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Coalition Payoffs in Parliamentary Democracies
https://iuj.repo.nii.ac.jp/records/548
https://iuj.repo.nii.ac.jp/records/5480b41a699-3a3e-439a-92ed-a9d598164a7c
| 名前 / ファイル | ライセンス | アクション |
|---|---|---|
PIRS_2013_01 (312.1 kB)
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| Item type | 紀要論文 / Departmental Bulletin Paper(1) | |||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 公開日 | 2013-02-01 | |||||
| タイトル | ||||||
| タイトル | Coalition Payoffs in Parliamentary Democracies | |||||
| タイトル | ||||||
| タイトル | Coalition Payoffs in Parliamentary Democracies | |||||
| 言語 | en | |||||
| 言語 | ||||||
| 言語 | eng | |||||
| キーワード | ||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | parliamentary democracies | |||||
| キーワード | ||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | prime minister's party | |||||
| キーワード | ||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | coalition partners | |||||
| キーワード | ||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | coalition | |||||
| キーワード | ||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | party | |||||
| キーワード | ||||||
| 言語 | en | |||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | parliamentary democracies | |||||
| キーワード | ||||||
| 言語 | en | |||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | prime minister's party | |||||
| キーワード | ||||||
| 言語 | en | |||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | coalition partners | |||||
| キーワード | ||||||
| 言語 | en | |||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | coalition | |||||
| キーワード | ||||||
| 言語 | en | |||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | party | |||||
| 資源タイプ | ||||||
| 資源タイプ識別子 | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501 | |||||
| 資源タイプ | departmental bulletin paper | |||||
| 著者 |
尾野, 嘉邦
× 尾野, 嘉邦× Ono, Yoshikuni |
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| 抄録 | ||||||
| 内容記述タイプ | Abstract | |||||
| 内容記述 | In parliamentary democracies, parties negotiate with each other to form a coalition, and the resulting portfolio allocation reflects their bargaining outcome over coalition payoffs. This study demonstrates that the share of portfolios given to the prime minister's party often reflects neither proportionality nor formateur advantage theories because portfolios are used to defuse tensions among coalition partners as well as to reward them for joining a coalition. The empirical work shows that the prime minister's party surrenders more portfolios not only as its bargaining power in assembling a coalition declines, but also as the policy preferences of coalition partners become more divergent because of the need to put together the coalition. | |||||
| 書誌情報 |
en : Politics & International Relations Series 発行日 2013-02-01 |
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