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Regulated Medical Fee Schedule of the Japanese Health Care System
https://iuj.repo.nii.ac.jp/records/452
https://iuj.repo.nii.ac.jp/records/452a0180f86-186f-44c0-aa57-394b6bc17a2d
| 名前 / ファイル | ライセンス | アクション |
|---|---|---|
EMS_2011_13 (391.7 kB)
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| Item type | 紀要論文 / Departmental Bulletin Paper(1) | |||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 公開日 | 2011-12-01 | |||||
| タイトル | ||||||
| タイトル | Regulated Medical Fee Schedule of the Japanese Health Care System | |||||
| タイトル | ||||||
| タイトル | Regulated Medical Fee Schedule of the Japanese Health Care System | |||||
| 言語 | en | |||||
| 言語 | ||||||
| 言語 | eng | |||||
| キーワード | ||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | asymmetric information | |||||
| キーワード | ||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | budget caps | |||||
| キーワード | ||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | regulated medical fee schedule | |||||
| キーワード | ||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | Japanese health care system | |||||
| キーワード | ||||||
| 言語 | en | |||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | asymmetric information | |||||
| キーワード | ||||||
| 言語 | en | |||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | budget caps | |||||
| キーワード | ||||||
| 言語 | en | |||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | regulated medical fee schedule | |||||
| キーワード | ||||||
| 言語 | en | |||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | Japanese health care system | |||||
| 資源タイプ | ||||||
| 資源タイプ識別子 | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501 | |||||
| 資源タイプ | departmental bulletin paper | |||||
| 著者 |
柿中, 真
× 柿中, 真× 加藤, 竜太× Kakinaka, Makoto× Kato, Ryuta Ray |
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| 抄録 | ||||||
| 内容記述タイプ | Abstract | |||||
| 内容記述 | We present a theoretical framework for investigating the effect of the Japanese government-regulated medical fee schedule, `Shinryo-Houshu-Seido,' on the behavior of medical providers. We also discuss the optimal rule of this fee schedule for the regulator, taking into account information asymmetry between the regulator and providers. Our simple model predicts that under the current fee schedule heterogeneous providers either under-provide or over-provide medical inputs, depending on the price. Furthermore, our analytical results show that when the allocated budget is reduced to a certain level, even the second-best outcome becomes unachievable, no matter how the fee schedule is regulated. While we demonstrate that the global budget caps or the limited budget size is shown to have a clear negative effect on social welfare, we suggest that the prospect of obtaining the second-best outcome without complete information on heterogeneous providers is left to negotiation between the regulator and the budget allocator. | |||||
| 書誌情報 |
en : Economics & Management Series 発行日 2011-12-01 |
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