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  1. Economics & Management Series

On fundamental performance of a marketable permits system in a trader setting: Double auction vs. uniform price auction

https://iuj.repo.nii.ac.jp/records/471
https://iuj.repo.nii.ac.jp/records/471
38171a55-f1ff-46eb-bd6b-4e2007909cb8
名前 / ファイル ライセンス アクション
EMS_2012_08.pdf EMS_2012_08 (874.2 kB)
Item type 紀要論文 / Departmental Bulletin Paper(1)
公開日 2012-08-01
タイトル
タイトル On fundamental performance of a marketable permits system in a trader setting: Double auction vs. uniform price auction
タイトル
タイトル On fundamental performance of a marketable permits system in a trader setting: Double auction vs. uniform price auction
言語 en
言語
言語 eng
キーワード
主題Scheme Other
主題 Marketable permits
キーワード
主題Scheme Other
主題 economic experiments
キーワード
主題Scheme Other
主題 double auction
キーワード
主題Scheme Other
主題 uniform price auction
キーワード
主題Scheme Other
主題 trader settings
キーワード
言語 en
主題Scheme Other
主題 Marketable permits
キーワード
言語 en
主題Scheme Other
主題 economic experiments
キーワード
言語 en
主題Scheme Other
主題 double auction
キーワード
言語 en
主題Scheme Other
主題 uniform price auction
キーワード
言語 en
主題Scheme Other
主題 trader settings
資源タイプ
資源タイプ識別子 http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
資源タイプ departmental bulletin paper
著者 小谷, 浩示

× 小谷, 浩示

WEKO 29

小谷, 浩示

ja-Kana コタニ, コウジ

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田中, 健太

× 田中, 健太

WEKO 646

田中, 健太

ja-Kana タナカ, ケンタ

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馬奈木, 俊介

× 馬奈木, 俊介

WEKO 647

馬奈木, 俊介

ja-Kana マナギ, シュンスケ

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Kotani, Koji

× Kotani, Koji

WEKO 31

en Kotani, Koji

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Tanaka, Kenta

× Tanaka, Kenta

WEKO 325

en Tanaka, Kenta

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Managi, Shunsuke

× Managi, Shunsuke

WEKO 326

en Managi, Shunsuke

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抄録
内容記述タイプ Abstract
内容記述 The marketable permits systems have been widely suggested as a potential solution for environmental problems. A critical feature in the market is that an agent can be both sellers and buyers of permits, so-called "trader settings." Although properties of the marketable permits in non-trader settings are well-documented, little is known in a trader setting, particularly about how different auction mechanisms perform and how much each of them achieves efficiency. To answer the questions, we have designed and implemented two different auction mechanisms of trader settings for marketable permits in controlled laboratory experiments: (i) Double auction (DA), and (ii) Uniform price auction (UPA). To the best of our knowledge, this research is the first which designs and implements UPA for marketable permits in a trader setting, and makes a direct comparison with the performance of DA on the same ground. We obtain the following novel results: (1) UPA is more efficient than DA in a trader setting, which is in sharp contrast with the established result in non-trader settings, (2) UPA generates more stable price dynamics and (3) UPA induces subjects to reveal more truthfully about abatement costs for emissions through their trading behaviors. With these results, we conclude that UPA is more likely to work better than DA in a trader setting.
書誌情報 en : Economics & Management Series

発行日 2012-08-01
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