses of the 1947 constitution. See The Paper for Moral, “We Must Defend the Democracy (Vol I. No. 5),” November 4, 1958, CD(E)00101, Defence Services Museum and Historical Research Institute; Ministry of Defence, “The Facts that Required to Rethink Concerned with the Constitution” (Education and Psywar directorate, October 10, 1958), CD(B)00055, Defence Services Museum and Historical Research Institute.

¹⁷⁵ David I. Steinberg, *Burma’s Road toward Development: Growth and Ideology under Military Rule* (Routledge, 2019), 29.

socialization concept of the Burmese Way to Socialism.¹⁷⁶ Six hundred thousand copies of the book were printed between January 17, 1963, the RC's 22nd meeting, till 1982. This is a philosophical system of the people to build a socio-economic system based on democracy and socialism in a Burmese way. Some scholars argued that the rhetoric of these two papers (Burmese Way to Socialism and The System of Correlation between Man and His Environment) are the same as that of the Thakin Party (formerly known as DBA) and the three central concepts of nationalism, socialism, and Buddhism.¹⁷⁷ The author cannot find any concept of nationalism in the system of correlation, but I do see some essence of Buddhism and Socialism. While “The System of Correlation” (အညှစ်ညှစ်သဘောတရား) has critics on its religious-metaphysical speculations,¹⁷⁸ in Burma, so far, there is no evidence of any impressive counter work or public critique. In practice, its weaknesses were in the methods, rules, and regulations,¹⁷⁹ mismanagements, and far-reaching centralized economic policy of the Revolutionary Council and the Burma Socialist Programme Party.¹⁸⁰

In the second and third stages of Naing-ngan-taw Warda development and socialization, the role of Chit Hlaing cannot be omitted. He was a former revolutionary soldier, a political officer in the BDA, and a Burma Communist Party (BCP) member who did not go underground in March 1946. After a visit to Yugoslavia in June 1952, he increasingly came to agree that a “new class”¹⁸¹ was appearing.¹⁸² In retrospect, Tatmadaw designated Chit Hlaing as a special officer in the Psychological Warfare Branch in 1955 and also an instructor of the Psychological Warfare training course

¹⁷⁶ Burma Socialist Programme Party, *The Paper of Burma Socialists Programme Party's Way of Thinking: The System of Correlation between Man and His Environment* (Yangon: 15th Party Press, 1982).

¹⁷⁷ Robert H. Taylor, *The State in Burma* (University of Hawaii Press, 1987), 196–97; David I. Steinberg, *Burma: A Socialist Nation of Southeast Asia* (Westview Press Boulder, CO, 1982), 76.

¹⁷⁸ Dr. Ba Maw commented on the usage of Buddhist terminology in the moral configuration of continually changing social philosophy. It is a common error of confusing race with religion and religion with society. See Nakanishi, *Strong Soldiers, Failed Revolution*, 62–63.

¹⁷⁹ DSMHRI, “The Perspective of AFPFL on ‘Burmese Way to Socialism’ that was declared by Revolutionary Council,” n.d., DR(J)00196, Defence Services Museum and Historical Research Institute.

¹⁸⁰ See Myat Thein, *Economic Development of Myanmar* (Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2004); Mya Maung, *The Burma Road to Poverty* (Praeger Publishers, 1991).

¹⁸¹ Milovan Djilas, *The New Class: An Analysis of the Communist System* (Praeger, 1957).

¹⁸² Nakanishi's interview with Chit Hlaing. See Nakanishi, *Strong Soldiers, Failed Revolution*, 63–70.

started in December 1957. Though there were other talented players, such as Colonel Aung Gyi, Colonel Maung Maung, Lt. Col. Ba Than, U Saw Oo (editor of the *Socialist Mandaing* newspaper), the conduct of Chit Hlaing was prominent, and he was a mastermind.¹⁸³ Myawaddy Magazine,¹⁸⁴ first published in November 1952, played an essential role in ideological socialization. Chit Hlaing's article— 'Myanmar and Democratic Socialism' (မြန်မာနိုင်ငံနှင့်ဒီမိုကရေစီဆိုရှယ်လစ်ဝါဒ) stated in the magazine, even in 1957, what would become the third stage of Naing-ngan-taw Warda — “The Law of Correlation” (အညှစ်ညှစ်သဘောတရား). He called it “The Law of Interaction with Mind and Matter”¹⁸⁵ (နာမရူပဝါဒ)¹⁸⁶ at that time.

Unsurprisingly, after the 1962 military coup, Tatmadaw manipulated state and mass media apparatuses. Inside the Tatmadaw, there were courses for ideological orientation like plans of “Sharing and Teaching Knowledge in the Tatmadaw” (တပ်တွင်းပညာပေး), and “Discussions in the Tatmadaw” (တပ်တွင်းဆွေးနွေးပွဲ). Furthermore, it disseminated the papers and journals, such as *Journal of Ideology* (သဘောတရားရေးရာစာစောင်), *Lanzin Journal* (လမ်းစဉ်ဂျာနယ်), and *People's Army Journal* (ပြည်သူ့တပ်မတော်စာစဉ်).¹⁸⁷ The Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP)

¹⁸³ Colonel Saw Myint discussed in 1959 COs' conference that this ideology was prepared carefully by real persons, especially Chit Hlaing. He knew about the 'new class' seven or eight years before becoming popular in Burma. He mentioned so early, even when people did not agree on this point. See DSMHRI, “The Second Phase of the discussion of Tatmadaw's ideology in Tatmadaw Conference, Tatmadaw's Role and Attitude, which was held at No.1 Training School, Mingalardon, in 1959,” n.d., CD(B)00068, Defence Services Museum and Historical Research Institute.

¹⁸⁴ In Callahan's Interview with Aung Gyi, he said that 'Myawaddy' magazine was intended “to provide balance” to 'Shumawa' magazine that was dominated by anti-government views and ideas. See Callahan, *Making Enemies*, 183.

¹⁸⁵ While he had written five articles concerned with national ideology in 1957, this one was well-known basic. See Shwe Moe, “Burma and Democratic Socialism,” *Myawaddy Magazine*, 1957.

¹⁸⁶ “.... A man is made up of nama and rupa (mind and body). Of the two, nama is aware of the senses and rupa is not. So nama is the leader and rupa, the follower. But in the sense sphere and the fine-material sphere, nama needs the support of rupa for its arising.....”. For understanding detail, see Mehm Tin Mon, *The Essence of Buddha Abhidhamma* (Mya Mon Yadanar Publication, 1995), 17–18. Though Chit Hlaing had wrote another document— “Ideology Critical for the Development of Human Nature and Democracy”—a booklet that had used in Psychological Warfare Training course, it does not differ from “The Law of Interaction with Mind and Matter”.

¹⁸⁷ Myoe, *Building the Tatmadaw*, 352:62.

also printed the book, “*The Specific Characteristics of the Burma Socialist Programme Party*,” in both Burmese and English, to socialize and legitimize the regime by demonstrating the vital differences between the Burma Socialist Programme Party and the rightist and communist parties or between the Burmese Way to Socialism and democratic socialism and Marxism/Leninism.¹⁸⁸ Additionally, the Revolutionary Council founded the main institution, “The School of Political Science,” later known as the “Central Institute of Political Science” (CIPS), on July 1, 1963, which helped not only ideology socialization but the institutionalization of the Burma Socialist Programme Party.¹⁸⁹ Chit Hlaing, a vice-principal, was engaged in the process of ideology orientation and training of party cadre until 1971. By the third stage of Naing-ngan-taw Warda development, the Tatmadaw’s position changed again from “Praetorian Army”—Revolutionary Council to “Revolutionary Professional Army”—People’s Armed Forces” (ပြည်သူ့တပ်မတော်) during the subordination to the Burma Socialist Programme Party leadership from 1974 to 1988.

4.3 The Structure of Civil-Military Relations under BSPP’s leadership

Along with ideology development, the Revolutionary Council (RC) established the Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP) as a “Cadre Party” (အခြေတေပါတီ) by enacting the “The Constitution of the Burma Socialist Party for the Transitional Period of Its Construction,” on July 4, 1962.¹⁹⁰ While the RC has a revolutionary essence, the structural formation like a Military Council that deemed undesirable, a revolution naturally must be led by a political party that has a revolutionary essence. Therefore, the RC decided to establish a political party to lead future Myanmar politics. It was the BSPP. At the time of the RC’s leadership, by Articles 4 and 5, the Cadre Party would be organized by a principle of “centralism” and, after party-building, it was intended


¹⁸⁸ BSPP, *The Specific Characteristics of the Burma Socialist Programme Party*, Third Edition (the Central Committee of the BSPP, Sarpay Beikman Press, 1972).

¹⁸⁹ The Union of Burma Revolutionary Council, *Tawhlanyae Kaunsi Ei Loatsaungchat Thamine Akyinchoke Hnint Pyitsimyar Saryin (The Brief History of the Conduct of Revolutionary Council and the List of Substances)* (The Association of Buddha Tharthanar Press, n.d.), 18.

¹⁹⁰ *Party Tisautyae Karla Ei Party Pwaesioakhotpone Achaykhanaupaday (The Constitution of the Burma Socialist Programme Party for the Transitional Period of Its Construction)* (BSPP, 1962).

that a new constitution would be framed and operated on the principle of “democratic centralism” in accordance with the people's desire. Section 18 of this constitution prescribed the resolves and duties of the party, in which Article (h) prescribed that “The Party will strive towards developing the present Defence Services of the Union of Burma into a national armed force imbued with socialist patriotism and inspired to defend the Socialist Economy and the Socialist State.” It is a clear sign that RC and BSPP would transfer the Tatmadaw to a subordinated institution under their guidelines and objectives, like a Soviet-style army. Therefore, it was officially a starting point of “centralism” and “party-military relations” in Myanmar politics after regaining Independence.

Figure 4.1 The Subjective Civilian Control of Burma Socialist Programme Party



By the party's constitution, the BSPP appointed three committees of equal status: the Party Central Organising Committee (PCOC), the Party Discipline

Committee (PDC), and the Socialist Economy Planning Committee (SEPC).¹⁹¹ To control the organizing and recruiting of the Tatmadaw members on behalf of the PCOC and in accordance with its policy, RC formed, on December 27, 1963, the Tatmadaw Education Team (TET) under the Vice Commander-in-Chief (Army), Brigadier General San Yu, including the Vice C-in-C of Navy and Air Force and Directors. From 4 July 1962 to January 1971 was a time of centralized party-building and recruiting members. In every command, regiment, and unit of Tatmadaw, these kinds of education teams were organized structurally and hierarchically.

It is necessary to note that the BSPP's recruiting and organizing in Tatmadaw was conducted in accordance with the Tatmadaw's organizational structure. It means that there was no exclusive designation of political commissars and establishing party control mechanisms. Basically, the commanders of Tatmadaw were also the Party members and its leaders, which is different from the AFPFL's CMR structure in the resistance movement and Soviet and China-styled party control mechanisms. Consequently, Tatmadaw became the main pillar of BSPP. BSPP drew a "Plan of Burma Socialist Programme Party to Organize as a People Party" that based on "democratic centralism" and reorganized its members by this policy.¹⁹² After about 11 years of party construction, by the May 1973 report of the Central Organising Committee, 331,985 civilian members and 135,065 military members were designated in the BSPP.¹⁹³ Hence, the formation was approximately three-ratios-one of civil and military members. BSPP trained and taught the Commanders and selections Tatmadaw Party members at CIPS and through respective Education Teams in military commands and units, by the ideology and policy of BSPP.

By the constitution of BSPP and "Law and Procedure of Organising Burma Socialist Programme Party," Party Central Committee (PCC) has the authority to form institutions, by including PCC members, to conduct on behalf of PCC to closely

¹⁹¹ The Party Central Organising Committee and the Party Discipline Committee were formed on 6 July, 1962, and the Socialist Economy Planning Committee was formed on 2 October 1967. See *Tawhlanya Kaunsi Ei Loatsaungchat Thamine Akyinchoke Hnint Pyitsimyar Saryin (The Brief History of the Conduct of Revolutionary Council and the List of Substances)*, 18–19.

¹⁹² BSPP, "The Political Report of the Party Central Organising Committee," 1971, 218.

¹⁹³ BSPP, "The Political Report of the Party Central Organising Committee submitted to the 2nd BSPP Conference," 1973, 146.

supervise, check, and coordinate with other party's organizations and institutions. And PCC has the authority for organizing party members of institutions that has special characteristics, like Tatmadaw.¹⁹⁴ In accordance with these laws, BSPP bounded the Tatmadaw in its control by promulgating "The Structure and Duties of Party Organization in Tatmadaw" in March 1971, by the decision of PCOC's 89th meeting. Subjective Party control was clearly defined that "For the Defence Services that has a special characteristic among other civil services, to more convince and obey the leadership of BSPP, to follow and conduct Party's basic principles, policies, and procedures, to advance the Tatmadaw's military ability and the spirit for national defense, to be more strong unity in Tatmadaw, to advance and develop the political view and knowledge of Tatmadaw, to organize a party organizing structure suitable for Tatmadaw's obedience system and culture and to conduct BSPP's duties."¹⁹⁵ BSPP formed Tatmadaw Party Committee (TPC) on October 29, 1971, and Tatmadaw Education Teams were abolished. And then, under TPC, 13 Command Headquarters/Light Infantry Division Organising Committees and 346 Battalions/Regiments/Corps/Posts Organising Committees were organized.¹⁹⁶ All of the Party Organisations in Tatmadaw were subordinated to the Party Central Committee through Tatmadaw Party Committee under the Ministry of Defence. The subjective party control by the Tatmadaw Party organizational structure was as shown in figure 4.1.

General Ne Win publicly revealed to transfer the civilian rule would require a constitution, a national assembly, and a ruling political party at the BSPP's first-party seminar in 1965. Therefore, at the first party congress in 1971, RC created a constitution drafting committee. It was a legal sign of transferring from a 'cadre party' to a 'people party.' The constitution drafting committee published the very first draft of the constitution on March 6, 1972, and most government officials, including General Ne Win, retired from the Tatmadaw to become civilians. On December 15 to

¹⁹⁴ BSPP, *The Organizational Structure and Duties of Party's Organizations in Tatmadaw* (Yangon: Sar Pay Bate Mhan Press, 1971).

