{"created":"2023-06-23T12:12:31.940301+00:00","id":548,"links":{},"metadata":{"_buckets":{"deposit":"25703013-c5e7-448e-b9fe-108022307be8"},"_deposit":{"created_by":14,"id":"548","owners":[14],"pid":{"revision_id":0,"type":"depid","value":"548"},"status":"published"},"_oai":{"id":"oai:iuj.repo.nii.ac.jp:00000548","sets":["2"]},"author_link":["748","299"],"item_10002_biblio_info_7":{"attribute_name":"書誌情報","attribute_value_mlt":[{"bibliographicIssueDates":{"bibliographicIssueDate":"2013-02-01","bibliographicIssueDateType":"Issued"},"bibliographic_titles":[{},{"bibliographic_title":"Politics & International Relations Series","bibliographic_titleLang":"en"}]}]},"item_10002_description_5":{"attribute_name":"抄録","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_description":"In parliamentary democracies, parties negotiate with each other to form a coalition, and the resulting portfolio allocation reflects their bargaining outcome over coalition payoffs. This study demonstrates that the share of portfolios given to the prime minister's party often reflects neither proportionality nor formateur advantage theories because portfolios are used to defuse tensions among coalition partners as well as to reward them for joining a coalition. The empirical work shows that the prime minister's party surrenders more portfolios not only as its bargaining power in assembling a coalition declines, but also as the policy preferences of coalition partners become more divergent because of the need to put together the coalition.","subitem_description_type":"Abstract"}]},"item_creator":{"attribute_name":"著者","attribute_type":"creator","attribute_value_mlt":[{"creatorNames":[{"creatorName":"尾野, 嘉邦"},{"creatorName":"オノ, ヨシクニ","creatorNameLang":"ja-Kana"}],"nameIdentifiers":[{"nameIdentifier":"748","nameIdentifierScheme":"WEKO"}]},{"creatorNames":[{"creatorName":"Ono, Yoshikuni","creatorNameLang":"en"}],"nameIdentifiers":[{"nameIdentifier":"299","nameIdentifierScheme":"WEKO"}]}]},"item_files":{"attribute_name":"ファイル情報","attribute_type":"file","attribute_value_mlt":[{"accessrole":"open_date","date":[{"dateType":"Available","dateValue":"2017-05-22"}],"displaytype":"detail","filename":"PIRS_2013_01.pdf","filesize":[{"value":"312.1 kB"}],"format":"application/pdf","licensetype":"license_note","mimetype":"application/pdf","url":{"label":"PIRS_2013_01","url":"https://iuj.repo.nii.ac.jp/record/548/files/PIRS_2013_01.pdf"},"version_id":"49f38d36-7e62-4ab3-88be-ac7b1b7fb4ea"}]},"item_keyword":{"attribute_name":"キーワード","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_subject":"parliamentary democracies","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"prime minister's party","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"coalition partners","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"coalition","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"party","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"parliamentary democracies","subitem_subject_language":"en","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"prime minister's party","subitem_subject_language":"en","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"coalition partners","subitem_subject_language":"en","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"coalition","subitem_subject_language":"en","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"party","subitem_subject_language":"en","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"}]},"item_language":{"attribute_name":"言語","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_language":"eng"}]},"item_resource_type":{"attribute_name":"資源タイプ","attribute_value_mlt":[{"resourcetype":"departmental bulletin paper","resourceuri":"http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501"}]},"item_title":"Coalition Payoffs in Parliamentary Democracies","item_titles":{"attribute_name":"タイトル","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_title":"Coalition Payoffs in Parliamentary Democracies"},{"subitem_title":"Coalition Payoffs in Parliamentary Democracies","subitem_title_language":"en"}]},"item_type_id":"10002","owner":"14","path":["2"],"pubdate":{"attribute_name":"公開日","attribute_value":"2013-02-01"},"publish_date":"2013-02-01","publish_status":"0","recid":"548","relation_version_is_last":true,"title":["Coalition Payoffs in Parliamentary Democracies"],"weko_creator_id":"14","weko_shared_id":-1},"updated":"2023-06-23T12:26:35.689289+00:00"}