@article{oai:iuj.repo.nii.ac.jp:00000515,
 author = {大湾, 秀雄 and 高橋, 新吾 and 都留, 康 and 上原, 克仁 and Owan, Hideo and Takahashi, Shingo and Tsuru, Tsuyoshi and Uehara, Katsuhito},
 journal = {Economics & Management Series},
 month = {Jun},
 note = {Using the personnel and transaction data from a large auto dealership in Japan, this　paper discusses the value, incentives, assignments, determinants of performance, and　learning of managers. We find that: (1) moving one standard deviation up the　distribution of manager fixed effects raises a branch's profit by 9.3%; (2) the relationship between managers' branch assignments and their performance is more　consistent with tournament theory rather than screening or learning mechanism; (3) better managers are systematically selected to run less profitable branches; and (4) managers with smaller age difference with subordinates and broader experience tend to perform better.},
 title = {Finding good managers: an econometric case study of a large Japanese auto dealership},
 year = {2014},
 yomi = {オワン, ヒデオ and タカハシ, シンゴ and ツル, ツヨシ and ウエハラ, カツヒト}
}