¹⁹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁹⁶ *Tawhlanya Kaunsi Ei Loatsaungchat Thamine Akyinchoke Hnint Pyitsimyar Saryin (The Brief History of the Conduct of Revolutionary Council and the List of Substances)*, 331.

31, 1943, a national referendum was held with 90.19 percent of yes votes of approving the new Constitution.¹⁹⁷ It became active on January 3, 1947. The first People's Parliament opened on 2 March, and legally, it completed a transition to civilian rule.

By the constitution, though there was no special provisions or section for the Armed Forces, the subjective civilian control is apparent. In essence, though there was no special provision in the Constitution, Defence Services is assumed as the same as other civil services, the same essence of the 1947 Constitution. By article 49, the *Pyithu Hluttaw* (Parliament) can decide the declaration of war and making peace only by a vote of 75 percent of all its members. The Pyithu Hluttaw must constitute a National Defence and Security Committee consisting of a suitable number of Council of State's members and the Council of Ministers, by article 54 (b). While it has a check and balance system between the Parliament and the Council of State, the latter is the most powerful body in practice. The Council of State may be constituted only by the decision of the Council and must appoint or dismiss heads of bodies of Public Services by article 81 and 73 (i). The Council may take suitable military action in the face of aggression and may declare a state of emergency and promulgate martial law in specified areas or in the entire state by article 75 and 76.

The Council of Ministers is the highest executive organ of the State, including Defence Ministry, by article 84. By article 87 (a) (e), it was responsible for the management of executive, economic, financial, social, cultural and foreign affairs and national defense, maintain the rule of law and uphold law and order, on behalf of the Parliament in accordance with the principle of collective leadership. The military had an independent justice system by article 99: "military justice of members of the People's Defence Services may be administered according to law by a collective organ or by a single Judge." The People's Councils at different levels under the Council of State must implement local security, defense, maintenance of the rule of law, and order by article 132 (c). By article 171, every citizen must undergo military training and undertake military service for the defense of the State. In practice, the provision never materialized. According to these facts, by the Constitution, the Armed Forces have a

¹⁹⁷ BSPP, *Soshallit Thamada Myanmar Naing-ngan-taw Phwe-si-pone A-chay-cha-aupada 1974* (*The Constitution of the Union of Burma 1974*) (Printing & Publishing Corporation, 1973).

subordinated role to Parliament, Council of State, and Ministries, even at the local level.

4.4 Revolutionary Council's and Burma Socialist Programme

Party's Power and Human Resources

Though the RC had tried to establish the BSPP as an autonomous institution and subjective civilian control, Tatmadaw, in practice, was a human resources base of BSPP. The party-state building was extremely dependent on the active and retired military officers. After starting a military coup on March 2, 1962, the Revolutionary Council (RC) was formed led by General Ne Win. All 17 members were military officers, as shown in Table 4.1.¹⁹⁸ No doubt that RC and government were led by military officers along the period of BSPP-building. Party members were recruited from both civilian and military sectors in approximately 3:1, as discussed above. It also designated military officers in critical posts in bureaucracy, economic corporations, and administrative bodies.¹⁹⁹

Table 4.1 The Revolutionary Council

NO.	POST	RANK AND NAME	POST IN THE MILITARY
1	Chairman	General Ne Win	Chief of Staff
2	Member	Brigadier-General Aung Gyi	Vice Chief of Staff (Army)
3	Member	Brigadier General Than Pe	Vice Chief of Staff (Navy)
4	Member	Brigadier General T. Criff	Vice Chief of Staff (Air Force)
5	Member	Brigadier General Tin Pe	Quartermaster General
6	Member	Brigadier General San Yu	Commander of Northwest Military Command
7	Member	Brigadier General Sein Win	Commander of Central Military Command

¹⁹⁸ U Mya Han et al., *Myama-Naing-ngan-yae Sanit-Pyaung-karla 1962-1974 (The Period of Changing System in the Myanmar Politics 1962-1974)*, vol. I (Yangon: Tatkathomyar Press, 1993), 3–4.

¹⁹⁹ Han et al., I:21.

8	Member	Colonel Thaung Kyi	Commander of Southeast Military Command
9	Member	Colonel Kyi Maung	Commander of Southwest Military Command
10	Member	Colonel Maung Shwe	Commander of Eastern Military Command
11	Member	Colonel Than Sein	Colonel-General Staff
12	Member	Colonel Kyaw Soe	Military Appointment Secretary
13	Member	Colonel Saw Myint	The administrator of Border Regions
14	Member	Colonel Chit Myaing	Vice-Quartermaster General
15	Member	Colonel Khin Nyo	Director of Military Training
16	Member	Colonel Hla Han	Director of Medical Services
17	Member	Colonel Than Yu Saing	Vice-Commissioner of Police Forces

Yoshihiro Nakanishi also analyzed the human resources of the BSPP by examining the profiles of the candidates of the Party Central Committee (PCC).²⁰⁰ For the BSPP's first CC, 31 out of 43 candidates from Party Headquarters were in-service military officers from the ranks of Colonel to Captain. Only 12 candidates were civilian members. They were the assistant bureau chiefs, directors, deputy directors, section chiefs, and subsection chiefs of Party Central Organizing Committee, Peasants Affairs Bureau, Education Affairs Bureau, and Administrative Affairs Bureau in the party headquarters. Military personnel positions could move and transferred between the Tatmadaw and the BSPP. They could also enjoy party positions after retirement from the Tatmadaw. The important courses that were offered by CIPS from 1963 to 1971 included the Special Cadre Course, the training course for Deputy Chairman, Secretary-General, Division Inspection Cadre, Cadre Retraining, and High-level training course were exclusive for military personnel only, though 1,156 Out of 29,141 trainees were military personnel, as shown in table 4.2.²⁰¹ Although there were no

²⁰⁰ Nakanishi, *Strong Soldiers, Failed Revolution*, 105–41.

²⁰¹ Nakanishi, 110.

Table 4.2 Courses and Trainees of the Central Institute of Political Science (1963-1971)

NO	COURSES	NUMBER OF CLASS	CIVILIAN	MILITARY	TOT AL
1	Special Cadre Course	1	-	24	24
2	Deputy Chairman, Secretary General	1	-	21	21
3	Division Inspection Cadre	1	-	117	117
4	Division Inspection Cadre Retraining	1	-	41	41
5	Higher Course	1	16	4	20
6	Instructor Course	6	157	70	227
7	Party Organization Course	7	408	189	597
8	Basic Political Science Course	23	3,111	445	3556
9	Party Organization and Administration Reeducation Course	6	315	181	496
10	Basic Political Science and Administration Course	8	821	26	847
11	Party Organization/Basic Military Training Course	3	237	-	237
12	Ethnic Minority Cadre Course	3	95	-	95
13	Worker Affairs Course	30	11,163	-	11,163
14	Peasant Affairs Course	18	7,096	-	7,096
15	People's Peasants' Council Organization Course	1	115	-	115
16	People's Workers' Council Organization Course	2	181	38	219
17	Agricultural Mechanization Assistant Course	1	41	-	41

18	People's Workers' Council Administration Course	13	1,381	-	1,381
19	People's Peasants' Council Course	6	439	-	439
20	Township People's Peasants' Council Activity Course	3	558	-	558
21	People's Affair Course	2	100	-	100
22	Party Office Officers Administration Course	19	1,751	-	1,751
	Total	156	27,985	1,156	29,141

military personnel trainees in the Party Office Officers Administration Courses, military personnel dominated the Party Headquarter and regional and local offices, as discussed above. Table 4.3 also shows the evidence of military domination of leading positions in the Local Party Organizations.²⁰² There were no civilian candidates from Regional Supervision Committee, while only one civilian candidate of Division Supervision from office manager position. It takes roughly equal members of civilian and military candidates from the leading positions of Party Units and Party Class. Therefore, overall military personnel also dominated the local party organizations. No doubt that Tatmadaw was the backbone of the BSPP building.

Table 4.3 The First Central Committee Member Candidates in the Local Party Organizations

PARTY ORGANIZATION	POST	RANK	NUMBER
REGIONAL SUPERVISION COMMITTEE	Chairman	Colonel (Army)	5
	Deputy Chairman	Lieutenant Colonel (Army)	10
		Lieutenant Colonel (Navy)	2

²⁰² Nakanishi, 111.

		Major (Army)	1
DIVISION SUPERVISION COMMITTEE	Chief Secretary	Major (Army)	4
		Major (Navy)	2
		Major (Air Force)	1
		Captain (Army)	4
	Office Manager	Captain (Army)	1
		Civilian	1
PARTY UNIT	Chairman	Major (Army)	1
		Major (Air Force)	1
		Captain (Army)	57
		Lieutenant (Army)	1
		Civilian	58
	Chief Secretary	Captain (Army)	1
		Civilian	15
	Executive Committee Member	Civilian	5
PARTY CLASS	Leader	Colonel (Army)	1
		Civilian	2
	Deputy-Leader	Civilian	1
PARTY CELL	Chief Secretary	Civilian	3
TOTAL			177

General Ne Win had stopped the appointment of active regional commanders to the RC in 1969. Started from the First Party Congress in 1971, BSPP's Central Executive Committee became a supreme decision-making body of the state. In the first CEC members, only one out of fifteen CEC members was a civilian member, Ba Nyein, Cooperative Deputy Minister. Most of them doubled as RC members. On 20

April 1972, many officers retired from the Tatmadaw, including General Ne Win, and only four out of fifteen members were active military officers. From the first to sixth CEC in 1985. All members were retired and active military officers.²⁰³ One point to be noticed is that Party CEC members were elected from among the Party Central Committee members approved by the Party Congress held once every four years. By analyzing the composition of representatives who ran for the Central Committee and won seats, one could see the composition of civilian and military members, as shown in table 4.4.²⁰⁴

Table 4.4 The Candidates of the First BSPP Central Committee Election

<i>Party Organizations</i>	<i>Nominated</i>		<i>CC Members</i>		<i>CC Candidates</i>		<i>Not Selected</i>	
	<i>Civilian</i>	<i>Military</i>	<i>Civilian</i>	<i>Military</i>	<i>Civilian</i>	<i>Military</i>	<i>Civilian</i>	<i>Military</i>
<i>Party Divisional Committee Representatives (Region No.1 to No. 15)</i>	85	65	14	7	21	9	50	49
<i>Party HQ Representatives (HQ Party Units, CIPS, and COC)</i>	21	79	17	72	4	6	-	1
<i>Tatmadaw Party Conference Representatives</i>	-	50	-	40	-	10	-	-
<i>Total</i>	106	194	31	119	25	25	50	50
	300		150		50		100	

²⁰³ Nakanishi, 114,132,138-140.

²⁰⁴ Nakanishi, 122.

4.5 Conclusion

General Ne Win's revolution that started from 1962 failed, and the structure of CMR collapsed by September 1988 national-wide uprising, after about 26 years. In fact, the development of "Burmese Way to Socialism" was the reemergence of Marxist-Leninist ideology in another legitimate way based on Buddhism and Socialism in Myanmar society. There were political and personal disintegrations between communists and the state even before regaining independence. Cold War led Myanmar's foreign policy not to take one-side. Hence, Myanmar never used Marxism/Leninism explicitly as a state or national ideology, but in practice.

Moreover, the 1962 military coup also related to international politics. At that time, brisk outbursts of the military revolution took place, especially in developing countries. While some were in Lebanon, Portugal, Turkey, and Venezuela, unsuccessful, some were, in Myanmar, Argentina, and Syria, successful. In the preceding year, successful coups occurred in El Salvador, South Korea, and Ecuador, and military interventions were observed in Algeria, Brazil, and Ecuador.²⁰⁵ Myanmar was not an exclusive example of military intervention in politics. Tatmadaw conducted the socialist revolution in the revolutionary sense. Revolutionary Council and Burma Socialist Programme Party established a Marxist/Leninist type of subjective civilian control even without the designation of political commissars. After the 1974 constitution was active, the Tatmadaw institutionally had no evidence of self-projection as a 'guardian of Myanmar nation-state.' Its institutional role projection is as a People's Army. The military's human resources' dominance in the revolution is another matter to highlight in this era.

No doubt, Cold War not only shaped world politics but effected Myanmar politics as well. But in Myanmar's case, the implication of the Cold War is more significant in the security context of Naing-ngan-taw Warda(s). China's assistance to the communist insurgency is an outstanding example in the stage of "Burmese Way to Socialism" because Myanmar socialist-state politically and militarily was against communism. Inward-looking and far-reaching centralized socialist economy have

²⁰⁵ Finer, *The Man on Horseback*, 1–5.

been significant forces in shaping the political and economic character of Myanmar during these periods. Myanmar tried to stand in world politics by handling theories of neutralism and non-alignment since regaining Independence.

By the analysis of this chapter, theoretically, though General Ne Win tried to establish the BSPP as a power center of the state, this party-state building was highly dependent on the Tatmadaw, in practice. Lack of designation party control mechanism in the Tatmadaw led to the BSPP's dependence on the Tatmadaw's power and human resources. This was also the result of fear in Tatmadaw's leadership psyche by the experience of Tatmadaw's disunity into pieces after regaining Independence because of the designation of the political officers in the Tatmadaw at the time of the Japanese resistance movement. Even though there was a conceptualization of BSPP that makes the theoretical difference between communism and the Burmese Way to Socialism had been made, the Tatmadaw-led revolution nurtured a one-party state in line with Marxist/Leninist ideology in practice. Retired and in-service military officers had become head and leading human-resources of the BSPP. But there was no doubt that Tatmadaw, by-laws, institutionally had subordinated to the BSPP's leadership by the CMR structure shaped by the development of Naing-ngan-taw Warda. The theoretical specifications had differed from empirical verification in Myanmar.

CHAPTER V

OUR THREE NATIONAL CAUSES, POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION, THE STRUCTURE OF CIVIL- MILITARY RELATIONS, AND THE TATMADAW

5.1 Background

After 26 years of experiencing Burmese Way to Socialism, Myanmar was faced with an economic recession followed by a nationwide uprising in September 1988. Mismanagements, far-reaching centralized economic policy, and the party's cadre system that led to a parting between BSPP and the public were the reasons for the collapse of the Burmese Way to Socialism. The Tatmadaw regained control of state power on September 18, 1988, and the State Law and Order Restoration Council advanced the fourth stage of Naing-ngan-taw Warda, "Our Three National Causes" (ဒို့တာဝန်အရေးသုံးပါး). Initially, the Tatmadaw described these three causes as the Tatmadaw's primary duties. A day before maintaining state power, the Tatmadaw described these causes in the Office of the Commander in Chief of Armed Forces (Army)'s order titled "Serving the primary duties of all Armed Forces members (Army, Navy, Air Force)," which was distributed to all its regional and divisional commands including navy and air force on September 17, 1988.²⁰⁶ The second passage states that "As all our in-services members of Armed Forces (Army, Navy, Air Force) [Tatmadaw] already resigned from the memberships of Burma Socialist Programme Party, we shall serve the following our primary duties: (1) Being steadfast of the Union, (2) Uniting of ethnicities, (3) Perpetuation of national sovereignty."²⁰⁷

²⁰⁶ DSMHRI, "The Order of Commander-in-Chief of Armed Forces (Army), No.152/6/U-1," September 17, 1998, DR(M)00018, Defence Services Museum and Historical Research Institute.

²⁰⁷ (က)ပြည်ထောင်စုတည်တံ့ခိုင်မြဲရေး။ (ခ) တိုင်းရင်းသားစည်းလုံးညီညွတ်ရေး။ (ဂ) အချုပ်အခြာအာဏာတည်တံ့ ခိုင်မြဲရေး။ The usage of verbs and construction of sentences in the literal sense of Burmese slightly differs from "Our Three National Causes" except the third one, but the essence is the same.

5.2 The Fourth Stage of Naing-ngan-taw Warda Development and Political Socialization

In 1989, a day before the “Tatmadaw Day” on March 27, the author *Myoe Htut* first wrote the structure and grammar of the same sentence in the literal sense of Burmese with the Our Three National Causes ideology²⁰⁸ in an article “The Honorary Day of Myanmar” (မြန်မာ့ဂုဏ်ထူးဆောင်နေ့).²⁰⁹ He stated that “...starting from the formation of the Tatmadaw in the anti-fascist revolution, it served the duty of national security and defense. Simultaneously, the Tatmadaw also never lost sight of three main duties—non-disintegration of the Union, non-disintegration of national solidarity, the perpetuation of national sovereignty—for serving the interests of the people by uniting the Tatmadaw and the strength of the people.” This means that these three causes are the Tatmadaw’s additional primary duties for serving the interests of the people in addition to its spontaneous commitment to national defense and security. This article shows the start of the guardian spirit role of the Tatmadaw, but it has not yet become a Naing-ngan-taw Warda. At the 44th anniversary of Tatmadaw Day, the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces General Saw Maung gave a speech that contained no points of contradiction with Myoe Htut’s article.²¹⁰

The next sign of development appears in the formal message of the Chair of SLORC General Saw Maung to the ceremony marking the 42nd anniversary of Independence Day on January 4, 1990. He stated, “The most important need to serve this duty [defending Independence and sovereignty] is to organize and unite the internal strength. For Myanmar that is a country organized with multi-ethnic groups, the unity of these groups, the non-disintegration of Union, and defending the national

²⁰⁸ (1) Non-disintegration of the Union; (2) Non-disintegration of national solidarity; (3) Perpetuation of national sovereignty [(က) ပြည်ထောင်စုမပြိုကွဲရေး၊ (ခ) တိုင်းရင်းသားစည်းလုံးညီညွတ်မှုမပြိုကွဲရေး၊ (ဂ) အချုပ်အခြာအာဏာတည် တံ့ခိုင်မြဲရေး။]

²⁰⁹ Myoe Htut, “The Honorary Day of Myanmar,” *The Working People’s Daily*, March 26, 1989, 12.

²¹⁰ He pointed out that these three causes are at the first priority before the Tatmadaw’s spontaneous duty of national defense and security. “The Speech of Commander-in-Chief of Armed Forces General Saw Maung to Armed Forces Day,” *The Working People’s Daily*, March 27, 1989, 1,6-7.

sovereignty at all costs are the main ‘National Political Duties.’ . . .”²¹¹ Two months later on Tatmadaw Day, the cover of the Working People’s Daily Newspaper expressed Our Three National Causes in bold upper-case letters a congratulatory sentence for Tatmadaw Day. Moreover, these were the priority in the five objectives of the 45th Tatmadaw Day. Subsequently, the Commander-in-Chief, General Saw Maung, gave a long speech with a detailed explanation of the nation’s political and security affairs, ending with the argument that “we must keep in mind our three national causes and cooperate with the people.”²¹² Therefore, 1990 is the year these three causes were elevated from being just an additional duty of the Tatmadaw to the national level.

Our Three National Causes became the SLORC’s policy in 1991. In a formal message at the 43rd anniversary of Independence Day, in 1991, SLORC’s chair, Senior General Saw Maung stated that these three causes are not only a national duty but the first government policy out of three.²¹³ The 1992 formal message of Independence Day was not different from the previous year, and they became the first objectives out of four for the 45th anniversary of Union Day. The message stated that “all ethnic nationalities should always primarily and completely focus on Our Three National Causes” (ဒို့တာဝန်အရေးသုံးပါးကို တိုင်းရင်းသားအားလုံးက အမြဲဦးထိပ်ထားဆောင်ရွက် ရေး)။²¹⁴ The message was that these causes must be kept as the most critical ideology and royal duty of the people. Senior General Saw Maung, also stated in his formal message on Union Day that “... all of the people in the Unions must preserve Our Three National Causes, our beloved motherland to stand proudly and grandly in the

²¹¹ “The Formal Message of the Chair of SLORC General Saw Maung to the Ceremony of the 42nd Anniversary of Independence Day,” *The Working People’s Daily*, January 4, 1989, 1.

²¹² DSMHRI, “The Armed Forces Day Speeches” (Defence Services Museum and Historical Research Institute, n.d.), DR 8572, Defence Services Museum and Historical Research Institute.

²¹³ “The Formal Message of SLORC’s Chair, Senior General Saw Maung, to the 43rd Anniversary of Independence Day,” *The Working People’s Daily*, January 4, 1991, 1.

²¹⁴ “The Objectives of the 45th anniversary of Union Day,” *The Working People’s Daily*, February 4, 1992, 2.

world.”²¹⁵ This development was a clear sign of OTNC becoming to the state or national level.

Though SLORC interchangeably used the terminology of national duty, national belief or conviction, and national objective in the following years, the precise usage of the language of “Naing-ngan-taw Warda” was described in 1995, in the formal message of Senior General Than Shwe on the Union Day. He stated that “State Law and Order Restoration Council has introduced and implemented the Our Three National Causes as a Naing-ngan-taw Warda that must be kept forever,” and then he defined in detail the three causes as:

“Non-disintegration of the Union aims or directs to form the Union structurally and quintessentially under the eternal principles of justice, liberty, and equality. Non-disintegration of national solidarity means that the Union must establish the unity, respect, and cooperation of all ethnic groups fully. The perpetuation of national sovereignty is the most important duty of all our people as our life [survival].”²¹⁶

Notably, the Tatmadaw never officially released the exact date of defining OTNC as a Naing-ngan-taw Warda. Therefore, the evidence clearly shows that OTNC is a paternalistic ideology based on national defense and security primarily derived from the primary duty of the Tatmadaw.

During the time of the military regime, there was no doubt that the military regime controlled all of the state media apparatuses. OTNC was frequently highlighted in bold letters on the cover of daily newspapers, in broadcasting, in military leaders’ speeches and formal messages, and the Union’s important days’ objectives, such as the Independence Day, the Union Day, the Tatmadaw Day, and so on. Moreover, it was found on the wall in the government’s office, at ward and village offices, and at universities, colleges, and schools. Red signboards with OTNC written on them stood on the conspicuous corner in cities. For inward ideological orientation, both for

²¹⁵ “The Formal Message of SLORC’s Chair, Senior General Saw Maung, to the Union Day,” *The Working People’s Daily*, February 12, 1992, 3.

²¹⁶ “The Formal Message of Senior General Than Shwe to the Union Day,” *The Working People’s Daily*, February 12, 1995, sec. Special Section (1).

officers and for other ranks, the Tatmadaw established Combat-Related Organizational Activity Training Centers (CROATC) (တိုက်ပွဲဝင်စည်းရုံးရေးသင်တန်းကျောင်း) in the early 1990s. This was the leading institution for ideology and political orientation. These schools teach subjects such as “The Belief in line with National Politics” (အမျိုးသားနိုင်ငံရေးနှင့်ယှဉ်သော ယုံကြည်ချက်ခံယူချက်) which emphasizes the ideology and political stance of the Tatmadaw based on OTNC.

Furthermore, the Tatmadaw established the Defence Services (Army) Combat Forces School (DSCFS) in 1955, Defence Services Administration School (DSAS) in 1964, National Defence College (NDC) in early 1955, and Burma Army Staff College (BASC) in 1948 (later renamed as the Command and General Staff College). Though nowadays, these schools mainly focus on training and education in military science, they are also related to Naing-ngan-taw Warda socialization, because training includes subjects, such as “The Subject in order to Have a High Belief in Our Three National Causes” (ဒို့တာဝန်အရေးသုံးပါး ယုံကြည်ချက်၊ ခံယူချက် မြင့်မားစေရေးဘာသာရပ်). As a macro-level training college, the National Defence College, not only provides military personnel but civil servants too. Subjects offered include some related to ideology, socioeconomic programs, and military doctrine.²¹⁷ To some extent, this college is similar to the Central Institute of Political Science during the Revolutionary Council and the Burma Socialist Programme Party regime.

Though there are many socialization agendas, the role of the University for the Development of the National Races of the Union (UDNR) is prominent. The Academy for Development of National Groups (ADNG) was established in Sagaing on October 20, 1964. Initially, it aimed to nurture national youths to become highly qualified educational personnel dedicated to socio-economic development and the solidarity of the national races. In 1991, SLORC upgraded it to the University level. From that time, OTNC is out of six aims of the University— “to keep alive and promote the spirit of desiring to preserve the causes of non-disintegration of the Union, non-disintegration

²¹⁷ Myoe, *Building the Tatmadaw*, 352:61.

of national solidarity and ensuring the perpetuity of the sovereignty of the State.”²¹⁸ The University has nurtured 13128 teachers, including those pursuing Master degrees, as of today.²¹⁹ Additionally, the two Central Institute of Civil Services (CICS) also teach OTNC in the subject of political science, emphasizing the administrative capacity of civil-servants.

SLORC and SPDC also established or allowed the organization of hundreds of non-governmental organizations in line with the three causes, such as the Myanmar War Veterans Organization (MWVO), Myanmar Medical Association (MMA), Myanmar Maternal and Child Welfare Association (MMCWA). Among them, the Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA) (ပြည်ထောင်စုကြံ့ခိုင်ရေးနှင့် ဖွံ့ဖြိုးရေးအသင်း), was prominent. Founded on September 15, 1991, it is now widely known as Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP). The objectives of the USDA were mainly based on Our Three National Causes.²²⁰ Senior General Than Shwe said in 1994 that the USDA’s goal leads the national program and its direction, for all people, in line with Our Three National Causes that require never losing sight, they are the truth for Myanmar and are not controversial.²²¹ Though to some extent, the association was the same as the idea of the National Solidarity Organization during

²¹⁸ See SLORC’s “The University for the Development of the National Races of the Union Law,” May 10, 1991. The aims of the University are as follows: (a) to strengthen the Union spirit in the national races of the Union while residing in a friendly atmosphere and pursuing education at the University; (b) to preserve and understand the culture and good custom and traditions of the national races of the Union; (c) to promote the spirit of desiring to serve in order to raise the standard of living of the national races of the Union; (d) to raise the quality of leadership and efficiency in carrying out the development of the national races of the Union; (e) to infuse the spirit of desiring to carry out works of research with a view to the success of the measures for the development of the national races of the Union; (f) to produce good educational personnel who are free from party politics and who are of good moral character; (g) to keep alive and promote the spirit of desiring to preserve the causes of non-disintegration of the Union, non-disintegration of national solidarity and ensuring the perpetuity of the sovereignty of the state.

²¹⁹ “The President Win Myint’s Speech at the University for the Development of the National Races of the Union,” *The Mirror Daily*, September 27, 2018.

²²⁰ Non-disintegration of the Union; Non-disintegration of national solidarity; Perpetuation of national sovereignty; Dynamism of Patriotic Spirit with a view to promoting national prestige and integrity; Development of the nation and emergence of a peaceful and modern state.

²²¹ Senior General Than Shwe’s speech at the Special Meeting of USDA on September 15, 1994, and his speech at the opening ceremony of The Course of Administration for USDA’s Executives (4/94) on November 7, 1994. See *Excerpts from SLORC’s chair Senior General Than Shwe’s Instructions and Speeches (1992-1995)* (State Law and Order Restoration Council Office, Photolitho Press, n.d.).

the Caretaker Government era, and the USDA was a more institutionalized organization that did not infringe on law enforcement and daily civil administration but focused on social development agendas.

Since 1992, the Tatmadaw cautiously prepared to craft the future state-building structure in line with OTNC. The objectives and duties of the Commission of Holding the National Conference were to exercise close supervision in the discussion of the constitution (later it will be the 2008 constitution).²²² On January 9, 1993, the commission held the National Conference. Therefore, the objectives of the commission became a foundation of the contemporary Union's consistent goals promulgated in the 2008 constitution.²²³ Though the discussion related to the case of national politics had happened in the 1950s Commanding Officers' conference, the very first explanation to the public about the Tatmadaw's national political role occurred in the speech of General Myo Nyunt, the Chair of the Commission for Holding the National Conference, on January 9, 1993.²²⁴ An analyzing the address reveals that he gave two main reasons for Tatmadaw's national political role in the future. The first pointed to the Tatmadaw's fulfillment of its responsibility from the revolutionary era until now and its experiences and lessons in this process. Second, he pointed out the difference between party politics and national politics. Party politics appeal to voters in an attempt to get their support by presenting the party's policies and methods. National politics defend or remove threats to the national interest, and crafts the situation in favor of it. So, the latter is not the duty of one party only, but of all the institutions.

²²² Organizing the Holding Committee of National Conference, article no. 4 (b). (1). non-disintegration of the Union, (2). non-disintegration of National Solidarity, (3). Perpetuation of Sovereignty, (4). flourishing of a genuine multiparty democratic system (it did not include the word "discipline," like the union's consistent objectives written in the 2008 constitution), (5). flourishing the eternal principles of Justice, Liberty and Equality, (6). enabling the Defence Services to be able to participate in the National political leadership role of the state. See "The Order of State Law and Order Restoration Council (13/92)," October 3, 1992.

²²³ Ministry of Information, *Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar (2008)* (Printing & Publishing Department, Ministry of Information, 2017), Chapter I, Article 6.

²²⁴ "Records of the Holding National Conference (June 21, 1992, to April 1, 1993), Vol 1," n.d., National Library (Nay Pyi Taw).

In his speech concerned with the basic principles of the constitution at the conference on June 7, 1993, General Myo Nyunt also stated that the six objectives of the National Conference constituted the main ideology and the basic principles of the nation.²²⁵ Actually, he suggested a structure of civil-military relations based on the concept of responsibility sharing in future nation-state building by defining the Tatmadaw's leadership role in national politics. The constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar (2008) prescribed the fourth stage of Naing-ngan-taw Warda development. SPDC announced it by the proclamation No. 7/2008 on May 29, 2008, after a nationwide referendum with 92.48 percent voting "yes" (although the legitimacy of this referendum and the result were questionable because it was conducted under strict military rule). It went into effect throughout the Union, starting with the first session of the *Pyidaungsu Hluttaw* (House of the Union) had convened on January 31, 2011.

In the fourth Naing-ngan-taw Warda development, democracy is not new. That term was used both in a parliamentary system and a one-party state. Additionally, this development was detached from any "-ism" and focused on the national interest and democratic principles based on Our Three National Causes. The institutions that were the most important for ideology orientation and socialization discussed above are still active in Myanmar. The fourth stage of ideology development—OTNC—was a gradual process for Tatmadaw's ideology from its primary duties to Naing-ngan-taw Warda. This ideology does not highlight or stress on the "-ism" but mainly focuses on national security and its national political role. The simplicity of Our Three National Causes based on the essentials of building a nation-state provides the most robust legitimacy of it, and that socializes it into the masses. The Tatmadaw led the nation for over twenty years by following these three causes.

5.3 The Current Structure of Civil-Military Relations

Based on this Naing-ngan-taw Warda development, the 2008 constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar guarantees the essential characteristics of

²²⁵ "Records of the Holding National Conference (June 7, 1993, to September 16, 1993), Vol. 2," n.d., National Library (Nay Pyi Taw).

“collective democratic control” of armed forces. According to the constitution, Myanmar is a “genuine, disciplined multi-party democratic system.” Voters have the sovereign right to elect representatives to the executive and legislative branches, while the President is elected by the Presidential Electoral College. The primary institution for the exercise of “collective democratic control” of the armed forces is the National Defense and Security Council (NDSC), which is comprised of eleven members.²²⁶ Six of the eleven NDSC members come from military backgrounds, and one of the two Vice-Presidents is nominated by the Tatmadaw Electoral College. The commander-in-chief nominates the three cabinet ministers of Defence, Home Affairs, and Border Affairs.

Many observers assume that the military members of the NDSC have an edge over the five civilian members when voting occurs within the institution.²²⁷ In practice, however, the NDSC is not an institution where voting takes place. According to article 201, the President of the country is the leader of the National Defense and Security Council, and he makes all final decisions.²²⁸ In fact, according to Articles 16 and 58 of the Constitution, the President is both the head of the Union and the head of the executive branch. The President is supreme not only in the NDSC but in all cases, despite there being a check on his responsibilities and authorities. In an interview with Kyodo News Agency on August 20, 2015, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing said, “[W]e submit the proposals [regarding the Tatmadaw] for the sake of the country, and it is up to the parliament and the government to accept them or not. It is typically seen in democratic systems. But we are responsible for submitting proposals.”²²⁹ The words

²²⁶ The eleven members are as follows: (1) President, (2) Vice President (first), (3) Vice President (second), (4) Speaker of the Pyithu Hluttaw, (5) Speaker of the Amyotha Hluttaw, (6) Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Services, (7) Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Services, (8) Minister of Defence, (9) Minister of Foreign Affairs, (10) Minister of Home Affairs, (11) Minister for Border Affairs.

²²⁷ Ei Ei Toe Lwin and Lun Min Maung, “Managing the Defence and Security Council | The Myanmar Times,” March 28, 2016, <https://www.mmtimes.com/national-news/19670-managing-the-defence-and-security-council.html>.

²²⁸ In the constitution, it states, “The National Defence and Security Council led by the President, to enable it to discharge the duties assigned by the Constitution or any law, shall be formed with the following persons . . .”

²²⁹ Myawady Daily Newspaper, “Commander-in-Chief of Defence Services Senior General Min Aung Hlaing’s interview with Kyodo News Agency,” *Myawady Daily Newspaper*, August 27, 2015, sec. Interview.

of General Min Aung Hlaing above are a clear sign of the Tatmadaw's perception that it is not a decision-making institution. Instead, the Tatmadaw must follow the government's decisions. The former Speaker of the House of Nationalities (2011-2016), Major General Khin Aung Myint's (retired), a confidant of Senior General Than Shwe and someone who was instrumental in drafting the 2008 constitution, also gave an interview to the *Myanmar Than-Daw-Sint* (the Myanmar Herald), revealing that, while the commander-in-chief is the supreme commander of the armed forces, he must follow the president's orders since the Tatmadaw is responsible to the government and since voting does not take place in the National Defence and Security Council. In short, the President is key, and the NDSC is under his leadership.²³⁰

A good example of the President's final decision-making power in the NDSC and in national security policy occurred during President Thein Sein's government when, in 2012 and 2013, armed conflicts between the Tatmadaw and Kachin Independence Army's (KIA) were intense. At that time, rumors spread on social media that the Tatmadaw was going to seize the Kachin Independence Organization/Kachin Independence Army's headquarters located at Laiza. However, the President's office announced on Radio Free Asia that there was no plan to seize Laiza.²³¹ Due to the decision of the President and NDSC, the Tatmadaw stopped the operation, and even ground forces that had come close to Laiza and were ready to seize it were stopped.²³² This incident is a good example of "collective democratic control" in Myanmar.

Contrary to this situation, no official meeting of the National Defense Security Council (NDSC) has taken place since the coming to power of the NLD government.

²³⁰ This interview took place after U Khin Aung Myint's meeting with Senior General Than Shwe (retired). This kind of information also released after the Senior General Than Shwe's (retired) meeting with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi by initiation of Nay Shwe Thwe Aung (or) Phoe La Pyae, the grandson of U Than Shwe. See *Than-Daw-Sint Weekly Journal*, "နိုင်ငံတော်ကြီးရဲ့တာဝန် ခင်ဗျားခေါင်းပေါ်ရောက်ပြီဟု ဒေါ်အောင်ဆန်းစုကြည်ကို ဗိုလ်ချုပ်မှူးကြီး(ငြိမ်း)သန်းရွှေပြောခဲ့ [Senior General Than Shwe (Retired) Said Daw Aung San Suu Kyi That Now All Duties of the State Are on Your Head]." *Than-Daw-Sint Weekly Journal* 6, No.24 (September 2, 2017): 2-39.

²³¹ RFA, "လိုင်ဇာမြို့ကို သိမ်းဖို့ အစီအစဉ်မရှိ ဟု မြန်မာအစိုးရ အရာရှိပြောကြား [A government official said there is no plan to seize Liza]," Radio Free Asia, January 2, 2013, <https://www.rfa.org/burmese/news/kachin-laiza-01022013113319.html>.

²³² The interviewees prefer to remain anonymous. This information has come from the unrecorded speech of the incumbent military leadership, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing to the trainees (military officers) in Defence Services (Army) Combat Forces School (DSCFS) at Bahtoo, in March 2013.

Indeed, even though the Tatmadaw has frequently cited a need to call an NDSC meeting amidst an uneasy security environment,²³³ only the government or President has the right to call such a meeting. Thus, the essence of the structure of civil-military relations and the spirit of the NDSC encourage a collective decision-making process that is led by the President. This encourages the cooperative and collective approach discussed above, rather than the dichotomous, or confrontational, approach. Moreover, it is important to note that the President has the explicit power of influence and authority over the armed forces through the NDSC's policymaking process, not through intervention into the armed forces' day-to-day administration and operations. At the same time, the Tatmadaw also has political space for decision-making within this process. In short, this collective sense of decision-making is much different from the confrontational approach that would exist if one could prevail over another.

There exists, however, an ambiguity in the power-sharing relationship, which is related to Article 20 (c) and 338. The commander-in-chief serves as the supreme commander of all the armed forces. However, the extent of that authority is unclear. Although the commander-in-chief nominates the three cabinet ministers whose ministries are directly related to security, the President must assign each to his post. Hence, according to Article 232 (h) of the Constitution, they are responsible to the President, and not to the commander-in-chief. Thus, the President has direct authority over these ministries and their policymaking, and, in practice, the commander-in-chief does not have the legal standing or a bureaucratic mechanism by which to assert direct command and control over the day-to-day activities of the three ministries. What is more, no evidence exists that the commander-in-chief personally or the Tatmadaw institutionally interferes in the responsibilities and day-to-day affairs of these three ministries, including the police and intelligence forces.

²³³ Soe Min Htike and Aung Min Thein, “နိုင်ငံအတွင်းဖြစ်ပေါ်နေသည့် လုံခြုံရေးနှင့် ငြိမ်းချမ်းရေးအခြေအနေများ၊ ဖွဲ့စည်းပုံအခြေခံဥပဒေ ပြင်ဆင်ရေးကိစ္စများနှင့် ပတ်သက်၍ ညှိညှိနှိုင်းနှိုင်း တိုင်တိုင်ပင်ပင် ဆောင်ရွက်ရေး ကာလခေါ်ရန်လိုအပ်ဟု တပ်မတော်သတင်းမှန် ပြန်ကြားရေးအဖွဲ့ ဒုတိယဥက္ကဋ္ဌ ပြောကြား [The vice-president of Tatmadaw Righteous News Agency revealed that it requires to call NDSC meeting to discuss collectively the issues related to security and peace and amending the constitution],” Eleven Media Group Co., Ltd, October 1, 2019, <https://news-eleven.com/article/137678>.

In fact, according to Article 342 of the constitution and Union Government Law,²³⁴ the commander-in-chief must be appointed by the President with the approval of the National Defense and Security Council. When the incumbent military leader, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, reached the retirement age 60 in July of 2016, he extended his service using the 1973 War Office Council's Instruction (18/73), which demanded that all commissioned officers continue their military service for as long as the Tatmadaw required. However, this Instruction was revised in 2014 by the War Office Council Order (4/2014), which capped the term of service for commanders-in-chief and deputy commanders-in-chief at age 65.²³⁵ Interestingly, the military leadership itself placed a limit on the unlimited retirement age. However, an alternative interpretation of this also exists: Senior General Min Aung Hlaing extended his term of service before the National League for Democracy government came to power in March 2016, thereby avoiding an appointment of a new commander-in-chief by the incoming NLD government.

In addition to such institutional factors, historical variables and ongoing armed conflicts must also be taken into account. First is the prolonged armed conflict that Myanmar has experienced since even before its independence. Even today, many Ethnic Armed Organizations exist in Myanmar. Some are under the control of the Tatmadaw, like the Border Guard Forces (BGF).²³⁶ Others are not under the Tatmadaw's control but have signed the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement. Still, others

²³⁴ မြန်မာ့ဥပဒေသတင်းအချက်အလက်စနစ် [The System of Myanmar Law and Information], "The Union Government Law," October 21, 2010, <https://www.mlis.gov.mm/mLsView.do?lawordSn=1459>.

²³⁵ On May 13, 2016, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing answered the press council and media that "by this law [18/73], it is likely there is no limitation for the age of retirement, so it amended the law to limit the retirement age is 65." See BBC, "ကာချုပ် အငြိမ်းစားမယူသေး [The C-in-C has not yet retired]," BBC News Myanmar, May 13, 2016, https://www.bbc.com/burmese/burma/2016/05/160513_minaunghlaing; See detail this information in Maung Aung Myoe et al., "Partnership in Politics: The Tatmadaw and the NLD in Myanmar since 2016," in *Presentation to the 2017 Myanmar Update Conference, Australian National University*, vol. 17, 2017, 268.

²³⁶ In 2009, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) launched the Border Guard Force (BGF) program with ceasefire groups. While some groups refused this program, such as United Wa State Army (UWSA), Kachin Independence Organization (KIO), New Mon State Party (NMSP), some accepted such as most of the forces from Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA), National Democratic Army – Kachin (NDA-K), Kachin Defence Army (KDA), Palaung State Liberation Front (PSLF), some forces from Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), Karenin National People's Liberation Front (KNPLF) and the Lahu Democratic Front (LDF).

have not signed that agreement²³⁷ and are engaging in intense fighting with the Tatmadaw.²³⁸ In addition to this were the clashes that nearly occurred between the Tatmadaw and the military police under the Ministry of Home Affairs led by Bo Min Gaung, which was a significant factor in the 1958 power transfer to the Caretaker Government led by General Ne Win.²³⁹ Therefore, giving supreme power to the commander-in-chief has helped alleviate the conflict between the Tatmadaw and the forces and intelligence units under the authority of the Ministry of Home Affairs. Despite having supreme authority in principle, the commander-in-chief is not to interfere in the day-to-day affairs of the Ministry of Home Affairs.

In Myanmar, no foreign policy contradiction exists between civil and military institutions.²⁴⁰ Myanmar military doctrine, as well as its defense and security policy, must be in line with the country's defensive nature, rather than its offensive nature.²⁴¹ Even in the case of foreign aggression, only the President has the authority to declare war and take appropriate military action in coordination with the NDSC and with the consent of the Union's parliament (Article 213). Another mechanism of control is the power of the purse.²⁴² The commander-in-chief, as well as the Tatmadaw, cannot influence or control the country's budget. This power rests with the national Financial Commission, which vets all national and regional level spending. While the Tatmadaw has some economic means, such as the Union of Myanmar Economic Holdings Limited (UMEHL) and the Myanmar Economic Corporation (MEC), it cannot

²³⁷ "Peace Process Overview » Myanmar Peace Monitor," *Myanmar Peace Monitor* (blog), accessed September 11, 2019, <https://www.mmpeacemonitor.org/peace-process-overview>.

²³⁸ National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDA), Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), Arakan Army (AA), Kachin Independence (KIO) and its armed wing Kachin Independence Army (KIA).

²³⁹ Maung, *Einsaunt Asoeya: Shudaunt Ahot Mha Democracy Ko Santhetchin (Some Aspects of the "Care-Taker Government": An Experiment in Democratic Process)* translated by Sithu Kyaw, 69–71.

²⁴⁰ Article 41 defines the foreign policy of Myanmar to practice independent, active and non-aligned foreign policy aimed at world peace and friendly relations with nations. It upholds the principles of peaceful co-existence among nations. Myanmar will not commence to aggress any nation and no foreign troops will not be permitted to be deployed in the territory of Myanmar by article 42 (a) (b).

²⁴¹ See also "The Republic of the Union of Myanmar Defence White Paper (2015)" (Myanmar Armed Forces, February 2015).

²⁴² In the case of vetting budget of Union and regional level organizations including ministries, by article 229, the President must form the Financial Commission with following members: President (Chairperson), two Vice-Presidents (Vice-Chairpersons), Attorney-General of the Union (member), Auditor-General of the Union (member), Chief Ministers of the Regions and States (members), Nay Pyi Taw Council Chairperson (member), and the Minister of Finance of the Union (secretary).

intervene in the Union's or the regional-level budgets, either in the vetting or in the allocation of funds. Also, as is the case with all ministries, the Tatmadaw's budget request must be submitted through the Ministry of Defence to the government.²⁴³

In short, contrary to conventional wisdom, the National Defense and Security Council (NDSC) is the channel for building trust and cooperation between military and civilian elites. In this transitional stage, civilian political leaders can learn from military expertise, and the military can learn from civilian politicians. However, the NLD government's perception of the NDSC is that it is a mechanism to further the Tatmadaw's decision-making control. The NLD overlooks the authority of the president, a civilian, as well as the fact that he exercises power over the NDSC. As a result, the government has refused to call an NDSC meeting. It may be that a conflict of interest and authority exists within the NLD government itself. State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi declared she would be above the President.²⁴⁴ However, in NDSC meetings, it is the President who serves as the leader, and no seat is available for the State Counsellor. Meanwhile, Aung San Suu Kyi can only sit in the NDSC as the Foreign Minister; therefore, her status and protocol as State Counsellor are undermined. In addition, according to Article 59 (f) of the Constitution, persons with immediate family who are foreign citizens cannot become President of the country. Thus, Aung San Suu Kyi cannot become the President or leader of the NDSC as her two sons are foreign citizens. In short, because of this, the NDSC is an effective mechanism for "collective democratic control" of Myanmar's structure of civil-military relations. This is especially the case for defense and security policy since collective democratic control is not fully active during the NLD regime.

Control by Legislative Body. Myanmar's highest legislative body, the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (House of the Union), is bicameral. Representation in the Pyithu Hluttaw (House of Representatives) is based on township and population size, while the Amyotha Hluttaw (House of Nationalities) is based on equal representation from

²⁴³ In fact, by article 103 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f), the final decision, of approval, refusal and curtailing of expenditures submitted by the President's Financial Commission, is the majority consent of the legislative body. Even the president has no final authority.

²⁴⁴ Simon Roughneen, "Suu Kyi Says 'I Will Be above the President,'" Nikkei Asian Review, November 5, 2015, <https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Suu-Kyi-says-I-will-be-above-the-president>.

each state and region, including self-administrative divisions and zones. Twenty-five percent of House of Union representatives are reserved for the Tatmadaw. Constitutionally, Myanmar's legislative body plays a critical role as a check on the defense and security sector by enacting laws and forming committees. According to article 96, the legislative body has the right to enact laws for the entire Union or any part of the Union, as well as laws governing the police.

The other power of the legislature that further enhances the democratic control of the armed forces is that it appoints the Defence and Security Committee with military representatives, but it may also include civilian representatives if necessary (Article 115 [b] and 147 [b]). The Committee would have the responsibility for studying defense and security-related issues. By article 115 (d) and 147 (d), both Houses have the authority to determine the number of committee members, their duties, powers, rights, and their terms. For exceptional cases that are not promulgated in the constitution, both Houses can form committees by including elected representatives as well as citizens from think-tanks, field experts, academics, and other suitable persons (Article 118). Thus, a relatively influential power of the legislature is its ability to check the affairs and policies of the armed forces.

In practice, the legislature has still not formed committees to check the armed forces, despite having the constitutional authority to do so. In legislative bodies led by both the opposition Union Solidarity and Development Party as well as the NLD, no committees were formed that were explicitly concerned with defense and security matters, even though the Speakers of both Houses have the exclusive authority to form, dissolve, structure, and appoint committee chairs. Even today, the NLD-led legislature has not shown any sign of sensitivity or an attempt to oversee defense and security policy, with the exception of the defense budget.²⁴⁵ This may be evidence of political elites' lack of a thorough understanding of the current structure of civil-military relations.

²⁴⁵ Tea Circle, "Myanmar's Parliament Is Missing Link in Rakhine Crisis – Tea Circle," December 7, 2017, <https://teacircleoxford.com/2017/12/07/myanmars-parliament-is-missing-link-in-rakhine-crisis/>.

However, several special committees have been formed that play a critical role and have a broad scope. One is the “Rule of Law, Peace, and Tranquility Committee” led by Aung San Suu Kyi in the USDP-led legislature.²⁴⁶ Because she is perceived as a democratic icon with high political credibility and persisted as an opposition leader against the former military regime, the committee’s responsibility encompasses a wide range of matters that are directly related to democratization, including any unlawful acts of the armed forces. The committee plays an important check by denouncing wrongdoing and provoking the awareness of government representatives as well as of civil society. It raises awareness among the armed forces of any misconduct, corruption, or violation of the rule of law.²⁴⁷ Notably, the Aung San Suu Kyi’s committee can also conduct direct investigations and exercise oversight over the Myanmar police forces. But the significant result did not come out. Even today, the formation of committees that are related to defense and security matters is still not a priority even in a political arena dominated by the opposition NLD.²⁴⁸

It is important to note that a Constitutional Tribunal has the final say on any conflicts of interpretation that arise regarding constitutional provisions.²⁴⁹ The current leadership and members of this tribunal have been selected by the NLD.²⁵⁰ Thus, all interpretations related to constitutional ambiguity are in the hands of civilians. For example, in March 2016, the NLD-led legislature formed the Legal Affairs and Special Cases Assessment Commission, which was led by the former Speaker of the Pyithu Hluttaw, Thura Shwe Mann. The commission has an advisory role toward Aung San

²⁴⁶ Nyein Nyein, “Suu Kyi to Head ‘Rule of Law’ Committee,” *The Irrawaddy*, August 7, 2012, <https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/suu-kyi-to-head-rule-of-law-committee.html>.

²⁴⁷ For example, to secure information regarding violations and misconduct, the Public Complaints and Petitions Committee has the authority to investigate and take complaints or receive reports from victims regarding both civilian and military-related issues.

²⁴⁸ Renaud Egretreau, “Negotiating Parliamentary Oversight of the Security Sector in Myanmar,” *ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute*, no. 2017, No.37 (June 6, 2017): 5.

²⁴⁹ It has a unique role in the case of interpretation and disputes concerned with the constitution. Moreover, it is a team of the President and the Speakers by article 321, 322, 323, 324, and article 9 of the Union Government Law (2010).

²⁵⁰ BBC, “အခြေခံဥပဒေခုံရုံး အဖွဲ့ဝင်အမည်စာရင်း လွှတ်တော်ကို တင်ပြ [Submission of Constitutional Tribunal Member List to the House],” *BBC News မြန်မာ*, March 24, 2016, https://www.bbc.com/burmese/burma/2016/03/160324_constitution_court.

Suu Kyi's government.²⁵¹ As a result, during the first and second renewal of this commission, the Tatmadaw's representatives expressed their opposition to it. Indeed, at the time of the second renewal, Tatmadaw representatives sent a letter to the Constitutional Tribunal asking whether its creation was constitutional, given that its remit overlaps with that of the existing bill committee.²⁵² However, the Constitutional Tribunal replied that it was constitutional.²⁵³ Moreover, the NLD-led legislature has significantly reduced the dominant position of military retirees in key legislative committees (Than 2018).

While the Tatmadaw has veto power over constitutional amendments (Article 436),²⁵⁴ it cannot control the primary legislation of either House.²⁵⁵ Logically speaking, if an exceeding landslide victory will not happen, even excluding the Tatmadaw's 25 percent share of each House, it is very unlikely that the diverse range of political parties could sufficiently agree to reach over 75 percent threshold necessary to amend the important provisions of the constitution and thus change the structure of civil-military relations. For example, the recent NLD's move to amend some charters of the constitution failed.²⁵⁶ After 2018 by-elections, NLD occupies 380 (over 58 percent) out of 654 parliamentary seats. In the case of amending Article 40 (c) related to C-in-C's authority at the time of a state of emergency arises, NLD got only 343 (over 52 percent) yes votes. It showed the lack of common agreement related to reducing Tatmadaw's national political role even in the strong opposition group NLD

²⁵¹ Myo Thant, "Thura U Shwe Mann Talks about Working for the Country," Mizzima Myanmar News and Insight, August 21, 2018, <http://mizzima.com/news/thura-u-shwe-mann-talks-about-working-country>.

²⁵² Nyan Hlaing Lynn, "Military Opposes Former General U Shwe Mann's Commission, Again," Frontier Myanmar, March 1, 2018, <https://frontiermyanmar.net/en/military-opposes-former-general-u-shwe-manns-commission-again>.

²⁵³ The commission's role is relatively high. It has a responsibility to study the existing laws, send a report to the House of Union if it is necessary to amend, repeal or enact, and update by adapting the current situation. It also must report the recommendation to House of Union or other institutions if it related to particular matters of the nation and the people.

²⁵⁴ Though the military has the veto power of amendment in the House of Union, this 25 per cent cannot enact a law per se. It also cannot interference in civilian drafted bill and proposal in the case of USDP and NLD landslide victory in 2010 and 2015. USDP had controlled 58.9 per cent, and NLD controlled 59.3 per cent of House of Union.

²⁵⁵ Renaud Egretreau, "Parliamentary Development in Myanmar: An Overview of the Union Parliament, 2011-2016," *The Asia Foundation, Myanmar*, May 2017, 6.

²⁵⁶ Yuichi Nitta, "Suu Kyi's NLD Moves to Amend Myanmar Constitution to Curb Military," Nikkei Asian Review, January 30, 2019, <https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Suu-Kyi-s-NLD-moves-to-amend-Myanmar-constitution-to-curb-military>.

itself. NLD's information committee said that "[w]e won politically, the result is good for them, and the outcome is good for us."²⁵⁷ Here one doubt arises whether the NLD government trying to amend the constitution or CMR structure is for democracy and the people or just a for show political trick and for the party. Some critics argued the result was prevention from "the tyranny of majority" [NLD dominated parliament], while some criticized the military representatives' "blind obedience" to military command. Even in a case where over 75 percent of representatives could agree on an amendment, it would still require a nation-wide referendum, needing the approval of more than half of the country's eligible citizens. In short, final veto power does not rest with the Tatmadaw; it rests with the electorate.

In terms of 'power of the purse,' the legislature has a check over all ministry budgets. Budget allocations for the Ministries of Defence, Home Affairs, and Border Affairs have been discussed publicly in both Houses since 2011.²⁵⁸ The defense budget has comprised 13 to 14 percent of the national budget since 2011. Nonetheless, there is still a lack of financial details from the Union of Myanmar Economic Holdings Limited (UMEHL) and the Myanmar Economic Corporation (MEC), which have changed to a public company under the Myanmar Companies Act.²⁵⁹ In addition, a Special Fund Relating to Necessary Expenditures for Perpetuation of the State Sovereignty allows the commander-in-chief to divert funds, with the approval of the President, into a special account for use in time of national emergency or threat to state security.

²⁵⁷ Htet Soe Lin, "NLD Sees Silver Lining in Charter Change Failure," *The Myanmar Times*, March 13, 2020, <https://www.mmmtimes.com/news/nld-sees-silver-lining-charter-change-failure.html>.

²⁵⁸ Hein Htet Zaw, "Lawmakers Denounce Large Defense Budget," *The Irrawaddy*, August 9, 2017, <https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/lawmakers-denounce-large-defense-budget.html>; Nan Lwin, "Myanmar Military Proposes Larger Budget for 'Stronger' Armed Forces," *The Irrawaddy*, July 22, 2019, <https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/myanmar-military-proposes-larger-budget-for-stronger-armed-forces.html>.

²⁵⁹ Motokazu Matsui, "Time to 'demilitarize' Myanmar Businesses - Nikkei Asian Review," April 19, 2016, <https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Time-to-demilitarize-Myanmar-businesses>; Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, "Top DoD Management Challenges - Fiscal Year 2018," Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, November 20, 2017, <https://www.dodig.mil/reports.html/Article/1377306/top-dod-management-challenges-fiscal-year-2018/>; U.S. Government Accountability Office, "High Risk: DOD Financial Management," 2018, https://www.gao.gov/highrisk/dod_financial_management/why_did_study.

In short, although civilian representatives cannot amend the constitution without the military's cooperation, they have the right to enact any law and to study, monitor, discuss and submit any legislation related to the affairs of the Union, including defense and security policy. In practice, however, the legislature has not been able to effectively exercise these powers. Conversely, one could argue that by allowing military representatives to hold 25 percent of parliamentary seats, parliament becomes a communication channel between civilian politicians and the officer corps, which has had different experiences and comes from a different background. Civilians and military elites can collectively think and work together in the Hluttaw Committees. This is akin to a social-relations channel in which civilian and military elites learn from and come to understand each other. To this end, even Aung San Suu Kyi has invited military representatives to dinner in the hope of promoting mutual understanding.²⁶⁰ As Myanmar is just in the transitional stage to democracy, knowing and listening to each other regarding the state's policies and day-to-day affairs is a positive development. It is better than not knowing anything that the armed forces think and do in the barracks.

Horizontal Control. Horizontal control is exercised through societal institutions, including the mass media, religious organizations, research institutions, and NGOs. The 2008 constitution grants rights, benefits, and freedoms to every Myanmar citizen, with specific provisions guaranteeing religious and ethnic rights.²⁶¹ Religious- and community-based NGOs, such as the "Young Men Buddhist Association" and "Our Burmese Association," have existed in Myanmar since the 1900s. Even during the time of authoritarianism, the government allowed NGOs that were in line with the government's policies to exist. However, since liberalization got underway in 2011, the independent formation of NGOs became considerably more

²⁶⁰ Aung Hla Htun and Jared Ferrie, "Myanmar's Suu Kyi Woos Military Lawmakers Ahead of Talks on Constitution," *Reuters*, December 3, 2014, <https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-myanmar-constitution-idUKKCN0JH0OC20141203>.

²⁶¹ The main article related to civil society is the article 354 (a) (b) and (c): every citizen has the right to express and publish their convictions and opinions freely, to assemble peacefully without arms and holding processing, and to form associations and organizations. This article guarantees to enact laws, rules, and procedures for free press and media, which can publicly discuss and criticize defense and security matters.

active.²⁶² An important liberalizing step was the 2014 enactment of the Registration of Organisation Law, which repealed the military's 1988 Association Act. Today, Myanmar has more than 600 civil-society organizations, including around 59 INGOs.²⁶³ Registering such civil-society organizations is relatively easy,²⁶⁴ and there is considerable room for civil society in Myanmar's reform process.²⁶⁵ While religious (Sangha) associations have an influential role within the armed forces in Myanmar,²⁶⁶ one can easily find many examples of NGOs that are critical of the government and the armed forces in the press and social media.

Workshops, seminars, and debates on defense and security matters cannot be prevented by the authorities unless they are contrary to security, peace, and tranquillity. Here the role of the legislature can be seen again, as it can enact laws that protect and support civil society's monitoring and understanding of defense and security matters as well as contribute to democratic norms and ideology. Criticism against the government and the Tatmadaw are also abundant in the press and social media, especially on Facebook. However, some political activists and mass media networks have been prosecuted by the government and the Tatmadaw.²⁶⁷ While some

²⁶² ICNL, "Myanmar - Civic Freedom Monitor - Research Center - ICNL," The International Center for Not-for-Profit Law, July 24, 2019, <http://www.icnl.org/research/monitor/Myanmar.html>; MIMU, "Myanmar NGOs | MIMU," Myanmar Information Management Unit, accessed November 15, 2019, <http://themimu.info/MNGOs>.

²⁶³ Christine Dugay, "Top Global Development NGOs in Myanmar: A Primer," Devex, May 12, 2015, <https://www.devex.com/news/sponsored/top-global-development-ngos-in-myanmar-a-primer-85786>.

²⁶⁴ INGO Forum Myanmar, *INGO Guide To Registration And MOUs* (2018 Myanmar INGO Forum, 2018), https://ingoforummyanmar.org/files/uploads/documents/MOUs_FINAL_120318_FINAL-January19.pdf.

²⁶⁵ Elliott Prasse-Freeman, "Power, Civil Society, and an Inchoate Politics of the Daily in Burma/Myanmar," *The Journal of Asian Studies* 71, no. 2 (2012): 371–397.

²⁶⁶ Jasmin Lorch, "Stopgap or Change Agent? The Role of Burma's Civil Society after the Crackdown," *Internationales Asienforum* 39, no. 1–2 (2008): 21–54.

²⁶⁷ Myoe Htet Paing, "တပ်မတော်ကတရားစွဲဆိုထားသည့် ဒေါင်းတို့မျိုးဆက်သံချပ်အဖွဲ့ဝင်ခုနစ်ဦးအား ပုဒ်မ ၅၀၅ (က) ဖြင့် စွဲချက်တင် [The seven members of Daung-toe-myoe-sat Than-chat-apwe were sued by the Tatmadaw, under Section 505 (a)]," Eleven Media Group Co., Ltd, September 30, 2019, <https://news-eleven.com/article/137622>; Min Thein Naing, "တပ်မတော်က ပုဒ်မ ၅၀၅ (က) (ခ) ဖြင့် တရားစွဲဆိုထားသည့် ဗိုလ်ကြီးဟောင်း နေမျိုးဇင်အား တရားရုံးက အာမခံမပေးသဖြင့် အင်းစိန်ထောင်သို့ ပို့ဆောင် [The court sent a former captain Ne Myoe Zin, charged under section 505 (a) (b), to Insein Jail]," Eleven Media Group Co., Ltd, April 19, 2019, <https://news-eleven.com/article/100797>.

of these cases have been withdrawn,²⁶⁸ others' sentences have received a presidential amnesty.²⁶⁹ Generally speaking, Myanmar's press and media have considerable freedom to check the armed forces and their policies, contrary to what was the case under the former one-party state and military government.

Another civil society group that is able to check and discuss defense and security matters are think-tanks. In Myanmar, such institutions have been established to good effect. For example, the ThayNinGa Institute for Strategic Studies analyzes defense and security matters. The Institute for Strategy and Policy focuses on promoting democratic leadership and strengthening civic participation by conducting policy-oriented research, analysis, public outreach, and training through leadership-level dialogue. The Tagaung Institute of Political Studies focuses considerable attention on the study of Myanmar's civil-military relations. The Myanmar Institute for Peace and Security provides information on issues related to federalism, constitutional reform, dialogue on the peace process, conflict monitoring and analysis, as well as peacebuilding and development. Currently, such think-tanks are also actively connecting with and engaging in media relations in order to conduct their work more effectively. Moreover, their work can easily be found in the press, on social media, and on their own websites. Hence, it is safe to argue that the role of think-tanks as a check on Myanmar's armed forces is relatively significant and greater than in the past under one-party rule and military government.

Self-control. In conventional democratic control theories, “self-control” implies that the military's ideology has been shaped by its military education and training in such a way that it values political neutrality and is convinced of its “professionalism,” democratic norms, human rights, respect for a democratically elected government, and non-interference in civilian politics. However, in Myanmar's

²⁶⁸ Eleven Media Group, “တပ်မတော်မှ တရားစွဲဆိုထားသည့် မီဒီယာသမားများ အပါအဝင် အမှု ငါးမှုအား ရုပ်သိမ်း [The Five Cases Were Withdrawn, Including the Cases of Media, Sued by the Tatmadaw],”

Eleven Media Group Co., Ltd, accessed November 12, 2019, <https://elevenmyanmar.com/news/8495>.

²⁶⁹ Ye Naing, “ရိုက်တာသတင်းထောက် ၂ ဦး လွတ်ငြိမ်းဖြင့် လွတ်မြောက်လာ [Two Reuters Journalists Freed in Amnesty],” Mizzima Myanmar News and Insight, May 7, 2019, <http://www.mizzimaburmese.com/article/56633>.

structure of civil-military relations, self-control is activated in various ways, such as with laws, military ethics, or Codes of Conduct, ideology, and political legacies. In other words, ‘self-control’ in Myanmar is also the way of the military’s preparation to adapt and synchronize current and future political liberalization process. However, one essential point is that, in Myanmar, the chance of establishing self-control through military education and training also exists. It is also the case that such education and training should be in line with national education policy generally. According to Article 28, for example, the Union has the right to implement a modern education system that promotes an ideology that contributes to nation-building. It is required that this be in line with a genuine, disciplined, multi-party democratic system. In fact, the President has the right to implement this, as well as the system of military education and training in the National Defense and Security Council. The legislature also has the right to form committees to study, discuss and submit related proposals, as well as the responsibility to enact laws related to education.²⁷⁰ At the same time, the perspectives of the larger civil society—as expressed by the media, NGOs, think tanks, and others—should also be important in shaping defense and security policy, including military education and training.

In practice, the commander-in-chief has declared that, in principle, he favors reforming the Tatmadaw along democratic lines.²⁷¹ Currently, the Tatmadaw’s ideological training focuses on a people-centric and national security-centric ideology, rather than on an “ism.” The training does not dichotomize between the military and civilians. Instead, it highlights the sense of “for the people” in a collective sense. All military academies, such as the Defence Services Academy, the Defence Services Technological Academy, and the Defence Services Medical Academy, as well as the primary military training schools, use songs and slogans for ideological training that

²⁷⁰ It includes the cases of curricula, syllabus, teaching methodology, research, plans, projects and standards and of universities, degree colleges, institutes and other institutions of higher education.

²⁷¹ Cincds, “(NCA) ချုပ်ဆိုခြင်း(၃)နှစ်ပြည့်၊ နှစ်ပတ်လည်နေ့တွင် အစိုးရနှင့်

(NCA)လက်မှတ်ရေးထိုးထားသော တိုင်းရင်းသားလက်နက်ကိုင် အဖွဲ့အစည်းများ သီးသန့်အစည်းအဝေး၌ တပ်မတော်ကာကွယ်ရေးဦးစီးချုပ် ဗိုလ်ချုပ်မှူးကြီး မင်းအောင်လှိုင် ပြောကြားသည့် အဖွင့်အမှာစကား [The Opening Speech of Commander-in-Chief, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, at the Exclusive Meeting with NCA Signatories, on the 3rd Anniversary of Signing NCA Agreement] | Cincds,” November 2018, <http://www.cincds.gov.mm/node/669>.

cadets and trainees must repeatedly sing as they move between buildings and during physical training. Through the detailed analysis of 26 songs and 15 physical training slogans,²⁷² phrases such as “Tatmadaw for the people,” “soldiers for all ethnicities,” “be careful about the interest of the people,” “always taking the people’s side,” “do not touch the people,” “people war for the people,” “defend and help the people,” “Tatmadaw based on the right social class,” “cooperate with the people friendly,” “prosperity heaven for the people,” “Tatmadaw born from the people,” and “people’s soldiers,” are frequently cited in such songs and slogans. Moreover, every soldier must recite daily the “Four Oaths,” which begin with the following line: “We will be loyal to the people and the state.”

In addition to this, the Tatmadaw operationalizes self-control by also applying “60 Codes of Conduct,” which include “10 Codes of Conduct for Relations with Superiors,” “5 Codes of Conduct for Relations with Subordinates,” “10 Codes of Conduct for Relations with All Comrades,” “20 Codes of Conduct for Relations with the People [civilians],” and “5 Codes of Conduct for Relations with the Enemy.” Within the Code, the “20 Codes of Conduct for Relations with the People” encourage self-control of the Tatmadaw in civil-military relations. This code includes principles regarding loyalty to the people, protecting people’s property and interests, communicating politely with people, refraining from bullying with arms, avoiding interference in unrelated matters, making civilians a first priority, satisfying civilians, and respecting the people’s religion, culture, and traditions, and so on. In addition, there are other little-known codes, such as the “20 Codes of Conduct for Every Soldier,” which emphasize a soldier’s loyalty to the state, its laws, and to the OTNC (“Our Three National Causes”). Every military academy, training school, and command post teach these codes of conduct, and annual oral and written competitions are held to operationalize the codes. Thus, it is through such means that the Tatmadaw tries to instill and socialize self-control in the military. However, critics continue to point out that the military’s role in Myanmar is contrary to the will of the people.

²⁷² “The Action Plan for Military Training” (The classified document of the Office of Commander-in-Chief of Armed Forces Training, n.d.).

In addition to the principle of self-control, another important teaching is the national security-centric OTNC (discussed detail above), which are frequently highlighted in the military leadership's speeches, formal messages, its declarations on Tatmadaw Day (March 27), and on red signboards emblazoned with OTNC and located in conspicuous places at military academies, training schools, and command posts. In sum, self-control of the Tatmadaw is activated through the teaching of a people-centric and national security-centric ideology, rather than through indoctrination to a specific state-system or a different ideology.

The other method of instilling self-control comes from the Tatmadaw's conceptualization of national versus party politics. The very first instance of this conceptualization was evident in the Tatmadaw's second stage of Naing-ngan-taw Warda development in 1959 (discussed detail in chapter IV). The second piece of evidence of the Tatmadaw's national political role comes from a January 9, 1993 speech of General Myo Nyunt, the Chair of the Commission for Holding the National Conference (discussed detail above). In fact, General Myo Nyunt suggested a structure of civil-military relations based on the concept of collectivity and responsibility-sharing in what would be the future nation-state building process by defining the Tatmadaw's leadership role in national politics. Later, the 2008 constitution legitimized this ideological base. Since that time, the incumbent military leadership frequently highlights the difference between national politics and party politics in order to keep military personnel politically neutral. Furthermore, it is important to note that Article 26 (a) of the constitution states that not only military personnel but also all civil servants should be free of party politics.

The other mechanism of "self-control" originates in the law, as Myanmar is being transformed into a more liberal form of constitutional government for the first time since the military takeover of 1988. Today, only a slight possibility of a military coup exists in Myanmar as long as the Tatmadaw respects its duty of safeguarding the constitution, as the military leadership frequently promises and teaches the military personnel. Indeed, Article 20 (f), which states that the military has the exclusive responsibility of safeguarding the constitution, implicitly prevents the armed forces

from launching a military coup. In addition, constitutional provisions regarding states of emergency also prevent unconstitutional military coups.²⁷³ In fact, the constitution gives the military the legitimate use of state power only in cases of specific emergencies, and it sets specific time limits for its use. The constitution or the structure of civil-military relations will survive even in cases of an external war, civil war or sectoral armed conflicts, and nationwide upheavals. The Tatmadaw cannot seize power for a long duration of time, as was the case when Myanmar experienced the 1962 and 1988 military coups. It must refrain from repeated military coups and attempts at rewriting the constitution, as occurs in Thailand.²⁷⁴

In practice, there were three declarations of a sectoral-level state of emergency during President Thein Sein's government.²⁷⁵ And there has been no evidence that a declaration of a state of emergency will occur under the de facto leadership of Aung San Suu Kyi's government, even while facing severe security threats in the northern

²⁷³ The case of a state of emergency is divided by two-level: sectoral level and national level. The sectoral case is related to the failures of administrative functions or sufficient reasons for endangering the lives, shelter, and property of the people in any parts of the union. It also consists of two steps. The first step is that the president has the right to declare a state of emergency by coordinating with NDSC. It can give executive power to any suitable body or person, not specifically to the military, by articles 410, 411, 412. However, the president has no right to take legislative power except the laws needed for administrative duty. The second step is that the president can declare a military administration in a state of emergency if necessary. However, the president must define the executive and judicial power of the C-in-C concerning the province of law and order. The president has an extraordinary power for an emergency that is only for 60 days. In short, in the sectoral context, there is a check and balance and limitation of exercising a state of emergency of executive power. In the case of a national-level state of emergency, the president has the unique power to transfer state power to the C-in-C after coordination with NDSC by article 417 and 418. The area will be the whole nation, but the specific duration is just one year, and all functions of legislative bodies must be suspended. It will also terminate the Union and regional governments except for the president and vice president. The president has the authority to give an extension of the duration of the state of emergency two times, six months for each extension, by article 421. It must be submitted to the House of Union but not for its approval. When the C-in-C reports the accomplishment of his duties, the president must declare the annulment of transferring the state power to the C-in-C by submitting to the House of Union or coordinating with NDSC by article 422. After that, the formation of executive and judiciary bodies will start again.

²⁷⁴ Amie Tsang, "Timeline: Thailand's Coups," *Financial Times*, May 23, 2014, <https://www.ft.com/content/88970d60-e1b0-11e3-9999-00144feabdc0>.

²⁷⁵ Manny Maung CNN, "Myanmar's President Declares State of Emergency," CNN, February 17, 2015, <https://www.cnn.com/2015/02/17/asia/myanmar-kokang-state-of-emergency/index.html>; Associated Press, "Burma Declares State of Emergency after Dozens of Soldiers Die in Rebel Region," *The Guardian*, February 18, 2015, sec. World news, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/feb/18/burma-declares-state-of-emergency-after-dozens-of-soldiers-die-in-rebel-region>.

Rakhine State and in the north-eastern part of Myanmar.²⁷⁶ It is important to note that the Tatmadaw does not decide on such matters.²⁷⁷ Instead, such declarations can be made by the President and by the authority of the National Defense and Security Council. This further illustrates that the Tatmadaw lacks influence as well as the ability to interfere in the states or the National Defense and Security Council's authority to affect the structure of civil-military relations, even in cases of severe internal security threats.

The final self-control mechanism is related to the Tatmadaw's political legacy. Here, the main point is that the 2008 constitution and the structure of civil-military relations are legacies of the Tatmadaw. The current political reality came from the top-down evolutionary change of the military regime, which stemmed from the "seven-step roadmap" that was announced by Prime Minister Khin Nyunt in August 2003. In short, Myanmar's reform process is not an immediate or urgent action but, instead, a well-planned and long-term strategy. Indeed, Myanmar currently is undergoing the last (or seventh) stage of the roadmap, building a modern, developed and democratic nation, one in which key decision-makers are selected by the government, parliament and/or its committees. Thus, the possibility of a coup led by a military leadership that would destroy the military's legacy is relatively low, except in cases of specific or extraordinary threats to national security and sovereignty. It goes without saying that the Tatmadaw will not easily destroy its legacy or its calculated long-term strategy,

²⁷⁶ EMG Reporter, "AA, TNLA and MNDAA Give Trouble to Local People and Transport in Northern Shan State," Eleven Media Group Co., Ltd, August 29, 2019, <https://elevenmyanmar.com/news/aa-tnla-and-mndaa-give-trouble-to-local-people-and-transport-in-northern-shan-state>; Kyaw Kha, "Militiamen Killed, Injured as Myanmar Rebels Continue Shan State Attacks," The Irrawaddy, August 26, 2019, <https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/militiamen-killed-injured-as-myanmar-rebels-continue-shan-state-attacks.html>; Kyaw Ko Ko, "Mandalay Security Beefed up in Wake of Pyin Oo Lwin Attack," The Myanmar Times, August 27, 2019, <https://www.mmmtimes.com/news/mandalay-security-beefed-wake-pyin-oo-lwin-attack.html>.

²⁷⁷ BBC, "စစ်ဖြစ်မှကာလုံခေါ်မှာလားလို့ တပ်မတော်မေးခွန်းထုတ် [The Tatmadaw questioned whether the NDSC meeting would be called in the war]," *BBC News Myanmar*, September 28, 2019, sec. Myanmar, <https://www.bbc.com/burmese/burma-49864634>; Htike and Thein, "နိုင်ငံအတွင်းဖြစ်ပေါ်နေသည့် လုံခြုံရေးနှင့် ငြိမ်းချမ်းရေးအခြေအနေများ၊ ဖွဲ့စည်းပုံအခြေခံဥပဒေ ပြင်ဆင်ရေးကိစ္စများနှင့် ပတ်သက်၍ ညှိညှိနှိုင်းနှိုင်း တိုင်တိုင်ပင်ပင် ဆောင်ရွက်ရေး ကာလုံခေါ်ရန်လိုအပ်ဟု တပ်မတော်သတင်းမှန် ပြန်ကြားရေးအဖွဲ့ဒုတိယဥက္ကဋ္ဌ ပြောကြား [The vice-president of Tatmadaw Righteous News Agency revealed that it requires to call NDSC meeting to discuss collectively the issues related to security and peace and amending the constitution]."

which has been built over two decades. This factor also likely influences the Tatmadaw's "self-control."

Common Ideological Base of Collective Democratic Control. In addition to the Tatmadaw's self-control, there is also a significant and shared ideological base that paves the way for the "collective democratic control" of Myanmar's civil-military relations, namely "Our Three National Causes." Currently, Myanmar is undergoing a process of national reconciliation through the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement, which is forging agreements for a gradual transformation to a Democratic Federal Union. According to the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement, future nation-building will "establish a Union based on the principles of democracy and federalism according to the outcomes of political dialogue and in the spirit of Panglong, which thoroughly guarantees democratic rights, national equality and the right to self-determination based on liberty, equality, and justice while upholding the principles of non-disintegration of the Union, non-disintegration of national solidarity and [the] perpetuation of national sovereignty."²⁷⁸ The Union Accords of national reconciliation between the government, the Tatmadaw, and the EAOs have been completed already.²⁷⁹ These Accords, which materialized under the leadership of the NLD government, appear to indicate that the national reconciliation process is in line with the OTNC even under Aung San Suu Kyi's NLD government, which served as a significant opposition to military rule in the past.

In the NLD government's national objectives of the 71st Anniversary of Independence Day in 2019, the OTNC was prioritized.²⁸⁰ Even though Aung San Suu Kyi does not reveal whether she stands with OTNC politically or explicitly, in her speeches, she frequently states ideas that are not different from OTNC. For example,

²⁷⁸ NRPC, "The Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar and the Ethnic Armed Organizations," September 20, 2018, <http://www.nrpc.gov.mm/en/index.php/node/229>.

²⁷⁹ State Counsellor Office, "37 Points Signed as Part of Pyidaungsu Accord | Myanmar State Counsellor Office," June 30, 2017, <https://www.statecounsellor.gov.mm/en/node/904>; State Counsellor Office, "14 Points Signed as Part II of Union Accord | Myanmar State Counsellor Office," July 17, 2018, <https://www.statecounsellor.gov.mm/en/node/2050>.

²⁸⁰ Global New Light of Myanmar, "71st Anniversary Independence Day National Objectives," *Global New Light of Myanmar* (blog), January 3, 2019, <https://www.globalnewlightofmyanmar.com/71st-anniversary-independence-day-national-objectives/>.

in a speech given at the signing of the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement by the New Mon State Party and the Lahu Democratic Union on February 13, 2018, Aung San Suu Kyi emphasized the term “unity” nine times and “reconciliation” four times.²⁸¹ In fact, the entire peace process led by Aung San Suu Kyi is directly related to perpetuating national sovereignty.

Finally, on the 74th anniversary of Tatmadaw Day in 2019, the Tatmadaw itself focused on OTNC as the highest value, stating that its highest priority is “[t]o safeguard the national policy; OTNC and the Constitution, and the lives and property of people” and “[t]o carry out the eternal peace [that is] essential to build[ing] the Democratic and Federal System which is adopted by [the] Six Peace Principles based on OTNC by Tatmadaw.” In short, this collective ideological base shared by the government and the Tatmadaw on the basis of a national security-centric OTNC is paving the way towards a collective, rather than a confrontational approach in the structure of Myanmar’s civil-military relations. This common ideological base could be more workable than other methods of civilian control of the military.

5.4 Conclusion

This chapter analyzed the fourth stage of Naing-ngan-taw Warda development, “Our Three National Causes,” and the democratic control of the armed forces in Myanmar’s structure of civil-military relations. OTNC developed from the primary duty of Tatmadaw into a Naing-ngan-taw Warda since 1988 before roughly three years of the Cold War ended. The presence of U.S. naval fleets in Myanmar’s territorial waters, communist insurgents’ intrigue, severe armed conflicts with some ethnic insurgents during the 1988 political upheaval seemed to provide the legitimacy of the military’s highlighting on “Our Three National Causes.” Though Cold War is not itself a principal causal factor, it seems to be rationalized that the U.S. Cold War policy of containment to Asia and fears of subversion in the Third World, by the domino theory, exacerbated the conflicts.

²⁸¹ Myanmar State Counsellor Office, “I Wish to Remind All of You Not to Waste This Opportunity,” accessed January 8, 2020, <https://www.statecounsellor.gov.mm/en/node/1711>.

Anti-neo-colonialism also emerged in Myanmar. Changing bipolar to unipolar world order and escalating interventionism contributed to assuring the development of paternalistic and national-security centric Naing-ngan-taw Warda, parallel with Tatmadaw's self-projected image as a 'guardian of Myanmar nation-state,' more prominent than ever, by adding its national political role in Myanmar politics till now. Revolutionary soldiers became guardians of the nation-state was more obvious in this stage. The currently ongoing development, "Federalism based on Our Three National Causes and Democratic Principles," was influenced by the extent of domestic politics rather than international politics. At the same time, it includes some degree of the state's trying to legitimize the transitional regime and the prestige of Myanmar in world politics. Nevertheless, by postcolonialists' perspective, the consequences of colonialism, and the fear of neo-colonialism still reflect not only the development of Myanmar Naing-ngan-taw Warda(s) but the current socio-economic-cultural-security pattern as well.

By following the development of OTNC, the CMR structure reflects a "collective concept" rather than a "confrontational concept." However, not all aspects of democratic control are yet active in that structure. The structure is also not a type of subjective civilian control of armed forces in the one-party state by breaking the officer corps up into competing units, Army, Navy, Airforce, Artillery, and by infiltration of the military hierarchy with other independent political chains of command like political officers in the Russian military and political commissars in the Chinese military. For instance, in the Russian military, it created this kind of party-control mechanism in 1917 and then abolished in 1991 by the President of the Soviet Union Mikhail Gorbachev. It was implemented again in February 2018.²⁸² In China's military, political commissars are responsible for 'three wars,' media, legal, and psychological warfare.²⁸³ Myanmar armed forces have none of these kinds of mechanisms following Article 26 (a), Civil Services personnel shall be free from party

²⁸² "В российской армии будет воссоздан руководящий политический орган [The leading political body will be recreated in the Russian army]," Interfax.ru, February 5, 2018, <https://www.interfax.ru/russia/598553>.

²⁸³ Srikanth Kondapalli, "China's Political Commissars and Commanders: Trends and Dynamics," *Singapore: Nanyang Technological University, RSIS Working Papers; 088/05, 2005.*

politics. Myanmar's "collective democratic control" has the right and mechanisms to check and balance military power rather than before. Subjective civilian control is possible even in the absence of democratic principles.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

6.1 Federalism based on Our Three National Causes and Democratic Principles

The fifth stage of Naing-ngan-taw Warda development, “Federalism based on Our Three National Causes and Democratic Principles,” that originated in August 2011 under President Thein Sein’s regime is ongoing and proceeding by the NLD government based on the fourth stage. Since 1962, the first official public usage of federalism or federal system can be seen in President U Thein Sein’s message sent on the occasion of the 67th Anniversary Shan State Day.²⁸⁴ Over six decades of internal armed conflicts are related to this development. At the same time, it directly links with the development of Naing-ngan-taw Warda(s) in the past, political socialization, and the structure of civil-military relations. Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement signed on October 15, 2015, is an opportunity to overcome the prolonged armed and political conflicts through political dialogues and discussions between the government, the Tatmadaw, and Ethnic Armed Organizations. In the NCA, it states the ideology for future nation-building, “establish a Union based on the principles of democracy and federalism by the outcomes of political dialogue and in the spirit of Panglong.”²⁸⁵ While ten EAOs already had signed the NCA, there have been nine EAOs as non-signatories.²⁸⁶ Though democratic principles are not a new one, federalism is a new

²⁸⁴ The New Light of Myanmar, “Taking Lessons of Past Experiences, All People Are to Make Efforts for Ending Conflicts and Peaceful Coexistence of All National Races.”

²⁸⁵ NRPC, “The Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar and the Ethnic Armed Organizations.”

²⁸⁶ NCA Ceasefire (10) groups are Lahu Democratic Union (LDU), New Mon State Party (NMSP), Karen National Union (KNU), Chin National Front (CNF), Arakan Liberation Party (ALP), All Burma Students’ Democratic Front (ABSDF), Democratic Karen Benevolent Army (DKBA), Restoration Council of Shan State/ Shan State Army (RCSS/SSA), Karen National Union/Karen National Liberation Army (Peace Council) (KNU/KNLA(PC)). Non-Ceasefire groups are Karenni National Progress Party (KNPP), Arakan National Council (ANC), Kachin Independence Organization/ Kachin Independence Army (KIO/KIA), Shan State Progress Party/Shan State Army (SSPP/SSA), United League of Arakan/Arakan Army (ULA/AA), Wa National Organization (WNO), United Wa State Army (UWSA), Palaung State Liberation Front / Ta-ang National Liberation Army (PSLF/TNLA), National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA). See “Peace Process Overview » Myanmar Peace Monitor.”

ideology that disappeared from Myanmar politics since the 1962 military coup. Nowadays, it would be a leading political agenda for future nation-state building schemes—Democratic Federal Union.

While there had been 51 points related to future Democratic Federal Union and federalism signed as part of *Pyidaungsu* (Union) Accord I and II, it does not look much different from the basic principles of the 2008 constitution, as discussed in chapter V. However, the process and progress are still elusive and in a phase of deadlock in terms of bringing non-signatories under the NCA umbrella. Armed conflicts between the Tatmadaw and some ethnic armed groups are continuing.²⁸⁷

With the current ongoing debates,²⁸⁸ there is no evidence of contradiction related to the OTNC between the government and the Tatmadaw. However, the latter's political stance by the number six of Union's consistent objectives in 2008 constitution is facing critics: veto power in the case of amending the constitution by taking 25 percent of parliamentary seats, six out of eleven members of National Defence and Security Council (NDSC) members comes from a military background, and reserving the C-in-C nominates critical positions of government, such as the vice-president and ministers of defense, home affairs, and border affairs, is questionable and sparks political debates. At the same time, the C-in-C frequently answered the point that the Tatmadaw would gradually reduce its political role according to the time and situation.²⁸⁹

In accord with this process, the country's ongoing liberalization process and national reconciliation is a Myanmar political reality. For instance, as a remarkable liberalization process, on December 28, 2018, the General Administration Department

²⁸⁷ EMG Reporter, "AA, TNLA and MNDAA Give Trouble to Local People and Transport in Northern Shan State"; Khaing Roe La, "Fighting between Tatmadaw and AA Intensified in Mrauk-U, Injuring Two Civilians," August 28, 2019, <https://www.dmediag.com/news/586-aa>.

²⁸⁸ Cheesman, Farrelly, and Wilson, *Debating Democratization in Myanmar*; Egretreau, *Caretaking Democratization*.

²⁸⁹ The Washington Post, "Burma's Top General: 'I Am Prepared to Talk and Answer and Discuss' with Aung San Suu Kyi's Government. (Posted 2015-11-23 16:41:21): Burma's Gen. Min Aung Hlaing Says What's Important Is the Nation's Long-Term Interests," *The Washington Post*, November 23, 2015, sec. EDITORIAL-OPINION, <https://search.proquest.com/docview/1735580147/abstract/1E8EE66FC184324PQ/1>.

(GAD), the backbone of Myanmar public administration had moved to under civilian control by transferring it from the Ministry of Home Affairs to the Ministry of the office of the Union Government that is under the direct supervision of the president. In July 2015, the USDP government enacted “The Law Amending the Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar” (2015). This law guarantees greater power-sharing through the legislative list of the regions and states that were intended to establish a future Democratic Federal Union. It was the sign of adaptation on responsibility-sharing between the civil and military. There is no sign that the Tatmadaw will allow the fourth stage of national ideological development to be diluted until the safe progress in national reconciliation and establishing a disciplined democracy are achieved.

6.3 Conclusion

Naing-ngan-taw Warda(s) also always encounter interstate-intrastate challenges from various sectors that have different ideologies, political beliefs, concepts, or interests. For example, in Myanmar, some political elites lean toward interstate Marxist doctrines, some interest groups saw benefits in British rule, and some non-Bamar nationalities’ perceptions of freedom from British colonial rule (some were not active to get freedom) was a main ideological contradiction with the first stage of ideology development— “Freedom at All Costs.” Therefore, Bojoke Aung San tried to get an agreement between ethnic groups to regain Independence together by Panlong Agreement. Burmese communism was a threat to the second and third phases of Naing-ngan-taw Warda development— “democratic socialism” and the “Burmese Way to Socialism.”

In the case of the fourth stage, “Our Three National Causes,” some Ethnic Armed Organizations fought for self-determination, and confederation were challenges. The current intense fighting between Tatmadaw and Arakan Army is a good example. But EAOs and insurgents politically never explicitly denied OTNC. The current phase of development— “Federalism based on Our Three National Causes and Democratic Principles”—could be more inclusive, if it ever occurs. The challenges come from the state structure side and political institutions confronting the Tatmadaw

as the “depository, creator, and guardian” of state ideology as well as its self-projected image of “not the guard but the guardian of Myanmar” and its “national political role.”

In the context of Myanmar Naing-ngan-taw Warda development and socialization, the Tatmadaw explicitly generated just two stages—the “Burmese Way to Socialism” and “Our Three National Causes.” “Democratic Socialism” was just consolidated. But the Tatmadaw played an influential role in political socialization and implementation in all phases. While the very first beginning of ideology was complicated, mostly based on Buddhism, Nationalism, and Marxism, it was influenced by pragmatism to regain Independence — “Freedom at All Costs.” Though it was derived from Myanmar nationalists and patriotists, the Tatmadaw influenced the implementation process as one of the main pillars of the Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League. Institutionally, the Tatmadaw also became the central pillar of three: Burma National Army, Communist Party of Burma, and People’s Revolutionary Party, in the struggle for independence because of General Aung San’s leadership both in the Tatmadaw and the AFPFL and because of two failed attempts at leftist unity.

In the parliamentary democracy period, the Tatmadaw reconstructed and consolidated the second stage of Naing-ngan-taw Warda— “democratic socialism”— that were scattered in three main documents. And then, the Tatmadaw established the “Burmese Way to Socialism” (democratic centralism) after the 1962 military coup. The third stage ended in 1988. The fourth stage, “Our Three National Causes,” developed from the Tatmadaw’s primary duty into a Naing-ngan-taw Warda by adding its national political role. It is a paternalistic ideology of national security that directly derived from Tatmadaw’s primary duty. Tatmadaw projected its image as a “guardian of Myanmar, not guard,” and maintained state power over two decades by following OTNC. Its three national causes are also playing an influential role in the current fifth developmental stage originated by President Thein Sein’s regime that intends to build a Democratic Federal Union.

These developmental stages of Naing-ngan-taw Warda influenced and shaped the structures of Myanmar’s civil-military. The origin of Myanmar CMR based on “Freedom at All Costs” started from the underground movement for independence.

This first structure of civil-military relations has a subjective control of AFPFL's collective leadership. After regaining independence, Tatmadaw was subordinate to a civilian government by stressing on democratic socialism. Still, the military role is prominent due to the civil war, the KMT army's invasion, and the political crisis. These factors led to becoming a high level of state dependency on the military in the late 1940s and 1950s. There seems to have been little civilian oversight on national defense and security policy even at the times of subjective civilian control being guaranteed by the structure of CMR. After the 1962 coup, the Revolutionary Council and Burma Socialist Programme Party established the mechanisms of subjective civilian control in and out of Tatmadaw. Still, Tatmadaw's role was prominent because the Burma Socialist Programme Party's human resources were mainly based on the Tatmadaw and retired personnel. General Ne Win's revolution had failed. After the 1988 national upheaval, SLORC/SPDC military regimes made a calculated plan to build the structure of CMR based on "Our Three National Causes" by defining the military's national political role, to run the nation by a more liberalized form of constitutional government in a multiparty democracy system. The current structure of Myanmar CMR has collective democratic control of armed forces, though the Tatmadaw's guardian role is prominent.

The main challenge of implementing the current stage of Naing-ngan-taw Warda development is an advancement of China's influence and interference in the Myanmar peace process, though Myanmar, China, and India jointly initiated the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence.²⁹⁰ The participation of non-signatories in the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement is the most practical way for the national reconciliation process and the implementation of Naing-ngan-taw Warda for a future democratic federal union. In northern and eastern Myanmar near the Chinese border, the fighting between Myanmar security forces and EAOs, which have historical and cultural linkages with China and have offered direct financial support, has raised since President Thein Sein government suspended the Myitsone mega-dam project in 2011. China is undermining Myanmar's peace process by holding the EAOs (non-

²⁹⁰ They include: mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence.

signatories) in his pocket.²⁹¹ Though at that time of President Thein Sein's regime, China played just an "observer" role in Myanmar peace process, its role advanced as a "mediator" at the time of State Counselor Aung San Suu Kyi's government²⁹² amidst the increasing the international pressure concerned with Bengali/Rohingya issue and intense fighting between Myanmar security forces and Arakan Army which received weapons and financial support from China, in Rakhine state.²⁹³

Moreover, nowadays, the civilian government is facing other critical challenges, such as a lack of governing experience, an absence of qualified professionals, a lack of knowledge in defense and security policies, higher daily food prices,²⁹⁴ contradictory data regarding economic development, and real economic hardships.²⁹⁵ In reality, these are more urgent, practical issues for the current government than changing the structure of civil-military relations. According to Huntington, a low-level institutionalization of democracy leads to a high level of military participation.²⁹⁶ While the performance and capacity of democratic institutions in Myanmar are still questionable, this article has demonstrated that the country's structure of civil-military relations has a sense of "collective democratic

²⁹¹ Sui-Lee Wee, "Myanmar Official Accuses China of Meddling in Rebel Peace Talks," *Reuters*, October 8, 2015, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-china-idUSKCN0S22VT20151008>.

²⁹² Mizzima Media, Exclusive Interview with U Aung Min, a former of Minister of the President's Office of Myanmar and chairperson of Myanmar Peace Centre., July 24, 2020.

²⁹³ ANI, "China Supplying Weapons to Arakan Army Armed Group to Weaken India, Myanmar: Report - Times of India," *The Times of India*, accessed August 9, 2020, <https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/china/china-supplying-weapons-to-arakan-army-armed-group-to-weaken-india-myanmar-report/articleshow/76741890.cms>; "Opinion | Myanmar's Generals Aren't Happy With China—and It's No Longer a Secret," *The Irrawaddy*, July 3, 2020, <https://www.irrawaddy.com/opinion/editorial/myanmars-generals-arent-happy-china-no-longer-secret.html>.

²⁹⁴ Eleven Media Group, "အခွန်တိုးမြှင့် ကောက်ခံလိုက်သည့် မူဝါဒအပြောင်းအလဲကြောင့် လုပ်ငန်းသုံးကားများသာ တင်သွင်းခွင့်ရသော မြဝတီနယ်စပ်မှ ကားတင်သွင်းမှု ရပ်ဆိုင်းလုနီးပါးဖြစ် [Due to Increase Taxation Policy, Import of Vehicles from Myawaddy Border Is Almost Halted, Which Is Only Allowed to Import Commercial Vehicles]," Eleven Media Group Co., Ltd, accessed November 13, 2019, <https://elevenmyanmar.com/news/14621>; Min Lwin, "Time for Myanmar to Focus on the Economy," <https://www.nationthailand.com>, October 8, 2017, <https://www.nationthailand.com/opinion/30328793>.

²⁹⁵ Mhu Ein Geal, "စာရင်းစယားလိမ်လည်မှုများကြောင့် စီးပွားတိုးတက်မှုမှန်မမှန် နိုင်ငံ့ခေါင်းဆောင်များမြေပြင်အခြေအနေနှင့် တိုက်ဆိုင်စစ်ဆေးရန် လိုအပ်ဟုဆို [The Leaders of the State Require to Check in Ground Due to Accounting Fraud] | *The Myanmar Times*," November 13, 2019, <https://myanmar.mmtimes.com/news/130820.html>.

²⁹⁶ Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (Yale University Press, 2006).

control” of the armed forces. Principally, the Tatmadaw is playing an influential role in the security sectors, while Myanmar’s constitutional civilian government has full responsibility for all state affairs.

Therefore, the current Naing-ngan-taw Warda development shapes the current Myanmar political reality. It also has historical experience related to the development of Naing-ngan-taw Warda(s), political socialization, the structure of civil-military relations, their consequences, and their security contexts. Nowadays, Myanmar politics is still conducted within the last or seventh stage of the Tatmadaw’s roadmap plan.²⁹⁷ The evidence shows nothing yet beyond this plan, while federalism becomes an added idea for future nation-state building. The structure of civil-military relations for future Democratic Union is still not clear, while the “Collective Democratic Control” shaped by the fourth stage of Naing-ngan-taw Warda is, to some extent, active nowadays. If it does not become fully functioning, Myanmar CMR structure will remain still subjective. But one again brought the past’s the concept of collectiveness into the present. In other words, AFPFL’s collective leadership of armed forces in a subjective way to a collective control of armed forces, to some extent of democratic way, by following the development of Naing-ngan-taw Warda and political socialization.

Finally, this dissertation contributed, a new concept of Naing-ngan-taw Warda to Political Science, International Relations, and Sociology, a new model of civil-military relations that is suitable for transitional or hybrid-regimes to Military Sociology, by following the analysis on Myanmar’s case, and a new research, findings,

²⁹⁷ The seven-step “roadmap” to establish disciplined democracy announced by Gen. Khin Nyunt on August 30, 2003: (1) Reconvening of the National Convention that has been adjourned since 1996; (2) After the successful holding of the National Convention, step by step implementation of the process necessary for the emergence of a genuine and disciplined democratic system; (3) Drafting of a new constitution in accordance with basic principles and detailed basic principles laid down by the National Convention; (4) Adoption of the constitution through national referendum; (5) Holding of free and fair elections for Pyithu Hluttaws (Legislative bodies) according to the new constitution; (6) Convening of Hluttaws attended by Hluttaw members in accordance with the new constitution; (7) Building a modern, developed and democratic nation by the state leaders elected by the Hluttaw; and the government and other central organs formed by the Hluttaw. See Ardeth Maung Thawngmung and Maung Aung Myoe, “Myanmar in 2007: A Turning Point in the “Roadmap”?”, *Asian Survey* 48, no. 1 (2008): 13–19.

and perceptive of Myanmar modern history and politics related to the scope of my study.

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